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Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. Philosophy as Existential Quest: Rorty's Life in Thought -- 2. The Philosophical Therapist: Rorty's Critique of 'Philosophy-as-Epistemology' -- 3. The Liberal Ironist: Rorty's Cultural Politics -- 4. The Anticlerical Prophet: Rorty and Religion -- 5. What is Truth For? The Conversation Continues -- Conclusion: Pragmatism as the Apotheosis of the Future: Rorty, Hope, and the American Sublime -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

In this paper I want two defend to principal ideas. In the first place, I will sustain, with Rorty, (I) tolerance is a moral virtue, which the members of a democratic society must have for it endures. In the second place (II), I will maintain, mere toleration is not enough by itself and a superior virtue, in order to liberal democratic community sustains or persists. ; En este artículo se sostienen dos ideas principales. Por un lado, se defiende, con el filósofo norteamericano Richard Rorty (I), que la tolerancia constituye una virtudmoral que los miembros de una sociedad democrática deben poseer si ésta ha de perdurar. Pero, por otro, se sostendrá que (II) la mera tolerancia no es por sí misma suficiente y que la solidaridad es una virtud superior para que subsista la comunidad democrática liberal.

Richard Rorty was a strong contextualist in his approach to philosophical and political ideas, yet his own most characteristic arguments are typically evaluated without much reference to the historical circumstances that provoked them. A key participant in the post-1980 revival of pragmatism within North American and European intellectual circles, Rorty reaffirmed the strong connections between American pragmatism and German idealism. This move placed him at odds with scholars who forged the unity of pragmatism—united John Dewey and William James—under the banner of radical empiricism. Those engaged most enthusiastically in celebrating Rorty's achievements, in short, defend a conception of pragmatism that Rorty sharply criticized and ideas about the history of philosophy that he did not share. His distinctive intellectual agenda is best appreciated after setting it in the context of the history of the American Left and, more specifically, the reckoning with the tumultuous 1960s that animates so many ongoing debates—inside and outside the academy—about cultural and political affairs.

APPROVED ; This thesis aims to explore Rorty's pragmatic approach to religion and critically engage with it. In the core of this approach lies his distinction between private and public projects, and his plea for the privatization of religion. Rorty argues that private beliefs do not need to be justified to others. They are about one's own making sense of the world, and individuals are under no obligation, neither epistemological nor moral, to justify them to other people. He insists that religious beliefs should be construed and understood as private beliefs. Throughout the thesis, I analyse the details and the implications of this position. I engage with the ethics of belief debate and examine the robustness of Rorty's views on unjustified private beliefs. I engage with his pragmatic predecessors and explore their influences on Rorty. I investigate his stance on religion's place in public. I discuss his views on democracy in relation to his views on religion. Finally, I compare his pragmatic approach to its current, mainstream alternatives. I conclude that Rorty offers a novel, attractive way to think and talk about religion. His approach is tolerant enough to accommodate both theistic and atheistic orientations. It is also robust enough to be able to fend its critics off.

This article presents, in its fundamental aspect, the theory of language of American pragmatist Richard Rorty, its construction from the reception and interpretation of Donald Davidson's linguistic philosophy and his conception of metaphor. The central tenets are developed and weighted as follows: contingency and historicity of language as conditions that prevent conception acquitted of any contextual link, holistic consideration of language games as a privilege justification for the pragmatic assessment evaluation, the non-cognitive dimensions of language that opens in a special way, metaphor, and, finally, projections or implications for human communication and the construction of a socio-political, pluralist, dialogic and imaginative democratic order. ; Este artículo presenta, en su aspecto fundamental, la teoría del lenguaje del pragmatista norteamericano Richard Rorty, su construcción a partir de la recepción e interpretación de la filosofía lingüística de Donald Davidson y de su concepción de la metáfora. Los postulados centrales que se desarrollan y ponderan son los siguientes: la contingencia e historicidad del lenguaje como condiciones que impiden concepciones absueltas de todo vínculo contextual, la consideración holística de los juegos de lenguaje como justificación del privilegio de la perspectiva pragmática de evaluación, las dimensiones no cognitivas del lenguaje a que abre, de manera especial, la metáfora y, por último, las proyecciones o consecuencias para la comunicación humana y la construcción de un orden socio-político democrático, pluralista, dialogal e imaginativo.

Rorty and Normativity
The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.