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Explores the ideology & organization of the rural militia movement in the US. The movement emerged in the 1990s, born of the 1980s farm crisis, which is argued to be a crisis of masculinity as well. In this light, the militia movement is described in terms of composition & ideology. Demonstrated is the gendered racist discourse about masculinity that these militias deploy to confront the forces of capital concentration & federal government in the form of various Others, eg, Jews. Ultimately, racism is the one way for white men to reclaim their masculinity. 3 Figures. J. Zendejas

"This chapter assesses the rote of different psychological factors in explaining voting behavior, particularly right-wing voting patterns. In the contemporary Is- k raeli political arena, we studied the effects of three facets of authoritarianism (individual, social, and political) on voting patterns in the 1999 Israeli general elecdons (both for prime minister and parliament). This study was based on a comprehensive survey of 965 university and college students in Israel. The questionnaire focused on authoritarian attributes and individual voting inclinations. i Two major points were examined: which type of authoritarianism was significant in predicting a voting preference for the right-wing or left-wing prime ministerial candidate; and the prediction of voting preferences for the two largest right-wing parties, Likud (moderate right-wing) and Shas (militant religious right-wing), in comparison to the two largest left-wing parties, Labor (moderate left-wing) and Meretz (militant secular left-wing). Results reveal that the complete, multifaceted (individual, social, and political) authoritarianism syndrome best predicted voting for the right-wing prime ministerial candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu. However, regarding partisan voting ,patterns, results showed that a segregated or single-faceted authoritarianism was more important. Findings indicate that in the cases of larger and more moderate parties, only political authoritarianism had a significant effect; but for more militant parties, other factors (individual authoritarianism in the case of Shas and social authoritarianism in the case of Meretz) had the most significant effects. This research yields several conceptual insights. On the whole, it uncovers the variable sensitivity of the different facets of authoritarianism. Voting for a single candidate can be best predicted by a more integrated conception of authoritarianism. However, the distinct, respective aspects of authoritarianism can best predict partisan voting. The individual aspect corresponds with the prediction of right-wing party voting, but for left-wing voting, the social form of authoritarianism is more reliable. Finally, the political form of authoritarianism appears to serve as a reliable predictor of voting for both moderate parties." (author's abstract)

"This chapter assesses the rote of different psychological factors in explaining voting behavior, particularly right-wing voting patterns. In the contemporary Is- k raeli political arena, we studied the effects of three facets of authoritarianism (individual, social, and political) on voting patterns in the 1999 Israeli general elecdons (both for prime minister and parliament). This study was based on a comprehensive survey of 965 university and college students in Israel. The questionnaire focused on authoritarian attributes and individual voting inclinations. i Two major points were examined: which type of authoritarianism was significant in predicting a voting preference for the right-wing or left-wing prime ministerial candidate; and the prediction of voting preferences for the two largest right-wing parties, Likud (moderate right-wing) and Shas (militant religious right-wing), in comparison to the two largest left-wing parties, Labor (moderate left-wing) and Meretz (militant secular left-wing). Results reveal that the complete, multifaceted (individual, social, and political) authoritarianism syndrome best predicted voting for the right-wing prime ministerial candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu. However, regarding partisan voting, patterns, results showed that a segregated or single-faceted authoritarianism was more important. Findings indicate that in the cases of larger and more moderate parties, only political authoritarianism had a significant effect; but for more militant parties, other factors (individual authoritarianism in the case of Shas and social authoritarianism in the case of Meretz) had the most significant effects. This research yields several conceptual insights. On the whole, it uncovers the variable sensitivity of the different facets of authoritarianism. Voting for a single candidate can be best predicted by a more integrated conception of authoritarianism. However, the distinct, respective aspects of authoritarianism can best predict partisan voting. The individual aspect corresponds with the prediction of right-wing party voting, but for left-wing voting, the social form of authoritarianism is more reliable. Finally, the political form of authoritarianism appears to serve as a reliable predictor of voting for both moderate parties." (author's abstract).

"Die öffentliche gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit Rechtsextremismus ist ein sehr diskontinuierliches Phänomen und entzündet sich in der Regel an wenigen resonanzstarken Skandalereignissen. Der Beitrag hat zum Ziel, Ursachen für diese diskontinuierliche gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtsextremismus zu erfassen und mögliche Folgen zu reflektieren. Die empirische Basis für die Analyse der Ursachen, Dynamiken und Regularitäten solcher Thematisierungswellen des Rechtsextremismus bilden Daten zur öffentlichen Kommunikation, die durch eine umfassende Inhaltsanalyse aller für die gesellschaftliche Bewertung des Rechtsextremismus relevanten massenmedialen und parlamentarischen Diskussionen seit 1998 in der Schweiz gewonnen wurden. Auf der Basis dieser Daten werden drei Fragen diskutiert. Erstens: Inwieweit sind diese Skandalisierungswellen Ausdruck einer gesellschaftlichen Sensibilisierung für das Phänomen Rechtsextremismus? Als Indikatoren für die Diskussion dieser These dienen den Verfassern einerseits die Nachhaltigkeit der öffentlichen Kommunikation über Rechtsextremismus und andererseits ihr Differenzierungsgrad. Zweitens: Inwieweit sind diese Skandalisierungswellen getrieben durch eine befürchtete resp. bereits beobachtete Diffusion rechtsextremer Deutungsmuster in die Mitte der Gesellschaft? Als wichtigster Indikator hierfür ist die Verwendung rigider Differenzsemantiken durch definitionsmächtige etablierte Akteure zu nennen, die rechtsextreme Deutungsmuster erst anschlussfähig machen. Drittens: Inwieweit sind diese Skandalisierungswellen zurückzuführen auf Veränderungen der Strukturen und Bedingungen der öffentlichen Kommunikation selbst, die als Effekte des neuen Strukturwandels der Öffentlichkeit beschrieben werden? Im Licht der Strukturwandelsthese sind die Skandalisierungswellen und der 'medienplebiszitäre' Druck auf das politische System vor allem durch die Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeitsgenerierung zu erklären - ein Prozess, der zu Aktionismus verführt und die Nachhaltigkeit der politischen Moral zu entwerten droht." (Autorenreferat)

In August 2020, the German capital of Berlin became the stage for political manifestations organized by regional and relatively unknown groups of individuals with diverse political agendas. The German government and the public observed smaller and bigger agglomerations of up to 40.000 citizens of different backgrounds articulating themselves critically towards the political and legal measures taken by the government to address the crisis caused by COVID-19. The public perception of these newly identified networks and organizations and their diverging political agendas posed questions to traditional understandings of political mobilization. While policy makers, researchers, the media and the general public are often categorizing political groups or movements into specific sections including left, right, center and others, the newly growing so called "anti-corona" or "corona-sceptical" movement in Germany did not allow an easy categorization at first sight. This chapter will give an overview and a first insight into this newly evolving movement, its political agenda and into its mechanisms of political mobilization. It will be shown, how a heterogeneous mixture of middle class citizens, peace movement activists, right wing extremists, antisemitic conspiracy theorists and others joined a common platform strengthened by social media activism and so called alternative media channels.

"Against the background of a series of serious right-wing extremist and anti-Semitic incidents in Germany in 2000, we constructed a new heuristic model with three components to describe new aspects of anti-Semitism based on: 1) traditional anti-Semitic prejudices, 2) communicative latency of anti-Semitism, and 3) refusal or acceptance of responsibility for what happened in the past to the Jewish people. The model was tested in some field studies (N=2130 youngsters in Ger-many) using a standardized questionnaire. Path analyses show a 3-dimensional structure of anti-Semitism (manifest, latent, and 'no responsibility toward Jews') and the data fit the theoretical model. New aspects of anti-Semitic attitudes reflect the public avoidance of anti-Semitic statements and refusal to discuss Germany's fault, behavior, and responsibility for the Jewish people. These new aspects of anti-Semitic attitudes are also linked to a general hostility toward foreigners. It is possible to differentiate between groups of individuals with various anti-Semitic attitudes. The new aspects of anti-Semitic attitudes are concerned with present debates about German national pride among German subpopulations and about the end of 'getting over history' The 'new' anti-Semitism in Germany may be considered as a social construction of German subpopulations designed to repress their own conceptions of unpleasant 'German' problems." (author's abstract)