Suchergebnisse

Comrad Don Quixote / Nina Witoszek -- Explaining action and explaining social phenomena / Andreas Balog -- Socio-economics and a new scientific paradign / Roger hollingsworth, Karl H. Müller, Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, David M. Bear -- Rule system theory : an overview / Tom R. Burns -- Negotiation int the context of generalized game theory / Ewa Roszkowska -- Rough rule-following by social agents / Anna Gomolińska -- On the art of being usefully wrong : lessons from voting paradoxes / Hannu Nurmi -- The stabliization of social order : social cognitive dissonance theory applied to hospitals and clinics / Nora Machado -- Dare we dream of a future without AIDS? : challenges and opportunities for responsive social science research / Beth Maina Ahlberg -- Of mind and matter : policy paradigms and institutional design / Marcus Carson -- Corporate (social) responsibility as an arena for partnered governance : from the business to the public policy case / Atlte Midttun -- The institutionalization of a meta-order : negotiating the energy charter theory / Svein S. Anderson -- Opinion polling on international political accords / Hans L. Zetterburg -- The political systems of the United States and the European Union / Alberto Martinelli -- Germany and migration : a European case / Helena Flam -- Social rule systems theory and the disintegration of Yugoslavia / Dusko Sekulic -- Could Home oeconomicus become a revolutionary? : probing the irrevelance of standard economics / Christian Arnsperger, Philippe VeVillé

The inequities of the present system of rules in jai alai are documented on the basis of empirical information and theoretical results from a Monte Carlo simulation model. Some suggestions are made for changing the rules in order to make the game more equitable for both players and bettors. The simulation model is used to compare the effectiveness of the suggested rules with that of the present rules.

Women's parliamentary representation in the 27 long-established but "unfinished democracies" (Haavio-Mannila et al. 1985) of the world varies between 2.3% in Japan's lower house to 39.0% in unicameral Finland. Women state legislators in the United States range from 4% in Kentucky to 39% in Washington in the lower house. Women are 11% of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The causes of this variation are primarily the electoral arrangements by which legislators are chosen and, secondarily, the political, economic, and social context.Favorable societal conditions will not substitute for unfavorable electoral systems for women to reach their optimal representation in parliament and local legislatures. But unfavorable contextual conditions—including cultural biases and discriminatory practices—can be overcome to a great extent by alternate electoral systems. Electoral arrangements are not neutral; they are the means used to exclude or include groups. The arrangements are amenable to change faster than social biases and other barriers to women's election opportunity and fair representation.Democracy falls short when women of whatever color or ethnic group cannot cast an effective vote to elect representatives of their choice or to enact laws they believe are critically needed. When there are higher proportions of women in parliament, for example, more laws are enacted that benefit children (Lijphart 1991).

Examines the interaction between federalism & electoral rules which are generally seen as two distinctive mechanisms for managing territorial conflicts. Different kinds of electoral systems are described, including single-member plurality, closed list proportional representation, & alternative systems. A discussion of the effects that electoral systems have on conflict management & various aspects of party systems is followed by a look at patterns related to choices of electoral rules across different federations, especially in the industrialized world, in order to identify similarities within & across different systems. Data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development countries of Western Europe, North America, & Australasia are used to explore how different electoral rules affect the integration of political parties/party systems across levels of governments within countries. It is concluded that federalism is both strongly associated with bicameralism & compatible with a variety of electoral rules at both national & territorial levels. The advantages & disadvantages of single-member plurality electoral rules for governance are discussed. 4 Tables, 43 References. J. Lindroth