Suchergebnisse

The article was inspired by the visit of Pope Francis on September 22-25 in 2018 to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. During the visit, the Pope Francis spoke about the idea of preserving national identity: "It is obvious that from the political point of view you are part of the West. but the part of that tragic history came from the West – from Germans, Poles. To have this in mind means to know that the firmness is necessary, the firmness not only to belonging to the West, but also the firmness of having the identity of ourselves" (https://www.lrytas.lt/pasaulis/įvykiai/ 2018/09/26/news/popiezius-pranciskus/). Mentioning the Poles, the Pope apparently had in the mind the occupation of Vilnius. The research of the pupils of South-Eastern Lithuania, conducted in 2016 by the Lithuanian Institute of Culture Policy, which was headed by the author of this article, allows us to look at the current situation. Since this publication is dedicated for the issue of the social integration in Lithuania, the study on influence of the Poland on the identity of Polish pupils may be relevant. The subject of the whole study was broader - the cultural needs of pupils, but the influence of Poland was revealed indirectly: by identifying the difference in participation in excursions of Lithuanians, Poles and Russians to Poland. In April – May 2016, 1141 pupils were questioned in 19 schools in Vilnius, Švenčionys and Šalčininkai districts. 66% of the respondents in Vilnius district in the first place identified Lithuania as their fatherland, 26% identified Lithuania as their fatherland in the second place, while did not identified Lithuania as their fatherland 8% of pupils. The question is: "If the every twelve person who does not indicate Lithuania as their fatherland is big or small number?" In our opinion, it big number, since the same 8 per cent of respondents in the first place as their fatherland named the other country. Most often it was mentioned Poland, sometimes Russia or Belorussia. In addition, almost every third respondent in the second place considers his or her fatherland another (not Lithuania) country. The views of Lithuanians and Poles are rather different. If for 75% of the Lithuanians respondents, Lithuania are in the first place as their fatherland, and for 18% in the second. Meanwhile, 59% of Lithuanian Poles said that their fatherland is Lithuania in the first place, and for 33%, Lithuania as their fatherland is in the second place (in the first place as their fatherland indicated Poland). 7% of Lithuanians and 8% of Poles did not indicate Lithuania as their fatherland either in the first or second place. Poles in the schools with education in Polish language have a much better chances to visit Poland, and the number of visits in Poland is directly correlated with the naming of Poland as their fatherland. Almost 2/3 of the Polish pupils respondents who went on a trip to Poland, indicated another country as their fatherland (an absolute majority indicated Poland). Only one-third Lithuanians who went on a trip to Poland, indicated another country as their fatherland. Of course, an excursions to Poland be considered a decisive factor in such an identification with Poland, but this data quite clearly highlight the differences in the identification of the Lithuanians and the Poles. Thus, a data of representative study of pupils from Southeastern Lithuania (Vilnius, Švenčionys and Šalčininkai districts) raise the question: is the Pole is a Lithuanian Pole (a citizen of Lithuania), or a Pole, who live in Lithuania and identifying with Poland? According to the data of a qualitative survey, the inactivity of Lithuanian state institutions does not encourage the development of the attitude of Lithuanian Pole as a citizen of Lithuania. Attitude to identifying Lithuania as a fatherland is often treated as old approach, does not relevant to the present-day Europe. Often, a pupils living in Vilnius region naming Poland as his fatherland. Poland's support for schools with Polish language education is more effective than the influence of Lithuania itself in Vilnius region. Obviously, there are still dominated two different concepts: Poland is based on the concept of one country – the two Republics, where Lithuania was in the role of a younger brother, and Lithuania is "get stuck" in the memories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The intensity of these two different concepts can hardly be changed in the nearest future. It is necessary to realize that for the Poles who lives in the Vilnius region their own village or town are primarily considered as their fatherland. This is not only Lithuanian, but also their land. However, they live in Lithuania, therefore, must be formed a perception that their fatherland is not only a native land, but also Lithuania. As the qualitative research shows, unfortunately, this formation is only imitated, as many measures on the development of South-Eastern Lithuania are only adopted, but not implemented in the practice.

The article was inspired by the visit of Pope Francis on September 22-25 in 2018 to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. During the visit, the Pope Francis spoke about the idea of preserving national identity: "It is obvious that from the political point of view you are part of the West. but the part of that tragic history came from the West – from Germans, Poles. To have this in mind means to know that the firmness is necessary, the firmness not only to belonging to the West, but also the firmness of having the identity of ourselves" (https://www.lrytas.lt/pasaulis/įvykiai/ 2018/09/26/news/popiezius-pranciskus/). Mentioning the Poles, the Pope apparently had in the mind the occupation of Vilnius. The research of the pupils of South-Eastern Lithuania, conducted in 2016 by the Lithuanian Institute of Culture Policy, which was headed by the author of this article, allows us to look at the current situation. Since this publication is dedicated for the issue of the social integration in Lithuania, the study on influence of the Poland on the identity of Polish pupils may be relevant. The subject of the whole study was broader - the cultural needs of pupils, but the influence of Poland was revealed indirectly: by identifying the difference in participation in excursions of Lithuanians, Poles and Russians to Poland. In April – May 2016, 1141 pupils were questioned in 19 schools in Vilnius, Švenčionys and Šalčininkai districts. 66% of the respondents in Vilnius district in the first place identified Lithuania as their fatherland, 26% identified Lithuania as their fatherland in the second place, while did not identified Lithuania as their fatherland 8% of pupils. The question is: "If the every twelve person who does not indicate Lithuania as their fatherland is big or small number?" In our opinion, it big number, since the same 8 per cent of respondents in the first place as their fatherland named the other country. Most often it was mentioned Poland, sometimes Russia or Belorussia. In addition, almost every third respondent in the second place considers his or her fatherland another (not Lithuania) country. The views of Lithuanians and Poles are rather different. If for 75% of the Lithuanians respondents, Lithuania are in the first place as their fatherland, and for 18% in the second. Meanwhile, 59% of Lithuanian Poles said that their fatherland is Lithuania in the first place, and for 33%, Lithuania as their fatherland is in the second place (in the first place as their fatherland indicated Poland). 7% of Lithuanians and 8% of Poles did not indicate Lithuania as their fatherland either in the first or second place. Poles in the schools with education in Polish language have a much better chances to visit Poland, and the number of visits in Poland is directly correlated with the naming of Poland as their fatherland. Almost 2/3 of the Polish pupils respondents who went on a trip to Poland, indicated another country as their fatherland (an absolute majority indicated Poland). Only one-third Lithuanians who went on a trip to Poland, indicated another country as their fatherland. Of course, an excursions to Poland be considered a decisive factor in such an identification with Poland, but this data quite clearly highlight the differences in the identification of the Lithuanians and the Poles. Thus, a data of representative study of pupils from Southeastern Lithuania (Vilnius, Švenčionys and Šalčininkai districts) raise the question: is the Pole is a Lithuanian Pole (a citizen of Lithuania), or a Pole, who live in Lithuania and identifying with Poland? According to the data of a qualitative survey, the inactivity of Lithuanian state institutions does not encourage the development of the attitude of Lithuanian Pole as a citizen of Lithuania. Attitude to identifying Lithuania as a fatherland is often treated as old approach, does not relevant to the present-day Europe. Often, a pupils living in Vilnius region naming Poland as his fatherland. Poland's support for schools with Polish language education is more effective than the influence of Lithuania itself in Vilnius region. Obviously, there are still dominated two different concepts: Poland is based on the concept of one country – the two Republics, where Lithuania was in the role of a younger brother, and Lithuania is "get stuck" in the memories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The intensity of these two different concepts can hardly be changed in the nearest future. It is necessary to realize that for the Poles who lives in the Vilnius region their own village or town are primarily considered as their fatherland. This is not only Lithuanian, but also their land. However, they live in Lithuania, therefore, must be formed a perception that their fatherland is not only a native land, but also Lithuania. As the qualitative research shows, unfortunately, this formation is only imitated, as many measures on the development of South-Eastern Lithuania are only adopted, but not implemented in the practice.

The article was inspired by the visit of Pope Francis on September 22-25 in 2018 to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. During the visit, the Pope Francis spoke about the idea of preserving national identity: "It is obvious that from the political point of view you are part of the West. but the part of that tragic history came from the West – from Germans, Poles. To have this in mind means to know that the firmness is necessary, the firmness not only to belonging to the West, but also the firmness of having the identity of ourselves" (https://www.lrytas.lt/pasaulis/įvykiai/ 2018/09/26/news/popiezius-pranciskus/). Mentioning the Poles, the Pope apparently had in the mind the occupation of Vilnius. The research of the pupils of South-Eastern Lithuania, conducted in 2016 by the Lithuanian Institute of Culture Policy, which was headed by the author of this article, allows us to look at the current situation. Since this publication is dedicated for the issue of the social integration in Lithuania, the study on influence of the Poland on the identity of Polish pupils may be relevant. The subject of the whole study was broader - the cultural needs of pupils, but the influence of Poland was revealed indirectly: by identifying the difference in participation in excursions of Lithuanians, Poles and Russians to Poland. In April – May 2016, 1141 pupils were questioned in 19 schools in Vilnius, Švenčionys and Šalčininkai districts. 66% of the respondents in Vilnius district in the first place identified Lithuania as their fatherland, 26% identified Lithuania as their fatherland in the second place, while did not identified Lithuania as their fatherland 8% of pupils. The question is: "If the every twelve person who does not indicate Lithuania as their fatherland is big or small number?" In our opinion, it big number, since the same 8 per cent of respondents in the first place as their fatherland named the other country. Most often it was mentioned Poland, sometimes Russia or Belorussia. In addition, almost every third respondent in the second place considers his or her fatherland another (not Lithuania) country. The views of Lithuanians and Poles are rather different. If for 75% of the Lithuanians respondents, Lithuania are in the first place as their fatherland, and for 18% in the second. Meanwhile, 59% of Lithuanian Poles said that their fatherland is Lithuania in the first place, and for 33%, Lithuania as their fatherland is in the second place (in the first place as their fatherland indicated Poland). 7% of Lithuanians and 8% of Poles did not indicate Lithuania as their fatherland either in the first or second place. Poles in the schools with education in Polish language have a much better chances to visit Poland, and the number of visits in Poland is directly correlated with the naming of Poland as their fatherland. Almost 2/3 of the Polish pupils respondents who went on a trip to Poland, indicated another country as their fatherland (an absolute majority indicated Poland). Only one-third Lithuanians who went on a trip to Poland, indicated another country as their fatherland. Of course, an excursions to Poland be considered a decisive factor in such an identification with Poland, but this data quite clearly highlight the differences in the identification of the Lithuanians and the Poles. Thus, a data of representative study of pupils from Southeastern Lithuania (Vilnius, Švenčionys and Šalčininkai districts) raise the question: is the Pole is a Lithuanian Pole (a citizen of Lithuania), or a Pole, who live in Lithuania and identifying with Poland? According to the data of a qualitative survey, the inactivity of Lithuanian state institutions does not encourage the development of the attitude of Lithuanian Pole as a citizen of Lithuania. Attitude to identifying Lithuania as a fatherland is often treated as old approach, does not relevant to the present-day Europe. Often, a pupils living in Vilnius region naming Poland as his fatherland. Poland's support for schools with Polish language education is more effective than the influence of Lithuania itself in Vilnius region. Obviously, there are still dominated two different concepts: Poland is based on the concept of one country – the two Republics, where Lithuania was in the role of a younger brother, and Lithuania is "get stuck" in the memories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The intensity of these two different concepts can hardly be changed in the nearest future. It is necessary to realize that for the Poles who lives in the Vilnius region their own village or town are primarily considered as their fatherland. This is not only Lithuanian, but also their land. However, they live in Lithuania, therefore, must be formed a perception that their fatherland is not only a native land, but also Lithuania. As the qualitative research shows, unfortunately, this formation is only imitated, as many measures on the development of South-Eastern Lithuania are only adopted, but not implemented in the practice.

Ever since 1992 UN global conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro the countries that took part in this global event agreed upon the development of the concept of sustainable development. This latter concept has become the basis and as well the main objective of the international environmental regime, trying to fulfill it to its highest theoretical level. The concept of sustainable development is pointed at the balance of three different spheres: economical, social and environmental, at the same time not prioritizing any of them, thus making sure none of them is superior to others. Considering the main idea of the latter concept it is seen why it has become so important in the years from the day it was presented – today the humanity has to deal with constantly developing environmental problems and their caused aftermaths which have a close link with the globally acknowledged human rights. Such aftermaths infringe the human rights as well as the principles of the common welfare deriving from them, like the right to clean environment, to shelter, to food, to water and, of course, the most fundamental rights of all – the right to health and the right to life. It is important to mention that a number of people that pattern of life is being affected by the actual global environmental problems (such as climate change, water, ground and air pollution, ineffective waste management or naturally or human-caused environmental degradation) is constantly growing and has an increasing tendency to grow unless these problems are effectively addressed internationally. The main objective of this master's work is to determine the specifics of the actual global environmental problems, what international legal instruments cover them, to determine the effectiveness of their regimes and what value they provide towards the creation of the global environmental system that would ensure sustainability in reaching international environmental law solutions. Trying to make sure how the international environmental law instruments and their regimes work the following aspects are reviewed: 1) today's ecological situation in the world, today's ecological problems and what relation they have with the fundamental welfare principles derived from the human rights; 2) theoretical model of sustainable development and the role of the European Union as one of the most ecologically aware actors in the international arena; 3) specifics, efficiency and implementation problems of the international environmental instruments which regulation is addressed to climate change such as United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol; 4) regimes of the international waste management (including dry land as well as water, seas and ocean areas), their efficiency, implementation problems and methods addressed to waste prevention; 5) status of ecological refugees – how they are treated and what dangers as well as legal problems they are facing. The hypothesis of this mater's work is as follows: The international solution of the global environmental problems can be ensured implementing today's international environmental legal instruments and together with them ensuring creation of the international sustainable environmental system. Considering the analyzed data and the legal scholars' opinions considered in this work it is seen that the latter hypothesis is not proved out. It is seen that both, implementing international environmental legal instruments and creation of the international sustainable environmental system with the regimes deriving from such instruments, depend on several factors that are primarily related to separate states and their sovereign power. Moreover, while many states (especially the states referred as the third world countries) are not financially strong to consider the possibility to invest a lump sum of money in order to fight environmental problems, there are concerning cases when a bunch of economically strong states is not even considering such behavior – they are simply not willing to lose their economic competitive ability abiding the rules of international environmental legal instruments addressed to prevent certain factors that have a significant footprint in a progress of the environmental problems that are being faced, for example, the case with the climate change and following obligations to reduce emissions. We can see that there is a specific legal vacuum when the states that have previously ratified specific international legal instruments, for example Kyoto Protocol, can even avoid common obligations that other states obligate themselves to follow (for example the case with Russia, Japan and Canada when these countries simply opted out from the second commitment period (2013 to 2020) of the Kyoto Protocol due to strict emission obligations) – such imperative-free option is one of the main reasons why the idea of international sustainable environmental legal system is in a stage of stagnation. Therefore, now we can see that implementation of sustainable development principle is only possible in state and regional level (as common states' initiative, for example, the case of the European Union and its member states). Meanwhile, the global level is considered to be a future objective, a pursuable model of environmental international cooperation which at the given moment is only possible on a theoretical plane.

Ever since 1992 UN global conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro the countries that took part in this global event agreed upon the development of the concept of sustainable development. This latter concept has become the basis and as well the main objective of the international environmental regime, trying to fulfill it to its highest theoretical level. The concept of sustainable development is pointed at the balance of three different spheres: economical, social and environmental, at the same time not prioritizing any of them, thus making sure none of them is superior to others. Considering the main idea of the latter concept it is seen why it has become so important in the years from the day it was presented – today the humanity has to deal with constantly developing environmental problems and their caused aftermaths which have a close link with the globally acknowledged human rights. Such aftermaths infringe the human rights as well as the principles of the common welfare deriving from them, like the right to clean environment, to shelter, to food, to water and, of course, the most fundamental rights of all – the right to health and the right to life. It is important to mention that a number of people that pattern of life is being affected by the actual global environmental problems (such as climate change, water, ground and air pollution, ineffective waste management or naturally or human-caused environmental degradation) is constantly growing and has an increasing tendency to grow unless these problems are effectively addressed internationally. The main objective of this master's work is to determine the specifics of the actual global environmental problems, what international legal instruments cover them, to determine the effectiveness of their regimes and what value they provide towards the creation of the global environmental system that would ensure sustainability in reaching international environmental law solutions. Trying to make sure how the international environmental law instruments and their regimes work the following aspects are reviewed: 1) today's ecological situation in the world, today's ecological problems and what relation they have with the fundamental welfare principles derived from the human rights; 2) theoretical model of sustainable development and the role of the European Union as one of the most ecologically aware actors in the international arena; 3) specifics, efficiency and implementation problems of the international environmental instruments which regulation is addressed to climate change such as United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol; 4) regimes of the international waste management (including dry land as well as water, seas and ocean areas), their efficiency, implementation problems and methods addressed to waste prevention; 5) status of ecological refugees – how they are treated and what dangers as well as legal problems they are facing. The hypothesis of this mater's work is as follows: The international solution of the global environmental problems can be ensured implementing today's international environmental legal instruments and together with them ensuring creation of the international sustainable environmental system. Considering the analyzed data and the legal scholars' opinions considered in this work it is seen that the latter hypothesis is not proved out. It is seen that both, implementing international environmental legal instruments and creation of the international sustainable environmental system with the regimes deriving from such instruments, depend on several factors that are primarily related to separate states and their sovereign power. Moreover, while many states (especially the states referred as the third world countries) are not financially strong to consider the possibility to invest a lump sum of money in order to fight environmental problems, there are concerning cases when a bunch of economically strong states is not even considering such behavior – they are simply not willing to lose their economic competitive ability abiding the rules of international environmental legal instruments addressed to prevent certain factors that have a significant footprint in a progress of the environmental problems that are being faced, for example, the case with the climate change and following obligations to reduce emissions. We can see that there is a specific legal vacuum when the states that have previously ratified specific international legal instruments, for example Kyoto Protocol, can even avoid common obligations that other states obligate themselves to follow (for example the case with Russia, Japan and Canada when these countries simply opted out from the second commitment period (2013 to 2020) of the Kyoto Protocol due to strict emission obligations) – such imperative-free option is one of the main reasons why the idea of international sustainable environmental legal system is in a stage of stagnation. Therefore, now we can see that implementation of sustainable development principle is only possible in state and regional level (as common states' initiative, for example, the case of the European Union and its member states). Meanwhile, the global level is considered to be a future objective, a pursuable model of environmental international cooperation which at the given moment is only possible on a theoretical plane.

Ever since 1992 UN global conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro the countries that took part in this global event agreed upon the development of the concept of sustainable development. This latter concept has become the basis and as well the main objective of the international environmental regime, trying to fulfill it to its highest theoretical level. The concept of sustainable development is pointed at the balance of three different spheres: economical, social and environmental, at the same time not prioritizing any of them, thus making sure none of them is superior to others. Considering the main idea of the latter concept it is seen why it has become so important in the years from the day it was presented – today the humanity has to deal with constantly developing environmental problems and their caused aftermaths which have a close link with the globally acknowledged human rights. Such aftermaths infringe the human rights as well as the principles of the common welfare deriving from them, like the right to clean environment, to shelter, to food, to water and, of course, the most fundamental rights of all – the right to health and the right to life. It is important to mention that a number of people that pattern of life is being affected by the actual global environmental problems (such as climate change, water, ground and air pollution, ineffective waste management or naturally or human-caused environmental degradation) is constantly growing and has an increasing tendency to grow unless these problems are effectively addressed internationally. The main objective of this master's work is to determine the specifics of the actual global environmental problems, what international legal instruments cover them, to determine the effectiveness of their regimes and what value they provide towards the creation of the global environmental system that would ensure sustainability in reaching international environmental law solutions. Trying to make sure how the international environmental law instruments and their regimes work the following aspects are reviewed: 1) today's ecological situation in the world, today's ecological problems and what relation they have with the fundamental welfare principles derived from the human rights; 2) theoretical model of sustainable development and the role of the European Union as one of the most ecologically aware actors in the international arena; 3) specifics, efficiency and implementation problems of the international environmental instruments which regulation is addressed to climate change such as United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol; 4) regimes of the international waste management (including dry land as well as water, seas and ocean areas), their efficiency, implementation problems and methods addressed to waste prevention; 5) status of ecological refugees – how they are treated and what dangers as well as legal problems they are facing. The hypothesis of this mater's work is as follows: The international solution of the global environmental problems can be ensured implementing today's international environmental legal instruments and together with them ensuring creation of the international sustainable environmental system. Considering the analyzed data and the legal scholars' opinions considered in this work it is seen that the latter hypothesis is not proved out. It is seen that both, implementing international environmental legal instruments and creation of the international sustainable environmental system with the regimes deriving from such instruments, depend on several factors that are primarily related to separate states and their sovereign power. Moreover, while many states (especially the states referred as the third world countries) are not financially strong to consider the possibility to invest a lump sum of money in order to fight environmental problems, there are concerning cases when a bunch of economically strong states is not even considering such behavior – they are simply not willing to lose their economic competitive ability abiding the rules of international environmental legal instruments addressed to prevent certain factors that have a significant footprint in a progress of the environmental problems that are being faced, for example, the case with the climate change and following obligations to reduce emissions. We can see that there is a specific legal vacuum when the states that have previously ratified specific international legal instruments, for example Kyoto Protocol, can even avoid common obligations that other states obligate themselves to follow (for example the case with Russia, Japan and Canada when these countries simply opted out from the second commitment period (2013 to 2020) of the Kyoto Protocol due to strict emission obligations) – such imperative-free option is one of the main reasons why the idea of international sustainable environmental legal system is in a stage of stagnation. Therefore, now we can see that implementation of sustainable development principle is only possible in state and regional level (as common states' initiative, for example, the case of the European Union and its member states). Meanwhile, the global level is considered to be a future objective, a pursuable model of environmental international cooperation which at the given moment is only possible on a theoretical plane.

The paper compares the introduction and stabilization of national currency in the First and Second Republics of Lithuania (LR I and LR II) during the years 1918–1922 and 1990–1993, respectively. These diachronic comparisons are supplemented by the synchronic ones where LR I is compared with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland and LR II with Estonia and Latvia. Jointly with Lithuania, all these countries faced the challenge of nation state building simultaneously with the macroeconomic stabilization. Both times, Lithuania was the last to introduce the national currency. The analysis starts with a discussion of the similarities and differences in the economic situations of the LR I and LR II during the first years of independence. In this discussion, the author argues that the prototype of the Soviet command administrative economy was the administrative war economy of Kaiser Germany during WWI, with occupied Lithuania suffering under extreme forms of the administrative control of economic activities by the Oberost authorities. The restoration of the capitalist free market economy and macroeconomic equilibrium was complicated by the extraordinary spending to finance the independence wars in 1918–1920 when national states-in-making lacked administrative capacities to collect taxes in the ordinary ways. Therefore, all Lithuanian neighbours did finance their independence wars by inflation tax, introducing national currencies almost immediately after proclaiming independence and collecting up to 2/3 of the total state revenue from the seigniorage. Among all countries fighting indepenendence wars in the modern times, Lithuania was probably unique in its persistent effort to pay the war cost without the inflation tax. As Lithuania maintained a monetary union with Germany up to 1922, it donated to this country the seigniorage income and was not able to draft all its available manpower because of monetary restrictions. At the same time, the early LR I provides for the posteriority an example of the frugal management of state finance policies even under extraordinary circumstances. This example still lacks the due appreciation by neoliberal monetarist apologists of the sound monetary and fiscal policies. During its early time of restored independence, LR II procrastinated to end the monetary union with its former imperial suzerain (Russia) too for quite a different reason: the choice of the Gediminas Vagnorius' government to participate in the "inflation race" in the rouble zone after September 1991 when the restoration of independent Lithuania was internationally recognized. The winners in this race were the former republics of the USSR that were the leaders in rising prices and wages. Therefore, while Lithuania in 1918–1922 suffered only from imported (from Germany) inflation, in 1991–1992 this country both imported and exported inflation. While permissive policies of the Vagnorius government helped to void the efforts of the Moscow to undermine Lithuanian independence in January–August 1991 by the economic blockade, their continuation after the dissolution of the USSR delayed the onset of macroeconomic stabilization until the early summer 1993. Even after October 1st, 1992 when the national provisional currency talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania, its govermnent continued collecting the inflation tax, which was immoral given the absence of the war or other extraordinary circumstances. Because of the delayed macroeconomic stabilization, market reforms in Lithuania were conducted in the wrong sequence, with a large-scale privatization enacted under conditions, near to hyperinflation, which favoured prolonged rent-seeking by the early winners. The correct sequence of market reforms in Estonia, due to its early monetary stabilization (since June 1992), jointly with more favourable initial conditions, helped this country to become the leader in the "Baltic race". The policy of Gediminas Vagnorius to chase after short-time advantages of the leadership in the inflation race among the former Soviet republics was punished by Lithuania losing the long-time advantages of the leadership in the transformation race among them Baltic countries. According to another concluding causal argument, the governments of LR I committed a strategic blunder by declining to use the inflation tax for the extraordinary spending to finance the independence war in 1918–1920. Despite their smaller populations and a greater WWI damage (in Latvia's case), both Estonia and Latvia raised more than 70 000 manpower each, financing their war efforts by the inflation tax. Because of its responsible and frugal financial policies, which were wrong given the extraordinary circumstances of a war, the peasantly penny-pinching Lithuania had only some 30 000 manpower at the time of critical battles for its historical capital Vilnius in the autumn 1920. Such military power was too small and weak to hold the city against only one allegedly rebellious division under general Lucjan Żeligowski from landlordly lavish Poland which, like other Lithuania's neighbours, financed its war effort in 1918–1920 by the inflation tax. So Lithuania lost Vilnius in 1920, because it was not ready to pay its (monetary) price. Credits to Prof. Dr. Arnd Bauerkämper from Freie Universität Berlin who hosted the research visit of the author to Berlin to collect and research part of the sources (about post-WWI inflation in Germany and Eastern Europe) used in the paper.

The paper compares the introduction and stabilization of national currency in the First and Second Republics of Lithuania (LR I and LR II) during the years 1918–1922 and 1990–1993, respectively. These diachronic comparisons are supplemented by the synchronic ones where LR I is compared with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland and LR II with Estonia and Latvia. Jointly with Lithuania, all these countries faced the challenge of nation state building simultaneously with the macroeconomic stabilization. Both times, Lithuania was the last to introduce the national currency. The analysis starts with a discussion of the similarities and differences in the economic situations of the LR I and LR II during the first years of independence. In this discussion, the author argues that the prototype of the Soviet command administrative economy was the administrative war economy of Kaiser Germany during WWI, with occupied Lithuania suffering under extreme forms of the administrative control of economic activities by the Oberost authorities. The restoration of the capitalist free market economy and macroeconomic equilibrium was complicated by the extraordinary spending to finance the independence wars in 1918–1920 when national states-in-making lacked administrative capacities to collect taxes in the ordinary ways. Therefore, all Lithuanian neighbours did finance their independence wars by inflation tax, introducing national currencies almost immediately after proclaiming independence and collecting up to 2/3 of the total state revenue from the seigniorage. Among all countries fighting indepenendence wars in the modern times, Lithuania was probably unique in its persistent effort to pay the war cost without the inflation tax. As Lithuania maintained a monetary union with Germany up to 1922, it donated to this country the seigniorage income and was not able to draft all its available manpower because of monetary restrictions. At the same time, the early LR I provides for the posteriority an example of the frugal management of state finance policies even under extraordinary circumstances. This example still lacks the due appreciation by neoliberal monetarist apologists of the sound monetary and fiscal policies. During its early time of restored independence, LR II procrastinated to end the monetary union with its former imperial suzerain (Russia) too for quite a different reason: the choice of the Gediminas Vagnorius' government to participate in the "inflation race" in the rouble zone after September 1991 when the restoration of independent Lithuania was internationally recognized. The winners in this race were the former republics of the USSR that were the leaders in rising prices and wages. Therefore, while Lithuania in 1918–1922 suffered only from imported (from Germany) inflation, in 1991–1992 this country both imported and exported inflation. While permissive policies of the Vagnorius government helped to void the efforts of the Moscow to undermine Lithuanian independence in January–August 1991 by the economic blockade, their continuation after the dissolution of the USSR delayed the onset of macroeconomic stabilization until the early summer 1993. Even after October 1st, 1992 when the national provisional currency talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania, its govermnent continued collecting the inflation tax, which was immoral given the absence of the war or other extraordinary circumstances. Because of the delayed macroeconomic stabilization, market reforms in Lithuania were conducted in the wrong sequence, with a large-scale privatization enacted under conditions, near to hyperinflation, which favoured prolonged rent-seeking by the early winners. The correct sequence of market reforms in Estonia, due to its early monetary stabilization (since June 1992), jointly with more favourable initial conditions, helped this country to become the leader in the "Baltic race". The policy of Gediminas Vagnorius to chase after short-time advantages of the leadership in the inflation race among the former Soviet republics was punished by Lithuania losing the long-time advantages of the leadership in the transformation race among them Baltic countries. According to another concluding causal argument, the governments of LR I committed a strategic blunder by declining to use the inflation tax for the extraordinary spending to finance the independence war in 1918–1920. Despite their smaller populations and a greater WWI damage (in Latvia's case), both Estonia and Latvia raised more than 70 000 manpower each, financing their war efforts by the inflation tax. Because of its responsible and frugal financial policies, which were wrong given the extraordinary circumstances of a war, the peasantly penny-pinching Lithuania had only some 30 000 manpower at the time of critical battles for its historical capital Vilnius in the autumn 1920. Such military power was too small and weak to hold the city against only one allegedly rebellious division under general Lucjan Żeligowski from landlordly lavish Poland which, like other Lithuania's neighbours, financed its war effort in 1918–1920 by the inflation tax. So Lithuania lost Vilnius in 1920, because it was not ready to pay its (monetary) price. Credits to Prof. Dr. Arnd Bauerkämper from Freie Universität Berlin who hosted the research visit of the author to Berlin to collect and research part of the sources (about post-WWI inflation in Germany and Eastern Europe) used in the paper.

The paper compares the introduction and stabilization of national currency in the First and Second Republics of Lithuania (LR I and LR II) during the years 1918–1922 and 1990–1993, respectively. These diachronic comparisons are supplemented by the synchronic ones where LR I is compared with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland and LR II with Estonia and Latvia. Jointly with Lithuania, all these countries faced the challenge of nation state building simultaneously with the macroeconomic stabilization. Both times, Lithuania was the last to introduce the national currency. The analysis starts with a discussion of the similarities and differences in the economic situations of the LR I and LR II during the first years of independence. In this discussion, the author argues that the prototype of the Soviet command administrative economy was the administrative war economy of Kaiser Germany during WWI, with occupied Lithuania suffering under extreme forms of the administrative control of economic activities by the Oberost authorities. The restoration of the capitalist free market economy and macroeconomic equilibrium was complicated by the extraordinary spending to finance the independence wars in 1918–1920 when national states-in-making lacked administrative capacities to collect taxes in the ordinary ways. Therefore, all Lithuanian neighbours did finance their independence wars by inflation tax, introducing national currencies almost immediately after proclaiming independence and collecting up to 2/3 of the total state revenue from the seigniorage. Among all countries fighting indepenendence wars in the modern times, Lithuania was probably unique in its persistent effort to pay the war cost without the inflation tax. As Lithuania maintained a monetary union with Germany up to 1922, it donated to this country the seigniorage income and was not able to draft all its available manpower because of monetary restrictions. At the same time, the early LR I provides for the posteriority an example of the frugal management of state finance policies even under extraordinary circumstances. This example still lacks the due appreciation by neoliberal monetarist apologists of the sound monetary and fiscal policies. During its early time of restored independence, LR II procrastinated to end the monetary union with its former imperial suzerain (Russia) too for quite a different reason: the choice of the Gediminas Vagnorius' government to participate in the "inflation race" in the rouble zone after September 1991 when the restoration of independent Lithuania was internationally recognized. The winners in this race were the former republics of the USSR that were the leaders in rising prices and wages. Therefore, while Lithuania in 1918–1922 suffered only from imported (from Germany) inflation, in 1991–1992 this country both imported and exported inflation. While permissive policies of the Vagnorius government helped to void the efforts of the Moscow to undermine Lithuanian independence in January–August 1991 by the economic blockade, their continuation after the dissolution of the USSR delayed the onset of macroeconomic stabilization until the early summer 1993. Even after October 1st, 1992 when the national provisional currency talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania, its govermnent continued collecting the inflation tax, which was immoral given the absence of the war or other extraordinary circumstances. Because of the delayed macroeconomic stabilization, market reforms in Lithuania were conducted in the wrong sequence, with a large-scale privatization enacted under conditions, near to hyperinflation, which favoured prolonged rent-seeking by the early winners. The correct sequence of market reforms in Estonia, due to its early monetary stabilization (since June 1992), jointly with more favourable initial conditions, helped this country to become the leader in the "Baltic race". The policy of Gediminas Vagnorius to chase after short-time advantages of the leadership in the inflation race among the former Soviet republics was punished by Lithuania losing the long-time advantages of the leadership in the transformation race among them Baltic countries. According to another concluding causal argument, the governments of LR I committed a strategic blunder by declining to use the inflation tax for the extraordinary spending to finance the independence war in 1918–1920. Despite their smaller populations and a greater WWI damage (in Latvia's case), both Estonia and Latvia raised more than 70 000 manpower each, financing their war efforts by the inflation tax. Because of its responsible and frugal financial policies, which were wrong given the extraordinary circumstances of a war, the peasantly penny-pinching Lithuania had only some 30 000 manpower at the time of critical battles for its historical capital Vilnius in the autumn 1920. Such military power was too small and weak to hold the city against only one allegedly rebellious division under general Lucjan Żeligowski from landlordly lavish Poland which, like other Lithuania's neighbours, financed its war effort in 1918–1920 by the inflation tax. So Lithuania lost Vilnius in 1920, because it was not ready to pay its (monetary) price. Credits to Prof. Dr. Arnd Bauerkämper from Freie Universität Berlin who hosted the research visit of the author to Berlin to collect and research part of the sources (about post-WWI inflation in Germany and Eastern Europe) used in the paper.

The paper compares the introduction and stabilization of national currency in the First and Second Republics of Lithuania (LR I and LR II) during the years 1918–1922 and 1990–1993, respectively. These diachronic comparisons are supplemented by the synchronic ones where LR I is compared with Estonia, Latvia, and Poland and LR II with Estonia and Latvia. Jointly with Lithuania, all these countries faced the challenge of nation state building simultaneously with the macroeconomic stabilization. Both times, Lithuania was the last to introduce the national currency. The analysis starts with a discussion of the similarities and differences in the economic situations of the LR I and LR II during the first years of independence. In this discussion, the author argues that the prototype of the Soviet command administrative economy was the administrative war economy of Kaiser Germany during WWI, with occupied Lithuania suffering under extreme forms of the administrative control of economic activities by the Oberost authorities. The restoration of the capitalist free market economy and macroeconomic equilibrium was complicated by the extraordinary spending to finance the independence wars in 1918–1920 when national states-in-making lacked administrative capacities to collect taxes in the ordinary ways. Therefore, all Lithuanian neighbours did finance their independence wars by inflation tax, introducing national currencies almost immediately after proclaiming independence and collecting up to 2/3 of the total state revenue from the seigniorage. Among all countries fighting indepenendence wars in the modern times, Lithuania was probably unique in its persistent effort to pay the war cost without the inflation tax. As Lithuania maintained a monetary union with Germany up to 1922, it donated to this country the seigniorage income and was not able to draft all its available manpower because of monetary restrictions. At the same time, the early LR I provides for the posteriority an example of the frugal management of state finance policies even under extraordinary circumstances. This example still lacks the due appreciation by neoliberal monetarist apologists of the sound monetary and fiscal policies. During its early time of restored independence, LR II procrastinated to end the monetary union with its former imperial suzerain (Russia) too for quite a different reason: the choice of the Gediminas Vagnorius' government to participate in the "inflation race" in the rouble zone after September 1991 when the restoration of independent Lithuania was internationally recognized. The winners in this race were the former republics of the USSR that were the leaders in rising prices and wages. Therefore, while Lithuania in 1918–1922 suffered only from imported (from Germany) inflation, in 1991–1992 this country both imported and exported inflation. While permissive policies of the Vagnorius government helped to void the efforts of the Moscow to undermine Lithuanian independence in January–August 1991 by the economic blockade, their continuation after the dissolution of the USSR delayed the onset of macroeconomic stabilization until the early summer 1993. Even after October 1st, 1992 when the national provisional currency talonas became the only legal tender in Lithuania, its govermnent continued collecting the inflation tax, which was immoral given the absence of the war or other extraordinary circumstances. Because of the delayed macroeconomic stabilization, market reforms in Lithuania were conducted in the wrong sequence, with a large-scale privatization enacted under conditions, near to hyperinflation, which favoured prolonged rent-seeking by the early winners. The correct sequence of market reforms in Estonia, due to its early monetary stabilization (since June 1992), jointly with more favourable initial conditions, helped this country to become the leader in the "Baltic race". The policy of Gediminas Vagnorius to chase after short-time advantages of the leadership in the inflation race among the former Soviet republics was punished by Lithuania losing the long-time advantages of the leadership in the transformation race among them Baltic countries. According to another concluding causal argument, the governments of LR I committed a strategic blunder by declining to use the inflation tax for the extraordinary spending to finance the independence war in 1918–1920. Despite their smaller populations and a greater WWI damage (in Latvia's case), both Estonia and Latvia raised more than 70 000 manpower each, financing their war efforts by the inflation tax. Because of its responsible and frugal financial policies, which were wrong given the extraordinary circumstances of a war, the peasantly penny-pinching Lithuania had only some 30 000 manpower at the time of critical battles for its historical capital Vilnius in the autumn 1920. Such military power was too small and weak to hold the city against only one allegedly rebellious division under general Lucjan Żeligowski from landlordly lavish Poland which, like other Lithuania's neighbours, financed its war effort in 1918–1920 by the inflation tax. So Lithuania lost Vilnius in 1920, because it was not ready to pay its (monetary) price. Credits to Prof. Dr. Arnd Bauerkämper from Freie Universität Berlin who hosted the research visit of the author to Berlin to collect and research part of the sources (about post-WWI inflation in Germany and Eastern Europe) used in the paper.