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During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].

During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].

During 2000 Finland and the USSR had special relations. Finland's foreign and defense policy was highly dependent on the USSR. Their cooperation went through four stages: starting from Finland being a part of Russian empire, to being one of the most important allies in the Western and Nordic Europe. The last period dates go back to the end of the Cold War. Finland come to conceive Russia not only as a threat to their homeland, but also as a possible partner and ally in helping to create secure community across the Baltic Sea region. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the rise of new states in the neighborhood of Finland and the changed attitude of Russia towards Finland allowed Finns to adopt new defense and foreign policy. This allowed Finland to join the European Union and NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Since 1991 Finns have paid a special attention towards the development of security in the Baltic Sea region, where the most important task was Russia's integration into European institutions and its democratization. Baltic Sea could become a bridge for achieving Russia's integration. Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Russia may turn the Baltic Sea region into a big economic and cultural network.[.].

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

This article analyses the status of the energy (in)dependence of Lithuania, as well as the effects it may have on the national security. The legacy of the soviet era in Lithuania is an energy infrastructure that conditions absolute dependence of certain energy sectors upon the imports of energy resources from Russia. The article argues that ambitions of Russia are not limited to just this kind of structural influence: Russia is making efforts to strengthen its position in the energy sector of Lithuania even more, by acting all in one with the largest energy companies of its own country, as well as through mediators and/or other means. The use of economic leverages for political ends is an exceptionally firm line in the current foreign policy of Russia, which is also translated into practice of international relations. In the light of the above, expanding influence of Russia in the Lithuanian energy sector prompts negative assessment of the energy independence and national security prospects in future.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

Though the Baltic Sea region appears to be an ideal place for the formation of classical regional security regime, this assumption appears to be substantially wrong for one simple reason - Russia cannot accommodate itself in this regional format. Therefore, only international institutions of a wider scope are capable of resolving the dilemma of Baltic security and performing the conflict prevention function. CSCE successfully coped with this task in 1991-1994. CSCE was the international format that ensured successful withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. However it soon became clear that the organisation is of little use in further settlement and normalisation of the Baltic-Russian relations. Therefore, the regional Cold War could only be ended by the influence of international institutions capable of conducting equal dialogue with Russia. And NATO could became such institution. After uniting its former antagonists into NACC, then into EAPC and PfP, and after 2002 decision to invite the Baltic States to start accession talks, it managed to find a peculiar form of institutionalisation of relations with Russia. Therefore one may say that the security regime in the Baltic Sea region is becoming a NATO-centric regime because even countries formally not members of NATO will have established solid relations with this organisation. This applies to Finland and Sweden for a long time already. And there is a chance now that the same will soon apply to Russia.

The article deals with the issue on Russian foreign policy in length of one year -from September 2001 till October 2002. It's evident, that the attacks of terrorists on the Twin Towers in New York signalled the turn in Russian foreign policy under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin from confrontation with USA and Euro Atlantic organizations to the cooperation with the said opponents. The turn was influenced by the objective bankrupt to confront with the West. Otherwise, the domestic high popularity rating of President Putin and his image of the State's consolidator, what has been originated on the brutal represses of Chechnya's separatism and the authoritarian concentration of power, served for the taken, non popular in Russia, course of ally with the West and particularly with USA. It's shown within the article, how fluctuated the emphasises of Putin's policy in the analysed period, i.e. from the cooperation of USA and Russia in crushing the Afghanistan's Talibs, from the entering into the pact START - 3 and establishing NATO - Russian Council to the reactivated flirtation with Peking and Phenian, and the blackmail with the rockets "Satana". It is also established, how Putin's diplomacy relates the brewed Iraq crisis and the case of Chechnya militants in Georgia Pankisi pass and how for the pro western political course was obtained the transit through Lithuania to/ from Kaliningrad. In sum, Putin just modifies the previous Russian (Eugenie Primakov) so called. [to full text]