Suchergebnisse

Suradnja EU–a i Rusije pruža europskom kontinentu i šire mnoge prilike. Istočno partnerstvo predstavlja glavnu poveznicu ali i područje prepreka Rusije i EU–a jer dijele zajedničko susjedstvo sa zemljama koje nisu članice EU–a a niti žele biti pod kontinuiranim utjecajem Rusije. Za zemlje koje nisu članice EU–a, EU je razvila Europsku politiku susjedstva putem koje surađuje sa južnim i istočnim susjedima kako bi postigla blisku i stabilnu političku zajednicu i najviši mogući stupanj ekonomske integracije. Rusija nije članica ovog instrumenta već je s EU-om razvila četiri zajednička prostora, ekonomski prostor, prostor slobode, sigurnosti i pravde, prostor vanjske sigurnosti i prostor istraživanja i obrazovanja te kulturnih aspekata. Najvažnija područja suradnje EU–a i Rusije jesu ona u energetskom sektoru pri kojem ima usuglašen Akcijski plan do 2050. godine te suradnja u području znanosti, tehnologije i inovacija što je među glavnim prioritetima Europe 2020 te je Rusiji bitno i jačanje razvoja istraživačke infrastrukture. ; Cooperation between European Union and Russia offers plenty opportunities to European continent and beyond its boundaries. Eastern Partnership is the main connection but also a barrier of Russia and EU because of their common neighbourhood with countries which are not members of the EU, and also do not want to be under continuous Russian influence. For countries that are not members of the EU, European Union developed European Neighbourhood Policy which cooperates with South and East neighbours so it could achieve close and sustainable political community and the highest possible level of economic integration. Russia is not a member of this instrument but instead it developed four common spaces with EU, economic space, freedom, security and justice, external security and research and education, including cultural aspects. The most important areas of cooperation between the two sides are the one in energy sector with established Roadmap until 2050, cooperation in science, technology and innovation which is included as the main priority of Europe 2020 and it is also important the development of the research infrastructure in Russia.

Suradnja EU–a i Rusije pruža europskom kontinentu i šire mnoge prilike. Istočno partnerstvo predstavlja glavnu poveznicu ali i područje prepreka Rusije i EU–a jer dijele zajedničko susjedstvo sa zemljama koje nisu članice EU–a a niti žele biti pod kontinuiranim utjecajem Rusije. Za zemlje koje nisu članice EU–a, EU je razvila Europsku politiku susjedstva putem koje surađuje sa južnim i istočnim susjedima kako bi postigla blisku i stabilnu političku zajednicu i najviši mogući stupanj ekonomske integracije. Rusija nije članica ovog instrumenta već je s EU-om razvila četiri zajednička prostora, ekonomski prostor, prostor slobode, sigurnosti i pravde, prostor vanjske sigurnosti i prostor istraživanja i obrazovanja te kulturnih aspekata. Najvažnija područja suradnje EU–a i Rusije jesu ona u energetskom sektoru pri kojem ima usuglašen Akcijski plan do 2050. godine te suradnja u području znanosti, tehnologije i inovacija što je među glavnim prioritetima Europe 2020 te je Rusiji bitno i jačanje razvoja istraživačke infrastrukture. ; Cooperation between European Union and Russia offers plenty opportunities to European continent and beyond its boundaries. Eastern Partnership is the main connection but also a barrier of Russia and EU because of their common neighbourhood with countries which are not members of the EU, and also do not want to be under continuous Russian influence. For countries that are not members of the EU, European Union developed European Neighbourhood Policy which cooperates with South and East neighbours so it could achieve close and sustainable political community and the highest possible level of economic integration. Russia is not a member of this instrument but instead it developed four common spaces with EU, economic space, freedom, security and justice, external security and research and education, including cultural aspects. The most important areas of cooperation between the two sides are the one in energy sector with established Roadmap until 2050, cooperation in science, technology and ...

This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia's action. NATO's enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia's pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula. ; This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was a motive for Russia's action. NATO's enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, politicalpsychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether Russia's pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula.

Odnosi Rusije i Srbije od raspada Sovjetskog Saveza i SFR Jugoslavije aktualno je pitanje ne samo o budućnosti Srbije nego dometa i intenziteta utjecaja zapadnih integracija i/ili Rusije na Zapadnom Balkanu i JI Europi. Odnosi između Srbije i Rusije analizirani su s obzirom na pitanje smetaju li oni ulasku Srbije u EU i NATO. Analiza je podijeljena na razdoblje od 1991. do 2000. i poslije 2000. godine pri čemu su posebno izdvojene teme oko kojih se najintenzivnije razvijao odnos koji je u pitanju. Intenzitet odnosa između dvije zemlje promatran je prvenstveno kao posljedica pojedinačnih odnosa obje zemlje sa Zapadom, prvenstveno sa Sjedinjenim Državama i EU, pa se i oni analiziraju. Iako se kroz literaturu i pojedinačne događaje ne pokazuju jedinstvena mišljenja i informacije, zajedno pružaju temelj za zaključak da je ulazak Srbije u zapadne integracije, osim ulazak u NATO u određenom stupnju, prvenstveno određen pragmatičnim interesima Srbije, a ne Rusije kojoj je Srbija jednako tako interesna zona samo u pogledu aktualnih pragmatičnih pitanja, a ne nekog iracionalnog, sudbinskog savezništva. ; The relationship between Serbia and Russia since the break-up of Yugoslavia and the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a very timely topic of discussion: Beyond the political and economic future of Serbia, it bears on the scope and intensity of Western integration throughout the Balkans and SE Europe. To this end, contemporary Serbo-Russian relations are analyzed in terms of their potential impact on Serbia joining the EU and NATO. The analysis is divided into two periods, 1991-2000 and post-2000. The more critical issues in bilateral relations are emphasized. Understanding each country's separate relationship with the West -- particularly the USA and EU -- is an essential part of this analysis. Contradictory conclusions may be reached when arguments advanced in the literature or individual geo-political events are considered in isolation; but when available information is combined, there is a basis for concluding that ...

The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one. ; The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.

The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one. ; The post-communist NATO member states from Central and South-Eastern Europe (CSEE) comprise a group of 11 NATO/EU member states, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Sea. The twelfth and thirteenth NATO member states from the region are Albania and Montenegro. The afore-mentioned NATO/EU member states have mostly shown a similar stance towards the Eastern Partnership Policy. However, since 2014, these states have shown more diverse stances, albeit declaratively supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. Due to the difference in stances towards Russia, the "New Cold Warriors" (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania) and the "Pragmatics" (Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Bulgaria), will maintain a mostly common course towards Russia and the Eastern Partnership states because they have to. The Czech Republic, although hosting a part of the US anti-ballistic missile shield, is not a genuine "New Cold Warrior", while in 2016 Croatia effectively became one.

After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO's deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe's security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia's new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions while tackling new challenges and threats. ; After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO's deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe's security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia's new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions while tackling new challenges and threats.

After the breakup of the USSR, and the several rounds of Post-Cold War enlargements of the Western integrations, once large space of newly independent and geopolitically uncontrolled European post-communist states, located between the EU, NATO and Russia, contracts geopolitically and 'wanders' strategically. The three states, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, located on Russia's western borders share about three thousand kilometers of borders with the EU and NATO, and about two thousand and five hundred kilometers with Russia, which implicates that they are prone to the geopolitical influences from their surroundings. This Interspace of the three states lies inside the strategic triangle comprised of: 1) Russia - geopolitically and militarily powerful state as well as a giant considering its energy reserves, which makes her relatively strong 'hard' power as well as a significant 'soft' power; 2) the EU - economic giant on the global level that is not unified enough; has domestic problems and is partially dependent on Russia when it comes to energy, a civilian power without 'hard' power that in its foreign relations relies on policies based on financial assistance, assurance, and attractiveness; 3) NATO, led by the USA - the most powerful military-political-security 'hard' power that exists today; it does not have the kind of influence on Europe and the Post-Soviet space that it had in the 90-ies. However, as a consequence of subordination of the Interspace that lasted for a couple of centuries, the common characteristics intrinsic to this space occur: ambiguous identities; deficits in the democratic practices; complicated, prolonged and incomplete transition; economic decline, demographic problems - all of which favor a strategic 'adoption' of the Interspace by the Kremlin, a former imperial master. At the same time, a relative marginalization of the Interspace is evident regarding the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration. After the unsuccessful attempts of 'pulling out' Kiev, Kishinev, and the South Caucasian Tbilisi from this Russian sphere of influence, the states positioned in the Interspace, together with Russia, comprise a regional security complex, a stabilized geopolitical 'Russosphere' that is a key part of the Kremlin's attempts for Eurasian reintegration under Russia's leadership. Adapted from the source document.

Ruski inozemni turizam poznat je na svjetskom turističkom tržištu. Izvoz turističkih usluga u Rusiju zabranjen je sankcijama za ekonomije mnogih zemalja. U današnje vrijeme prisutne su nove tendencije koje bi trebale radikalno promijeniti strukturu ruskog domaćeg turizma i utjecati na inozemni turizam. Za to postoje vanjski i unutarnji tržišni i politički razlozi. U Rusiji država potiče razvoj domaćeg turizma različitim programima i strategijom njegova razvoja. Poduzetničke aktivnosti, konkurencija, investicija u turizam i turistička infrastruktura također su u porastu. U današnjoj Rusiji vidljiva je promjena od "inozemnog turizma" prema "domaćem turizmu". Ovo posljednje donosi dodatne prihode ruskim regijama. Sadašnja ekonomska i politička situacija doprinosi tom procesu. Pad prihoda uzrokovan ekonomskom krizom prisiljava Ruse da manje putuju u inozemstvo, a raste broj putnika u domaće jeftinije destinacije. Suočena s ekonomskim sankcijama ruska državna tijela traže unutrašnje investicije i mogućnosti smanjenja troškova uvoza. Počeli su više pažnje posvećivati domaćem turizmu. Pod sloganom "supstitucija uvoza" i "protusankcije" neke restrikcije koje utječu na međunarodni turizam, preferencije prema domaćem turizmu i stimulacija potražnje elaborirane su u ovom radu. Također i restrikcije inozemnog turizma kao i zabrana stranim kompanijama da djeluju na ruskom turističkom tržištu postali su politički faktor. Pad ruskog inozemnog turizma jača konkurenciju među svojim destinacijama, a povezano je i s Republikom Hrvatskom. Broj ruskih turista u Hrvatskoj pada iz godine u godinu. S jedne strane to može imati negativan utjecaj na hrvatsko turističko tržište, a s druge strane može otvoriti nove mogućnosti za pronalaženje načina da se privuče više posjetitelja iz Hrvatske. Smatramo da to može biti u interesu Hrvatske. ; Russian outbound tourism is well noticed in the World Tourist Market. Exporting tourist services to Russia has been the boon for the economies of many countries. Nowadays new tendencies are being revealed which should radically change the structure of Russian national tourism and influence the International tourism. There are outer and inner, market and political reasons for that. In Russia the government supports the inner and inbound tourism by means of programs and the strategy of its development. Entrepreneurial activities, competition, investment in tourism and tourist infrastructure are growing as well. In nowadays Russia the shift from "The industry of outbound tourism" to "The industry of national tourism" is well seen. The latter brings additional revenues to Russian regions. Current economic and political situation is contributing to this process. The economic-crisis-related decline in incomes pushes Russians to travel abroad less and instead increases the number of travelers within the country to cheaper destinations. Facing economic sanctions Russian authorities search for inner investment and the possibilities to reduce the cost of import. They started paying more attention to inner tourism. Under the slogans of "import-substitution" and "counter-sanctions" some restrictions on outbound tourism, preferences for the national tourism industry, and stimulation of consumers' demand were elaborated in this paper. Also the outbound tourism restrictions, prohibition for some foreign companies to act on Russian tourist market became a political factor. The decline of Russian outbound tourism strengthens the competition among its destinations. It is related to Republic of Croatia. The number of Russian visitors to Croatia declines from year to year. On the one hand it may have negative influence on Croatian tourist market, on the other – it opens new possibilities to find ways to attract more visitors from Russia. We suppose that it may be in the interest of Croatia.