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The virulent strain of nativist, anti-establishment, anti-corporatist and anti-immigrant sentiment is rocking the foundations of traditional party systems in all industrialized democracies. Its causes are many, but in broad terms it is safe to say they surfaced right after the 2008-09 economic collapse, an era that was characterized by intense polarization and confrontational approaches against governments, corporations and financial institutions which crossed party lines and traditional political cleavages. The sweeping changes brought about by globalized capital and corporate interests, and the blurring of national borders that accompanied them, have alienated big swathes of the population and given rise to new forms of strident populism everywhere.In the United States the main manifestation of this phenomenon is taking the form of a populist revolt, a singular form of class warfare inside the Republican Party, between the established party hierarchy and the Tea Party movement.As the next legislative election approaches, the internecine feud within the Republican Party continues to create challenges for its top candidates who must veer more right-wing to secure the nomination and then turn back to the center of American politics to win the general election. Before 2012, the GOP tried to co-opt the extreme right and used their rhetoric, but after the 2012 election losses, the party took uncertain steps to distance itself from the movement. Today, the movement rather than the establishment seems to be dictating the party line, so there is paralysis in Washington once again. The leadership will still have to govern and legislate on some central issues-increase the debt limit, fund the government, and renew the authorization charter of the Export-Import Bank, among other things, and in so doing, further alienate Tea Party voters. The Republican-dominated House will no doubt stay away from the avoidable taboos, such as considering immigration reform (for which the Senate already passed its own bill one year ago!) and in consequence, one more time unintentionally secure the Latino vote for the Democratic Party. They will continue blocking the minimum wage raise and the Fair Paycheck Act, thereby losing the minorities and women's vote. In this context, the 2016 presidential horizon looks brilliantly promising for Democrats and their two presidential hopefuls, Hillary Clinton and Elizabeth Warren.The defeat of Virginia Representative and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in the June 10th Republican primary for the seventh Congressional district is symptomatic of deep divisions not only within the Republican Partybut in the electorate at large. Eric Cantor, a Republican with impeccable conservative credentials who had been re-elected seven times and who was first in line for House Speaker,lost by ten solid points to a little known college professor who ran against him by portraying him as the pro-Wall Street, pro-K Street typical Washington insider, indifferent from Main Street needs and demands. This race is very significant for several reasons. For starters, the anti-Washington, anti "corporate welfare" and anti-Wall Street sentiment is widespread among independent voters and those GOP legislators that have been "pro-bailout, pro-Obama stimulus spending and pro-immigration," as articulated by Tea Party leaders, live in fear of being chastened by voters.That is why this week Republicans in Congress who were holding their breath, are exhaling with a sense of relief as Senator Thad Cochran wins the primary runoff against Tea Party challenger ChrisMcDaniels who ran on a promise to voters that he would add his voice to the fight against Obamacare and big government spending. It appears then that the anti-incumbent sentiment has not been strong enoughto become a sustained trend: so far, only two sitting representatives have not won re-nomination in the House and all 18 Senate races have been won by those holding the seats, including Lindsay Graham of South Carolina, who was a leader in favor of Immigration Reform in the Senate, but has been vocal in confronting Obama with his dismal record in foreign policy, from Benghazi to Syria to Ukraine, and now all the way back to Iraq. But even pollsters have been taken by surprise in most cases, whether as to the narrowness of results (such as the one is Mississippi, which required a runoff election) or to the unfathomable upsets (Cantor's represents a historical defeat: no Majority leader had been voted out in a primary election since the nineteenth century). There are many reasons why nobody saw this coming, first among them the constant problem of voter turnout, especially in primaries, followed by new strategies by candidates (David Bratt, the college professor that beat Cantor, did door -to -door canvassing, taking time to speak to prospective voters, and he beat a competitor who had outspent him 40 to 1) and by the strong commitment of a small group of activists that mobilized the grassroots against Cantor's pro-business stance. The outcome of these races is further complicated by the fact that many Democrats are taking part in open primaries, which makes them even more unpredictable. Democrats participated in both races, voting against the incumbent, Cantor, in Virginia (he was perceived as the main obstacle for bringing to the floor a vote on immigration bills that apparently would have had the votes to pass) and in favor of incumbent, veteranSenator Thad Cochran in Mississippi (he courted the African American vote, pointing out the amount of federal funds he had brought to the state in his 36 years as Senator, and they acquiesced, fearing Mc Daniels would be a worse choice for their interests in such a red state as Mississippi).These idiosyncratic variations and distortions should not distract us from the fact that the defeat of ultra-conservative House Majority leader from a white, affluent Richmond suburb is extremely significant and will have many ramifications in the near future. First and foremost, it has led to an immediate reshuffle of the party internal House leadership, as Cantorresigned his post as Majority leader. The first in line to fill his post, House whip Kevin McCarthy from California, used his insider skills to mobilize his contacts and call in his favors fast enough to pre-empt a challenge by a Tea Party congressman from Idaho, Raul Labrador, in a secret, internal party ballot. He has thus become Majority leader only eight years after he was first elected to Congress for California 23rd district. If re-elected in November, he will be first in line for House Speaker when Rep. Boehner gives up his post. This coveted position would have been Cantor's crowning achievement after a solid career of 14 years in Congress: he had hoped to become the first Jewish Speaker of the House.In spite of McCarthy's success in pre-empting challenges from outside the party leadership, the next one in line to move into McCarthy's whip position, deputy whip Peter Roskam from Illinois, lost the ballot to Tea Party challenger Steve Scalise from Louisiana, who mobilized the vote of Southern legislators and won, thereby establishing a presence for the movement inside the GOP hierarchy. Scalise, who was elected to Congress in 2008, has also risen rapidly through the ranks, as chairman of the ultra-conservative Republican Study Group and as a vocal advocate against big government.Party Whips in Congress are in charge of counting votes for and against legislation. They are enforcers, offering incentives and doling out punishments for votes among their caucus members. Their role becomes particularly important in close votes. The whip is also the main liaison between the party leadership and the rank and file.Primaries are proving to be much more dangerous for establishment Republicans than a prospective national election at the end of this year, in which they are poised to win both some Senate and House seats, mainly due to slow economic growth and low support for Obama, but more pointedly due to the opportunity created by the retirement of a significant number of long-serving senior legislators. Rather than the November election challenge against Democrats, primaries have become the main obstacle to surmount and the main focus of funding for incumbents and party establishment candidates. Memories of seats lost due to Tea party primary winners in the national 2010 and 2012 election still loom heavily in GOP minds. Karl Rove's words of advice to both the Tea Party activists and the GOP leadershipin February of 2010 still resonate in the halls of Congress:"If Tea party groups are to maximize their influence on policy, they must now begin the difficult task of disassociating themselves from cranks and conspiracy nuts. This includes 9/11 deniers, "birthers" who insist Barack Obama was not born in the U.S., and militia supporters espousing something vaguely close to armed rebellion.""The GOP is also better off if it foregoes any attempt to merge with the tea party movement. The GOP cannot possibly hope to control the dynamics of the highly decentralized galaxy of groups that make up the tea party movement. There will be troubling excesses and these will hurt Republicans if the party is formally associated with tea party groups" (Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18 2010).Because they are extremely vocal as well as media favorites (whether to disparage or to endorse them) and have made some undeniable inroads into the halls of power, the Tea Partiers have indeed made a splash in US politics, and they have re-shaped the agenda on issues of taxes and spending (with mixed success). But so far this term, 273 of 275 House incumbents and 18 out of 18 Senators have won re-nomination, even if in most House cases these contests were won by small margins. This is evidence that there is still somediscipline in party ranks, and newcomers are forced to follow the party leadership. For example in Kentucky, Sen. Rand Paul, largely recognized as the presidential candidate for Tea-Partiers and libertarians alike, did not campaign in favor of the Tea Party candidate who was running against Senate Minority leader Mitch McConnell, and gave the former only lukewarm support. Senator McConnell, a tough, seasoned veteran, was reported to have had a private, one-on-one, closed-doors conversation with Rand Paul before the primary campaign started…It then becomes clear that membership still has its privileges, and the Tea Partiers' disdain for insider politicking and the compromises required by politics in general won't take them very far. That is the stuff of politics, so now these political neophytes are getting into the fray, they will have to learn a few organizational lessons from the savvy insiders they are trying to replace. Nonetheless, one of the first comments made by Kevin McCarthy Fox News as he moved into Cantor's position was that "Yes, he would let the Export-Import Bank (reauthorization) to expire because it is something the private sector can do better". This represents a reversal from his 2012 position, and one that distances him from the business community and the party establishment, who want the Bank to remain. (Tea Partiers want to do away with the Ex-Im, the IRS and the Department of Education, among other institutions they find superfluous). In another interview, McCarthy asserted that the GOP had more to gain (politically) if it moved closer to libertarian ideas. So it has become apparent then, that the Tea Party as a movement and as a faction of the Republican Party is here to stay, at least for the near future. Its strength will depend on how they can accommodate their desires to the realities of governing the United States of America in the XXI century.María Fornella-Oehninger - Comparative Politics Professor, Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.

The short-lived popularity boost of the Osama bin Laden operation having all but faded, President Obama for the first time appears vulnerable and could be defeated in the 2012 election. Indeed, many are starting to wonder if he will be a one-term president like Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush. As congressional leaders continue to meet with Vice President Joe Biden to negotiate a reduction of the federal budget and to avoid a potential default on government debt, the economic recovery seems to be stalling: reports released last week show unemployment rose again to 9.1 % and job growth slowed down, and manufacturing and retail sales are also down from last quarter.The only good news for the President is that the Republican field of candidates, while still fluid, is very weak so far, and the Republican Party leadership divided and ineffective. Hefty potential candidates such as Jeb Bush (undoubtedly the strongest intellect in the GOP today) and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie have eschewed confronting the formidable President-candidate in 2012 and seem to be lying in wait for 2016, when they expect the field to be wide open.The first serious national presidential debate for the Republican candidacy took place on Monday, June 13. Mitt Romney, former governor of Massachusetts and the author of a health plan there which critics contend is very similar to Obama's, emerged as the solid front-runner and Michelle Bachman, an Evangelical Congresswoman from Minnesota and a Tea Party favorite, as the one who can challenge him. She is a former tax lawyer and a mother of five, who also apparently has found time to raise 23 foster kids. She is often compared to Sarah Palin, but most agree that she has more substance, understands how the government and can articulate ideas. She portrays herself as the anti-establishment figure, although she has been in Congress for a while and is at present the Chair of the House Intelligence Committee. Similarly to Palin, she considers the federal government an "elitist conspiracy" against middle-America and has invoked the War Powers Resolution to force Obama to request Congress authorization to continue operations in Libya. Tim Pawlenty, former governor of Minnesota, also an Evangelical with Tea Party following, was expected to be a serious challenger, but missed an opportunity to confront Romney on his health care plan for Massachusetts, which he had severely criticized the day before on national TV, stating it was very similar to Obama's, and going as far as calling Romney a "co-conspirator in Obama care." This lack of courage to confront the front-runner personally has made him a distant third in the primary race. Romney, on the other hand, was very well-prepared, confident in his own image of the businessman/CEO who can fix the jobs problem. The rest of the Republican candidates were a motley crew, starting with Herman Cain, an African-American businessman, owner of a pizza chain and talk show host, followed by Ron Paul, a radical libertarian that in spite of his quirky ways is quite endearing in his candid contempt for government, and Newt Gingrich, whose entire campaign staff had just resigned due to his lack of discipline and inability to run a serious campaign. All candidates focused more on bashing Obama than each other, since it is early in the race and there will be time enough for that this coming fall. Rick Santorum, another fiscal and social conservative (but in this case Catholic) and former Senator for Pennsylvania, completes the second-tier line-up of Republican candidates.But the Republican field has not firmed up yet, and there could be some surprise Republican candidates entering the race, as the President appears more vulnerable. In fact, only yesterday John Huntsman, a new intriguing figure who has been Obama's ambassador to China, joined the fray announcing his candidacy from Liberty Island, next to the Statue of Liberty, in the same spot where Ronald Reagan announced his in 1980. Huntsman, former governor of Utah, is a billionaire, a moderate and a Mormon, just like Romney. Both will skip Iowa, the first test for candidates, and one dominated by Evangelical "value" voters. Both are well-spoken, good looking family men with no rough edges. Unlike Romney, he has very little name recognition at the national level, and spent years as a missionary in China, where he learnt to speak Mandarin fluently. What he brings to the race is his expertise in that country, the main holder of American's debt, and therefore, the one that worries Americans the most. He has framed this primary contest as one between "renewal and decline". He speaks in a very quiet, civil tone and he introduced himself to the public through a stream of unusual videos, one for example that shows the candidate himself, in motocross attire from heads to toe, riding his motorbike across the Utah desert, as dreamy country music plays in the background. The White House is said to be concerned about his candidacy, not only because of moderation, his capacity and his presidential demeanor but also because he has been an insider of this administration and may use information thus acquired against the President. He could become a formidable opponent, a Republican mirror image of the President.Another prospective candidate, who, if he decides to run, could throw all calculations into disarray, is Rick Perry, the Governor of Texas. He is an attractive candidate for the party establishment and has two very strong qualities: first, he is a social conservative who could supersede Bachman and Pawlenty in drawing the Tea Party vote; second, he has been a successful governor who can boast about his job creation record in Texas (40% of all new jobs during the recovery were created in Texas). He is still testing the waters, and similarly to Huntsman, may perhaps use 2012 as a platform that can propel him into the 2016 election. Although he has not announced his candidacy, observers point to his convening of a "National Day of Prayer" for early August as a sign that he may run. He would be a formidable contester, since he can speak both the language of the Tea Party as well as the national language of this 2012 election, which is the economy and jobs.In comparing the Republican Party today with the one of ten years ago, one cannot help but notice the big shift that has occurred, and in doing so, perhaps be less dismissive of Ron Paul's philosophical influence on the party rank and file. The truth is the libertarian streak has made important inroads inside the party, and voters are now serious about not only fiscal conservatism and smaller government, but also a retrenchment of America's role in the world. This was apparent during last week's debate and the public conversations that followed in the airwaves throughout the week. Most of the candidates blasted Obama for intervening in Libya and called for an early withdrawal from Afghanistan. Michelle Bachman invoked the War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973 during Watergate, which obligates the President to seek the approval of Congress 60 days after the beginning of hostilities. The Republican Party has traditionally been the home of National Security "hawks", and the last strong isolationist mood in the party dates to the 1920s. While an isolationist wing emerged again right before Gen. Eisenhower became president, after that it was represented by a very small group, led in the last twenty years or so by Pat Buchanan. Today, a war-weary and budget- conscious American public is in favor of withdrawal from Afghanistan by a wide majority (73% of all Americans, 59% among Republicans), in spite of the fact that most had understood that to be a "war of necessity" as opposed to Iraq, a war of choice. If we count American military presence in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and the tribal areas of Pakistan, today the US is involved in five different conflicts, and spending billions of dollars a month on them, most of which are considered wars of choice. Today, President Obama is in fact a victim of his own success: bin Laden is dead, so Americans want out of Afghanistan. This is echoed loudly enough by his opponents. The President is thus under pressure to bring the troops home not only by libertarians but also by extreme Right candidates (Bachman) and even by mainstream candidates like Huntsman and Romney.After the debate, Republican Senators John Mc Cain and Lindsay Graham and Defense Secretary Gates took to the airwaves to admonish the candidates on this issue, accusing them of choosing politics over policy in matters of national security. Mc Cain went so far as to say that Reagan would not recognize his own party: "This is not the Republican Party of Ronald Reagan, who was always willing to stand up for freedom all over the world". He insisted that Khadafy was crumbling and that US logistical support, intelligence and refueling capabilities had to be continued to finish him off. He went even further and picked the opportunity to criticize Obama for not using America's own airpower, and instead "leading from behind". This was a theme that Bachman had also used in her speech, somewhat incoherently, since she vilified Obama for allowing the French to lead the operation in Libya while at the same time invoking the War Powers Resolution and demanding US withdrawal, since there were no apparent US interests involved there. Mc Cain in his own interview with Christiane Amanpour, later refuted Bachman's claim by stating that Khadafi had consistently supported terrorism, was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 and was about to massacre his own people at Benghazi when NATO intervened and stopped him. "Our interests are our values" and "Sometimes leadership entails sacrifice," he added.To Romney's equivocal reference to the "Afghanis (sic) war of Independence" (an expression that per se brings serious doubts to his basic knowledge of geopolitics) Senator Lindsay Graham also in his own interview, later retorted: "This is not a war of Afghan independence, from my point of view" (of course, it isn't, it's a civil war!). He continued: "This is the center of gravity against the war on terror, radical Islam. It is in our national security interest to make sure that the Taliban never come back". He warned them not to try to position themselves to "the Left" of President Obama on this issue" and he hinted that that decision would lose them the nomination.Among the wide array of opinions, only Tim Pawlenty heeded the party line that the advice of military commanders and the situation on the ground would be the main determinant of troop withdrawals under his watch. Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized the "declinists" who put the short term expediency politics ahead of long-term national security interests. He added that examining the bottom line only is short-sighted, since intervention is not about sheer cost, it is about the cost of failure of early withdrawals, such as Afghanistan in 1989. Earlier, on his last trip as defense secretary, Gates had bluntly told NATO members meeting in Brussels that the military weakness of most members and their lack of will to share risks and costs of NATO operations were putting severe strains on the organization and particularly on the United States. Indeed, less than a third of NATO members are taking part in the Libyan operation, although NATO is a consensus- based organization and therefore, all members voted to approve it.According Secretary Gates, the need to cut spending and radically reduce the budget has become an obsession and sparked a new current of isolationism that now insidiously divides the traditionally hawkish Republican Party. This, he told a Newsweek interviewer, is one of the main reasons that have led to his resignation, after serving two administrations and becoming the epitome of bipartisanship. His unwillingness to plan for more withdrawals and find other ways to reduce the bloated defense budget has been criticized both from the Left and the Right. He complains about how both "Congress budget hawks and defense hawks" constantly interfere with his work. He ends by saying he refuses to be part of a nation that is forced to scale back its military power so much that it can no longer lead. His frustration is apparent; his resignation paved the way for Obama's announcement of troop withdrawal, a few days later.This last week, the presidential politics of war became clearer. Feeling the pressure of Republicans attacking him from his "left flank", President Obama told a war-weary nation that he plans to start withdrawing troops by December this year, ending the surge by the summer of 2012 and bringing home most of the rest by 2014. Although there is a widespread sense that Obama has gotten so involved in the daily details of the war that would prefer to stay on and see his counterinsurgency policy through, he has quickly readjusted to the realities at home and accelerated the withdrawal timeline that his generals had recommended. With his earlier decisions of aggressively pursuing the war on terror, signing off on drone killing missions, and having bin Laden killed inside Pakistan, he successfully beat the image of a Dovish President, weak in National Security. This past Wednesday, with the words, "It is time to do nation-building at home", he acknowledged the public's concerns about the waste of American power, blood and treasure abroad while the country is still suffering from the recession, and quickly moved back to center.This is the spirit of the times. It requires a new type of leadership, one that is strong enough to face down enemies, yet flexible enough to accommodate to the new and constantly shifting realities, to accept a revised status of the nation and to lead it into new era in its history. Time will show whether such leader is among the Republicans new line-up or whether he is already in the White House.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Desde su inicio, la llamada crisis de los refugiados produjo situaciones dramáticas a diario en referencia al alto número de personas desplazadas, fallecidas y desaparecidas, situaciones de vulnerabilidad y riesgo y el rechazo de gobiernos y ciudadanos en las sociedades de destino. Las redes sociales en Internet, entre ellas Twitter, han funcionado como herramientas de comunicación digital donde transmitir, interactuar y compartir con el resto de los usuarios estos y otros sucesos gracias a su popularidad, inmediatez y actualidad. El objetivo general de esta tesis doctoral ha sido conocer los imaginarios, representaciones sociales y discursos que se plasman en Twitter sobre las personas refugiadas en el contexto de la crisis migratoria, identificar las narrativas dominantes, los contenidos que las acompañan, e identificar y caracterizar a los principales actores que han participado en el debate desde una perspectiva internacional al obtener los datos en diferentes idiomas. Se ha pretendido también conocer si los discursos se polarizan ideológicamente, en qué términos y quién o quiénes están detrás de cada extremo. Igualmente se han comparado los contenidos, los discursos y los actores presentes en una campaña específica en Twitter, el Día Mundial de los Refugiados de 2016, con los resultados obtenidos de los objetivos anteriores. Esta investigación se inició con fase de extracción de datos de Twitter durante un año completo (mediados de diciembre de 2015 a mediados de diciembre de 2016), en diferentes días y horas de la semana a través de la herramienta NodeXL y a partir de la cadena de búsqueda "refugiados" en diferentes idiomas: español ("refugiados"), inglés ("refugees"), alemán ("fluechtlinge"), francés ("réfugiés"), italiano ("rifugiati") y portugués ("refugiados"). La muestra está compuesta por un total de 1.807.901 tuits. Posteriormente se aplicaron diversas técnicas de procesamiento y filtrado de datos para trabajar con diferentes datasets en función del análisis a llevar a cabo. Estos han sido análisis de contenido, análisis de discurso y análisis de redes sociales, a partir de redes de retuits. Para el procesamiento y el análisis se han utilizado Spss, Excel, Atlas.ti, T-LAB y Gephi principalmente. Los resultados arrojan una serie de narrativas polarizadas que se relacionan con estrategias de humanización y deshumanización, así como con imaginarios y representaciones sociales. Por una parte, discursos de apoyo a las personas refugiadas, campañas de apoyo o pro-refugiados, valoraciones críticas respecto a las políticas europeas que se llevaron a cabo para abordar la crisis y diversos tipos de mensajes destinados a la sensibilización a favor de colectivos vulnerables, en los que entran en juego imaginarios sobre la moral y la inocencia y representaciones sociales de Occidente, de los y las niñas y las mujeres. Estas narrativas parten principalmente de organizaciones y movimientos sociales de apoyo a la población refugiada. Por otra parte, discursos negativos con componentes de incitación al odio y al racismo, posturas claramente anti-islam y que incluyen argumentaciones estereotipadas que apoyan un discurso del miedo hacia este grupo social. Estos discursos se valen de representaciones sociales de las personas refugiadas como sujetos meramente religiosos (en concreto musulmanes) a los que se presupone una práctica homogénea de manera radical y violenta, así como la representación de los refugiados como amenaza en un contexto de narrativas de securitización. Los discursos presentan un importante componente emocional manifestado a través de metáforas, indignación, catastrofismos o exageraciones que producen una sensación de descontrol y afianzan el miedo. Estos discursos se valen de medios de comunicación conservadores o de extrema derecha o fuentes acusadas de compartir noticas falsas y teorías de la conspiración para reformar los argumentos. Los actores detrás de estos discursos tienden a ser anónimos o con poca información que los caracterice, y algunas de sus cuentas en Twitter están actualmente suspendidas. Se ha encontrado una cierta diversidad en las narrativas en función de la lengua o el territorio desde el que provengan. Existen aspectos comunes compartidos entre los diferentes contextos, pero los discursos, imaginarios y representaciones sociales no son universales. Se finaliza con algunas reflexiones en torno a la necesaria respuesta desde la intervención social dirigida a la gestión de la diversidad y las políticas de integración para la población refugiada, y a la lucha contra las teorías de la conspiración, noticias falsas, desinformación y discursos de odio en las redes sociales. ; Since its origin, the so-called refugee crisis has produced daily dramatic and humanitarian situations according to the high number of displaced, dead, and missing people, vulnerability, and risks, not to say the rejection of refugees by some governments and citizens in several countries. Social networks on the Internet, including Twitter, have functioned as digital communication tools to transmit, interact and share these and other events with other users thanks to their popularity, immediacy, and timeliness. This doctoral thesis's general objective was to know the imaginaries, social representations, and discourses expressed on Twitter about refugees in the context of the migration crisis. Relevant objectives were also to identify the dominant narratives, messages accompanying them, and identifying and characterizing the main actors participating in the public debate on Twitter about refugees, from an international perspective. It also intended to know if the narratives were ideologically polarized to know who supported each group. Likewise, we wanted to compare the messages, discourses, and actors of a specific Twitter campaign -2016, World Refugee Day- with the results obtained from the previous objectives. This research started with a data mining phase from Twitter (mid December 2015 to mid-December 2016), an entire year, on different days and times of the week through the NodeXL tool. Data were recovered from the search string "refugees" in different languages: Spanish ("refugiados"), English ("refugees"), German ("fluechtlinge"), French ("réfugiés"), Italian ("rifugiati") and Portuguese ("refugiados"). The sample consists of a total of 1,807,901 tweets. Subsequently, various data processing and filtering techniques were applied to work with different datasets depending on the analysis to be done. These were content analysis, discourse analysis and social network analysis, based on networks of retweets. Spss, Excel, Atlas.ti, T-LAB and Gephi, especially, were used for these analyses. The results yield a series of polarized narratives related to humanization and dehumanization strategies, as well as social imaginaries and representations. On the one hand, we found different discourses of support for refugees or pro refugee campaigns. Also, critical assessments of the European policies addressing the crisis, and various types of messages aimed at raising awareness in favour of vulnerable groups emerged. Imaginaries about morality and innocence and social representations of the West, girls and women also came into play. Behind these narratives are mainly organizations and social movements supporting refugees. On the other hand, we found negative discourses that disseminate refugees' terrible image with incitement components to hatred and racism. There are also anti-Islamic positions that include stereotyped arguments that support a discourse of fear towards this social group. These discourses make use of social representations of refugees as purely religious subjects (specifically Muslims) who are assumed to have homogeneous radical and violent behaviours and the representation of refugees as a threat in a context of securitization narratives. The discourses show a critical emotional component manifested through metaphors, indignation, catastrophism, or exaggerations that produce a sense of out-of control and entrench fear. In both cases, the discourses use conservative or extreme right-wing social media to be disseminated, or sources accused of sharing false news and conspiracy theories to reshape the arguments. The actors behind these discourses tend to be anonymous on Twitter or expose little information about them. Many of them have suspended Twitter accounts. We found diversity in the narratives depending on the language or territory from which they originate. There are common aspects shared among the different contexts, but discourses, imaginaries and social representations were affected by the context, they are not always universal. We conclude with some reflections on the necessary response from a type of social intervention aimed at managing diversity and integration policies for the refugee population in a coordinated and effective manner, and, on the other hand, the fight against conspiracy theories, fake news, and disinformation, as well as hate speech on social networks.

Two weeks ago was the 40th anniversary of President Nixon's dramatic resignation. He did so against his own will, in order to avoid the certainty of impeachment as a result of the Watergate case. This event, together with the traumatic defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam that preceded it, resulted in a dramatic loss of trust in the Executive, followed by strong legislative action to limit its powers. It also revealed the growing partisan polarization that has characterized the politics of the following four decades.Today we may be living the climax of this polarization, as Congress is unable to pass badly-needed legislation on immigration, energy and infrastructure funding, to name a few. Indeed, not even the presence of 40,000 unaccompanied Central American children at the border is sufficiently dramatic to bring about some kind of consensual action. At the same time, President Obama is being sued by the House leadership for abuse of power, and the media are irresponsibly talking about possible impeachment, the ultimate use of legislative power against a democratically elected President.The transformative President has fulfilled or at the very least addressed most of the platform under which he was elected in 2008 and re-elected in 2012. Obstruction in Congress, his own bad foreign policy decisions and constant complaints from the left wing of his own party have resulted in low approval ratings (around 40%) by a frustrated public that has, for the most part, tuned out of politics. This will no doubt have consequences for the coming mid-term elections, when the majority of voters will stay home, giving an advantage to the militant extremes on both sides of the ideological spectrum.Gridlock in government is nothing new. In fact, the fathers of the Constitution preferred Congress to "muddle through" rather than being too pro-active. Incremental, slow change was preferable to sweeping reforms. Yet this 113th Congress, now in its long August recess before its return to a full-fledged electoral campaign in September, is probably unique in its paralysis. There are not only deep divisions between the two Houses, each dominated by one party, but also within the House of Representatives itself, where the GOP has a majority of seats but is so internally divided that it has had to withdraw many of its own leadership-introduced bills for lack of votes from its own party.This Do-Nothing-Congress that left town on August 1st for a five-week recess is the least productive in History: Congressional productivity is down from 151 in the previous 112th Congress to 142; the originally "Do-Nothing Congress" of 1947-48 passed 906 laws.Nothing seems to be sufficiently urgent or dramatic enough to bring the GOP legislators to a consensus, not even the unprecedented border crisis, where 40,000 unaccompanied migrant children from Central America are amassed in military bases and other government agencies at the southern border, awaiting due process. The House leadership was ready to pass a bill to provide a small part of the funding the President had requested to help him address the surge of newly arrived immigrants, but it did not have the votes. The Tea Party, on the other hand, opposed the funding and wanted to introduce its own bill to speedily deport the children and to rescind the President's authority to decide whether to deport or not certain undocumented immigrants from earlier waves of immigration.Late in the afternoon of their last day in the Capitol when all bags were packed and representatives were ready to leave, Speaker John Boehner announced he was ready to withdraw his bill since he didn't have the votes, and let the recess begin. But Tea Party favorites Steven King and Michele Bachman demanded a vote on both measures. Finally, at the eleventh hour, Boehner compromised: both bills were introduced and passed by a narrow vote. They are at this point insignificant, and very unlikely to become laws since the Senate will not consider them. But the point was made: the Tea Party's main goals is not solving any problems, but instead keepconstraining presidential powers to the point of total ineffective government. They are succeeding to a large extent, even if Obama has been quite deft at using his executive authority of implementation to break free from the imposed legislative shackles.Dysfunction in government is the new normalcy in the nation's capital. These bills were only a modest attempt to deal with the crisis of the day, but the acrimonious debate brought into relief a bigger systemic failure: the inability of Congress, since 2007, to pass a comprehensive overhaul of Immigration law. Once the Senate passed it last summer, it was expected that the House may come up with its own proposal, which would have been a series of smaller bills to solve the problem piecemeal, thereby satisfying different constituencies with a mixture of more border security, more workers' permits and other special visas, and the granting of legal status to the 11 million undocumented.Unlike the year 2007, when G.W. Bush had expressed support for Comprehensive Immigration Reform legislation but could not muster enough consensus, this time around (2013-2014) it was supposed to be different. For the first time the concept had widespread support from all the very powerful interest groups concerned: corporations, labor unions, the Christian Evangelical right and immigration advocates. But it was halted by the Tea Party in the House and no legislation was passed.It is this vacuum, among others, that the Executive has been trying to fill through administrative measures and executive decrees. The President used his prosecutorial discretion to solve some aspects of the enormously complex issue of dealing with 11 million undocumented immigrants, most of whom have lived and worked in the US for ten, twenty, or even thirty years. One example is the President's policy directive that provided temporary relief from deportation and study/work authorization to young people brought here illegally by their parents between certain dates, and under certain conditions (DACA). Lately, Obama has expressed some interest in extending DACA to the children's families, causing more Tea party outrage and increasing their attempts to stop him.To strike a balance and to give more legitimacy to his unilateral decision to solve that part of the problem, the President has applied to the letter the pre-existing immigration law to deport (other) immigrants through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency. He has deported more immigrants than any other president before him (360,000 in 2013 alone), earning him the sobriquet of "Deporter-in-chief" and the antipathy of immigrant advocate groups.During the latest crisis of children at the border, Speaker Boehner expressed his "frustration and his concern" with the situation, and quite cynically called on Obama to "take steps to secure the border and return the children to their home countries", adding that the President "didn't need Congressional action to do that". Given that the Speaker is suing the President (just a political gesture, since he has no legal standing to do so) for over-stepping his Constitutional powers, his hectoring makes even less sense. In any case, his frustration was misdirected: Obama had asked Congress to approve funding for this operation and a Republican bill was ready to be introduced, but the Speaker himself was struggling to get the Tea Party votes he needed to pass it. This sort of dysfunction is a weakness the Republican Party will need to address in order to succeed in future elections.The November mid-term election will be critical: according to the latest polls, Republicans have around an eighty per cent chance to win the six seats they would need for a majority in the Senate. With both Houses in Republican hands, the President will not only lose the minimum control he now has to shape the agenda but he will also find it very hard to keep in place the policies that he is already implementing.If we add to that the problematic challenges he is now faced with on several foreign policy fronts, none of which can be solved in the short term, a Republican win becomes almost certain, not only in 2014 but also perhaps in the 2016 presidential election. But in order to seal those wins, Republicans will need two fundamental elements they lack now: party unity and a positive agenda. Professor Maria Fornella-Oehninger, Old Dominion UniversityVirginia, U.S.A.

"Opportunities multiply as they are seized."Sun TzuOn the eve of the one hundredth day of his Presidency, Barack Obama received a wonderful gift: Senator Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, announced he was leaving the Republican Party to become a Democrat. This puts the number of Senate Republicans at 40, the lowest level in over 30 years, and gives the Democrats, at least on paper, the special majority of 60 votes needed for them to override a filibuster of legislation by the opposition. Besides the obvious advantages for Democrats, Specter's pivotal decision has other important implications, not only for Republicans but also for Democrats.First, it highlights the sad state of the Republican Party: Specter explained that he felt compelled to leave the party because he knew that, as a moderate, he could not win another Republican primary election. The Republican Party under G.W Bush employed the electoral tactic of consolidating the white, Southern, right -wing Christian base, rather than reaching out to the middle. This helped them win two presidential elections and gave credence to the claim that they were the "party of the permanent majority". That was only four years ago. But Bush's disastrous second term had the effect of alienating two major constituencies: the realist establishment in foreign policy who were dismayed by his stated goals of bringing democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fiscal conservatives who saw the federal budget surplus rapidly turn into deficit. The party then entered a downward spiral of contraction. It lost ground with centrist voters, at a time when the center of the political spectrum was expanding. It suffered from a leadership void that left it at times voiceless, while at other times it spoke in a cacophony of inchoate opinions. During these 100 days, no articulate Republican counter-case was made to Obama's proposals. The "big tent" party has become so narrow in its geographical and ideological base that it is as irrelevant today as the Whigs were in the 1850s.Second, Arlen Specter's switch is also significant in that it may have a moderating force on the Obama agenda, forcing him to accommodate it toward the center instead of pushing ahead at full steam. This could be a timely correction, since some fiscally conservative Democrats (so-called Blue Dog Democrats) are increasingly voicing their concern, not only about the frenetic pace of reforms but also about the ambitious scale of the spending: the request for $ 800 billion in the form of a fiscal stimulus will be followed by another $ 600 billion for health care and $ 500 billion for infrastructure. This will add two trillion dollars to the national debt, and would represent the biggest expansion in the role of the Federal Government since Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society program. According to Niall Ferguson, economic historian at Harvard, the federal debt which is now around a still-healthy 70% of GDP, will balloon to 180% of GDP, similar to Japan's. These are serious concerns that may come back to haunt the administration further down the line, if the economy does not pull ahead in a year or two.The first one hundred days is by most measures an inconclusive, artificial period of time in which to evaluate a President's success. In all likelihood the next one hundred days will be more determinative, once the legislative agenda moves forward. But we can still use this early stage as a barometer of public support and as a measure of how much Obama has worked to fulfill his campaign promises. In many ways, this period only writes the afterword of the 2008 presidential election. The President has been given an extended period of grace by the American people, in the understanding that he inherited the worst economic crisis since 1930. In the face of tumultuous times and unprecedented unease over the economy, he has maintained his calm and collected demeanor and continued to communicate, explain, and give hope. Thus he was able to avoid a flare- up of populist rage at the excesses of Wall Street, and focus with calm persistence on fixing the economic mess at home and the frayed international ties abroad. His ability to recognize US missteps and open up to the world reaching out to Iran and Cuba has already changed the entire tone of US foreign policy. This new moderation and sensitivity about how others perceive the United States was welcomed around the world and even has not borne fruit yet, it bodes well for future exchanges.The main criticism that has been raised is that the Obama team is embarking on too many different tasks and that this "frenzied flurry" of activity will not allow it to focus on solving the two main problems it faces: the economy and the fight against terrorism. Both are labor intensive and complicated and demand full-time attention and concentration. There is some value in these criticisms, but there are two main reasons why the White House has chosen this approach. First, the President has a vision that ties all his initiatives together, and he so far deserves praise for pursuing it without neglecting any of the major problems he faces. For Obama, fixing the economy alone is not feasible without changing the country's energy base, reforming its health care and education systems. His vision encompasses a technological, knowledge- based economy where the new jobs will be in the green energy sector and in bio-technology and robotics. To meet the job demands of these two revolutions in technology and energy, a third revolution will have to take place in the educational field, with a renewed stress on mathematics and science, as well as a restructuring of curriculums and developing inter-disciplinary skills for problem-solving. At the same time, these revolutions would also transform the international landscape in many ways, some predictable (the demise of oil-based economies would certainly solve a problem or two in the Middle East), others not so. But the United States is clearly at a crossroads in its history and must choose between continuity and demise, or change and a renewed claim to leadership in the XXI century.Second, blessed by a prolonged period of grace granted to them by the American people and the media, and with no opposition in the horizon, the administration has adopted this frenetic pace to make the most of this enlarged window of opportunity. Propelled forward by a vision but at the same time imbued of a healthy pragmatism, Obama has not kept every single promise to every constituency, and has preferred instead to pick his battles. For example, he did not re-open NAFTA in the realization that economic recovery will require free trade. Similarly, he has postponed a fight over making permanent a ban on the sale of assault weapons. He also gave up on pushing for a reduction of farm subsidies when it was clear that Congress Democrats would not yield on that issue. Instead, he has focused on a set of non-negotiable priorities, trying to do as much as he can and knowing that only a few will bear fruit in the long run. Obama is now at the peak of his power but has not lost sense of the ephemeral nature of politics, and he knows that the seeds of the downfall are often sowed at the highest point of power. A student of history, he is well aware that presidents inevitably become reactive, as unforeseen events beyond their control begin to shape their tenures and their place in history. If a year or two from now the economy has not recovered and promises made in the first hundred days remain unfulfilled, disillusionment will set in and his power will wane accordingly. His outsized expansion of the federal government would then be harshly criticized and cost him the support of moderates. His strong repudiation of all of Bush's national security policies, including the publishing of the torture memos, could also become a huge liability in the case of another major terrorist attack. Ultimately, the strongest moment for a president is also the riskiest, since there is a temptation to overreach. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Satisfied with some important progress being made in health care reform on the home front, these past few days President Obama turned his full attention to foreign policy. In a week packed with international speeches, bilateral meetings and joint declarations, he succeeded in establishing a new ambitious agenda for international cooperation and wasted no time in getting started. In his speech to the UN, he outlined his main foreign policy goals based on four pillars: non-proliferation, climate change, Middle East peace and economic stability. He spoke clearly about his determination to put an end to the international skepticism and distrust the United States faced during the Bush years and enumerated the changes already made: banning the use of torture, closing the Guantánamo base, drawing down forces in Iraq, renewing efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict by naming a special envoy, seriously addressing climate change and abandoning plans for a land-based missile defense in Eastern Europe. He challenged other leaders to respond in kind by joining US efforts at non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, taking measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combating poverty. A day later in Pittsburgh for the G-20 summit, the President, flanked by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Sarkozy, revealed a new nuclear facility built by Iran in the city of Qum and called for further sanctions on the Islamic Republic. This well-timed revelation is supposed to give the administration some more leverage when talks with the Iranians start later this week. As it happens, the US had known about this new uranium enriching plant for more than a year but had kept the information secret for later use. In Pittsburgh, with France and Britain safely on his side, the President had further opportunity to press the other two members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, to cooperate with the new sanctions regime that will most likely include imports of refined oil into Iran. While Russia appears to be leaning towards cooperation (perhaps as a quid pro quo of Obama's decision not to deploy the anti-missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic), it is not as yet clear whether the Chinese will too. This week has been a good one for China, which seems to be coming of age as an international player both in climate change and as a partner for economic stability in the G-20. But the revelation at Qum was certainly a pre-emptive coup that put the Iranians on the defensive, and gave Obama an opportunity to publicly test the other Permanent Members of the Security Council to prove their commitment to non-proliferation.As the United States moves aggressively to engage with the rest of the world and vows to renew its pledge to international law and institutions, the expectation is that others will take their share of responsibility and respond to global challenges. Obama's moral authority flows not only from what he says, and how he says it, but also by virtue of who he is: in his case, the man is the message and the intended drastic cut with his predecessor could not be more apparent. However, as Realists constantly remind us, foreign policy is about national interest defined as power, and while the change of tone and of emissary is well-noted, we are likely to see some change, but also a lot of continuity in US foreign policy. Barack Obama's first speech at the United Nations General Assembly was well-received around the world but had less impact on a home audience whose main concerns are unemployment, health care reform and economic recovery. Inevitably, the usual suspects accused him of treason for recognizing America's past mistakes in public and for socializing with tyrants. Others denounced his narcissistic impulses, for trying to portray American foreign policy as "all about Obama". While it is easy to dismiss the extreme critics, it is important for the rest of the world to realize how much the United Nations' legitimacy and prestige has suffered in the United States during the last ten years, and not only due to derisions by Bolton and Bush. TV images of the UN headquarters in New York seem distant and irrelevant to most Americans, who view the organization as an anachronistic shibboleth that embodies all fluff and no substance and whose activities are hard to take seriously in most cases, be it when it deals with Rwanda, Darfur or with Iranian sanctions. At this year's opening session, the General Assembly room, with a badly lit podium and a very unbecoming blue-greenish background, was showing its age in spite of a 2002 facelift (it was built in 1952). And while Obama was as dynamic and articulate as usual, his televised speech was followed by that of Mohammad Khadafy from Libya, which lasted one hour and a half and included bizarre statements and phrases that can only be accounted for by a serious onset of senility. Besides calling for a UN investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination, and surreally complaining about how far most of those present had had to travel to get to New York (was jetlag his excuse to explain away his own state of mental confusion?), he repeatedly called President Obama "my son" (I cringed at imagining the right wing blogs reaction to that) and referred to the UN Security Council as the "Terror Council". His difficulty to find a place in New York where he would be allowed to pitch his tent was followed with amusement by the media and further added to his own oddity, and by extension, to the inadequacy of the UN as a serious forum. While later Prime Minister Netanyahu's excellent, Churchill-like speech brought the audience back to the 21st century and restored some respectability to the venue, the UN lost credibility again when Iranian president Ahmadinejad went on a new rant later in the day and again and proceeded once more to deny the Holocaust's existence. In addition to this rarified atmosphere, the main foreign policy topic that is of concern for the American public, and the one that would have made them pay attention, namely, the war in Afghanistan was hardly mentioned by Obama in this occasion. After eight years of war in Afghanistan, the effort seems to be unraveling on all fronts. European NATO members, whose soldiers are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, are unwilling or unable to commit more troops; the Taliban has renewed its offensives with new intensity in the south and the east of the country, and the Afghan election was plagued with corruption, proving what many already suspected, that President Hamid Karzai is an extremely unreliable partner and a corrupt leader who will not be able to hold the country together. At the same time, Al Qaeda has found refuge in neighboring Pakistan so the US initial counterterrorist mission, namely to hunt down and exterminate Al Qaeda, has mutated into one of counterinsurgency against an indigenous group, the Taliban, fighting against the government and the foreign forces to regain its power. All this in a country that has never been a nation, a narco-state whose economic base is the production and trafficking of opium, and where several empires, from the Macedonians to the British and the Soviets were once defeated. The President's plan so far has been to train the Afghan army so that it can hold off the Taliban, support government institutions, gain the trust of villagers and create structures of governance in rural areas so that Al Qaeda won't be able to move in again. This week a Pentagon memo by General Crystal was leaked by Bob Woodward of Watergate fame. Published in the Washington Post on September 21st, it presents a grim picture of the war and warns that success is uncertain. It calls for new resources and a new counterinsurgency campaign. While the number of troops requested is not specified, it warns that "under-resourcing" the effort could be fatal. Woodward, never one to sell himself short, has called his leaked memo the equivalent of the 1971 Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in the New York Times, which revealed the expansion of the Vietnam War from 1965 on, that had been kept secret from the American public. Of course the memo is not the equivalent of Ellsberg and Russo's revelations, but still, it refocused attention on the intractability of this war. The President's response has been that after the Afghan election, the White House is re-assessing its strategy and that until he is satisfied with a new strategy he will not send more troops. It is clear that the administration is having doubts about a conflict it once called a war of necessity. Public opinion is also turning against what will soon be the longest war in American history, as casualties continue to increase and there is no end in sight. As the term "military surge" is being increasingly used to denote McCrystal's new demands, comparisons with the war in Iraq are inevitable. Similarly to the Iraq war, elections have represented a turning point. But the surge in Iraq began with the so-called Sunni awakening, when the Iraqis themselves decided they had had enough of the violence and organized against those that insisted on it (mainly outsiders, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq). Also, in Iraq's leader Al-Maliki, the US found a relatively reliable and legitimate partner, one who instigated the political class to resolve their differences by political means. Finally, Iraq had an economic base that could be restored to produce substantial national wealth, and a mostly urban, well-educated population with some institutional experience. In contrast, Afghanistan is a mainly rural country, a tribal society which repudiates any attempts at centralization and profoundly distrusts the government in Kabul more, in some cases, than the foreign troops. The central government is rotten and weak, Karzai an unreliable leader who stole the election and whose brother is the head of the drug mafia. Can more US troops make up for all these weaknesses?Obama is thus in a delicate situation: he can't be "at war" with his own generals (indeed, General McCrystal was appointed by Obama only in March, after he dismissed the previous general in charge). On the other hand, if he allows more troops to be deployed, there is danger that Afghanistan may become his Vietnam. He therefore needs to choose between continuing a counterinsurgency operation, training more Afghan forces, protecting the local populations, getting into their villages and gaining their trust, or withdrawing ground troops and focusing on counter-terrorism, using drones and other off-shore means and special forces to go after the terrorist bases. Vice-President Biden is advocating a middle ground strategy: leaving enough troops on the ground to prevent Al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, but redefining the mission as one of narrow counter-terrorism and move away from nation-building and a protracted counter-insurgency operation that would signify more US casualties and more discontent at home. After all, the main reason why the US went to Afghanistan was to confront and eliminate Al Qaeda, which has since then moved across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. As several domestic arrests have demonstrated this week, Al Qaeda threats are just as likely to come from Springfield Illinois, Queens New York or Dallas Texas as from abroad or from the virtual Al Qaeda organizing through the worldwide web. Recalibrating his approach to Afghanistan is thus imperative, and it must be done for the right reasons, regardless of personal gain or saving face.Obama has had a very successful September, but his ambitious agenda both at home and abroad faces many pitfalls ahead. A youthful president, brimming with self-confidence, with a huge electoral mandate and with the best team of experts in history, can still be thwarted by unsolvable problems, domestic and foreign enemies and by serendipity itself. As a student of history and a John F Kennedy admirer, Obama knows this, and he should measure his decisions and temper his ambitions accordingly. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Under immense pressure to bring some certainty into the markets, Barack Obama has moved quickly to announce his choice for main cabinet posts. His planned appointments, as well as his policy announcements, are a study in how to turn crisis into opportunity. A reader of history, with particular attention to the biographies of certain presidents, he has taken a page from Abraham Lincoln in naming a "team of rivals" or at least of big personalities with strong opinions, as his foreign policy lineup: Hillary Clinton will be Secretary of State and General James Jones, a retired Marine commander, his National Security Advisor, while Robert Gates, current Secretary of Defense under Bush, would stay on at least for the first year of the Obama administration. On the economic side, his choice for Treasure Secretary, arguably the most important post in this crisis is Timothy Geithner, New York Federal Reserve chairman, who has been working closely with both Federal Reserve President Ben Bernanke and Treasure Secretary Hank Paulson, and has been part of the decision-making on bank bailouts from the very beginning. This would give continuity to the policy choices already made and bring a stronger measure of certainty and coherence to the process. With the cooperation of George W. Bush, Obama has been shaping the policy-making process behind the scenes, but after calls for him to give some certainty to the markets and to fill the power vacuum of the interregnum period, he has come forward several times this week to reassure consumers and markets that he is ready to continue the federal government's unprecedented spending in order to stimulate the economy. His activist government agenda will be in many ways enabled by the crisis, for example in job creation and energy transformation: he can tie those two goals together by embarking on a New Deal-style of public works while at the same time renewing the energy base of the economy, thereby meeting environmental goals and severing the country's economically costly and politically unsustainable dependency on oil. He is also helped by the fact that bipartisanship is for now a necessity until the first critical period of this dire economic period is crossed. Just like FDR took advantage of the Great Depression to drive through his agenda of redistribution, so can Obama. Energy renewal, job creation, adequate health care, education, regulation and tax reform all are goals that had been neglected for too long but now there is an opportunity to turn them into part of the solution to economic recovery. At times when calls for government action are coming from all sides of the political spectrum, the opportunity to turn those calls into reform is enormous, and Obama is using his bully pulpit early to lead the country in that direction. He is now proposing the rapid approval of an economic stimulus deemed around the sum of 500 billion dollars in federal spending and tax cuts for the middle class. As the pieces of the Obama's cabinet puzzle start falling into place, most observers are surprised at the pragmatism that seems to be guiding his choices. Timothy Geithner is a centrist, a problem solver, a Wall Street outsider, who has worked in different position at the Department of Treasury since 1988, under three different presidents. During the Clinton administration he dealt with the Asian crisis and the Mexican bailout. A dedicated public servant, pro-regulation, young and non-ideological, he has a student-mentor relationship with Larry Summers, Treasure Secretary under Clinton and also a pragmatist, who will now become Obama's economic adviser. This choice as well as others points to a fact-based administration, which coincides with the vision laid out by Obama during the campaign, one that solves problems and is not ruled by ideology. Bob Rubin, a deficit "hawk" with a strong penchant for balanced budgets who was also Treasure Secretary under Clinton, is helping Obama put together the economic team, which so far has no progressive heavy weight economists like Joseph Stiglitz or James Galbraith, both of whom were Obama advisers during the campaign. Similarly, on the foreign policy front, Obama chose Hillary Clinton, in spite of their disagreements in foreign policy during the primary election campaign. And all signs point to his picking of General James Jones, a retired Marine general and former NATO commander, as his National Security Advisor. Jones is a Vietnam decorated veteran with strong cross-party appeal, who was asked twice by Condoleezza Rice to be her adviser at State (but he declined). Defense Secretary Bob Gates, another dedicated public servant, would be asked to stay on at Defense and negotiate the next stage of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is close to Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser for Bush 41 and Gerald Ford, who has criticized George W. Bush for both the decision to invade Iraq, which he called "a war of choice not of necessity", and the way he allowed it to be mishandled by Rumsfeld. To this eclectic team one must add Vice President Joe Biden, whose foreign policy experience was a main consideration when he was picked by Obama as his running mate. He will certainly be another strong voice at the foreign policy table. The main intention behind these choices seems to be that, once Obama succeeds in forming an effective team out of such strong and experienced personalities on the foreign policy front, he can more comfortably focus on the economy without distractions. These early decisions, whether confirmed, leaked out or strongly rumored, have Washington buzzing. Does the choice of experienced people detract from Obama's message of change? Not necessarily, since it is the President that will set the agenda and who will lay out the vision. Obama invites strong opinions from his aides, and likes to debate options. That is how he envisions the decision-making process, with his advisers as partners in governance, not as passive surrogates. But there are risks to this approach, the main one being how to mesh these big egos with different backgrounds and perspectives into a real team that can work together without undermining each of its individual members' missions. That is exactly what happened to Secretary of State Colin Powell under the Bush-Cheney White House: he did not have the full backing of the rest of the team, especially of the vice-president, so he became ineffective and he never recovered. Another rumor often heard around the capital this week, especially in the anti-Obama camp, is that, given his cabinet choices, Obama seems to be positioning himself to govern from the center of the political spectrum, thus "betraying his progressive agenda" and his left-wing supporters. This claim is incorrect for two main reasons. First, because it is blind to the fact that his so-called "progressive agenda" coincides with the center today. The ideological center has shifted, and "Progressive" is now mainstream. What was considered radical ten or twenty years ago is now what most of Americans want, namely: demands for corporate responsibility and universal health care, concerns about global warming and energy renewal, a foreign policy based on multilateral decision making, respect for human rights and international law. It is still a divided country, but the wide majority wants reform. Second, Obama's blueprint of massive public investment to rebuild infrastructure and schools, and to create "green" jobs, his new "New Deal", will be made possible by the crisis itself. Most experts agree that this is not a time to worry about budget deficits. There are new opportunities created by the crisis itself: the call for government action comes from all sides, so it is time to use the momentous circumstances to bring about the change that has been postponed for so long, and to do it in the service of job creation and sustainable growth. Just like President Roosevelt used the Great Depression to drive through his economic agenda of education and distribution, so Obama should make use of the moment and embark on major investments in a XXI century infrastructure, with a new electric grid, water and sewer system, a world class internet service and health care reform. The new stimulus package announced this week seems to be a first step in that direction. In the next few days the President-elect will announce his choices to head the Department of Commerce and Homeland Security. Bill Richardson, the Hispanic governor of New Mexico, and Jane Napolitano, governor of Arizona are the most likely candidates. Bill Richardson's nomination will be very important since it will not only appease Hispanics (over 67% of who voted for Obama) but also signify a pro-free trade stance by Obama that will assuage fears of Protectionism both in American and abroad. On her part, Jane Napolitano is someone with hands-on experience in Immigration, and her choice to head Homeland Security seems to signal that serious Immigration reform is also on the Executive's agenda. At only three weeks after his election, and at eight weeks before his inauguration, Barack Obama has been forced to use his bully pulpit to restore confidence and pledge continuity to commitments already made by the outgoing administration. He has shown his pragmatism by inviting the best-qualified and most experienced people into his cabinet to face the difficulties ahead, regardless of their ideology or ties to past administrations. His greatest challenge is to continue turning crisis into opportunity, using the unprecedented consensus on government spending to promote his transformational agenda. He must stick to his narrative of change and use his cabinet's experience to make that change happen. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

"If there was ever a doubt about just how American Mr. Obama is, Sunday's raid eliminates it better than any long-form birth certificate. This was his finest hour." Bret Stephens, the Wall Street Journal Late at night on Sunday May 1st President Obama announced to the nation that Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by a US Navy Special Operations team. The Navy SEAL team Six, as it is known here, landed two helicopters inside a walled three-story compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where years of painstakingly gathered intelligence had led authorities to believe there was a high chance the Al Qaeda leader may be hiding. This may well have been the largest, most successful intelligence operation in US history; the President acted boldly and decisively and for that he received accolades from both sides of the political divide. Coming as it did just a month after the President launched his re-election campaign, this victory immediately boosted his approval rate by eleven points, according to surveys.Even if the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda has not yet been accomplished, this was a huge milestone and the closing of a chapter that started ten years ago when the hunt for Osama Bin Laden was launched by the Bush administration. Last week's operation resulted in the largest trove of data ever found on Al Qaeda, including information on immediate threats being planned, location and structure of its leadership, and scores of data that will help piece together a deeper understanding of their long-term tactics, techniques and procedures.Disposing of such a reviled figure who, for over ten years had ordered the killing of innocent civilians around the world, is undoubtedly a great blow both symbolic and real, to Al Qaeda, a decentralized movement whose members are tied together mainly by feelings, emotions and mythology. But does it sound the death knell for the organization? What are its short and long term implications? Al Qaeda has proven to be quite resilient, but is it still spreading and growing? More importantly, how relevant is it in the face of the Arab Spring moving throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa?All these questions need to be pondered carefully, since they have deep implications for US foreign policy in the region, for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for its difficult and troubled relation with Pakistan. This unexpected win will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of US military presence in the area, its strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and its alliance with Pakistan.American reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death was one of noisy, overt celebration in New York and DC, and of relief and jubilation in the rest of the country. It was indeed the reverse of the deep shock, terror and bereavement of 9-11, but both instances had one common denominator: there was a sense of collective emotion, of a long-forgotten and now recovered national unity. However, this did not last long as incipient criticism and second-guessing started 24 hours later over Bin Laden's burial at sea and the decision by the administration not to show pictures of his death. It came from both sides of the ideological spectrum and, in some cases, it was bolstered by strong arguments. For example Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard Law professor, considered the burial at sea a "willful destruction of evidence that may arise suspicions that there was something to hide." Others used the occasion to stir up doubts and demanded pictures to certify Bin Laden's death, but then again, these are not to be taken seriously sine they were the same groups that had to be shown a long version of the President's birth certificate as evidence he was American. A second criticism coming mainly from some Neo-conservatives, was the administration's failure to recognize publicly that the intelligence gathering that led to the finding and killing of Bin Laden was a vindication of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: water boarding) used by the Bush administration in foreign detention centers and at Guantánamo, which Obama had consistently and very publicly condemned during the 2008 campaign and into his years in office.To the first, members of the administration responded that the point was to dispose of his body in a respectful manner, not because he deserved it but to deny a source of friction with other Muslims and to deprive his followers with a shrine and an opportunity to exploit him as an iconic martyr. A similar argument was used to explain the decision not to release the pictures: the President wants to avoid ostentatious displays of triumphalism that may come back to haunt him. His sobriety and restraint further reinforce the boldness of his decision and his steadfast determination to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda and not be distracted from his goal by premature claims of "mission accomplished".To the second claim, the White House responded that the success of the operation is far from a vindication of such unconstitutional techniques, since it was the result of the hard work of professionals over time and across two administrations, who integrated thousands of small pieces of intelligence gathering coming from human and technological sources into one gigantic puzzle, and that no one single piece led the US to Bin Laden. It took all the resources only the US can muster, from military bases to networks of human intelligence, to electronic eavesdropping, to specially trained forces, to locate and kill one hidden individual in a foreign country, and then match his DNA in an aircraft carrier before disposing of the corpse. But it also took a courageous American president to make such a risky call, namely, authorizing a covert operation deep into Pakistani territory based on circumstantial evidence at best, and without alerting the Pakistani authorities about it. Fortunately, wide recognition was given to the President's courage and many on the Right called it "Obama's Finest Hour". Both former President Bush and his prickly vice-president Cheney congratulated Obama and gave him full credit.A more productive conversation that has already started in academic and diplomatic circles is how relevant Bin Laden's death is for the Arab world. If he had died eight years ago, says one French scholar, he would have instantaneously become a martyr in the Arab street, an icon of anti-Western sentiment. However, in 2011, he had receded into the back of the consciousness of young Arabs for several reasons. First, because he had been in hiding for so long that his presence in the media had been noticeably diminished: out of sight, out of mind. Time spent out of the limelight erases mystiques and cools down emotions. Secondly because many saw him as the culprit for bringing the United States into Iraq and Afghanistan, which in turn gave an excuse for authoritarian regimes in the region to become even more repressive and extend their time in power. In Iraq, local Sunnis blame Al Qaeda for bringing the Shiites to power and expanding the influence of Iran in their country. Also, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had increasingly lost the allegiance of many Muslims around the world for their indiscriminate bombings of hospitals, mosques and shrines and the killings of non-combatant Muslims in Baghdad, Basra and Amman (even if many were Shiite, the slaughter of innocent women and children caused revulsion in these populations).More importantly, the wave of pluralistic revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa has rendered Al Qaeda irrelevant. There is an emerging sense of strong national identities, whereby the masses are thinking of themselves first as Egyptians, Tunisians or Libyans, with ethnicity and religion taking a secondary role. Indeed, Nasser's Pan-Arabism died the 1960sm, and the dream of a Caliphate "extending Islamic rule from Indonesia to Spain", which Bin Laden proposed as Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is no longer an interesting proposition to the extremely young populations of the region, many of whom have access to the new social media in the Internet, and who crave freedom and modernity more than anything else. The "Arab Spring" may spell the end of Al Qaeda's political aspirations for the region: the Turkish model of a secular, modern state with an overwhelmingly Islamic population and a pluralistic party system is far more appealing than the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Prophet's era. In the words of Professor Fouad Ajami, "It is risky to say, but Arabs appear to have wearied of violence…It was Bin Laden's deserved fate to be struck down when an entirely different Arab world was struggling to be born."Time and treasure spent in a ten-year war have also changed perspectives in America, especially for the younger generations. There is an on-going unofficial revision of the Bush doctrine of invading whole countries "that harbor, train or fund terrorists" in favor of narrower, more focused actions against the terrorists themselves. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken their toll on the American military as far as recruitment and resources. The main concern of voters is the American economy, especially unemployment and the ever-expanding national debt. A hundred and forty thousand American and NATO troops are involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, with no endgame in sight. Killings of Americans by despondent Afghan soldiers and other groups whose "hearts and minds" the US is supposed to win, occupy the headlines daily. Counter-terrorism increasingly seems to be a much more appealing and productive strategy. Expressing this widely-held sentiment, Senator Kerry recently declared: "There is no possible victory to be had in Afghanistan".Even though President Obama called it a war of necessity and has invested deeply in it, this is no longer a popular war: two-thirds of the American electorate is against it. Therefore, there will be pressure on President Obama to accelerate the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complete it before the set deadline of 2014. He is a rational decision-maker who does not easily cave under pressure, but the 2012 election is likely to enter into his calculations. As a champion of counter-terrorism and opposing counter-insurgency from early on, Vice-president Biden might still be vindicated in his wisdom. When Obama opted for the surge in Afghanistan two years ago, he overruled Biden and sided with the military. Will he change his mind and speed up the withdrawal now? The killing of Bin Laden certainly gives him an opening to change his initial timetable. "Al Qaeda is no longer there, and the Taliban must be beaten by Afghans themselves", says Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations.Finally, the fact that Pakistan has proved to be an unreliable partner in the war against terrorism is also putting pressure on the President to review his Afghan policy. The alliance is frayed; Pakistan is giving sanctuary to violent militants of all sorts, and another high Al Qaeda operative now in American custody, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was also found in Pakistan (Rawalpindi). Indeed, by the rationale of the Bush doctrine, the US should be invading Pakistan next. The White House says they have no evidence that there was any "foreknowledge" by the Pakistani leadership that Bin Laden was holed up in a one-million-dollar compound, in a military town, only 30 miles away from Islamabad. Pakistan will conduct its "own investigation" and will have to prove itself a worthy ally, for example, by sharing information gleaned from Bin Laden's three wives and several children now held under Pakistani custody. On the other hand, veteran security experts retort, more terrorists have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities since 2001 than anywhere else in the world. In this case, was it incompetence or complicity? Pakistan is a very complex country, where the military are an autonomous force above civilian rule, and they also control the Intelligence Services (ISI). It is a house divided against itself. It harbors numerous militant groups, and goes after some but not others. It hedges its bets this way so as not to lose influence and power in the region, for example by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani networks fighting to seize power in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization against India in Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign and national security policy is built around its obsession with India, its most vilified enemy and against which it has fought several wars. It is clear now that ISI gave sophisticated support to the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2009. Pakistan needs a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can maintain its "strategic depth" vis à vis India. Armed with over a hundred nuclear weapons and with some control over this wide array of militant groups, Pakistan is pivotal in the stability of South Asia. Those are the two main reasons why the US-Pakistani relationship survived after the Cold War ended. Because of the weakness and corruption of civilian governments, past and present, the US has preferred to engage with the military, who control the nuclear arsenal, and has made them the recipient of most US aid (indeed, by the end of this year alone the Pakistani military will have received $3 billion from the US). But this may be about to change if Pakistan rejects the US request to be in charge of the internal investigation on whether Bin Laden was given sanctuary, and if so, by whom.Now that its main leader has been killed, and in spite of its virtual irrelevance, Al Qaeda is likely to undergo an internal struggle to determine its future. The mystique of its international role has already somewhat dissipated and the different groups in the network are shifting their focus to their national agendas. Indeed, this has already been the case in Egypt, where after days of ominous silence on the Tahrir Square Revolution, Al Qaeda's second in command, Egyptian-born Al-Zwahiri injected himself in the process by supporting the leader of an Islamist party that wants post-Mubarak Egypt to adopt Sharia law. But his attempt did not resonate with the young revolutionaries, most of which want a pluralistic society and are much more concerned with jobs and government accountability than with religious utopia. However, revolutions are just the beginning of a long process, transition periods are by definition unstable, and post-revolutionary regimes have historically been highjacked by extremists. So one can only be cautiously optimistic about what will come next, but it appears as if the Middle East and the Arab world are moving on and beginning to spell the end of Al Qaeda's aspirations. Bin Laden's demise is the appropriate end of this chapter in the region's history.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

¨The actions taken by the Armed Forces are not a mere overthrow of a government but rather the final closing of a historical cycle and the opening of a new one in which respect for human rights is not only borne out by the rule of law and of international declarations, but is also the result of our profound and Christian belief in the preeminent dignity of man as a fundamental value.¨ (…) ¨It will be the objectives of the Armed Forces to restore the validity of the values of Christian morality, of national tradition and of the dignity to be an Argentinean; (…) a final solution to subversion in order to firmly found a reorganized Argentina on the values of Western and Christian civilization by eradicating, once and for all, the vices which afflict the nation. This immense task will require trust and sacrifice but has only one beneficiary the Argentinean people¨ (1). With these words the military junta addressed the Argentines after taking over the government through a coup d'état the 24th of March 1976. Already in this first official communication it is possible to find the strong messianic discourse where the armed forces were fulfilling their holy mission to protect the Christian-national identity of the country.For the first time in the history of Argentina catholic-nationalism, as a nationalist ideology, had an absolute control of the State and was backed by the entrepreneurship and by important sectors of the middle class.(2) The military junta, leaded by Jorge Rafael Videla, was the perfect embodiment of a permanent alliance between religion and fatherland. The armed forces were compelled, being the institution that gave birth to the nation, to fulfill a decisive role in the "holy mission" to morally regenerate the country. This would have allowed Argentina, and therefore all of the Western-Christian civilization, to not just vanquish communism but, also, all of its roots like liberalism, democracy and agnosticism. The military, alongside the Argentinean Catholic Church and its supporters, were convinced that the final battle of the "third world war" was taking place in Argentina. Generals Ramon Camps and Menéndez would even call the "Argentinean theater of operations" as third world war, where they thought the international subversive movements were playing a pivotal role (3). This extremely eschatological feeling was completely different from other similar Cold War scenarios in other developing countries. In Argentina the "final showdown against international communism" syndrome was exacerbated by this alliance between the sword and the cross that would fight communism in order to make a "healthy" society possible, which would lead the way to the regeneration of the "atheist infected" western world. This expectation was the pillar of messianic spirit that justified the extermination plan.But the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (National Reorganization Process), as the military junta denominated the period that begun with the coup d'état, was more than an extermination plan; it aimed at a total "restoration" of society. The speech given by Lieutenant Jorge Eduardo Goleri at a book burning gathering in Córdoba in April 1976 clearly shows what the Junta was aiming for: "God's will requires that the military preserves the natural order manifest in the Western and Christian civilization to which Argentina is integral, but the East had organized a massive international conspiracy to subvert that civilization by restructuring society in accordance with the seditious and atheistic doctrine of communism. We are facing the imminent doom of our way of being Christian under the assault of subversion"(4).The Junta regarded itself as the creative agent of historical destiny(5). In their eschatological mindset they were analogous to the Messiah. They saw themselves as the mythological/biblical Hero that defended the most sacred/holy interests and appeared when a series of afflictions required his abilities of salvation. The Hero needed a nemesis in order to act and what better foe than international communism. But the latter was constructed in a Manichean, epical and apocalyptical manner. The myth of the Hero was opposite to the myth of a "Metaphysical Enemy". The former would engage in a Mythological/Holy War against an invisible but encompassing "Evil". Violent acts from left-wing guerrilla groups, which the Junta labeled as terrorism, perfectly ascribed that ontological description. Communism, with its terrorist offspring, was foreign, atheist and ideological. The military, then, had to combat it not just in the streets or countryside; but in the people's minds, and souls, as well. Guerrilla fighters were just the armed side; the roots of communism, meaning of terrorism and anti-Catholicism, were to be found in individuals that had ideas contrary to the Juntas' weltanschauung. They were ideas that opposed the catholic foundations of the nation and the society that it embodied.The Junta's adversary was an essentially ideological foe as General Videla stated to a British journalist: "A terrorist (read communist or atheist) is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas which are contrary to Western and Christian civilization" and he continued, "…Subversion is all action that seeks the alteration or the destruction of the people's moral criteria and form of life, with the end of seizing power and imposing a new form based upon a different scale of values"(6). The guerrilla was not the most dangerous enemy; because in military terms it was already defeated before the Junta took power. The nemeses were communism, liberalism and democracy, ideologies that advocated an "Anti-Christian Revolution" that subverted the catholic foundations of the country(7). Accordingly, the subversive was guilty of the most serious crime against the Augustinian concept of "Common Good". In this latter sense, the battle against that invisible, but spiritual, Evil was a conflict inside each one of us. Like Massera said: "…the Third World War is not only fought in battlefields but, more importantly, in the believer's soul" (8). This Holy War mobilized the Junta as a "warrior-savior", as a modern crusader fighting for God and freedom from foreign atheist ideologies. This, in part, self-perceived holy mission strengthened the Junta's self-image as Christ's vicar, as crusading defender of Christianity and its Natural Order from the "pagan agents and antinational beings of the Antichrist"(9). Not surprisingly, the military profession was defined by Monsignor Bonamín as a profession of religiosity. Consequently, it is no wander that before the armed forces toppled Isabel Peron's government, they asked for the Catholic Church benediction the night before the coup(10). The Argentinean Catholic Church was as deeply as it could possibly be involved in this crusade. The Crusade's sanctification by the ChurchAfter Videla and Massera were blessed by the heads of the Argentinean Episcopate the night before the coup, Parana's Archbishop and military Bishop Adolfo Tortolo announced that the Catholic Church would positively cooperate with the new government (11). The Church was actively supporting and legitimizing the imminent armed forces' putsch. This probably did not surprise the future Junta's leaders. In December 1975, just three months before the coup d'état, Tortolo had called for the military to inaugurate a "purification process" and his subordinate Bonamín had stated, during the mass in front of future Junta leader General Viola, that Christ wanted the armed forces to be beyond their function in the future (12). The vicars of Christ on Earth were actually telling the military what were their Lord's orders. This symbiosis between the sword and the cross continued even after the first accusations of human rights violations against the Junta. On October 1976, Tortolo declared that he did not know of any evidence that proved that human rights were being violated or abused. In 1977 he went even further by affirming that the Church thought that the armed forces were acting accordingly to the special demands of the present juncture; meaning that the military was fulfilling its duty (13). The same with Bonamín's declarations regarding the role of the armed forces: "…it was written, it was in God's plan that Argentina did not have to lose its greatness and it was saved by its natural custodian: the army"; "…Providence has given the army the duty to govern, from the Presidency to the intervention in a trade union"; and finally "…the anti-guerrilla fight is a battle for the Republic of Argentina, for its integrity, but also for its altars (…) This fight is a fight in morality's defense, of men's dignity, ultimately a fight in God's defense (…) That is why I ask for the divine protection in this dirty war to which we are committed to." (14)The vast majority of the Argentinean Catholic Church favored and strongly supported the military junta's government and repression. Only four of the eighty-four clerical members of the Argentinean Episcopate publicly denounced the regime's repression (15). However, the Church was not just backing the Junta because it legitimized its sacred duty to defend the fatherland or because it identified itself in the Junta's messianic mission; but because Church also had to deal with its own internal enemies. The Argentinean Catholic Church was, perhaps, the most conservative Latin-American national Church. It was strongly in disagreement with the three most important progressive movements inside the Catholic Church: the Second Vatican Council, the Third World Priesthood Movement and the Latin-American Episcopal Council of Medellin. The Theological Liberation Movement that spread through Latin America during the 60s and 70s was extremely popular among young Argentineans. Several priests identified themselves with the Movement and tried to bring change to the Argentinean Church through their communal and pastoral actions among poor sectors. Additionally, several Montoneros' members were former catholic school's students that had radicalized, in part, because of their experience with the Theological Liberation Movement. The Catholic Church, then, supported, or did not protest too much against, the "internal cleansing" done by the military; like the killing of Father Mujica, Angelleli and four Palotines clerics among other cases (16).Lastly, the Catholic Church was involved in a much sinister way with the Junta's actions. The heads of the Argentinean Church knew about the repressive methods being used by the security and armed forces and chose not to condemn them. They considered them as necessary sacrifices for the Common Good. Nevertheless, several clerics went further by assisting and taking an active part in the implementation of torture and other repressive mechanisms used by the Junta. More than two hundred prelates participated in four different ways: offering confession/absolution to the victims before being executed or thrown into the sea; assisting the torturers by playing the "good cop" role; being themselves the torturers; and, by confessing and spiritually assisting the torturers and other victimizers (17). The priest Christian von Wernich is, maybe, one of the best examples of the fusion between the cross and the sword. Not only he assisted the torturers in their tasks, he even was involved in the kidnapping and torture of several desaparecidos and in the infiltration of exiled groups in New York (18). He, among others like Archbishop Plaza, Fathers Astigueta, Castillo and Perlanda López that also assisted torture sessions, justified the repressive methods, not considering them sins, by legitimizing their, and the military, behavior under the Augustinian and De Vitorian doctrines of "just war". The support of the Catholic Church for the fight against subversion and its blessing was a pivotal element in the implementation of the plan of extermination and its suppressive mechanisms. The repressive methods, chosen by the Junta, were not void themselves of a messianic and divine nature. Divine and Redemptory Violence The three main types of violent acts that reflected the Junta's Messianic crusade, which were an integral part of their repressive methods, were: torture, thevictim's throwing into the sea and the appropriation of the victims' children by families deemed proper by the military. These violent means, chosen by the perpetrators to perpetually annihilate the ideas that were subverting the Argentinean Catholic traditions, were constructed under the discourse of "love" in two different ways: firstly, the kind of love upheld by Thomas Aquinas where the authority could legitimately kill evil-doers when the formers were motivated by charity. The crusading Junta envisaged that the repressive methods it used had a transcendental value. That type of violence was constructive rather than destructive, insofar as it was able to eradicate evil in order to create good (19). Love was considered the reason for an act of violence, for a punishment that redeemed the sinner, disregarding whether the latter survived the penitence. General Ramón Camps, commenting of how the detention centers perfected the victims through torture, said: "It is love that prioritizes and legitimates the actions of soldiers. The use of force to put an end to violence does not imply hate since it is nothing other than the difficult search for the restoration of love. In the war we are fighting, love of social body that we want to protect is what comes first in all of our actions" (20). Massera and Videla also referred to the dictatorship's repression as an "act of love" or "work that began with love"(21). All these statements reflected how the just war's discourse of Christian charity was in their minds by giving love a pivotal place.Secondly, there was another, and more complex, kind of love in the Junta's Christian-inspired crusade, which contrasted with the former metaphysical type and appeared exclusively in the torture tables of the detention centers, and should be labeled as sexual love. The torture sessions were filled of sexual symbolisms and discourse. The eroticism present in the torments was the exteriorization of the torturer's sexual -religiously repressed- desires into the body -the sexual surrogate totem- of the tortured. Consequently, the act of torture symbolized the act of sex(22). Like Jacobo Timerman perfectly put it, the Junta's violence was the emotional and erotic expression of a militarized nation (23).An expression orchestrated by the use of the picana. The latter was the preferred torture instrument used by the torturers for many reasons. Historically, it was first used by the nationalists during Uriburu's dictatorship and it was extremely effective in administering the desired amount of pain. However, symbolically, thepicana represented, better than other torments, the rawest manifestation of the Junta's conception of power related to "love's twofold sense". Considering torture as a Christian act of love, the picana was the necessary instrument to get a confession from the torturer that would eventually get him redemption. But thepicana had to fill a "void space". According to the perpetrators the victims were atheists (then they were not Argentines), which meant that in order to get any kind of absolution they had to, somehow, recognize and accept the Word of Christ. The Word would fill the empty victims; but first the picana would have to fill them with the will to "repent" and "convert". Once the tortured had received several electric shocks, they would receive and recite the Word by being ordered by the torturers to deliver Catholic prayers (24). Through these confessions the Junta's self perceived role of being the vicars of Christ on Earth was realized every time. They had defeated the atheist enemy but, employing Christian charity, they also had won the battle for the subversives' souls. Redemption was offered to anyone, even the irrecoverable cases. Even if their bodies were deprived of life their souls were saved. One of the ways that the ones not redeemed during confession were granted spiritual salvation was by the purifying power of water. By throwing them into the sea alive they were bestowing them a new, or first, "baptism" (25). It was the perpetrators' holy mission to redeem the victims' souls in life or in death. The picana, when considering torture as a sexual act, was also a phallic symbol. The torturer would make use of the picana-phallus to inflict pain and, at the same time, through the victim's screams and spasms satisfy his own repressed sexual desires. The perpetrator would systematically use the picana-phallus in the erogenous parts of the body. The body of the tortured would then transform into the sexual object of the repressor's desires. A sinful object that had to be purified with repent or conversion but only after the torturer's sexual desire had been satisfied (26). Symbols of divine violence can be found in other examples of torture sessions during the Junta's dictatorship. The torturers would yell at the captives, and would also made them say, "Viva Cristo Rey" and would make them thank God for another day by make them recite prayers before sleep. The picana was sometimes referred as "giving holy communion" as well as water-boarding was named "baptism". Among the many names that the torture chambers were given by the perpetrators there were: "the confessionary" and "the altar" (27). The latter clearly reflects the idea of sacrifice embedded in the repressors' minds. Regarding the victims' religious creeds the torturers would make a distinction between the recoverable and irrecoverable cases. Among the former ones there would be victims that had a catholic background because they had gone to catholic schools or because they knew how to recite prayers (28). Nevertheless, being catholic was not synonym of survival. The irrecoverable Catholics would only have their souls saved, but not their lives. Amid the desaparecidos there were an important proportion of Jews. About 1% of the Argentine population was of Jewish origin, but 20% of desaparecidos shared the same religious background (29). The Junta believed in an international communist conspiracy that, like the Nazis before, was leaded by the Jewry. Being Jewish meant being a Bolshevik. Additionally, the Junta's Messianic trope further propelled the kidnapping and execution of the community that, according to them, was responsible for Christ's crucifixion (30). Lastly, the appropriation of the desaparecidos children by the military was, perhaps, the most sinister of the Messianic-inspired repressive acts done by the military., The kidnapped pregnant women that gave birth in captivity, after being tortured regardless of their condition, were deprived of their children. The newborns were appropriated by families that would rise according to Catholic tradition. Motivated by Christian charity and its doctrine, these children would avoid the atheism, Judaism or wrongly conceived Catholicism that their parents would have offered them. These newborns were, according to the Junta, truly "innocent" and deserved to have the chance to live a proper life in genuine catholic families. Concluding RemarksThe Messianic ideology during the dictatorship was present not only in the Junta's ideology, but also in its discourse and repressive methods. Even if not everything that happened during the military regime can be explained through the catholic-nationalist ideology, the latter provides the essential motivation for the government. It is difficult to imagine that the magnitude, and chosen methods, of the repression would have been the same without the Messianic trope. By comparing the level of Argentinean repression to other military regimes of the Southern Cone in the same period, the distinction is remarkable. Not only the repressive mechanisms used by the Argentinean dictatorship were distinct, and more sadist and cruel, than the Chilean, Uruguayan and Brazilian cases, but the amount of Argentina's desaparecidos dwarfs those cases.Additionally, the Argentinean Catholic Church was the only one to completely back the regime and its repressive methods. In Chile, for example, the heads of the Church were divided in supporting Pinochet. Ultimately, the majority of the Church would condemn the Chilean regime. Regarding the political leadership, there are no religious discourses that serve as justification for the regimes in the other Southern Cone's dictatorships. The military juntas of those countries never legitimized their governments or their respective coup d'états in God's will or the salvation of Christian-Western civilization. National security and the fear of communism were their justification. Even if the regimes were ideologically justified, these were never of a religious nature like in the Argentinean case. It is probably the catholic-nationalist ideology, matured in the 30s, augmented by the international communist conspiracy typical of the Cold War that prompted the Junta in Argentina to completely wipeout what they perceived as atheist and foreign elements in society. Without a Messianic military that was ready to fight a crusade in order to restore order to the nation and without the blessing and active support from the Church, the repression would not have had the size and the horror that it had. The armed forces were fighting what they thought was the last crusade of the 20th century against the atheist forces of communism. The "Third World War" was already happening to them. Winning it was more than strategic, it was a holy mission. (1) Excerpts from a radio announcement made by the Junta after taking control of the State. Cited in Loveman, David and Davies, M. Thomas; The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America; University of Nebraska Press; Lincoln; 1978; pp. 177. (2) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003. (3) See Clarin, June the 26th 1976. Cited in Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 93. (4) Cited in Frontalini, Daniel and Caiati, Maria C.; El mito de la guerra sucia; CELS; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 90. Note how the East is viewed as the geopolitical source of "evil" similar to the Nazis' fear of the East. (5) See Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 120.(6) See CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 342. (7) See Castro Castillo, Marcial; Fuerzas armadas: Ética y represión; Nuevo Orden; Buenos Aires; 1979; pp.120. (8) Massera, Emilio; El país que queremos; FEPA; Buenos Aires; 1981; pp. 44. This concept of an internal and spiritual struggle is common to all religious fanatic ideologies. For example the original significance of Jihad was that of the soul's struggle against temptation. The concept would later evolve to holy war. (9) As subversives were defined by Ramon Agosti. Cited in Verbitsky, Horacio; La última batalla de la tercera guerra mundial; Legasa; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp.16. (10) La Nación, March the 25th 1976; cited in Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; pp.25. (11) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; pp.25. Additionally, Tortolo was Videla's private confessor. (12) Ibid; pp. 25(13) Ibid; pp. 26-28. (14) Ibid; pp. 30-31. (15) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 99 (16) Ibid; pp. 97(17) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; and CONADEP;Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 342-360. (18) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986pp.179-188. (19) Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp.152(20) See Camps, Ramón; Caso Timerman: punto final; Tribuna Abierta; Buenos Aires; 1982; pp. 21. (21) CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 348. Additionaly, it is interesting to notice how Carl Schimitt's political theology theory is translated into the Junta's discourse. In this sense, the Junta's actions would be a Schimittian case of politics not being able to be dettached from religion. This, in turn, would contradict several secularization theories. See, Schimitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignity, Chicago Univertisty Press, Chica, 2006.(22) Interestingly, Saint Augustine described copulation in such a dreadful way that it seemed like an act of torture. See Foucault, Michel; Historia de la Sexualidad: Vol. 1, La voluntada del saber; Siglo XXI; Buenos Aires; 2008; pp. 37. (23) See Timerman Jacobo; Preso sin nombre, celda sin número; De la Flor; Buenos Aires; 2002; pp. 17. (24) See CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 347-360; and Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 166. (25) It is rather interesting to note that throwing victims alive into the sea or rivers was a common killing method used by other strongly catholic Messianic inspired authoritarian regimes or groups. The falangistas would throw communists, anarchists and socialists (and whoever they thought was not catholic enough) to the rivers during the Spanish Civil War. The Algerian French and later the OAS would throw FLN suspects to the Mediterranean during the Algerian War of Independence. Even in Argentina, during the 1930s, the nationalists were talking about pushing the communists into the sea. A more detailed research should be conducted on this issue. Probably the Spanish Inquisition's torture methods, involving boiled water or a pool where the suspected heretics would drown, clearly influenced all of these cases into using natural sources of water to purify their sacred lands from the nonbelievers. (26) For more on torture as a sexual act and the picana as phallus see Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 158-190. (27) CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 26-50. (28) Many tortured victims remember how the torturers were clearly surprised to see the formers wearing crosses after making them take out their clothes. In some of these cases the torturers would say to the victims that their life would be saved because they were Christians but had lost their way and it would be the repressors' task to show them the right path. (29) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 115. (30) During the trial of torturer known as Jorge "El Tigre" Acosta a witness remembered him saying, after killing a captive while torturing him, that he was happy that he had died because he was going to be freed but he did not want a Jew to walk freely in Argentina; all Jews were guilty because they had killed Christ. See Diario Perfil; "Juicio al Tigre Acosta por el asesinato de Hugo Tarnopolsky"; May the 12th 2007. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

From the pages of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte by Marx and understanding the political and social events in France between 1848 and 1852, several interpretations have been made, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, regarding the role played by the lower middle class in moments of crisis. Particularly, after the advent of fascism in 20th century Europe, many voices have risen to signal the XVIII Brumaire as Marx's call of attention on the dangers set by the lower middle class's counterrevolutionary and reactionary spirit. Even more, some think of the XVIII Brumaire, and Marx's take on Bonapartism as the first, and extremely prophetic, definition and description of a modern fascist regime. The purposes of this essay are to: first, define and describe the lower middle class and its social and political consequences according to Marx; and, second, to explore how the lower middle class has been analyzed by a selection of Marxist and non-Marxist authors as a crucial sociological and historical problem. The latter has been taken to the extent of even comparing the political phenomenon of Bonapartism to Fascism and the lower middle class historical relationship in both of them. Bonapartism and Fascism are very distinct types of political regimes, even if they share some similarities. Nevertheless, it would be ahistorical to describe Louis Bonaparte's regime as fascist. Even so, Marx's typically coined reactionary or counter-revolutionary role played by the lower middle class in both cases was similar. (1)Several designations have been used to differentiate the lower middle class from the higher middle class or big bourgeoisie: petite bourgeoisie, Kleinburgertumand, the unpleasant, lumpen-bourgeoisie. It is impossible to assign fixed meanings in distinct times and places to those concepts. What they mean, and enfold, in different historical moments is determined by historically concrete political, social and economic structures and conditions. A social lower middle stratum was economically, but not so much politically, active during the preindustrial era. Its internal structure, predominantly formed by independent peasants, corporate-guild artisans and shopkeepers, and the nature of its relationship to the rest of society was particularly different from the economically, socially and more politically active, lower middle class of primarily dependent clerks, independent peasants, technicians, professionals and small shop owners of capitalist society (2). From Marx to the present there have been few attempts to define the lower middle class because the main issue was not the Kleinburgertum's own historical, social and political particularities; but, the fact that the petite bourgeoisie conformed a "classes class". In Marxist terms, the lower middle class was a class in but not foritself. This meant that the petty bourgeoisie was dependent on its own fate but not on its own existence. The lower middle class was torn, and it still may be today, between two possible outcomes: proletarianization or embourgeoisement (3). In the first one, the petite bourgeoisie is condemned to being proletarianized. In fact, during the early industrialization period of England the small artisans and some specialized technicians were dissolved or forced into the industrial working class (4). In the second scenario, they would integrate with the big bourgeoisie finally accomplishing a long social aspiration. It would, certainly, diminish the fears and concerns of being proletarianized and, lastly and possibly, would allow clerks and professionals to be the frontrunners of a classless postindustrial society (5). Accordingly, as Marx said in the XVIII Brumaire, the lower middle class should be viewed as a transitional class whose members would finally end up being part of the proletarians or the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the lower middle class has had a pivotal role in certain historically crucial events: revolutions and counterrevolutions. Marx attributed no apparent class-consciousness to the petite bourgeoisie, except in times of severe crisis. The lower middle class, following Marx, lacked its own class-consciousness because it was afraid to become proletarian and aspired to attain the bourgeoisie's style of living and class standing in society even though it also despised the big bourgeoisie's productive means and way of life. Marx, in a prophetic Freudian style analysis, would ascribe this apparent contradiction to the lower middle class own self-hate. Nevertheless, lacking its own class-consciousness did not mean that the petite bourgeoisie was not capable of generating its own separate culture, life-style and Weltanschauung. The problem was that it engendered its own ethos in direct opposition to the proletarian and bourgeoisie ones; affecting, then, its own cultural authenticity. All this said, the lower middle class may not have been self-conscious but it certainly was self-aware. It had distinctive class awareness (6). The interest of Karl Marx in the lower middle class was provoked by the role the author gave to it during the events that unfolded in France between February 1848 and December 1852, particularly the role played by the petite bourgeoisie in the ascendance to power of Louis Bonaparte in the coup d'état of December 1852. First of all, it is imperative to define how Marx understood the social composition of the lower middle class in mid-nineteen century France. Small independent peasants, clerks and small artisans and shopkeepers were Marx's main petty bourgeoisie members. All of them were part of this classless class because they lacked the property of the main means of capitalist production, that in mid-nineteen century France Marx attributed to the industrial, large-retail and financial sectors; and, because they were not even proletarians either because they were small owners (particularly small peasants and shopkeepers) or because their work did not constitute an intensive manual waged labor (artisans and specially State's clerks). Marx did not see in them any economic conditions of existence, under which they lived, that could separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of other classes. Given this situation, the small peasants, clerks and shopkeepers were not in any hostile opposition (as a clearly defined class with its own interests, culture and mode of life) to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Marx did not witness any sense of class-consciousness in them. He only viewed a local interconnection among small peasants, shopkeepers and clerks; but there was no sense of identification of interests between all of them that could beget unity and political organization. But even if they did not conform a class on itself, they were aware of their own uncertain socio-economic circumstances: at any given moment the big bourgeoisie, either by the action of retail competition or that of bank executions of failed mortgage payments, could toss them into the proletarian class. This socio-economic fear of becoming part of a propertyless class put them in direct opposition with the working class and drove them into the arms of the big bourgeoisie in moments of severe political crisis. Only here did Marx perceive the existence of class-consciousness in the petty bourgeoisie. In the XVIII Brumaire Marx distinguishes three moments where the lower middle class acted as a class in itself: in the February Revolution of 1848 when they rebelled, alongside sectors of the big bourgeoisie and the proletarians, against the Orleanist monarchy; in June 1848 when they actively collaborated with the big bourgeoisie in crushing the proletarian rebellion; and finally, in December 1852 when they endorsed Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état against the bourgeoisie republic. In the first episode, Marx observes a revolutionary role embedded in the lower middle class. He recognizes a class-consciousness in them; a strive to enact political and social change in the wellbeing of their own interests. In June 1848, Marx assigns them a counter-revolutionary role. They react out of fear and misguided by the bourgeoisie. They are afraid that a proletarian revolution would forever kill their socio-economic aspiration to become part of the bourgeoisie. According to Marx they are right to be fearful. A proletarian revolution would lead to a dictatorship of the proletariat and to the end of all classes. Alas, their desire of a bourgeoisie life-style as a "heaven on earth" would be tromped. A classless society would take away from them what distinguished them from the proletariat and what would, eventually, provided them upwards-social mobility: small private property and better paid and socially-respected professional labor. It has to be added that Marx also makes the bourgeoisie responsible for the lower middle class actions in the June rebellion. The former convinced the latter not to support and even to fight the proletarians by guaranteeing them access to better social standing, better financial and trade benefits and inclusion into the higher middle class. These were all false promises, which lack of satisfaction led to the events of December 1852. The lower middle class, betrayed by the bourgeoisie and immersed in deeply economic despair (which they made the big bourgeoisie responsible for) decided to fully endorse Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état. Again, and maybe more than ever if Marx's argument is to be followed, the lower middle class acted as a fully conscious class and had a counter-revolutionary and, even more, a reactionary role against the French bourgeoisie republic. Why did the lower middle class support Bonapartism? According to Marx, Napoleon III was the only one that could represent the petty bourgeoisie's interests. They did not have any sense of class-consciousness, which meant that they were unable to express their interests in a collective way. Meaning, that they were, like Marx says, incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name through a parliament or any other democratic convention or institution. The lower middle class needed, and were also longing for, a paternalistic, authoritarian and charismatic figure that would represent their interest and implement policies accordingly. Louis Bonaparte mirrored everything the lower middle class was pursuing: the protection of their interests by identifying them with France's interests; the understanding of France as an economically based petite bourgeoisie country in opposition to big bourgeoisie enterprises (banks and big retails companies); and, the conversion of the lower middle class's aspiration forgrandeur through the Second French Empire's expansionist foreign policy (7).Bonapartism protected them from the rapacious big bourgeoisie, assured their vital place in society as France's economic engine protecting small private property from socialist distribution of wealth drives coming from the working class and satisfied their sumptuousness desires by establishing a lower middle class based Empire as Europe's major power. Marx's perceptions and warnings on the lower middle class counter-revolutionary and reactionary roles in periods of political and economic crisis has been regarded, by Marxist and non-Marxist authors alike, as an indication for future revolutionary moments and as a prophetic alert on future authoritarian regimes like fascism. Lenin himself defined the petite bourgeoisie as a "half-class" or "quasi-workers" or "quasi-bourgeois" class that would be more difficult to eradicate than the big bourgeoisie and that would be politically unreliable (8). The lower middle class unpredictable behavior and dislike for radical policies could produce a reactionary backlash that could only be prevented by a rapid proletarization of all society. Nevertheless, even if Lenin was afraid of the possibility of an authoritarian government led by Kornilov and backed by the petty bourgeoisie (9); he later acknowledged, particularly by implementing the New Economic Policy, the lower middle class economic importance and envisaged them as a transitory class towards a proletarian society (10). Lastly, several authors have taken the XVIII Brumaire in order to compare Bonapartisim to fascism, even affirming that Napoleon's III rule was the first fascist regime in history, or to seek the social origins of both kinds of regimes in the lower middle classes. Jacob Schapiro not only sees the origins of 20th century fascism in 19th century Bonapartist France, he even defines Bonapartism as a type of fascism based on Marx's description of the regime in the XVIII Brumaire (11). Jost Dulffer analyses such comparison and, even if similarities are found, completely rejects its. He actually trends the historical origins of such comparisons to Trotsky's and August Thalheimer's writings on Nazism during the 1920s and 30s (12). Finally, Seymour Martin Lipset popularized the notion that fascism, just like Bonapartism, was an expression of the lower middle class resentments. According to Lipset, fascism was politically transformed rage of independent artisans, shopkeepers, small peasants and clerks that found themselves squeezed between better organized industrial workers and big businessmen and were "missing the boat" within the rapid social and economic changes of modern society (13). However, Ian Kershaw, Robert Paxton and Thomas Childers empirically confirm that fascism was not only a lower middle class phenomenon and that without the acquiesce of the conservative elites and sectors of the big bourgeoisie it would never had have come to power (14). Even if the comparisons between Bonapartism and fascism are historically pointless it is worth noticing, like Arno Meyer did, that Karl Marx was the first one to tackle the problem of the lower middle class lack of class-consciousness (15). Marx is correct in pointing out the lower middle class's awareness of itself and its dysfunctional and contradictory relationship vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Even more so, Marx accurately identifies the social, political and historical role of the petty bourgeoisie: to gain consciousness in moments of crisis and pivotally function either as a revolutionary actor, alongside the bourgeoisie and the working class, or as a counter-revolutionary one, against the proletariat, or as reactionary one against the big bourgeoisie. This is, maybe, Marx's most important and timeless legacy from The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.(1) Crossick, Geoffrey and Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1780-1914, Rutledge, New York, 1998, pp. 16-38.(2) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. (3) See Thompson, Edward, The Making of the English Working Class, Random House, New York, 1963.(4) See Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Basic Books, New York, 1999. (5) See Giddens, Anthony, The Class Structure of Advanced Societies, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989.(6) See, Zeldin, Theodore, The Political System of Napoleon III, Macmillan, London, 1958.(7) Lenin, V. I., "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics, University of the Pacific Press, San Francisco, 2001, pp. 9-52. (8) Fitzpatrick, Sheila, The Russian Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 60.(9) Ibid, pp. 93-149.(10) Schapiro, Jacob S., Liberalism and the Challenge to Fascism, McGraw Hill, New York, 1949, pp. 308-31.(11) Dulffer, Jost, "Bonapartism, Fascism and National Socialism", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 109-128.(12) Lipset Seymour M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 127-182.(13) See, Childers, Thomas, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote",Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 11, No.4, 1976, pp. 17-42; Kershaw, Ian,"The Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; and, Paxton, Robert, The Anatomy of Fascism, Random House, New York, 2004.(14) Mayer, Arno J., "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, No.3, Sep. 1975, pp. 409-436. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

1- Introducción En un breve artículo ciertamente premonitorio, William Schneider (1994) identificaba las características de la nueva cultura política que, condicionada y a su vez potenciada por las nuevas tecnologías de la información, estaba cambiando la relación histórica entre partidos, líderes y electores. Schneider avanzaba tres características principales de este nuevo acontecer político (Schneider, 1994: 779), a saber: el pragmatismo entendido como la dilución de las ideologías; el personalismo con la emergencia de la figura del candidato por sobre la del partido; y por último el populismo como un movimiento claramente anti-elitista y anti-establishment. En el mundo post guerra fría, la demanda acentuada de participación popular y de control del demos sobre los procesos de decisión y las herméticas elites gubernamentales, obligaría al sistema político a rever las estrategias de comunicación, facilitar la inclusión de las masas y mejorar los procesos de rendición de cuentas. Esto conduciría a une mejora del sistema político y del funcionamiento democrático de las instituciones2. Sin embargo, escasos son los cambios que las principales democracias del mundo han introducido en sus instituciones para mejorar el proceso de inclusión democrática, como así lo atestan el mantenimiento de sistemas electorales a menudo arcaicos y la renuencia de las élites políticas a la utilización de mecanismos de democracia directa. Donde sí ha existido una modificación orientada a complacer a la ciudadanía es, como bien menciona Schneider, en el discurso y en la estrategia política. Cortejar a las masas e incluirlas en un proyecto común (del cual excluiremos a las élites) ha progresivamente reemplazado el debate ideológico. El discurso político se transforma entonces en una técnica de movilización del pueblo en contra de una comunidad política desarticulada y debilitada cuyas instituciones flaquean en sus componentes organizativo y representativo (Badie, 1997: 227). Es en este ámbito de quebranto de los valores de la democracia representativa donde la crisis de la representación y "la faillite du politique" cobran amplio sentido y donde el populismo se inscribe entonces como un proceso subversivo de los canales tradicionales de movilización política, creando nuevas lealtades (apolíticas o anti políticas) culturales, nacionales, comunitarias, étnicas, etc., en reemplazo de las anticuadas construcciones sociales (élites, establishment, clase política, etc.). Pero si el populismo se define antes que nada en oposición al sistema político, no es en sí ni una teoría política ni un programa económico alternativo (Touraine, 1997: 242), y es por eso que podemos argumentar que el populismo se inscribe más en la práctica discursiva que en el dominio de lo normativo. Pero, a fin de cuentas, ¿qué es el populismo? Todo y nada se ha escrito sobre este fenómeno que apasiona y confunde tanto por su complejidad (e inconsistencia) teórica, su variabilidad histórica y la ambigüedad moral que este fenómeno histórico, político e ideológico ha generado entre críticos y defensores. El estudio del populismo ha sido objeto de enfoques disciplinarios que, en lugar de integrar el fenómeno en un contexto general, han contribuido a su compartimentación (Holmes, 1990: 27). Así, los historiadores se han focalizado en los aspectos descriptivos del fenómeno, los politólogos han intentado construir definiciones operativas del concepto, los sociólogos se han centrado en aplicar las teorías de la movilización para explicar la construcción de los movimientos populistas, y los enfoques marxistas, por ejemplo, han aportado clarificaciones sobre la relación entre el populismo y el desarrollo del sistema capitalista moderno. Ernesto Laclau, uno de los más fecundos pensadores sobre la cuestión, ha propuesto que el sustento del populismo reside en la oposición semiótica entre una entidad denominada Pueblo y otra denominada Poder (Laclau, 1977: 167) y que es la propia vaguedad de estas construcciones discursivas la que avala la permanencia y resistencia de este fenómeno. El populismo se articularía y construiría a partir de dos premisas centrales. La primera es una dependencia epistemológica de lo negativo, del enemigo; el populismo, como movimiento con un débil componente ideológico y normativo, se construye preferentemente sobre la crítica más que sobre la propuesta. Es en la identificación del enemigo donde el populismo gana la mitad de la batalla. La segundad premisa, igualmente negativa, es la construcción de un sentido y vínculo comunitario a través del "sacrificio colectivo". Es necesario para esto una articulación narrativa que oponga al Pueblo (o sociedad virtuosa) a una élite egotista destinada al sacrificio (Schulte-Sasse, 1993: 96). El populismo, por lo tanto, no sólo debe definir (y construir) un enemigo, sino que la eliminación de ese enemigo pasa a ser el factor aglutinante del discurso y el accionar político. Si el enfoque de Laclau permite efectivamente un amplio espectro de análisis, es la imprecisión conceptual del "fenómeno populista" lo que ha llevado a la manipulación y abuso teóricos de un concepto por demás interesante. En efecto, la política del antagonismo no es privilegio exclusivo de los movimientos populistas, sino que es producto de la banalización y pauperización del discurso político, contribuyendo así a la creación de sociedades binarias donde los matices y la búsqueda de compromisos inclusivos ceden terreno frente a posiciones radicales. Aquellos que anunciaban el amanecer de una "política de consenso" más allá de las tradicionales demarcaciones izquierda/derecha, constatan en la actualidad la emergencia de nuevas fronteras políticas que fragilizan el consenso y de partidos políticos que aprovechan la debilidad del debate democrático para anunciarse como representantes directos investidos de la voz del pueblo (Mouffe, 2005: 51). En este sentido, la práctica discursiva que construye categorías excluyentes como pueblo/poder, amigo/enemigo, sociedad civil/élites, nacional/foráneo etc., no define únicamente al populismo, sino que ha pasado a ser una estrategia recurrente de movilización política en las democracias modernas. Por lo tanto, la fuerza explicativa de este proceso semiótico en referencia al populismo se diluye, ya sea porque se ha "populizado" la política o porque se ha politizado el populismo. 2- El populismo europeo El populismo europeo, vigente desde mediados/fines del siglo XIX, está fuertemente ligado al sentimiento nacionalista y, en algunos casos, a la consolidación del Estado. Desde fines del siglo XVIII, las nociones de nación y pueblo han articulado las construcciones de las diferentes instituciones y regímenes políticos, pero independientemente de cuáles hayan sido los caminos recorridos, todos se han visto inculcar por el Estado un cuerpo de valores destinado a exaltar las particularidades propias de cada pueblo, cimentadas en un sentimiento de solidaridad excluyente (Hermet, 1997: 34). Esta construcción de una solidaridad e identidad nacional siguió dos caminos diferentes. En los países liberales como Gran Bretaña y Francia, donde existía ya una ciudadanía en vías de expansión, la adhesión al proyecto nacionalista se logró bajo el entendido que si las masas hasta ahora sometidas devenían progresivamente actores políticos, el sistema sólo podría sostenerse a través de la solidaridad y pertenencia a una identidad común, a la vez nacionalista y cívica. Es en el ejercicio creciente de sus responsabilidades y derechos cívicos y políticos donde el pueblo (la ciudadanía en este caso) edifica un proyecto único del cual todos son parte. Por el contrario, en estados más autoritarios que liberales y de creación reciente y cuyo proceso de unificación aún no estaba terminado, como en Alemania o Italia, la nacionalización acelerada de esas identidades fragmentadas, tanto a nivel político como religioso, se construyó antes que nada sobre la solidaridad cultural de la población, a fin de paliar el lento (o inexistente) proceso de construcción cívica (Hermet, 1997: 35). El primer tipo de construcción nacional es lo que ha pasado a denominarse nacionalismo cívico liberal, más acotado a los Estados de Europa occidental. El segundo caso es el de un nacional-populismo o un nacionalismo orgánico y autoritario, más propio de Europa central y oriental Estas construcciones arquetípicas reflejan las dos grandes concepciones sobre la nación y la ciudadanía. La idea de nacionalismo occidental u oriental es intercambiable con la noción de nacionalismo político (el caso francés) o cultural (caso alemán). Si bien es sabido que todos los nacionalismos poseen a su vez características políticas o culturales, la distinción entre estas dos vertientes dependerá de la importancia relativa y de la prioridad histórica de los principios de la organización política o de las preocupaciones culturales (lengua, literatura, historia, folklore, etc.). En el caso de la nación política (Francia): el pueblo = Estado = nación. Toda la población residente sobre el territorio controlado por el Estado constituye la nación. Es el Estado quien crea, quien define la nación (creación desde arriba). En este caso, la unidad política precede a la unidad cultural. En este modelo, la ciudadanía puede ser adquirida por todos aquellos nacidos en el territorio (ius solis), y que adhieran a esta concepción (en el caso francés, a los valores republicanos). Típicamente esta forma de nacionalismo no reconoce la diferencia cultural (ej. velo musulmán). En el caso del nacionalismo cultural (Alemania), la unión se logra a través de una identidad común, lingüística, étnica o cultural. La Nación crea el Estado; la unidad cultural precede a la unidad política. En estos casos, la ciudadanía no puede ser adquirida, sino que es innata, reservada a un grupo primigenio definido en términos étnico-culturales (ius sanguinis). Este nacionalismo no reconoce la asimilación cultural (ej: los judíos o los turcos) (Greenfield, 1999: 48-49). El nacionalismo cívico liberal fue en gran medida impulsado por la clase dominante del momento-la burguesía económica-, y reposa sobre principios abstractos de igualdad y libertad propios de individuos desarraigados de los lazos comunitarios y necesarios para la creación de regímenes burgueses liberales (Khon, 1967). La burguesía, que no se reconocía en le "petit peuple", se oponía a la creación de una identidad nacional basada en características culturales populares. El nacional-populismo, por el contrario, más pasional que intelectual, se desarrolló ahí donde los constructores del Estado nación no tenían otro recurso que exaltar los particularismos culturales (o étnicos) de la comunidad en su proceso de construcción política. En los países de Europa Oriental, donde las élites burguesas carecían del empuje necesario (en parte por una débil industrialización y la permanencia de fuertes estructuras rurales, con históricos lazos de solidaridad entre sí y de subordinación a la autoridad), los valores liberales no lograron influenciar la construcción del Estado. El nacional populismo puede ser visto, igualmente, como un fenómeno de resistencia y de rechazo hacia una opresión exterior, como fue el caso de los Balcanes bajo la dominación Austro-Húngara, de Irlanda hacia Inglaterra o del país vasco contra España. Esta forma de solidaridad se cristalizó en gran medida en las minorías oprimidas en el seno de imperios multiétnicos que, ansiosos por imponer una uniformidad liberal o autoritaria, provocaron como reacción la consolidación de identidades nacionales deseosas de garantizar su libertad, autonomía e integridad a través de la edificación de un Estado propio. El nacional populismo, exacerbando en algunos casos el carácter casi mesiánico de pertenencia a una cultura única, producirá emancipaciones ideológicas peligrosas como el fascismo. El populismo europeo ha conocido diferentes corrientes políticas a lo largo del siglo XX que desgraciadamente no podemos tratar aquí. Conviene sin embargo mencionar que en su acepción más reciente, el populismo europeo se ha visto revigorizado por una unión discursiva con la extrema derecha (o lo que se ha denominado como la "nouvelle droite"), que maneja a placer los discursos identitarios, nacionalistas y anti-elites en un peligroso cocktail ideológico a fuerte potencial de movilización. Mazzolenni ha identificado 5 características centrales de este "neo-populismo" europeo (2003: 117). En primer lugar el populismo conduce a una valorización del pueblo, del "hombre de la calle". El llamado al pueblo implica la participación política directa y la desconfianza de la democracia representativa. El "culto al pueblo" se acompaña con la crítica a las élites. En cuarto lugar, un equilibrio precario se instala entre crítica y aceptación del sistema. Como las instituciones son necesarias para aportar la legitimidad política, la crítica no puede abiertamente intentar destruir el sistema político; en algunos países pueden entonces instalarse "simulacros de democracia". Por último, el populismo es acompañado casi siempre de la exaltación del líder carismático en el cual se concentran el proyecto y las aspiraciones del pueblo. Convengamos, sin embargo, que no todos los movimientos populistas europeos son de derecha, reflejando así la "flexibilidad" ideológica (u oportunismo político) de estos partidos así como la heterogeneidad de la base de apoyo a los movimientos populistas. Estos y otros puntos han conducido a ciertos autores a ver en el resurgimiento del populismo de derecha una amenaza al orden democrático (Mouffe, 2005), pero otros, más mesurados, ven en el éxito de estos partidos de "nueva derecha" un realineamiento de los clivajes tradicionales y de las lealtades partidarias (Sciarini et al. 2002, Hug y Treschel, 2002, Lachat y Kriesi, 2008, Oesch, 2008). En este sentido, los partidos populistas se beneficiarían de un posicionamiento ideológico en terreno fértil y de una hábil estrategia política frente al inmovilismo de los partidos más tradicionales, socialistas y de centro derecha, limitados en su accionar por lealtades de clase y concepciones morales anquilosadas. 3- El populismo Latinoamericano El caso latinoamericano no escapa, como sus colegas europeo o norteamericano, a las dificultades de conceptualización producto de diferentes enfoques disciplinarios. Weyland (2001) ha realizado un importante trabajo estudiando los diferentes conceptos que han sido utilizados para abarcar el populismo latinoamericano y demostrar que la confusión conceptual proviene del hecho que los académicos enfatizan diferentes atributos como características decisivas del concepto, sin ponerse de acuerdo si estamos hablando del ámbito político, económico, social, discursivo u otro (Weyland, 2001:2). Tres grandes enfoques han predominado en el estudio del populismo. Entre 1960-80, la utilización de conceptos cumulativos predominó en el estudio del fenómeno3, influenciada por las teorías desarrollistas (modernización y dependencia) que argumentaban la fuerte subordinación de la esfera política a los factores socio económicos. Estos autores resaltaban en el populismo un conjunto central de características políticas y socioeconómicas. Los regímenes populistas serían en parte una respuesta a los fenómenos de urbanización, de industrialización y de participación masiva que fragilizaron las instituciones existentes y permitieron la emergencia de regímenes inestables centrados a menudo en una lógica de acción política personalista y carismática, plebiscitaria y redistributiva, destinada a agrupar y movilizar las masas desorganizadas y amorfas (Germani, 1974). Ciertos autores han querido ver en el populismo un proceso de desarrollo intermedio entre el pasaje de una sociedad tradicional o pre industrial hacia una sociedad moderna industrializada, orientada a la sustitución de importaciones y donde un régimen oligárquico cede terreno frente a la emergencia de la sociedad de masas (Cardoso y Faletto, 1979). Otros autores, como Roberts (1995: 89), han intentando descifrar el populismo utilizando conceptos radiales o de adición4. Así, los populismos latinoamericanos tendrían las siguientes características: Un liderazgo paternalista y personalista; una coalición política heterogénea y multi –clase; un proceso de movilización política top down que cortocircuita las instancias tradicionales de mediación; una ideología amorfa y ecléctica; y un proyecto económico que utiliza importantes políticas redistributivas y clientelares. La existencia de estos 5 aspectos caracterizaría al populismo pleno, mientras que la presencia de una o más características constituiría sub-tipos particulares de populismo. Por último, la tradición más reciente se ha centrado en el estudio del populismo latinoamericano como un concepto clásico en el ámbito político. El populismo no puede ser enfocado como un concepto económico, argumenta Weyland (2001:11) porque su utilización es confusa y problemática y la política económica es, en manos populistas, un instrumento, no un fin. La definición política ve al populismo como una manera particular de competir y ejercer el poder. El populismo se sitúa en la esfera de la dominación, no de la distribución. El populismo intenta antes que nada construir formas de control político, y la distribución de beneficios a través de políticas socio-económicas es una herramienta para facilitar ese control. El líder populista busca ganar y ejercer el poder, y su oportunismo tiene como corolario un débil compromiso en el campo ideológico y programático. Construido a partir de la dicotomía amigo/enemigo que permea toda acción política, el populismo debe ser definido como una estrategia política, entendida como la capacidad de los líderes de perpetuarse en la arena política. Bajo el populismo, el "gobierno" es ejercido por un líder carismático, no por un grupo u organización política (Weyland, 2001: 18). El populismo surge principalmente cuando ese líder logra arrear y agrupar el apoyo masivo de gran parte del pueblo en un movimiento espontaneo y atomizado donde la lealtad de cada individuo se inscribe en una lógica vertical de subordinación entre él y el líder, y no en una lógica horizontal de solidaridad mecánica de pertenencia a un proyecto común. En este sentido, los movimientos populistas y sus adherentes carecen de la cohesión ideológica necesaria para que el movimiento sobreviva a la partida/muerte del líder. 4- Democracia populista Vs. Populismos semi-democráticos A modo de breve conclusión, desearía discutir brevemente uno de los puntos subrayados en la introducción. Si una de las características principales de la nueva cultura política y democrática es el populismo, entendido como un discurso anti élite y anti establishment (y hasta anti intelectual), conviene interrogarse entonces en qué se parecen las democracias populistas modernas (como la Americana o la Francesa) y los regímenes populistas democráticos o semi-democráticos (Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, etc.). Por lo tanto, hay que distinguir entre lo que es una característica secundaria del sistema – el populismo como lenguaje político – de un principio ordenador y legitimador del poder -el populismo en los regímenes latinoamericanos-. La diferencia puede ser entendida con un claro ejemplo. Mientras que el lenguaje populista en las democracias modernas tiene como cometido "igualar" al líder político con el votante común, el populismo latinoamericano presupone todo lo contrario, la excepcionalidad del líder. El populismo americano o francés actual elimina todo privilegio, todo "passe-droit" que la figura del líder político piense poder tener por su pertenencia a un grupo privilegiado; por el contrario, presupone que el contrato de confianza ciudadano entre gobernados y gobernantes demanda una conducta intachable y responsable de estos últimos. En el caso de los populismos semi-democráticos, el líder es por naturaleza excepcional y, ya sea por la escasa instrucción cívica y ciudadana, por la corrupción del sistema político o por lo que es aún peor, la creencia dogmática en el carácter mesiánico del líder, éste se encuentra, de facto, por encima de la ciudadanía (y por ende de la ley). El culto al líder al que se libran los populismos latinoamericanos y la triste complacencia de las ciudadanías amorfas erosionan el accionar democrático, debilitan la separación de poderes y conducen a la utilización irresponsable y clientelista de los recursos nacionales. Si es innegable igualmente que el discurso populista en las democracias modernas puede ser antes que nada una estrategia política en época de crisis y vacas flacas, no obstante éste se construye sobre una premisa incuestionable: la igualdad ciudadana y la necesidad de contralor del poder político. Lo importante aquí no es la incorporación ética por parte de las élites de los principios de igualdad y responsabilidad, sino la sanción, electoral o legal, de todo comportamiento que infrinja ese contrato de confianza. Lejos de mí la idea de asimilar al elector francés o americano a un quijote cívico y moralizador, pero en su estrategia "maximizadora" de bienestar no se encuentra la tolerancia a la corrupción política, al abuso de poder o a la desigualdad manifiesta entre gobernantes y gobernados. Si bien admitimos que el populismo latinoamericano emerge en un contexto histórico de débil institucionalización en las décadas del 20-30 en adelante (en cierta medida heredero de las tradiciones caudillistas), y que el vínculo primordial entre líder y pueblo fue en parte necesario para asegurar derechos sociales y cívicos antes del otorgamiento de plenos derechos políticos, ¿qué argumentos justifican 60 años después de un Perón o un Vargas la ciega obsecuencia ante un "déspota iluminado"?.1- El presente artículo retoma partes de un trabajo más extenso dedicado al estudio del fenómeno populista en los Estados Unidos (en vías de publicación). Lo que se presenta a continuación sirve como introducción teórica en dicho artículo. La conclusión de este artículo sí representa una reflexión original.2- Autores como Schumpeter, sin embargo, han argumentado contra el concepto clásico de democracia popular extendida, avanzando que una parte importante de la ciudadanía carece de los conocimientos necesarios para realizar juicios instruidos y determinar el bien común y que por lo tanto estaría ésta a la merced de élites políticas "manipuladoras". En este sentido, el ciudadano debería limitarse a la elección de líderes y a su sanción periódica vía los procesos electorales. Ver J. SHUMPETER, 1994 (rev. ed), Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy, Routledge.3- Los conceptos cumulativos elaboran definiciones combinando los atributos de diferentes campos a través de la lógica de inclusión "Y". Sólo las características comunes de todos los dominios son adoptadas como determinantes del concepto. Los conceptos cumulativos aportan un alto estándar de inclusión con un pequeño número de casos y excluyen la posibilidad de casos "límite". Un problema recurrente de los conceptos cumulativos es su debilidad empírica si hay escasa superposición entre las diferentes áreas de estudio, generando así pocos casos reales que cumplan con el fuerte contenido teórico.4- Los conceptos radiales utilizan la preposición lógica "O", conectando los atributos propuestos por los autores en diferentes campos. Si un caso posee al menos una de estas características puede ser incorporado al estudio del concepto. Si los conceptos radiales poseen las ventajas de abarcar un amplio universo de casos, la pertinencia de cada caso dependerá del número de características totales que posea, falseando entonces la comparación entre los diferentes casos. 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