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Yesterday, a bluesky discussion focused on whether the Federation of Planets was essentially the UN with US domination or something else.  While I have written far more here about Star Wars, I have actually used Star Trek more in my teaching, and I have watched far more Trek (there is simply many more hours of Trek content).  Plus having written about NATO (the ebook is less than $18!), I have a few views on the matter.To start, what is the United Federation of Planets and what is Starfleet?  The Federation is an alliance of planets, more so than it is a true federation a la the US.  Not even a confederation like Canada.  How so?  The planets still have their own foreign policies--we see plenty of meetings of diplomats from members to various proceedings.  Note, diplomats, not just leaders or representatives.  Just as I always like to make fun of Texas secessionists for having their embassy in Texas when it should be in Washington, DC or London or some place beyond the territory of the "country" it is representing, federal units (with the funky exception of Quebec) don't have embassies and ambassadors.  This is a short cut, a bit of evidence, for the basic idea that the units in the federation are more independent, more akin to nation-states than they are to units in a federal country.  So, yeah, the name is deceptive.  Starfleet adds to the confusion because it is the military (despite denials) of the Federation.  This would make the Federation appear more like a country if it had a monopoly--if Starfleet was the only armed force within the federation.  However, I seem to remember various planets within the fed having their own armed starships including Vulcan.  So, despite the name, the Federation is not akin to a single country.  It is easier to dispense with the idea that the Federation is the European Union.  How much of the series and movies are about economic regulations and subsidizing agriculture?  Ok, more directly, the European Union, despite many attempts, does not really have a military, and it does not have a common foreign policy.  The EU forces that have shown up in Bosnia and elsewhere only do so (this will be brutal, sorry) after NATO has done all of the heavy lifting. It was NATO that ended the Bosnia conflict, it was NATO that compelled Serbia to let peacekeepers into Kosovo, it is NATO deterring the Russians from attacking the Baltics, and so on.  In trade negotiations, the EU acts as a single actor and with great power.  In other stuff?  Not so much. Which leaves the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Clearly, from the name and from Gene Roddenberry's idealism, the United Federation of Planets is just a spacey UN, right?*  The stuff above that makes the Federation not a country but many countries or nation-states works toward the UN idea--a bunch of different sovereign entities constantly negotiating, sending diplomats hither and yon to settle all kinds of issues.  The big questions are what is the Federation for and what is Starfleet for?  The classic answer is collective security: to deter aggression by any member against any member by providing assurances that any target of aggression will receive assistance from the rest of the community.  Until Alexander Wendt has his way, the entire imagination of the role of the UN is focused on members.  The UN is a universal organization...on Earth--the only countries that are not in the UN are Taiwan and ... depending on how you count the Vatican and Palestine and various unrecognized separatist folks.  The key things about this notion of collective defense are that no member is excluded from its protection, and it is not aimed at any particular aggressor.  The UN does not have a standing military, but has "sent" massive interventions when the membership have agreed, to thwart North Korea's aggression in 1950 (because the Soviet diplomats were stupidly boycotting the UN Security Council at the time) and Iraq's in 1990-91.  In both cases, it was really the US military and some allies under a UN banner in the former and nearly so in the latter.  One could argue that Starfleet is mostly a Terran/American endeavor and its activities are simply under a federation banner.  But again, the aim is at members.  In the original Trek, maybe some of it was aimed at fostering peace among members, but for most of Trek's history, Starfleet was aimed at protecting its members from non-members.Which gets us to NATO, which is not really a collective security organization, but a collective defense organization.  It is not so much aimed at protecting Greece from Turkey, but all of the members from external threats--mostly the Soviet Union/Russia but also terrorism, maybe China, etc.  "An attack on one is an attack on all", Article V, the heart of the alliance, is aimed at outsiders. All of NATO's military endeavors have been on the border of or entirely outside the territory of its members.  Kind of like how much of Starfleet's activities are at the borders, patrolling nearby neutral zones, or going beyond to intervene, despite the Prime Directive, in non-members.  How many episodes are akin to the Kosovo effort?  A boodle. Of course, the parallel is not perfect, since Starfleet is a coherent military organization from the academy to the command staff and in between, which NATO is not.  Its captains may buck orders (Kirk more so than others, but all of them did so), but not because their home country/planet had different rules than the Federation for operating in place x or y.  That is, the Steve and Dave book on the Federation would focus far less on the political systems of members states and far more on the personalities of individual ship captains, compared to our work on NATO (our book and articles focused mostly on whether countries had coalition governments or not, what kinds of coalitions they had, and personality of presidents and prime ministers only kicked in if there were no coalitional bargaining).Of course, there is no perfect parallel between the Federation and an existing Terran international organization, but given the focus of the Federation and the activities of Starfleet, NATO appears to be the closest, and I didn't even discuss enlargement.   *  I'd argue that Babylon 5 comes a lot closer to that, but that is a post for another day.   

An independent South African investigation found "no evidence" that Pretoria loaded arms onto a Russian ship when it docked in Simon's Town late last year, contradicting accusations made by the U.S. ambassador to South Africa in May.
"When all matters are considered, none of the allegations made about the supply of weapons to Russia have been proven to be true," South African President Cyril Ramaphosa said, adding that the accusation "had a most damaging effect on our currency, our economy, and our standing in the world."
Ramaphosa's fiery remarks highlighted the extent to which the allegations have soured U.S.-South Africa ties, which were already badly strained following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Pretoria has frustrated Washington by refusing to isolate the Kremlin and continuing to work with the Russian military, while South Africa has grown increasingly indignant at the idea that it must toe the U.S. line on the conflict.
But the results of the inquiry, which was led by an apparently trustworthy former judge, provide a chance to soothe growing tensions between the two countries. The State Department took a step in that direction Tuesday when spokesperson Vedant Patel said the U.S. appreciates "the seriousness with which the panel of inquiry in South Africa undertook to investigate" the incident, though he stopped short of endorsing the findings completely.
For South Africa, the motivation to improve relations with the U.S. is clear. While the country's ruling party has long insisted on neutrality in great power disputes, Pretoria has a much closer economic relationship with Washington than it does with Moscow.
That relationship relies in no small part on American goodwill since much of the countries' bilateral trade is underpinned by the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which allows South Africa to export certain goods to the U.S. without tariffs. Congress will have to decide in 2025 whether Pretoria gets to stay in the program.
But a drop in tensions could also have big upsides for the U.S. as it navigates choppy geopolitical waters ahead. Washington's insistence that other countries toe its line on the war has created a surge of frustration among leaders in the Global South, many of whom evince little interest in choosing a side in great power disputes. This is perhaps one reason that so many states now seek to join BRICS, a geopolitical grouping focused on economic independence from the West and led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. By papering over issues with South Africa, the United States could build a roadmap for improving relations with the Global South more broadly.
Improved relations with South Africa could also provide a boost to efforts to end the war in Ukraine, which has largely been locked into a bloody stalemate in recent months. As Philani Mthembu of the Institute for Global Dialogue recently argued, Ukraine and Russia have been fighting a second war for hearts and minds in Africa, which "may leave the doors in Kyiv and Moscow open to further dialogue" with African leaders pushing for a peace deal.
"The African peace initiative may thus not be the main negotiation process that resolves questions such as the future of the European security architecture, but it can still play an important role in focussing the world's attention on dialogue instead of further military escalation," Mthembu wrote. If the United States chose to quietly endorse this approach, it could help build momentum toward a peace deal, no matter how improbable such a result seems today.Ramaphosa and President Joe Biden will have a chance to start mending ties this weekend at the G20 summit in New Delhi, India. Though progress on Ukraine is likely to be limited, Biden has reportedly endorsed the African Union's bid to become a full member of the G20, helping to fulfill a long-time South African goal. The move suggests that, public differences aside, the U.S. may finally be ready to bury the hatchet.In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said he expects that the Black Sea Grain Initiative will be revived "in a short time" following meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to CNBC. Putin, who tore up the deal in July, told reporters that he would only rejoin the agreement if provisions related to the export of Russian agricultural products are "fully implemented." — On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken took a surprise trip to Kyiv, where he announced a new tranche of aid for Ukraine and batted down accusations that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed to make meaningful progress, according to the New York Times. Blinken also sought to tamp down concerns that a series of corruption scandals in Ukraine could affect American support for the country. "We're engaged in assisting the government of Ukraine on anticorruption efforts and on efforts to ensure accountability and full transparency of all the assistance we're providing, as well as the security of U.S.-provided defense articles and technologies," he said.— Western officials are pushing the United Arab Emirates to stop allowing Russia to avoid sanctions by purchasing dual-use goods, according to the Wall Street Journal. The UAE has reportedly become a prime intermediary for Russian businesses looking to get their hands on Western computer chips and electronics. Notably, Abu Dhabi has not joined sanctions against the Kremlin but has tried to avoid gaining a reputation as a market for illicit goods.— Robert Fico, the leading candidate in Slovakia's upcoming elections, is a staunch opponent of aid to Ukraine, raising the prospect that the country could split with fellow NATO allies and European Union members over the conflict, according to the New York Times. Fico's popularity stems in part from the fact that the Slovakian public remains divided over the conflict, with only 40 percent of the country saying that Russia is solely responsible for the war. Notably, the leftist and former prime minister has said that he would oppose Ukraine joining NATO, preferring instead to end the war by formalizing Kyiv's status as a buffer between Russia and the West.U.S. State Department news:When asked if the U.S. believes a diplomatic resolution of the war is likely, State Department spokesperson Vedant Patel emphasized American support for Ukraine's peace plan. "The Ukrainians and President [Volodymyr] Zelensky have very clearly laid out a proposal for a just and durable peace and a conclusion to this war," Patel said. "President Putin and the Russian Federation have continuously not been interested in engaging in these kinds of discussions."

Ukraine would consider inviting Russian officials to a peace summit to discuss Kyiv's proposal for a negotiated end to the war, according to Andriy Yermak, the Ukrainian president's chief of staff."There can be a situation in which we together invite representatives of the Russian Federation, where they will be presented with the plan in case whoever is representing the aggressor country at that time will want to genuinely end this war and return to a just peace," Yermak said over the weekend, noting that one more round of talks without Russia will first be held in Switzerland.The comment represents a subtle shift in Ukrainian messaging about talks. Kyiv has long argued that it would never negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin, yet there is no reason to believe Putin will leave power any time soon. That realization — along with Ukraine's increasingly perilous position on the battlefield — may have helped force Kyiv to reconsider its hard line on talking with the widely reviled Russian leader.Zelensky hinted at a potential mediator for talks following a visit this week to Saudi Arabia. The leader "noted in particular Saudi Arabia's strivings to help in restoring a just peace in Ukraine," according to a statement from Ukrainian officials. "Saudi Arabia's leadership can help find a just solution."Russia, for its part, has signaled that it is open to peace talks of some sort, though both Kyiv and Moscow insist that any negotiations would have to be conducted on their terms. The gaps between the negotiating positions of the two countries remain substantial, with each laying claim to roughly 18% of the territory that made up pre-2014 Ukraine.Ukraine's shift is a sign of just how dire the situation is becoming for its armed forces, which recently made a hasty retreat from Avdiivka, a small but strategically important town near Donetsk. After months of wrangling, the U.S. Congress has still not approved new military aid for Ukraine, and Kyiv now says its troops are having to ration ammunition as their stockpiles dwindle.Zelensky said Sunday that he expects Russia to mount a new offensive as soon as late May. It's unclear whether Ukrainian troops are prepared to stop such a move.Even the Black Sea corridor — a narrow strip of the waterway through which Ukraine exports much of its grain — could be under threat. "I think the route will be closed...because to defend it, it's also about some ammunition, some air defense, and some other systems" that are now in short supply, said Zelensky.As storm clouds gather, it's time to push for peace talks before Russia regains the upper hand, argue Anatol Lieven and George Beebe of the Quincy Institute, which publishes Responsible Statecraft."Complete victory for Ukraine is now an obvious impossibility," Lieven and Beebe wrote this week. "Any end to the fighting will therefore end in some form of compromise, and the longer we wait, the worse the terms of that compromise will be for Ukraine, and the greater the dangers will be for our countries and the world."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Hungary finally signed off on Sweden's bid to join NATO after the Swedish prime minister met with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Budapest, according to Deutsche Welle. What did Orban get for all the foot dragging? Apparently just four Swedish fighter jets of the same model that it has been purchasing for years. The prime minister blamed his party for the slow-rolling, saying in a radio interview prior to the parliamentary vote that he had persuaded his partisans to drop their opposition to Sweden's accession.— French President Emmanuel Macron sent allies scrambling Tuesday when he floated the idea of sending NATO troops to Ukraine, according to the BBC. Leaders from Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and other NATO states quickly swatted down the idea that the alliance (or any individual members thereof) would consider joining the war directly. Russia said direct conflict with NATO would be an "inevitability" if the bloc sent troops into Ukraine.— On Wednesday, Zelensky attended a summit in Albania aimed at bolstering Balkan support for Ukraine's fight against Russia, according to AP News. The Ukrainian leader said all states in the region are "worthy" of becoming members of NATO and the European Union, which "have provided Europe with the longest and most reliable era of security and economic development."— Western officials were in talks with the Kremlin for a prisoner swap involving Russian dissident Alexei Navalny prior to his death in a Russian prison camp in February, though no formal offer had yet been made, according to Politico. This account contrasts with the one given by Navalny's allies, who claimed that Putin had killed the opposition leader in order to sabotage discussions that were nearing a deal. Navalny's sudden death has led to speculation about whether Russian officials may have assassinated him, though no proof has yet surfaced to back up this claim. There is, however, little doubt that the broader deterioration of the dissident's health was related to the harsh conditions he was held under.
U.S. State Department news:In a Tuesday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the situation on the frontlines in Ukraine is "extremely serious." "We have seen Ukrainian frontline troops who don't have the ammo they need to repel Russian aggression. They're still fighting bravely. They're still fighting courageously," Miller said. "They still have armor and weapons and ammunition they can use, but they're having to ration it now because the United States Congress has failed to act."

The RAND corporation's Samuel Charap and Johns Hopkins University professor Sergey Radchenko published a detailed timeline and analysis of the talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators just after the Russian invasion in February 2022 that could have brought the war to an end just weeks after it had begun.
Much of the piece confirms or elucidates parts of the narrative that had previously been reported. In the spring of 2022, the two sides appeared relatively close to a deal, one that, according to the authors, would "have ended the war and provided Ukraine with multilateral security guarantees, paving the way to its permanent neutrality and, down the road, its membership in the EU."
But due to a combination of changing battlefield dynamics that convinced Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that he could win the war militarily, Western allies' hesitance to engage diplomatically with Russia and simultaneous ramping up of military support for Ukraine, and the discovery that Russian forces had committed atrocities in Bucha, the talks eventually fell apart.
On some of these points, the authors contend that earlier accounts have been overstated. The idea that the U.S. and the UK "forced" Zelensky to back out of peace talks is "baseless," say Charap and Radchenko, though they acknowledge that "the lack of Western enthusiasm does seem to have dampened his interest in diplomacy."
On the suggestion that the discovery of war crimes convinced the Ukrainian president to abandon negotiations, the authors note discussions "continued and even intensified in the days and weeks after the discovery of Russia's war crimes, suggesting that the atrocities at Bucha and Irpin were a secondary factor in Kyiv's decision-making."
But taken together, these factors, along with certain details of the agreement that were never finalized, were enough to imperil the negotiations.
In the two years since Ukrainian and Russian interlocutors last convened, the realities on the ground have changed. By April 2022, Vladimir Putin had likely realized that he would fail to achieve his most maximalist war aims. Now, with Western aid stalled and the war tilting in Moscow's favor, Ukraine is in a less favorable negotiating position than it was and Russia may be less inclined to enter talks.
But, as George Beebe and Anatol Lieven detail in a recent Quincy Institute paper, all sides still have a reason to pursue a diplomatic solution, one that could both end the war and provide for a new European security architecture once the fighting ceases.
As Charap and Radchenko note in their Foreign Affairs piece, one of the reasons the original talks broke down was because the two sides were more focused on the broader endgame rather than on shorter-term solutions.
"A final reason the talks failed is that the negotiators put the cart of a postwar security order before the horse of ending the war," they write. "The two sides skipped over essential matters of conflict management and mitigation (the creation of humanitarian corridors, a cease-fire, troop withdrawals) and instead tried to craft something like a long-term peace treaty that would resolve security disputes that had been the source of geopolitical tensions for decades."
The two years of war have only increased distrust between Russia, Ukraine, and Kyiv's Western backers, and diplomacy appears to be more difficult today than it was in 2022. But, say Charap and Radchenko, Zelensky and Putin surprised us once before with the concessions they may have been willing to make, and perhaps they will do so again. The consequences of that failed first effort at diplomacy are clear, as Thomas Graham, former senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff, argued this week.
"The great tragedy of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that it will ultimately prove to have been futile. The likely outcome — territorial adjustments in Moscow's favor, security guarantees for Ukraine and Russia — could have been peaceably negotiated beforehand had leaders had a firmer grasp of the real balance of power or greater political courage," he wrote in the Hill. "The cost of failed diplomacy is already hundreds of thousands of lives lost and hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of property destroyed."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— After months of waiting, the House may hold a vote to give Ukraine another tranche of aid over the weekend. On Wednesday, Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) introduced four separate bills, including one that will provide approximately $60 billion in aid for Kyiv. The House Speaker is already facing backlash from members of his own party, but the legislation is likely to have enough bipartisan support to pass if it is brought to the floor for a vote.
— There are reportedly increasing points of tension between Washington and Kyiv as Ukraine awaits more aid and its war effort falters. Zelensky was frustrated that Washington has not offered his country the same missile defense help as it provided to Israel during Iran's strikes over the weekend. "European skies could have received the same level of protection long ago if Ukraine had received similar full support from its partners in intercepting drones and missiles," Zelensky wrote in a post on X. "Terror must be defeated completely and everywhere, not more in some places and less in others."
Moreover, Kyiv has expressed frustration over Washington's recommendations that Ukraine not strike Russian oil refineries, according to The Washington Post. Vice President Kamala Harris reportedly privately made the suggestion to Zelensky in February at the Munich Security Conference.
"The request, according to officials familiar with the matter, irritated Zelensky and his top aides, who view Kyiv's string of drone strikes on Russian energy facilities as a rare bright spot in a grinding war with a bigger and better-equipped foe. Zelensky brushed off the recommendation, uncertain whether it reflected the consensus position of the Biden administration, these people said." according to the Post. "Instead of acquiescing to the U.S. requests, however, Ukraine doubled down on the strategy, striking a range of Russian facilities, including an April 2 attack on Russia's third-largest refinery 800 miles from the front."
— Russia and Ukraine nearly struck a deal late last month to renew the agreement that allowed for the safety of shipping in the Black Sea before Kyiv suddenly pulled out, according to Reuters.
"A deal was reached in March 'to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the Black Sea', and though Ukraine did not want to sign it formally, Kyiv gave its assent for Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan to announce it on March 30, the day before critical regional elections, the sources said," reports Reuters. The reason for Kyiv's withdrawal is unclear. Russia and Ukraine previously struck a deal to allow for safe shipping in June 2022 but Moscow withdrew from that agreement after one year.
U.S. State Department News
In a press briefing on Wednesday, State Department spokesman Vedant Patel urged the House to pass the aid bill for Ukraine quickly.
"So it certainly would not be hyperbole to say that every day matters, and the House, we believe, needs to act this week to support Ukraine and Israel as they respectively defend against Putin and the Russian Federation and the Iranian regime. And so this is something that we need Congress to provide urgently," Patel said.

On 31 January 2024, the International Court of Justice rendered its judgment on the merits of a case initiated by Ukraine against the Russian Federation in 2017. Ukraine alleged numerous violations by Russia of two treaties: the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This blog post provides a brief overview of the decision and argues that the Court sidestepped the task of reconstructing what has happened in reality via judicial fact-finding. This approach comes at the expense of several legal errors. The harsh realities of the conflict and, most importantly, the human suffering on the territories of Ukraine occupied by Russia seem far removed from the grandeur of the Peace Palace.

Russia has formally withdrawn from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the latest blow to prospects for continued Arctic cooperation as relations between Moscow and Western capitals plummet to new lows 18 months into Russia's invasion of Ukraine. "Under the current conditions, we are forced to announce the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (BEAC)," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement. "Through the fault of the Western members (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the EU), the Council's activities have been effectively paralysed since March 2022. The Finnish presidency failed to confirm the transfer of the BEAC presidency to Russia, scheduled for October 2023, in violation of the principle of rotation thus disrupting the necessary preparations," the statement added. Russia was informally dismissed from the BEAC, which has done work in areas including environmental protection, rights of indigenous peoples, conservation, and the sustainable management of forest resources, in the opening stages of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. A similar situation is playing out in the Arctic Council, whose seven other members — Canada, the United States, and the five Nordic states — announced in March 2022 that they will not convene under Russian chairmanship or work on projects involving Russia, the region's largest geographical stakeholder. The BEAC and Arctic Council, established in 1993 and 1996, respectively, reflected a uniquely optimistic moment in Russian-Western relations. With the Cold War in the rearview mirror at the end of 1991, there was an almost millenarian sense among former Cold War rivals that there was nothing stopping a fledgling Russian Federation from joining hands with the West to build a better world. Many of these multilateral institutions, established or expanded at a high point in Russian-Western relations, have seen their effectiveness diminished by decades of mounting tensions and were stretched to their breaking point following the Ukraine war. "Cooperation is based on values and on trust. And there is no trust today," said Finnish diplomat Jari Vilén, according to the Barents Observer. Western governments, in keeping with Vilén's line of reasoning, have tried to eject Russia from multilateral organizations and marginalize its role in any established frameworks for international cooperation as part of their maximum-pressure strategy against Russia. The problem is not just that Russia's sequestration has hobbled the BEAC and left the Arctic Council — an organization that pursues projects on a consensus basis — effectively paralyzed, but it is that, too. Work that cannot be conducted without Russian participation, including key environmental and climate monitoring initiatives, has been indefinitely suspended with all the varied consequences that entails. Yet there is an even more serious long-term cost to consider. Multilateral organizations can be especially useful in a low-trust or hostile environment, functioning as platforms for managing competition, filtering out destabilizing behaviors, and promoting dialogue on issues where limited cooperation can be mutually beneficial. The 1973 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which yielded a series of guiding principles articulated by the 1975 Helsinki Accords, was a substantive U.S. foreign policy achievement driven by a similar kind of gradualist institutional thinking. Moscow's membership in the BEAC and Arctic Council was, if nothing else, a way for the West to monitor Russian activities and keep them in check. Locking Russia into majority-western institutions, far from a liability, provided major strategic advantages. It established systems of regional cooperation that constrained Russia and benefited the west over the long term, incentivizing Moscow to act constructively toward Western states and institutions while diminishing opportunities for destabilizing behavior. Now, Russia's continued isolation from regional and other multilateral organizations is driving it to seek alternative arrangements that can harm Western interests in the arctic. Russia has responded to the Western embargo on Arctic cooperation by deepening its Arctic partnership with China, which is a void that Beijing has been all too happy to fill. Russia is proceeding with plans for a BRICS research station in the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard, reflecting Moscow's broader strategy to offset the effects of Western sanctions by deepening its cooperation with non-Western actors. More alarmingly, Moscow and Beijing have signed a memorandum in the northwestern Russian city of Murmansk for security cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic territories between Russian and Chinese coast guard units. Russia's isolation has opened the door for China to establish itself as a "near-Arctic state," an outcome that the Kremlin itself would have eyed warily prior to the new geopolitical realities that emerged after March 2022.Russia comprises around half of the Arctic, encompassing 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline. Moscow's current isolation from regional organizations cannot change the fundamental reality that Russia is and will continue to be a key player in the High North. The NATO bids of Finland and Sweden, too, have contributed to Russia's increasingly securitized framing of its interests in the Arctic. There is growing evidence to suggest that Russia is gradually increasing its Arctic military presence, investing in radar bases, runways, and other infrastructure. These actions are being accompanied by an uptick in NATO movements, contributing to a cycle of militarization that will make the region's inhabitants less safe. The cumulative effect of these developments is as ominous as it is unambiguous: once held up as a sterling model of transnational cooperation for the rest of the world, the High North has been transformed over the past 18 months into yet another theater of great-power competition.

Despite the initial optimism that accompanied the passage of billions of dollars in aid for Ukraine in April, there is a growing sentiment among analysts and American officials that it will serve an important defensive function — but might not be a game changer.
And while Ukraine waits for the latest tranche of American assistance to arrive, the situation on the battlefield is becoming increasingly grim. Over last weekend, Ukrainian forces retreated from three villages in the east of the country as it struggles to push back against Moscow's latest offensive.
In an interview with Foreign Policy on Wednesday, Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba did not present a particularly optimistic picture of what the new aid may accomplish. While he expressed gratitude for the aid, Kuleba lamented the slow process and urged Kyiv's Western allies to do more.
"There is a time gap between the announcement of the package and the moment when a Ukrainian artilleryman has more shells to fire back at the Russian invaders," Kuleba told FP's editor-in-chief Ravi Agrawal during the Q&A. "And that moment has not come yet, because everything that was announced—we are grateful and we appreciate it—is still on its way. And therefore, in this time gap, bad things may happen, such as the advance of Russian forces on the ground."
"Unfortunately, I have to admit that Ukraine's allies are behind schedule, despite their efforts. Some of them are making a great effort. But when I look at what Russia achieved in restoring the production of its defenders' industrial base and what the entire West has achieved so far, we have to face the truth and recognize that Russia is more effective in its war effort," he continued. "And this raises a more fundamental question to the West. If it cannot be efficient enough in this particular war effort, then how efficient can it be if other wars and crises of the same scale break out?"
But Ukraine is also confronting a significant manpower problem. The Washington Post reported last week that some in the country believe that President Zelensky's announcement that 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since 2022 is a significant underestimate.
Nonetheless, Kuleba pushed back against the argument — notably made by Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), among others — that Kyiv faced a "math" problem.
"If the war was only about math, you and I wouldn't be talking today because the position of the minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine would not exist anymore; we would have lost the war already," the foreign minister said.
Foreign Policy also asked about the prospect of diplomacy with Russia, wondering why Ukraine had so far neglected to invite one of the two warring parties to a series of "peace summits," including one forthcoming meeting in Switzerland.
"Your point is valid if you address the war that Russia launched against Ukraine with textbook diplomacy, because all textbooks that we learned from tell us that you need two parties to sit down and negotiate," Kuleba said. "Our approach comes from reality, and from the experience that we gained between 2014 and 2022, because the aggression against Ukraine started in 2014. Between 2014 and 2022, we had almost 200 rounds of talks with Russia in different formats, with mediators and bilaterally. But nothing worked. It ended up in the large-scale invasion [of 2022]. So we know that it doesn't make sense to have Russia at the table if you cannot ensure that they act in good faith."
He elaborated that the only ways to get Russia to negotiate in "good faith" are either to win on the battlefield or to build a global coalition of countries that can agree on shared principles and force Russia to agree.
"After that, communication with Russia may take place and Russia can be part of the talks," Kuleba acknowledged. "Because you are right: In the end, you cannot put the war to an end without both parties."
Moscow, for its part, has said that the peace conference in Switzerland is not a serious proposal. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Thursday that it is "completely impossible" that a summit without Russia will yield any meaningful results.
In other diplomatic news:
— Chinese President Xi Jinping will travel to Europe next week for the first time in five years. The trip is seemingly part of an ongoing effort from Beijing to present itself as a global peacemaker. Xi wants to play a "larger role in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine that has upended global political and economic security," according to The Associated Press. Earlier reporting said that one of Xi's goals during his visit will be to convince European leaders to invite Russia to participate in future peace talks.
— Zelensky says that Kyiv and Washington are working toward a long-term bilateral security agreement.
"Also, our teams, Ukraine and the United States, are currently working on a bilateral security agreement, and we are already working on a specific text," he said during an address this week. "Our goal is to make this agreement the strongest of all. We are discussing the specific foundations of our security and cooperation. We are also working on fixing specific levels of support for this year and for the next ten years, including armed support, financial, political, and joint arms production."
— The Ukrainian president also said that he expects his country to join NATO only after the end of the war with Russia. "In my personal opinion, we will only join NATO after we have won," he said during a joint press conference with NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg. "For Ukraine to be accepted into the alliance politically, it needs victory."
— The U.S. State Department formally accused Russia of using chemical weapons during its war in Ukraine on Wednesday. "The US conclusion tallies with testimony from Ukrainian troops who say they have faced increased encounters with gas and other irritant chemicals on parts of their frontline with Russia's forces in recent months," according to CNN. The Kremlin quickly denied the accusation, saying that they were "absolutely groundless, not supported by anything."
U.S. State Department News:
In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Vedant Patel denied reports that the U.S. was easing sanctions on certain Russian banks.
"I'm not sure what reports you're referring to, Alex. What I can just say broadly, though, is that when it comes to our efforts to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its infringement on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our Ukrainian partners, we have not taken our foot off the gas, going back to February of 2022 since this invasion occurred," Patel said. "And we will continue to take steps both to continue to support our Ukrainian partners, but also through sanctions, export controls, and other measures hold the Russian Federation accountable."

The Carnegie Center's Maksim Samorukov recently published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled "Putin's brittle regime. Like the Soviet one that preceded it, his system is always on the brink of collapse." The argument is driven by a straightforward historical analogy. The Soviet system appeared strong and immutable, and virtually no one predicted its collapse. But collapse it did. Likewise, the Putin system appears strong and resilient, and few people can imagine its collapse. But collapse it will.One can understand why this argument would be attractive to Foreign Affairs. Wishful thinking always gets an audience: people like to be told what they want to hear. Absent any prospects of a successful counter-offensive in Ukraine, the most likely scenario for Ukrainian victory is regime collapse in Russia.Historical analogies can be attractive but misleading in that they may focus our attention on superficial similarities, while ignoring structural differences. And there are several important respects in which Putin's regime is in a very different place from the Soviet Union of the perestroika era.First, Mikhail Gorbachev was only in power for six years and he was never able to establish effective control over the inner circle of Soviet leaders, nor the bureaucracy at large. As a result, his policy initiatives were blocked from effective implementation, forcing him to adopt more radical measures which destabilized the entire system.In contrast, Putin very quickly established strong control over rival elites after he came to power in 2000, restoring the "power vertical." He has been in charge for 24 years, and most analysts agree that the institutional foundations of the Putin regime are robust and it will likely survive the death of its founder.Second, a critical factor in the unraveling of the USSR was the fact that it was fighting an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, which forced it to enter negotiations with the West. Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine which it is still confident it can win.Third, the Soviet Union was bankrupt, running trade deficits and borrowing money abroad. In contrast, despite the pressure of Western sanctions, Russia ran a $50 billion trade surplus last year. The Soviet planned economy was rigid and value-destroying, a sinkhole of state subsidies. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia has a dynamic capitalist economy, well integrated into the global economy, and one whose entrepreneurs have been adept at evading Western sanctions.Fourth, the USSR was a federation where ethnic Russians made up 52% of the population. Putin's Russia is a more centralized state where Russians are 82% of the population.Admittedly, the possibility of an Islamist insurrection in the North Caucasus is a potential security challenge. But the logic that turned Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov into a loyal vassal of Moscow would apply to any successor. It is better to enjoy a flow of subsidies from Moscow and buy Lamborghinis, than to have Grozny turned back into a sea of rubble. The Chechens have learned their lesson from the first and second wars: that pursuit of independence is not worth the effort. None of the other ethnic republics in the Russian Federation are remotely interested in starting a war with Moscow.The Crocus City Hall attack of April 22 was not only a reminder that Islamist terrorism remains a security threat for Russia, but it represented a massive intelligence failure by the Russian security services. They were warned in advance by the U.S. that such an attack was coming: they should have placed armed guards at all concert halls in Moscow. However, attacks like Crocus are not going to cause regime change in Russia.The terrorists did not come from North Caucasus, but from Tajikistan. That indicates that the 8 million migrant workers from Central Asia are a potential security risk. But their value in Russia's labor-short economy still outweighs the security challenge, at least for now.The Wagner insurrection in June 2023 was an extraordinary development, the most serious threat to the stability of the Putin regime since its foundation in 2000. We'll never know what would have happened if the dog had caught up with the car: if Yevgeny Prigozhin had not turned back, but had ordered his troops to advance into Moscow. What we do know is that the insurrection failed. Prigozhin is dead and buried, and regime stability was quickly restored.Allowing the Wagner group to develop to a point where it could launch that mutiny was a serious error by Putin — second only to his decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But it remains an outlier, and cannot serve as a foundation for U.S.policy.To prevail in diplomacy and war one needs a realistic assessment of the adversary's strengths and weaknesses. The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union reminds us to expect the unexpected. But Putin (and China's President Xi Jinping) have learned from Gorbachev's mistakes. Washington should not build its Russia policy on the assumption that lightning will strike twice in the same place.

Western countries have asserted since the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine that they would use sanctions as a critical tool to suppress Russia's economy and sever its ability to trade with the rest of the world. They have kept their promise by continually adding to the number of sanctions as Russia's war in Ukraine has stretched into it second year.As of January 2024, the Russian Federation was subject to over 28,000 sanctions and the majority of these occurred after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Approximately 16,000 of these sanctions were imposed against individuals, while nearly 10,000 were imposed against companies and 3,200 against institutions. Additionally, there have been sectoral sanctions such as general trade embargoes on gas and oil. The EU and the U.S. have imposed most of these but countries like Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have also participated. While these sanctions intended to hamper Russia's war effort and foment domestic economic and political instability, most have not achieved these objectives. Russia has maintained its military activities in Ukraine while recent IMF forecasts predict growth of 2.6 percent in 2024 — at a time when many EU countries are heading toward recession amidst significant political uncertainty in 2024 — a pivotal election year in many Western democracies.Perhaps the greatest achievement has been reinforcing Russia's trade pivot to the East and the Global South and away from the European Union. As a result, Russia's trade turnover reached $530.2 billion in the first nine months of 2023. Exports reached $316.9 billion, while imports reached $213.3 billion. Russian exports to Asian countries reached $226.6 billion, an increase of 10.3% year on year, while imports amounted to $139.7 billion, increasing 39.5%. China accounted for $105 billion during the same time period compared to $78 billion for all of 2021. And Chinese imports of fuels were $52.7 billion in 2021 compared to $77.0 billion in the first nine months of 2023. China comprised $81.8 billion in imports to Russia (almost 40%) in the first nine months of 2023 while imports were 54.5 billion in all of 2021. During that same time, Russia's exports to India were $52 billion versus $8 billion for 2021. Indian imports of Russian fuel increased from $4 billion in all of 2021 to $46 billion during the first nine months of 2023.In contrast, Russian exports to the EU were $47 billion in the first nine months of 2023, a significant decrease from $192.8 billion in all of 2021. Russian imports from the EU sunk below $32 billion in the first nine months in 2023 from $81 billion just 21 months earlier. Fuel imports from Russia to the EU collapsed from $120 billion in 2021 to less than $27 billion in the first 9 months of 2023. Lastly, sanctions greatly reduced the share of imports from Russia from 28% in 2021 to 3% in 2023.Building a new trade frameworkThe trade numbers clearly depict the momentous redirection in Russian trade flows during the nearly two years since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But they don't reflect the geopolitical activities underpinning this seismic change nor do they indicate recent initiatives that the Russian government has undertaken to solidify the direction of trade. In this respect, Russia has actively engaged in a wide array of diplomatic activities, ranging from bilateral talks with countries like India and Iran to efforts to expand the membership and geopolitical reach of the BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).Late last year, India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow to discuss issues concerning the usual political, defense, and cultural partnerships. They also discussed more seriously, economic cooperation issues intended to buttress the strong growth in Russia-India trade that has occurred since 2022. The focus of these economic discussions centered on logistics, particularly those related to the establishment of the North-South International Transport Corridor (INSTC). All three segments of the corridor are now functional. These include the Western route (Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran-India), the Middle route (Russia-Iran-India) and the Eastern route (Russia-Central Asia-Iran-India). Russia hopes the increased use of the corridor will improve the infrastructure in Caspian ports and the ability to improve the status of Astrakhan and Makhachkala as transport hubs. Now that the Vladivostok-Chennai Sea route or Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) is also operational, India and Russia will have a realistic opportunity to elevate economic cooperation going forward and this will only bolster bilateral relations.The corridor is beneficial to India as well, both economically and geopolitically. It reflects the Indian elite's desire for viable alternatives to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India is also confident the corridor will provide greater access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan and continue to strengthen its economic ties with Iran and Russia. Another way that Russia is seeking to enhance regional trade is through the EEU. On December 25, EEU leaders met and signed an agreement with Iran. The agreement marked the end of two years of negotiations and will come into force after the ratification by the national parliaments. The Iran-EEU Free Trade Agreement eliminates tariffs of 87% of traded goods between the parties. It represents Iran's most extensive trade deal to date and it's an important deal for Russia as it solidifies another trade partner and underscores its leading role in the trade group and in Central Asia's economic development. Finally, in January 2024 the BRICS announced the expansion of the group by five new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The new membership will increase total BRICS GDP to $28.5 trillion or 28.1% of global output, compared to the G7 countries' 43.2% of global output. While the expansion of BRICS is notable from an economic perspective, it's more meaningful in a geopolitical context. The addition of Middle Eastern and more African countries gives the group a larger presence along key shipping and trade routes. It also increases the BRICS share of global oil production to 43% and 25% of exports. It's also important to note that BRICS accounts for 72% of global rare earth elements, which are key to high-tech weapons and consumer goods, including circuit boards and mobile phones.While many in the West only pay attention to the rhetoric about Russia's weak and collapsing economy and its economic isolation, Western policymakers need to follow closely Russia's continued initiatives in the geopolitical sphere. Russia's economic engagement may be complicated due to the joining of some difficult geopolitical realities, but the evolving framework has the potential to disrupt the traditional "rules-based global order" if not undermine it. Therefore, a policy of constructive and unrestricted engagement in trade and economic relations on a global scale needs to be a key tool of commercial diplomacy for Western policymakers going forward. This would include greater restraint from the heavy-handed sanctions policies that only reduce Western access to key goods and lead to higher global inflation, the brunt of which is borne by the middle- and lower-class consumer.

Russia's "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence," a high-level strategic document, says that Russia "hypothetically" could allow the use of nuclear weapons only "in response to aggression using WMD [weapons of mass destruction]" or if there is "aggression using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened."Responding to France's President Emmanuel Macron's February 6 statement that "no option should be discarded" in ensuring the defeat of Russia, including "troops on the ground" in Ukraine, Russia's President Vladimir Putin said that "we are ready to use any weapon, including [tactical nuclear weapons], when it comes to the existence of the Russian state and harm to our sovereignty and independence. Everything is spelt out in our strategy, we have not changed it."Macron replied that France is also a nuclear power. "We must first and foremost feel protected," Macron said, "because we are a nuclear power." He then added, "We are ready; we have a doctrine [for the use of nuclear weapons]."France is ready to send troops into Ukraine "to counter the Russian forces" and even to prepare for nuclear war. In a March 19 opinion piece in the French paper Le Monde, General Pierre Schill, Chief of the French Army Staff, declares that "nuclear deterrence safeguards France's vital interests." Reminding the world of France's "international responsibilities" and "interests" and "defense agreements," he says that "the French army is preparing for the toughest engagements, making this known and demonstrating it."But what do the French really mean by saying they are "preparing for the toughest engagement" and that Europe must be "ready" to have "troops on the ground" in Ukraine?Macron has said that NATO must not discard the option of "troops on the ground" to ensure that "Russia does not win." But win what? Does Macron want to ensure that Russia does not defeat Ukraine for Ukraine's sake, or does he mean that Russia should not win in Ukraine for the subsequent defense of Europe?Macron said that the time was coming "in our Europe where it will be appropriate not to be a coward" and that it is time for a "strategic leap." He pressed Germany to send their long-range Taurus missiles, reminding them that they once said, "'Never, never tanks; never, never planes; never, never long-range missiles'…. I remind you that two years ago, many around this table said: 'We will offer sleeping bags and helmets.'"When it came to the option of sending troops into Ukraine, Macron said that anyone who advocates "limits" on how the West helps Ukraine "chooses defeat." He insisted that "if the situation should deteriorate, we would be ready to make sure that Russia never wins that war." Europe must be "ready," he said, "to reach the means to achieve our objective, which is that Russia does not win."It sounded as if Macron was talking about Russian victory in Ukraine again when he considered the threshold for sending troops. "We're not in that situation today," he said, but "all these options are on the table." Following a March 7 meeting with parliamentary parties, Fabien Roussel, national secretary of the French Communist Party, reportedly said that "Macron referenced a scenario that could lead to intervention [of French troops]: the advancement of the front towards Odessa or Kiev." Macron's objective again seemed to solely be Ukraine when he said in a March 14 interview, "We are doing everything we can to help Ukraine defeat Russia, because I will say it very simply: there can be no lasting peace if there is no sovereignty, if there is no return to Ukraine's internationally recognized borders, including Crimea."But, against all these apparent narrow references to Ukraine, Macron's subsequent discussions of the threshold for troops sounded more as if they were about the defense of Europe than of Ukraine. He said that "war is back on our [i.e. Europe's] soil" and that Russia is "extending every day their threat of attacking us even more, and that we will have to live up to history and the courage that it requires."On March 14, Macron, again expressing his position that sending troops from NATO countries is an option that should not be discarded, said that "to have peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak." This time, he gave as his reason that Russia's invasion of Ukraine was "existential for our Europe and for France."He proceeded to say that "it wouldn't be us" who would trigger such a move and that France would not lead an offensive into Ukraine against Russia. "It would be Russia's sole choice and sole responsibility," he said. And then he added, "If war was to spread to Europe," it would "be weak, to decide today that we would not respond."But even if Macron means defending Europe from Russia, does he mean from an actual attack or simply a potential attack?With several of his aforementioned statements, Macron sounds like he means that Europe must be ready to defend against an actual attack from Russia after it defeats Ukraine. Yet elsewhere, Macron sounds like he is referring only to a potential attack, saying that Russia must not be victorious in Ukraine because that "would reduce Europe's credibility to zero" and would mean that "we have no security."Interpreting Macron's motives may be even more difficult than ascertaining his statements' bare meaning. Why would Macron express the previously inexpressible and risk crossing the red line of a third world war?It is of course impossible to know Macron's mind, so any analysis is speculative. But there are at least three possibilities.The first is that the intended target of his comments is not Russia at all, but the U.S. and Germany. With American war funding struggling against a congressional dam and Germany refusing to send Taurus long-range missiles, Macron may be trying to apply psychological pressure to his allies to send Ukraine more money and weapons assuming they would find that option more palatable than going even further and sending troops.The second is that the intended target of his comments is Russia. In this possibility, the goal is to create "strategic ambiguity." The purpose would be, as explained by one French diplomat, so that Russia, as it advances west in Ukraine, cannot rely on the assumption "that none of Ukraine's partner countries will ever be deployed" to Ukraine. The French newspaper Le Monde reports that "Macron's office explained that the aim is to restore the West's 'strategic ambiguity.' After the failure of the Ukrainian 2023 counter-offensive, the French president believes that promising tens of billions of euros in aid and delivering—delayed—military equipment to Kyiv is no longer enough. Especially if Putin is convinced that the West has permanently ruled out mobilizing its forces."The third possibility is that the intended target of his comments is Europe. Europe must prepare for the possibility of a Trump administration weakening its commitment to Europe and NATO. That would leave Europe with more responsibility for the defense of Ukraine and of itself. While Germany has been the economic leader of Europe, France has seen itself as the security leader.One diplomat told Le Monde that while Germany "is afraid of escalation…. France wants to give the impression that it isn't afraid." Macron "may have wanted to make it clear to Scholz that their two countries are not in the same league" as Macron positions France to be the security leader of Europe in a post-Biden Trump-led world. Macron has opened the door to the discussion of Western troops on the ground in Ukraine. With the risks that come with opening that door, it will be important for everyone to clarify both Macron's threshold and his motivation for sending troops to Ukraine.This piece has been republished with permission from The American Conservative.

With the pendulum of war swinging in Russia's favor and the Western alliance only now clearing the way for more aid to Ukraine, many have been waiting for the Institute for the Study of War to offer its take on who is to blame and what is to be done. ISW has been one of the most referenced think tanks in mainstream media reporting on the war in Ukraine and has played a prominent role in creating and sustaining war optimism in the West in 2022 and 2023. Its daily battlefield reports have repeatedly played up Ukrainian victories and emphasized Russian failures and losses, almost always uncritically reproducing the version received from Kyiv.Such reporting is unsurprising when we consider the specific nature of ISW as a think tank. Funded by important military contractors in America's military industrial complex such as General Dynamics, DynCorps International, and CACI International, ISW is also a creation of the "Kagan industrial complex." It was founded by Kimberly Kagan, the wife of military historian Frederick Kagan, who in turn is the brother of Robert Kagan — co-founder of the infamous neo-conservative think tank the Project for a New American Century. It would be remiss not to mention that Robert Kagan is married to none other than Victoria Nuland, who was until recently heading up the U.S. State Department's policy on Ukraine and Europe.Given the hawkish and neoconservative ideological bent of ISW's leadership, one would not expect their stance on the war in Ukraine to change even in the light of new developments. Yet, its recent report "Denying Russia's Only Strategy for Success" is a remarkable double down. Not only does it present the recent deterioration of Ukraine's military prospects as a Kremlin disinformation campaign, it is also a manifesto for military escalation.Instead of examining where the Western alliance has come up short, or any concession of Russia's resilience and adaptation to the challenge of war, the ISW report is squarely focused on the apparent superpowers the Kremlin enjoys in the domain of "perception manipulation." It claims the Kremlin "floods Western discourse with false and irrelevant narratives" to condition Western publics to "freely reason to a conclusion that Russia's prevailing in Ukraine is inevitable." Reviewing the references the report is based on, it is clear the authors have no direct proof of Kremlin activity. Their work mostly relies on other ISW reports and cites tweets by Elon Musk and David Sacks or cherry-picked media articles as evidence of Westerners being duped by Russia. Unpacking the central thesis of Russian disinformation, the report goes on to claim that the West has a vast superiority over Russia in terms of resources and technology and that all that is needed to defeat Vladimir Putin is "strategic clarity." As ISW are experts in military history, it seems incredible they have forgotten the numerous historical examples of countries with superior GDP being defeated by economically and technically inferior opponents. Sidestepping such inconvenient points, the ISW report focuses on the West's loss of clarity — be it the genuine divisions and fear within NATO or distractions caused by other issues. The blame for this is placed squarely on the Kremlin, implying that Russia has almost superhuman capacities to control Western perception. Unsurprisingly, the report urges Westerners (referred to as "we" and "us" throughout the text) to blow this Kremlin-induced fog from their minds. In other words, if only the West can eradicate "defeatism," return to its core "values" and "virtues" and understand the true nature of the Russian threat is in its disinformation capacities, then the rest will be simple. The Western alliance will bridge its "need gap" and produce a "surge" in support to Ukraine to ruin Putin's dream of a Russian victory. Once again, there is not a single sentence here that refers to the real war-making capacities of NATO or Ukraine. Where do the munitions come from? What about the manpower? Which NATO members are ready to step up their commitment? The ISW report fits into the previous track record of poor quality military analysis from neo-conservative think tanks on the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. One must conclude that the purpose of this ISW report is in fact to boost the morale of analysts overwhelmed by pessimistic questions about the war's new trajectory. Indeed, the ISW report dismisses talk of peace as "surrender" to Putin. It also rejects those concerned about escalation and a NATO-Russia war and explicitly saying that the West must escalate to resist Putin's aggression. Failure to resist is tantamount to surrender.The discourse of discrediting previous Western diplomacy with Russia as cowardly and failed appeasement is well-established and repeated in the report. ISW goes one step further by calling for the rejection of all "Russian premises" in understanding the conflict in Ukraine. This is a sure way to ensure there can be no basis for any negotiations with Russia.This brings us to the crucial final part of the report where, having "debunked" a spectrum of points as merely part of the Kremlin's grand perception manipulation campaign, the authors outline the logical next step in the war: a new escalation. The first part is to "deny Russia's sanctuaries," by which the authors mean encouraging Ukraine to have free rein in attacking targets inside the Russian Federation. Second, they call for NATO to support new forms of asymmetric warfare to catch Russia off guard and somehow offset their increasing dominance on the frontlines. Finally, the report vaguely calls for the West to "target Russia's capability globally," which appears to advocate espionage, political and economic warfare, and perhaps even terrorism. In summary, the report advocates blowing up various targets connected to Russia in the hope this derails their summer offensive in Ukraine. ISW has issued a clear call for the West to fearlessly up the ante against Russia. In reading it, one recalls the strong influence ISW has had up to this point in shaping perceptions of the war in Ukraine. What is striking is the way the group has revealed its own hand as a crucial agent not in supplying objective and accurate military reports but in waging information warfare. One could even say that ISW itself "floods Western discourse" to condition U.S. public opinion to "freely conclude" that it is necessary to escalate against Russia. Although deeper research is needed, it would seem likely that ISW is far more successful in spreading discourses on the war than any Kremlin agency. Indeed, Russia has no equivalent to ISW's global influence and reach in the information domain. The Kremlin's presentation of its war aims or ability to contest key points has been clearly weak in the West. Despite all the ISW claims, it appears that Russia has long given up on serious "perception manipulation" in the West in favor of hard power. As a debacle looms for the Western alliance in Ukraine, the Institute for the Study of War is offering a Plan B of escalation to solve the current situation. With the anniversary of NATO this month, we can expect their arguments will be heard in various meetings across the Western world. One only hopes the counter-argument for restraint can be made without being shouted down as a Kremlin propaganda tactic.

The Biden administration has spent the past six months trying to get China and Russia to play ball on nuclear arms control. Observers are now asking: What does the U.S. have to show for these efforts? Not much, according to a top official on the National Security Council.
In recent comments at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Pranay Vaddi, the Senior Director for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation at the National Security Council, gave a highly anticipated update on the administration's arms control efforts. On the China and Russia fronts, the picture ranged from dire to dismal.When it comes to Russia, the Biden administration's engagement strategy has been a failure. Just hours before the event at CSIS, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed a U.S. proposal to resume a dialogue on nuclear arms control. As Vaddi explained, the U.S. had delivered a formal proposal to Russia in September, which included three parts: discussing non-compliance issues in the New Start Treaty (the last remaining deal capping U.S. and Russian arsenals), discussing a post-New Start framework before its 2026 expiration date, and managing nuclear risks. Russia had already formally rejected the proposal in December, Vaddi said, and the Kremlin has since made no substantive proposals of its own.
As for China, there were at least some positive developments in the overall relationship worth highlighting. The two sides re-established a bilateral working group on arms control and non-proliferation in November. Then, later that month, President Biden and President Xi met on the sidelines of APEC, where they announced the resumption of military-to-military dialogue. Most recently, on Jan. 9, American and Chinese military officials held Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT). Talks between each country's militaries were particularly important, according to Vaddi, "because our emphasis for so long has been really on strategic risk reduction."
As important as these initial discussions were, Vaddi added that the Biden administration wants the arms control dialogues to be "results-oriented" and aimed towards getting to "practical solutions" to some of their shared security problems. This is a reasonable expectation on its face, but it also speaks to the Biden administration's concern that such talks may not go further than mere dialogue and consultation, owing to China's long-standing disinterest in such negotiations. At any rate, Vaddi gave no indication that we can expect any substantive arms control development in the near-future.
The lack of progress on arms control is a major disappointment for the White House that comes just six months after national security adviser Jake Sullivan's much-ballyhooed speech at the Arms Control Association. Describing the current moment as an "inflection point" in the global nuclear security order, Sullivan laid out the Biden administration's vision for arms control in an era of great power competition. This meant addressing the challenge presented by Russia and its suspension of the New Start Treaty, as well as questions and concerns regarding China's ongoing nuclear buildup in light of its long-standing No First Use policy and traditionally limited nuclear deterrent.
The Biden administration's failure to produce any substantive arms control wins through its good-faith engagement strategy will also make it all the harder to resist pressures to enter into a new nuclear arms race. Vaddi admits as much when he considers the prospect that Russia may not agree to a New Start follow-on. That very real possibility, he says, "has to be baked into our own thinking as we look at our own nuclear modernization."
Vaddi addressed questions about this modernization effort as the discussion turned, naturally, to a discussion about the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Established in the 2022 NDAA, the Commission was mandated to assess and provide recommendations for the U.S.'s long-term strategic posture and nuclear strategy. Although the Commission's members were selected ostensibly through a bipartisan process, the findings included in its final report, released on Oct. 16, struck many as anything but balanced – arguably a reflection of the outlook and interests of the defense industry, which nine of the 12 members reportedly maintain strong connections with the weapons industry. Called "a full-throated embrace of a U.S. nuclear build-up" by the Federation of American Scientists, the report argues that the U.S. must match the combined nuclear threat posed by Russia and China.As the Commission report's recommendations goes far beyond what is called for in the Biden administration's own Nuclear Posture Review, Vaddi emphasized that questions about U.S. nuclear posture and arms control lie solely with the executive branch and the established interagency process, and that this report amounts only to "important data" to take into account. He did, however, concede that the Commission's findings "communicate a sense of urgency that we share — that we are entering a two-peer environment. It's never been dealt with before."
Hinting at the ways in which the report was already putting pressure on the administration's internal discussions, Vaddi went on to say that the Commission's report has stimulated a lively conversation about U.S. nuclear posture, both at home and abroad. Vaddi shared that close allies and partners have asked how the U.S. is taking the Commission's report into account. And, he added, the White House has no choice but to engage with it since the recommendations will likely serve as a "baseline of information" as Washington enters the "posture-hearing season."
This refers to the annual spate of congressional hearings, typically in the spring months, in which the secretary of defense and other military leaders appear before the House and Senate Armed Service Committees to justify their budgets for the following fiscal year. Congress will no doubt be eager to see report recommendations make their way onto next year's budget.
Overall, the prospects for real and respectable arms control initiatives with China and Russia by the end of Biden's first term only seem to be getting worse, even as the threat of great power nuclear conflict becomes increasingly salient.

The uncertain future of the European EmpireThe European Union faces two paths that could lead to a dangerous fork in the road. On the one hand, the EU has increased its powers during the Great Recession and the pandemic. Specifically, it has increased public spending through the multiannual budget and recovery programs, for the first time it has issued its own debt bonds, it has strengthened its surveillance of state finances, it has established common rules on banking, and is trying to control the external borders. On the other hand, after ten years without accepting new members and Brexit, Ursula von der Leyen's Commission and Charles Michel's Council are now proposing a new wave of enlargements with Ukraine, Serbia, and up to nine countries.Internal reinforcement and external enlargement are not easily compatible paths. The more integration increases, the more difficult it will be to assimilate new members with lower economic levels, less compliance with the laws, and more corruption, like the existing candidates. And the more members are accepted, the more difficult further integration will be. Even with its 27 member countries, the euro is only used by 20 and the opening of internal borders by 23; energy policy clashes with the interests of different countries in oil, coal, gas, nuclear or renewables; common defense and security is the most lagging part of foreign policy; and the regulation of the labor market or Social Security is not even considered.In its current stage, the EU can be characterized as an Empire, a fluid, intermediate formula between national states and a consolidated federation. A few years ago, Oxford professor Jan Zielonka and the author of this Blog, who at the time did not know each other, concurred on publishing two books on the subject (his, Europe as Empire; mine: Great empires, small nations, and later The European Empire).The greatest echo came from the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso. At a massive press conference in Brussels to present the Treaty of Lisbon, he indicated that "The European Union is not a super-state like the United States nor an international organization like NATO. We have the size of empires," he noted, "and we are now what some authors call the first 'non-imperialist empire'."An empire as a form of political organization, like the EU, differs from a state and a federation in two characteristics. First, it has no stable external borders, but rather expands and contracts with expansions and exits. Second, the center maintains asymmetric relations with the territorial units.The best comparative reference is the process of building the United States. About 125 years passed from independence at the end of the 18th century to the consolidation of a stable federation. One of the first presidents, Thomas Jefferson, contemplated the creation of "an empire of liberty"; another of the founders, Alexander Hamilton, said that the United States was "the embryo of a great empire"; and in the mid-19th century, President James Polk declared that it was already "a country large enough for a great empire."The subsequent federal project almost failed due to a terrible Civil War. A more stable federation was only consolidated in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. Fixed borders were established in 1912 when the initial 13 republics on the East Coast of North America had expanded to 48 states from coast to coast (later, two more without territorial connection, Alaska and Hawaii, were added). In those same years, just before World War I, democratic representation was stabilized by fixing the size and form of election of the House of Representatives and the Senate, a single currency and robust public finances were consolidated through the Federal Reserve, and the FBI was created in charge of security throughout the country.In comparison, the construction of a united Europe has developed through only about seventy years. We can avoid the civil war because we already had it before, the so-called Second World War. In 1912, US public spending was 7% of GDP, a milestone that could perhaps serve as a horizon for the current EU. A Council with more and more diverse members would have even more difficulty making decisions unanimously, requiring intricate reforms of the decision rules.Meanwhile, integration advances at different speeds for different countries or a la carte, which produces, in eurojargon, a variable geometry or concentric circles: there is a strong core of three or four countries, the other members currently integrated, those not completely in, and several external partners on some issues. Ukraine's candidacy rules out a neutral zone or intermediate cushion against Russia, as Austria and Finland were during the Cold War, but the pending enlargements will not be consummated before 2030. The European Political Community, which met last week in Granada, seeks cooperation between the 47 geographically European countries.The European Union is already the third political unit in the world by the size of its population and economy. In the long term, it could evolve into a more stable and homogeneous democratic federation, as was the case with the United States, or break up into multiple territorial units, as happened to the Russian Empire first with the Revolution and then with perestroika. The difficult combination of internal reinforcement and external enlargement will determine its future, that is, ours and that of global balance.



 

 

During a major end-of-year press conference this week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that talking about negotiations with Russia was "not relevant" at this time because Moscow has not yet shown any interest in ending the war.
Zelensky said that Ukraine would participate in a fourth round of talks with international security officials to discuss Kyiv's ten-point peace plan at the World Economic Forum in Davos early next year.
"We will work to ensure that this meeting gathers representatives of all continents, including the Global South. The last five points of the Peace Formula will be worked out at this meeting," Zelensky said during the news conference, held on Tuesday in Kyiv. "The first five points were considered by advisers at the previous meeting in Malta at the end of October."
That meeting in Malta followed previous gatherings in Denmark and Saudi Arabia aimed at firming up support for Ukraine's vision of a settlement from the international community. Representatives from many major nations have taken part, though Russia has yet to be invited to the meetings.
"According to Zelensky, after the fourth round Kyiv will work on organizing the first inaugural summit at the level of state leaders – the Global Peace Summit," reported the Kyiv Post. "During the event, an agreement between the countries on the fundamental provisions, which will be embodied in the corresponding document, will be developed. After the document is adopted by all states, it can be transferred to the representatives of the Russian Federation."
"If Russia is ready to accept that document, it will indicate that the issue of negotiations is relevant. Today it is not relevant. I don't see any request from Russia, I don't see it in their actions. I only see arrogance and murder in their rhetoric," Zelensky said.
During his remarks, the Ukrainian leader made a number of other notable remarks, including rejecting the assessment that his troops were losing the war, instead maintaining that Moscow had not accomplished any of its goals on the battlefield in 2023.
Zelensky struck an optimistic tone, insisting that the slow-moving aid packages from the United States and the European Union would eventually come through. ""We are working very hard on it," he said regarding aid from Washington. "I am confident that the United States will not betray us and that everything we have agreed on with the U.S. will be fulfilled."
The Ukrainian president also said that military advisors told him that Kyiv would need to mobilize approximately another 500,000 troops next year if it wants to successfully repel Russia's invasion. Zelensky, however, did not commit to the mobilization, saying that the half a million figure was a "serious number" and that he would need to hear more arguments in favor of the move before making a decision.
As Connor Echols noted in last week's edition of Diplomacy Watch, Russian President Vladimir Putin held his own major press conference earlier this month, in which he "played down his military's middling performance and alleged that Western 'freebies' for Ukraine 'are gradually running out.'"
This week, Putin claimed that he would be open to negotiations with Kyiv and its Western supporters, but offered no details and said that Moscow "will not give up what is ours."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Turkey would be prepared to ratify Sweden's bid for membership in NATO once the U.S. Congress agrees to the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara. "Positive developments from the United States regarding the F-16 issue and Canada keeping its promises will accelerate our parliament's positive view on [Sweden's membership,]" Erdogan said. "All of these are linked." Turkey has held up Sweden's bid to join NATO for over a year.
—The U.S. Congress officially went home for the year this week without approving the emergency supplemental package that includes $61 billion in aid for Kyiv. The chances that the Senate would reach a compromise on the spending bill appeared slim in recent weeks, and despite some last-minute maneuvering, leadership eventually decided to punt on the legislation until next year. Punchbowl News published a timeline on Wednesday detailing how Washington — and the Republican Party in particular — has steadily grown skeptical on funding Ukraine in the nearly two years since Russia's invasion.
—The Associated Press reports that the mood among Ukrainian forces has become increasingly gloomy this winter as they revert toward a more defensive position and as the lack of both manpower and firepower become more evident. "Despite a disappointing counteroffensive this summer and signs of wavering financial support from allies, Ukrainian soldiers say they remain fiercely determined to win," the report reads. "But as winter approaches, they worry that Russia is better equipped for battle and are frustrated about being on the defensive again in a grueling war. Some doubt the judgment of their leaders."
U.S. State Department news:
During a press briefing on Tuesday, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller was asked if the administration had any "outside of the box" plans for funding Ukraine if Congress did not approve the aid package.
"There is no magic pot of funding that we have available to draw on if Congress doesn't pass this bill. That's not how government funding works. There is a – there are funding streams that we can draw on," he said. "We have used those funding streams. We have nearly exhausted them, and over the next few weeks, we'll fully exhaust them, and that's why we need Congress to act."

"I don't think that [the war] is a stalemate," Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky told NBC News' Meet the Press on Sunday."They thought they would checkmate us, but," he insisted, "this didn't happen." According to recent interviews, his military leadership disagrees. His political inner circle thinks his insistence is delusional.Zelensky is facing pressure both from within Ukraine and from without. Growing pressure from within is coming from both the political and military leadership; growing pressure from without is coming from Ukraine's key partners.The battle is largely being played out in the Western media. Most intimately, Zelensky has faced criticism from his political inner circle. TIME magazine reports that some of the president's advisors have become worried that his "belief in Ukraine's ultimate victory over Russia . . . "verg[es] on the messianic." One of Zelensky's "closest aides" said that Zelensky "deludes himself." The aide complained, "We're out of options. We're not winning. But try telling him that."Some Zelensky aides say his intransigence hampers Ukraine's ability to adapt to the changed reality on the battlefield and worry that negotiating a settlement with Russia remains "taboo."Domestic criticism is also coming from the top levels of the military. Zelensky is reportedly in conflict with his generals over the conduct of the counteroffensive and over his demands to defend Bakhmut and Avdiivka at any cost, which the military leadership sees as a strategic mistake that is already hurting Ukraine dearly in soldiers and equipment. A senior Ukrainian military officer said that orders from the president's office are, at times, disconnected from the battlefield reality and defended some front-line commanders who have begun second-guessing and refusing "orders from the top."Zelensky's struggle with his generals intensified on November 3 when Zelensky fired General Viktor Khorenko, the commander of Ukraine's special operations forces. The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Valery Zaluzhny, did not request his dismissal. The New York Times reports that "It was unclear whether General Zaluzhny, the overall commander of Ukraine's forces, knew in advance of the planned dismissal" and that "[t]he firing appeared to undercut General Zaluzhny's authority."The firing took U.S. military officers, who "described a close and effective working relationship with" Khorenko, by surprise. Khorenko's special operations forces had had some success with long-range strikes and sabotage operations behind Russian lines. But the NYT reports that there had been tension over what the military had "perceived as politically guided decisions on strategy" that had been ineffective and costly.Zelensky's tensions with his generals reached a peak with Zaluzhny's November 1 interview with The Economist. He asserted that the war had reached a "stalemate." He conceded that "There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough."What's worse is that Zaluzhny implied that the stalemate would evolve into defeat for Ukraine. A stalemate entails a long war of attrition. In a companion essay published simultaneously by The Economist, he explained that a long war "as a rule, in most cases, is beneficial to one of the parties to the conflict. In our particular case, it is the russian [sic] federation, as it gives it the opportunity to reconstitute and build up its military power."Zaluzhny said that in a prolonged war, Ukraine will run out of the "required volume" of missiles and ammunition while Russia, despite sanctions, is increasing its production capabilities. And even if it didn't run out of weapons, he added, it will run out of men: a war of attrition "leads to the lack of Ukraine's ability to achieve superiority over the enemy in reserves by increasing their number." A close Zelensky aide told TIME that, even if the United States gave Ukraine all the weapons it needed, Kyiv doesn't "have the men to use them."Zelensky's office censured Zaluzhny, saying it "eases the work" of Russia and stirs "panic" among Ukraine's Western partners. The New York Times calls the censure "a striking public rebuke that signaled an emerging rift between the military and civilian leadership."In addition to the pressure coming from within Zelensky's inner political and military circle, diplomatic pressure is also coming from Zelensky's international partners. A November 3 NBC News article reported that "U.S. and European officials have begun quietly talking to the Ukrainian government about what possible peace negotiations with Russia might entail to end the war." The article went on to say, citing one current and one former senior U.S. official familiar with the discussions, that "the conversations have included very broad outlines of what Ukraine might need to give up to reach a deal."The quiet talks suggest agreement by the U.S. and its European allies with Zaluzhny that Ukraine may not achieve its goals on the battlefield, that the realization of their aspirations may continue to dim with prolonged battle, and that some concessions may need to be made.There is a remarkable convergence in the language used by the U.S. and European officials and the language used by Zaluzhny and Zelensky's aides. NBC reports that the conversations "began amid concerns among U.S. and European officials that the war has reached a stalemate." NBC reports that, like Zaluzhny, "[s]ome U.S. military officials have privately begun using the term 'stalemate' to describe the current battle in Ukraine."Like Zaluzhny and Zelensky's aides, "Biden administration officials also are worried that Ukraine is running out of forces." According to "people familiar with the matter," NBC reported, "President Joe Biden has been intensely focused on Ukraine's depleting military forces." "Manpower," one of those sources is quoted as saying, "is at the top of the administration's concerns right now." Echoing the "close Zelensky aide" quoted in TIME, the same source said, "The U.S. and its allies can provide Ukraine with weaponry, but if they don't have competent forces to use them it doesn't do a lot of good."These concerns, NBC reported, have led U.S. officials to concede privately that "Ukraine likely only has until the end of the year or shortly thereafter before more urgent discussions about peace negotiations should begin."That leaves only a couple of months. With the battlefield turning against Ukraine despite Zelensky's intransigent "belief in Ukraine's ultimate victory over Russia," the pressure targeted at Zelensky seems to be building, from both within and without,, to turn to the diplomatic front and face the beginning of the end of the war.