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What connects Chinas to the challenges of separatism in Balochistan? Why is India important when it comes to water shortages in Pakistan? How does jihadism in Punjab an Sindh differ from religious militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)? Why do Iran and Saudi Arabia matter for the challenges faced by Pakistan in Gilgit-Baltistan? These are some of the questions that are raised and discussed in the analytical contribution of this report. Overall, the present report aims to illuminate the regional context of Pakistan's challenges, the rivalry and alliances between powerful actors in South and Central Asia and Pakistan's place therein. The analytical contributions address the interplay between the macro and micro level conflicts which undermine the resilience of Pakistan. The rationale behind this perspective is that a comprehensive understanding of Pakistan's challenges requires a consideration of both these levels and, not least, of the dynamics between them. The report consists of an initial overview of the regional conflicts playing out within Pakistan, focusing particularly on the impacts of Afghanistan, China, Russia, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This 'outside-in' analysis is followed by six papers that take their points of departure in local conflict zones in Pakistan, analysing the dynamics between the local and regional tensions. The papers focus on selected provinces, administrative divisions and urban centres in Pakistan, namely: (i) Balochistan, (ii) FATA, (iii) Pakistan-administered Kashmir, (iv) Gilgit-Baltistan, (v) Punjab and Sindh, and (vi) urban Sindh. Thematically they touch upon issues of contested boundaries, sectarianism, and militancy in Pakistan. The papers were originally prepared for the international seminar, 'Pakistan - the Impact of Regional Rivalries' held on 8 May 2012 and convened in London in a collaboration between Chatham House and the Danish Institute for International Studies. The views expressed in the contributions are those of the individual authors and are not representative of Chatham House or the Danish Institute for International Studies.

Contemporary political, economic and social institutions have no adequate tools to deal with diversity and tend to see it as a challenge. The unresolved evils of modernity that neoliberal globalization attempted to lacquer in its first triumphant years, have reemerged with full force confirming the discriminatory nature of the global culture, its unfair conditions of inclusion through erasing identities or through their commercialization. The overwhelming negative sensibility marking the present darker stage of neoliberal globalization, is not a brotherhood but merely a condition of fellow sufferers who have not fully realized that we are in the same boat and need to cooperate rather than compete to survive. The opinion article addresses the danger of multiplying victimhood rivalries as a manifestation of the modern/colonial agonistics. This position replaces politics with manipulative moral zeal and withdraws the dimension of the future as a collective existential condition from the horizon. Delinking from victimhood rivalries is a difficult but urgent task of transcending modernity and looking for other options and other worlds intricately correlating and interacting in a complex pluriverse.

Railroad construction provided a focus for the acceleration of economic rivalry between Richmond, Petersburg, and Norfolk from the 1830's through the 1850's. Richmond's place as a political center provided legislative leverage and attracted able promoters and sufficient capital. Richmond outdistanced its rivals handily, with Petersburg gaining little more than Norfolk. The rivalry left an enduring legacy. Based on railroad archives, manuscripts, and newspapers; 60 notes.

Bellicist theories of comparative development predict increases in taxation as the result of military rivalries. Others claim that this causal relationship is contingent on particular geographical, institutional, and historical conditions. In this paper, we explore the conditional effects of military rivalries on taxation during the 19th and 20th centuries using time-series cross-section models. We hypothesize that international norms of territoriality, inter-state military alliances, and regime type will condition the direction and magnitude of the effect of rivalries on taxation. Our models suggest that from 1815 to 1945 the effects of rivalry on taxation were insignificant independently of these systemic, dyadic, and institutional factors. However, after 1945 when norms of territorial integrity consolidated, democracies with strong military allies responded to military pressures by lowering taxes in the short-term, reoriented public expenditures towards social spending, and ultimately increased taxes in the long run through a reconfiguration of the fiscal contract. Conversely, autocracies with strong allies responded to military pressures by increasing taxes in the short-term, capturing as much wealth as possible but failing to consolidate durable fiscal institutions.

The nature of the relationship between the Serbs from Serbia and the Serbs from the Habsburg Monarchy in the nineteenth century is important for understand­ing the process of national development of the Serbian people as a whole. Therefore the paper analyzes the controversy over Švabe or Nemačkari, as the Serbs from Austria were called, which was one of the factors responsible for internal instability of the Principality of Serbia in the nineteenth century.

This Hotspot Analysis examines state-sponsored cyber-activities regarding Iran. It outlines that Iran uses cyberspace to surveil dissidents and control information within the country. On the international level, Iran considers cyber-operations to form a part of its asymmetrical warfare against the US and its allies, providing a way to harass adversaries with limited risks of retaliation. However, Iran's scarce resources limit its cyber-operations, leading the country to focus on easier targets. Iranian cyber-activities also appear to follow international events. For instance, Iranian cyberattacks against the US decreased following the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but increased after President Trump's withdrawal from the agreement. The discovery of the US-Israeli developed Stuxnet in 2010 demonstrates how Iran is on the receiving end of cyberattacks. However, the lack of information on cyber-incidents within Iran curtails effective assessments of such attacks.

The conventional argument in the international relations and social-psychological literature maintains that states should employ an incremental, or step-by-step, approach to initiate conciliation with their adversaries. Decision-makers are cautioned against making large, costly conciliatory gestures since they denote weakness, embolden rivals, and expose them to audience costs. Given these risks, it is puzzling why some leaders undertake bold conciliatory gestures when smaller, less radical avenues exist to engage rivals. This project applies theories and approaches from political psychology to examine why, and the conditions under which, decision-makers extend these types of olive branches in international relations. I employ a least-similar cases research design and select several rivalries – Egypt-Israel (1973-1979), the U.S.-the Soviet Union (1985-1987), and India-Pakistan (1998-2004) – to examine these questions. I found that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee undertook bold moves when they confronted strong, hawkish governments; when they found the rivalry costly to sustain; and when negotiations reached a deadlock. In each case, the leaders were personally involved in shaping and deciding on these initiatives since they were disillusioned with either their foreign policy bureaucracy or with third-party intermediaries. Showing considerable empathy, they were motivated to undertake such gestures to mitigate their rivals' insecurity and remove the psychological barriers such as fear and mistrust that, they believed, had stalemated negotiations.

This article seeks to explore the role that leadership plays in both the perpetration and avoidance of mass atrocities. Many scholars have argued that leadership is pivotal to the outbreak of such violence but there is almost no scholarship which explores the role that political leaders play in mitigating or aggravating the risk of atrocities over time. Why is it that mass atrocities occur in some places but not in others, despite the existence of similar risk factors? By conducting a comparative analysis of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, this paper investigates the impact that the strategies of each leader had on the risk of mass atrocities. Both countries share similar colonial backgrounds, and display comparable structural risk factors commonly associated with genocide and other mass atrocities. Both Kaunda and Mugabe were key leaders in their countries' liberation struggles, and both leaders played pivotal roles during the crucial formative years of independence. Yet the two countries have taken dramatically different paths – while Zambia has remained relatively stable and peaceful, Zimbabwe has experience mass violence and repression.

The Black Sea region is increasingly becoming a priority on the international agenda. In fact a regional approach is emerging as actors understand that common problems need to be addressed jointly. Nevertheless cooperation efforts are hampered by a number of factors such as uneven economic and political development within and among countries nationalist forces and longstanding animosities between regional players. In this context it is imperative to foster sound policies aimed at strengthening dialogue and cooperation so as to contain and ultimately resolve conflicts with peaceful means. However there is little policy-oriented research on the challenges and opportunities for cooperation in the Black Sea region. This study is primarily devoted to exploring and understanding the security environment and the main threats to security and stability in the Black Sea region.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 313-323) and index. ; Learning and crisis bargaining -- Research design -- The Soviet-American rivalry -- The Egyptian-Israeli rivalry -- The Indo-Pakistani rivalry -- Behavior, learning, and realpolitik. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The Covid-19 pandemic has moved relations with Sub-Saharan Africa further up the Maghreb countries' agenda and consolidated existing trends. Morocco is the Maghreb state with the most sophisticated Sub-Sahara policy. Its motivations include attractive growth markets in Africa, frustration over restricted access to Europe, stalemated integration in the Maghreb and the wish to see the Western Sahara recognised as Moroccan. Morocco's Sub-Sahara policy has heightened tensions with Algeria and awakened ambitions in Tunisia. Algiers, as a significant funder and security actor in the African Union (AU) and 'protector' of the Western Sahara independence movement, is seeking to thwart Rabat's advances. Tunis for its part is trying to follow in Rabat's footsteps, hoping that closer relations with Africa will boost economic growth. The European Union should treat these trends as an opportunity for African integration and triangular EU/Maghreb/Sub-Sahara cooperation. This could counteract Algeria's feeling of growing irrelevance, strengthen Tunisia's economy, put Morocco's hegemonic ambitions in perspective, and thus mitigate the negative dynamics of the rivalry.

We study the spatiotemporal correlation of terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and local insurgents, in six geographical areas identified via [Formula: see text]-means clustering applied to the Global Terrorism Database. All surveyed organizations exhibit near-repeat activity whereby a prior attack increases the likelihood of a subsequent one by the same group within 20 km and on average 4 (al-Qaeda) to 10 (ISIS) weeks. Near-response activity, whereby an attack by a given organization elicits further attacks from a different one, is found to depend on the adversarial, neutral, or collaborative relationship between the two. When in conflict, local insurgents respond quickly to attacks by global terror groups while global terror groups delay their responses to local insurgents, leading to an asymmetric dynamic. When neutral or allied, attacks by one group enhance the response likelihood of the other, regardless of hierarchy. These trends arise consistently in all clusters for which data are available. Government intervention and spillover effects are also discussed; we find no evidence of outbidding. Understanding the regional dynamics of terrorism may be greatly beneficial in policy making and intervention design.

Defence date: 8 September 2015 ; Examining Board: Professor Youssef Cassis, EUI; Professor Federico Romero, EUI; Professor Joachim Scholtyseck, University of Bonn; Professor Harold James, Princeton University. ; When in 1929 the world economy went into crisis, a new approach to international trade and finance appeared on the scene. Characterised by bilateralism, protectionism and autarchy, this approach challenged the idea of liberal free trade. Its main proponents were Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This thesis is about the role of economic factors in the German-Italian rapprochement under the banner of the fascism. The analysis looks with an institutional approach at three levels: the formulation of foreign economic policies, the implementation by governments, and the execution at the level of businesses. Not only is the bilateral German-Italian commercial relationship analysed, but also co-operation and rivalries between German and Italian government officials, economic experts and business representatives in third-party markets, as well as international organisations (especially the League of Nations) dealing with the crisis. The thesis shows that the "Rome-Berlin Axis", which plunged Europe and the world into the disaster of World War II, was built on economic foundations with serious cracks. Admittedly, Germany's and Italy's mutual economic importance increased notably, while they foreclosed their markets to former trade partners (especially the US). However, the analysis of the institutions governing the trade and its detailed structure indicate without question that this rapprochement followed no economic logic. Germany needed political support for its revisionist plans for Europe and was willing to pay for it. Nevertheless, in third-party markets no concessions were made. Especially in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, Nazi Germany harvested what Fascist Italy had sown. To increase market shares, Berlin copied foreign economic policies, developed by the likewise financially strapped Italy. Opportunities for better economic collaboration were given away. Victims of the approach can be found in many areas (e.g., chemicals, cars, artificial fibres) and especially among cross-border business endeavours. The contradictions in the economic rapprochement of the interwar ultra-nationalistic regimes clearly demonstrate the limits of economic nationalism in a globalising world.

The period of Islamic growth in Mecca from 610 to 622 AD can becategorized into a full challenges and full obstacles period. The Islamic da'wahdelivered by the Prophet Pbuh often encountered some constraints due to theresistance from the Quraysh leaders. At that time, it was difficult for Qurayshfigures to accept new beliefs, especially since Quraysh had a clan-based socio-cultural system consisting of 14 clans. Of the 14 clans or tribes in Quraish,there was competition for the political influence of Mecca which is recorded inhistory. The purpose of this study is to explain the obstacles to Islamic da'wahin Mecca caused by inter-clan politics among the Quraysh. The method usedin this study is a literature review method using primary sources from Arabic.This study explains that the hindrance to Islamic da'wah in Mecca before theProphet's Pbuh migration to Medina were caused by socio-cultural factors ofthe people at that time, that is the competition between clans in Quraish.

On January 3, 2020, the Iranian Quds Force commander, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated by the United States in Iraq. He was considered the mastermind behind Iran's regional strategy, especially in Syria and Iraq. A year and a half later, the Islamic Republic continues to wield considerable influence in Iraq, and Iran-backed militias continue to violently pressure US forces to leave Iraq. However, Iran now faces a series of serious challenges that are directly and indirectly related to Soleimani's death. In the geopolitical and economic spheres, the influence of Iran's rivals in Iraq has increased, while Tehran's room for maneuver has become increasingly limited. In the political arena, divisions among Iran-backed forces in Iraq have increased, while Iran's direct influence over the Iraqi government has been declining. At the same time, rising anti-Iranian sentiments among the Iraqi people have reduced Iran's social capital in the neighboring country. The combination of these factors seems to be limiting Iran's influence in Iraq. The EU should build upon this opportunity to sup­port a strong Iraqi government that pursues a multi-vector foreign policy.