The article deals with three terrorist attacks of right-wing extremists: in Norway (2011), New Zealand (2019) and Germany (2019). First, the modus operandi of perpetrators was shown and the course of each attack was analyzed. It was indicated what tactics the attackers used and why it was or was not effective. Secondly, the ideological background and motivations of the perpetrators were shown. It was possible to analyze the manifestos that the perpetrators left, and thus their way of thinking, their ideologies, and the purposes of organizing the attacks. Thirdly, issues related to the publicizing of the attacks by the perpetrators were shown. The goal of the article is to show that radical ideology of right-wing extremists (expressed in manifestos) leads to tragedies. In analyzed cases radical appointment of the perpetrators caused three deadly attacks. The article shows that the radical actions are preceded by radical speech, expressions, manifestos. The second goal is to pay attention to hate speech (also expressed in manifestos), which is just as dangerous as bullets or improvised explosive devices. The third goal is to show how the attackers used acts of terror to spread the ideologies to which they were devoted.
This article investigates the linguistic-discursive construction of others in one international right-wing extremist online discussion forum. By means of a positioning analysis and an appraisal analysis, the article shows how reference to absent third parties is used to establish others as outgroups in forum posts aimed at an international audience. The analysis reveals an othering practice that links the online extremist discourse world with international and local as well as with political, social, and personal concerns, providing various opportunities for user affiliation. The results of this investigation contribute to understanding of the linguistic-discursive construction of online hate speech in multicultural virtual (rhetorical) communities; the study also highlights how social media and the use of English as a lingua franca combine to connect geographically and linguistically separate individuals and facilitate the globalization of extremist discourse through the construction of a shared discourse world online
This policy brief traces how Western right-wing extremists have exploited the power of the internet from early dial-up bulletin board systems to contemporary social media and messaging apps. It demonstrates how the extreme right has been quick to adopt a variety of emerging online tools, not only to connect with the like-minded, but to radicalise some audiences while intimidating others, and ultimately to recruit new members, some of whom have engaged in hate crimes and/or terrorism. Highlighted throughout is the fast pace of change of both the internet and its associated platforms and technologies, on the one hand, and the extreme right, on the other, as well as how these have interacted and evolved over time. Underlined too is the persistence, despite these changes, of right-wing extremists' online presence, which poses challenges for effectively responding to this activity moving forward. ; Peer reviewed ; Final article published ; right-wing extremism ; online tools ; history ; contemporary trends ; online forums ; social media ; messaging applications ; Web 2.0 ; policy challenges
The main approaches of the extreme-right party definitions in the foreign and Ukrainian political science are analyzed. ; Аналізуються основні підходи в термінології визначення правоекстремістських партій у за- рубіжній та вітчизняній політичній науці, в якій відсутній єдиний підхід у традиції їх дослідження.
An analysis of the general election, which took place in Slovakia on Saturday 5th March 2016. Its results were strongly influence by the fear-mongering of the incumbent PM Robert Fico, who assumed a fiercely anti-refugee and islamophobic stance. As a result, his electoral support collapsed and a large number of votes went to extreme right wing parties.
Głównym tematem artykułu jest analiza prawicowo-ekstremistycznych nastrojów w społeczeństwie niemieckim, których rzecznikiem stają się coraz częściej przedstawiciele klasy średniej. Nieudany projekt wielokulturowości niemieckiej, długotrwały kryzys gospodarczy w Europie, zjawisko terroryzmu islamskiego i fala uchodźców stworzyły atmosferę ksenofobizmu i rasizmu. W efekcie tworzone są partie oraz nieformalne ugrupowania, które oczekują od państwa zmian w polityce azylowej i artykułują potrzebę utrwalania tożsamości narodowej. Tworzące się ad hoc ruchy społeczne odnoszą się krytycznie do niemieckiego systemu politycznego gromadząc określoną część elektoratu. Jeden z ruchów obywatelskich pod nazwą Pegida demonstruje nie tylko przeciwko radykałom muzułmańskim, a islamowi w ogóle. Organizatorzy i zwolennicy Pegidy dystansują się publicznie od ekstremistów prawicowych, ale wykorzystują lęki przed islamskim terrorem i szerzą nastroje niechęci wobec uchodźców i obcych. Pytanie badawcze dotyczy perspektyw utrwalania demokratycznych standardów w pozjednoczeniowym społeczeństwie niemieckim przez klasę średnią, która może stać się najważniejszym elementem wpływającym na opinię publiczną. Renesans ideologii faszystowskiej wymusił konieczność wykreowania nowego modelu komunikowania społecznego pomiędzy klasami. Percepcja tej ideologii jest przedmiotem badawczym sfery aksjologicznej. ; The main topic of this paper is the analysis of right-wing extremist sentiments in German society. Representatives of the middle-class are mostly identified with these political tendencies. The unsuccessful multicultural project in the Federal Republic of Germany, long-lasting economic crisis in Europe, Islamic terrorism and the wave of immigrants have led to the spread of xenophobia and racism. Thus, many new parties and various informal groups are being formed that expect the government to change the asylum policy of the state and which express their need to consolidate national identity. These social groups demonstrate a critical attitude to the German political system, attracting a certain portion of the protesting electorate. One of the citizens' movements, named Pegida, is demonstrating against not only radical Muslims but Islam as a whole. The organizers and supporters of Pegida publicly distance themselves from right-wing extremists, but use the fears of Islamic terror to spread general negative sentiments towards refugees and foreigners. The research question refers to the prospects of instilling democratic standards in the middle class of German society after the post-unification period. This social class may be the most important factor influencing public opinion. The renaissance of fascist ideology has forced the creation of a new model of communication between social classes. The perception of right-wing ideology is the object of research in the axiological sphere.
Głównym tematem artykułu jest analiza prawicowo-ekstremistycznych nastrojów w społeczeństwie niemieckim, których rzecznikiem stają się coraz częściej przedstawiciele klasy średniej. Nieudany projekt wielokulturowości niemieckiej, długotrwały kryzys gospodarczy w Europie, zjawisko terroryzmu islamskiego i fala uchodźców stworzyły atmosferę ksenofobizmu i rasizmu. W efekcie tworzone są partie oraz nieformalne ugrupowania, które oczekują od państwa zmian w polityce azylowej i artykułują potrzebę utrwalania tożsamości narodowej. Tworzące się ad hoc ruchy społeczne odnoszą się krytycznie do niemieckiego systemu politycznego gromadząc określoną część elektoratu. Jeden z ruchów obywatelskich pod nazwą Pegida demonstruje nie tylko przeciwko radykałom muzułmańskim, a islamowi w ogóle. Organizatorzy i zwolennicy Pegidy dystansują się publicznie od ekstremistów prawicowych, ale wykorzystują lęki przed islamskim terrorem i szerzą nastroje niechęci wobec uchodźców i obcych. Pytanie badawcze dotyczy perspektyw utrwalania demokratycznych standardów w pozjednoczeniowym społeczeństwie niemieckim przez klasę średnią, która może stać się najważniejszym elementem wpływającym na opinię publiczną. Renesans ideologii faszystowskiej wymusił konieczność wykreowania nowego modelu komunikowania społecznego pomiędzy klasami. Percepcja tej ideologii jest przedmiotem badawczym sfery aksjologicznej. ; The main topic of this paper is the analysis of right-wing extremist sentiments in German society. Representatives of the middle-class are mostly identified with these political tendencies. The unsuccessful multicultural project in the Federal Republic of Germany, long-lasting economic crisis in Europe, Islamic terrorism and the wave of immigrants have led to the spread of xenophobia and racism. Thus, many new parties and various informal groups are being formed that expect the government to change the asylum policy of the state and which express their need to consolidate national identity. These social groups demonstrate a critical attitude to the German political system, attracting a certain portion of the protesting electorate. One of the citizens' movements, named Pegida, is demonstrating against not only radical Muslims but Islam as a whole. The organizers and supporters of Pegida publicly distance themselves from right-wing extremists, but use the fears of Islamic terror to spread general negative sentiments towards refugees and foreigners. The research question refers to the prospects of instilling democratic standards in the middle class of German society after the post-unification period. This social class may be the most important factor influencing public opinion. The renaissance of fascist ideology has forced the creation of a new model of communication between social classes. The perception of right-wing ideology is the object of research in the axiological sphere.
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp.
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion
Previous research suggests that threat can bolster anti-immigration attitudes, but less is known about the effects of threat on ideological tolerance. We tested the hypothesis that realistic threats — tangible threats to e.g., the safety or financial well-being of one's group — bolster support for right-wing extremists. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 200) learned that crime and unemployment rates were either increasing (high threat condition) or remaining the same (low threat condition). Consistent with our hypothesis, higher threat lead to a significant increase in tolerance for right-wing, but not left-wing, extremists. In a second, pre-registered extended replication experiment (N = 385), we added a baseline (no threat) condition. Additionally, attitudes to immigrants were examined as a mediator. This experiment produced non-significant threat effects on tolerance of right-wing extremists. Overall, the current research provides weak support for the hypothesis that realistic threats have asymmetric effects on tolerance of political extremists. However, consistent with previous research, people were more tolerant of extremists within their own ideological camp. ; Funding: Linnaeus University Centre for Discrimination and Integration Studies
In recent years, an emerging body of work, centred on specific communicative forms used in facilitating collective and connective action, have contributed to greater understanding of how digital communication relates to social mobilisation. Plenty of these studies highlight the progressive potentiality of digital communication. However, undemocratic actors also utilise the rapid advancement in digital technology. This article explores the online video activism of extreme right-wing groups in Sweden. It analyses more than 200 clips on YouTube, produced by five right-wing extremist organisations. The study shows that the extreme right deploy video activism as a strategy of visibility to mobilise and strengthen activists. Moreover, the groups attempt to alter the perception of (historically-rooted) socio-political identities of the extreme right. Furthermore, YouTube becomes a political arena in which action repertoires and street politics are adapted to the specific characteristics of online video activism. Finally, video activism could be understood as an aestheticisation of politics.
UAVs have been used by non-state actors in the past decade. However, no known attack by right-wing extremists has been carried out using them. Håvard Haugstvedt reviews recent developments in attacks – through online activity in open forums and by examining groups that have already used UAVs in their operations – by such actors, to explore the possibility of right-wing extremists adopting UAVs. The article argues that right-wing extremist groups lack a strong entity, such as a state, backing their development and operations. However, terrorist groups learn from one another, and as extreme right-wing ideologies have gained currency among some members of the military and law enforcement agencies, the capability to develop and use UAVs may be more possible than that which has been revealed thus far. Nonetheless, this article casts doubt on right-wing extremists' capability and desire to incorporate UAVs into a violent repertoire that has historically been composed of fists, fires and firearms. ; publishedVersion
Die deutschsprachige rechtsextreme Szene ist auf YouTube aktiv. Rechtsextreme Influencerinnen und Influencer veröffentlichen regelmässig Videos, in denen sie politische Themen aufgreifen. Mit ihren Inhalten erreichen sie zum Teil hunderttausende Menschen. Dieser Beitrag analysiert anhand der Erkenntnisse der Framing-Theorie, die davon ausgeht, dass die Art, wie ein Ereignis beschrieben und dargestellt wird, Auswirkungen auf dessen Interpretation durch die Rezipierenden hat, fünf Videos von Produzierenden der rechtsextremen Identitären Bewegung mittels qualitativer Inhaltsanalyse. Dabei wird deutlich, dass sich die Produzierenden der gängigen Ästhetik der Plattform anpassen und dass die sich humoristischer Stilmittel bedienen, um ihre Inhalte weniger radikal wirken zu lassen. Ausserdem nutzen sie teilweise Ästhetiken und Strategien, die aus Nachrichtenformaten bekannt sind. So bedienen sie bekannte Sehgewohnheiten der Rezipierenden. Ausserdem erhalten die Videos so den Anschein, journalistisch recherchiert und belegt zu sein, obwohl dies nicht der Fall ist. Diese Ergebnisse bieten nicht nur einen Einblick in die Kommunikationsstrategien rechtsextremer Gruppierungen, sondern auch wichtige Anknüpfungspunkte für die praktische Arbeit gegen Rechts. ; The German-speaking right-wing extremist scene is active on YouTube. Right-wing extremist influencers regularly publish videos in which they address political issues. Some of them reach hundreds of thousands of people with their content. Based on the findings of the framing theory, which assumes that the way an event is described and presented has an impact on the interpretation of the event by the recipients, this study analyses five videos by influencers of the far-right movement ‹Identiäre Bewegung›, using qualitative content analysis. It is evident that the YouTubers adapt to the common aesthetics of the platform and that they use humorous stylistic devices to make their content seem less radical. In addition, they partly use aesthetics and strategies that are familiar from news formats. This way, they serve familiar viewing habits of the recipients. In addition, the videos appear to be journalistically researched and verified, although this is not the case. These results not only offer an insight into the communication strategies of right-wing extremist groups, but also important starting points for practical work against the far right.
'Gefühle des Abgehängtseins', welche vor allem in ländlichen Räumen vorzufinden seien, werden oft als Erklärung für den Wahlerfolg der Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) bei der Bundestagswahl 2017 herangezogen. Was unter 'abgehängt sein' zu verstehen ist, wird wissenschaftlich jedoch nicht definiert. In diesem Thünen Working Paper setze ich mich deshalb systematisch damit auseinander, wie der Ausdruck 'Abgehängtsein' im Kontext des AfD-Wahlerfolgs 2017 und ländlicher Regionen diskursiv besetzt und in welche inhaltlichen Zusammenhänge er gebettet wird. Dabei greife ich auf die Methodik der Grounded Theory zurück. 233 Beiträge(online und print) des populär-medialen Diskurses stellen den Materialkorpus dar. Neben Artikeln aus überregionalen Tages- und Wochenzeitungen habe ich auch Beiträge aus regionalen Zeitungen und durch die Onlinesuche bedingt auch Magazinartikel sowie vereinzelt Fernseh- sowie Audiobeiträge einbezogen. Die Sichtung der Printmedien wurde auf das dritte und vierte Quartal 2017 beschränkt. Deutlich werden drei verschiedene (im oben benannten Kontext verortete) Formen des 'Abgehängtseins': infrastrukturell, wirtschaftlich und kulturell. Das 'Abgehängtsein' geht dabei sowohl mit einem Gefühlskonglomerat aus Ängsten, Unzufriedenheit und Ohnmacht als auch mit einer Kritik am demokratischen System selbst einher. ; Feelings of being 'left behind,' which, according to the discourse, can be found especially among people in rural areas, are often cited as an explanation for the success of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the 2017 federal elections. The concept of being 'left behind' has not been scientifically defined. Therefore, in this Thünen Working Paper, I examine systematically what meanings are discursively attached to the expression being 'left behind' in the context of the success of the AfD in the 2017 elections, and the rural regions and in which these connections are embedded. For this analysis, I use the methodology of Grounded Theory. The material corpus consists of 233 articles (online and print) of the popular media discourse.In addition toe xamining articles from national daily and weekly newspapers,I have included in my analysis articles from regional newspapers, and, through an online search, magazine articles and occasional television and audio reports. My review of the print media was limited to reports that appeared in the third and fourth quarters of 2017. In the abovementioned context, three different discursive forms of being 'left behind' – economically, culturally, and in access to infrastructure– become evident. Being 'left behind' goes hand in hand with a conglomeration of feelings of fear, dissatisfaction, and powerlessness; and with a criticism of the democratic system itself.