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With an emphasis on the ideas that shaped the postwar international system, Robert Triffin: A Life explores both the man and his work. This biography evaluates what made Triffin a crucial figure in modern economic history, tracing Triffin's story from a child of the interwar period to his key role in European integration and ultimately the euro.

Robert Triffin (1911-1993), a Belgian-born economist who spent much of his career in America, had a major influence on 20th-century economic thinking. He is particularly known for his monetary approach. His intellectual legacy revolves ariund the 'Triffin dilemma' or 'Triffin paradox'. Triffin accurately predicted the end of the Bretton Woods system, though not for the right reasons. Triffin stuck by his monetary theory that it was much harder to achieve sound international economic management with flexible exchange rates and that best practices were by no means a guarantee of global stability if they were not accompanied by genuine international coordination. Triffin was also a committed European. He was close to Jean Monnet and Pierre Werner and worked alongside them from the early 1960's onwards in favour of European monetary integration.

Robert Triffin is questioned regarding his suggestion in "Reform of the International Monetary System" (no reference provided) to replace the US dollar as an exchange standard with an international standard based on reserves deposited in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). At present, rich countries import billions of US dollars as money investments from developing countries; in the suggested program, rich countries would export capital to the rest of the world, thus accelerating development in poorer countries. The responsibilities of the IMF as a supernational bank are explained, & its relations with the individual European Community governments are outlined. I. Shagrir

Cet article traite de la position de l'économiste Robert Triffin (1911-1993) au sujet des mesures de contrôle des changes, dont la charge devrait être assurée par la Banque centrale ou bien par une institution gouvernementale créée ad hoc . À la suite de l'expérience des années 1930 puis de la seconde guerre mondiale, un plaidoyer pour l'établissement de contrôle des changes apparaissait impossible à défendre de manière catégorique, compte tenu du rejet dont ces contrôles faisaient l'objet, par les économistes « officiels » aussi bien qu'académiques. Comme la plupart de ses contemporains, Triffin a par ailleurs affirmé dans ses écrits son souhait de voir naître un système monétaire international multilatéral qui serait idéalement dépourvu de restrictions et de discriminations. Toutefois, l'analyse macroéconomique de Triffin tout comme ses propositions de réforme monétaire internationale l'ont conduit à défendre de manière pragmatique un système coordonné de contrôles des changes en s'appuyant sur plusieurs arguments. D'une part, l'économie mondiale est confrontée à des cycles et donc des turbulences qui appellent un grand nombre de pays, en particulier les économies en développement, à appliquer des mesures de sauvegarde sur les changes. D'autre part, les contrôles des changes peuvent faciliter l'ajustement de la balance des paiements. Enfin, la mise en place de contrôle des changes est inhérente aux opérations de la chambre de compensation internationale dont Triffin, inspiré par la Clearing Union de Keynes, était un fervent partisan. Classification JEL : B22, E58, F31, F33

Especially with the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, Asian countries have advocated a profound reform of the international financial architecture. Their proposals focused on two main axes: a reform of the global financial system, and stronger regional monetary integration in Asia. There are here significant parallels with the ideas of Robert Triffin (1911–1993). Triffin became famous with trenchant analyses of the vulnerabilities of the international monetary system. The Triffin dilemma is still present among international monetary policy-makers, also in Asia. Triffin put forward several proposals for reforming the global monetary system, but he also developed proposals for regional monetary integration. These were very much based on his experience with the European Payments Union, and focused on the creation of a (European) reserve fund and a (European) currency unit. In this paper we focus on Triffin's proposals for an Asian payments union in the late 1960s, giving special attention to Japan (in Triffin's time, the biggest Asian economy; moreover, Triffin had an important Japanese network).

On 8 October 1970 in Luxembourg, Pierre Werner officially presented the plan by stages for an economic and monetary union (EMU) in the European Community. This document was the result of seven months of discussions by a group of experts from the six Member States, chaired by the Luxembourg Prime Minister and Finance Minister. The Werner Report set out the broad lines, principles and stages of an EMU based on the principle of irreversibility and an approach rooted in perfect symmetry between the economic and monetary aspects, with political union as the ultimate objective. It provided for the creation of a "centre of decision for economic policy" that would be "politically responsible to a European Parliament" elected by universal suffrage, and a "Community system for the central banks". It introduced the notion of strong macroeconomic governance, requiring the coordination of budgetary and monetary policies, and full financial integration. It also envisaged the involvement of the "social partners" (employers and unions) in defining economic and monetary policy, since the social dimension was seen as an intrinsic part of EMU. Although it was ultimately not implemented, the Werner Report led to the creation of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) in 1973 in Luxembourg – the embryo of the future European Central Bank. This institutional architecture was inspired by the reflections on a European reserve fund initiated in 1948 by Robert Triffin and subsequently developed through his discussions with Jean Monnet and Pierre Werner. The three were committed to the European cause and shared the same vision of EMU, rooted in "perfect parallelism", democratic strength and a social dimension. Robert Triffin and Jean Monnet, together with other members of Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe, intended to work on the strategy devised by Pierre Werner to build a political consensus around the report.