Suchergebnisse

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Since the demise of FSU, about one million Russian speakers from all republics of the FSU have moved to Israel. Today Russian Jews amount to 20 % of Israeli society. This aliyah doesn't integrate into Israeli society and forms Russian speakers' subculture (externalized through particular cultural identity, Russian language community formation and no integration process) in Israel. This segregation determines complex Russian Jews relationship with Israel and Russia: in Israel this community functions like separate ethnic group and creates diasporic ties with Russia. As a result of the demise of the FSU Russia-Israel relations take a new form. Russia renounced it's entirely proarabic politics and started developing friendly ties with Israel. The aim of the work is to determine the role of Israeli Russian Jews community in Israel-Russia relations, keeping in mind that Israeli Russian speakers in Israel society act like the separate ethnic group with strong diasporic ties with Russia. The hypothesis of the work – Israeli Russian Jews community is one of the factors, affecting Israel-Russia relations transformation in positive way. In order to verify the hypothesis there are formed four goals: 1) to define the term "diaspora"and theoretical model of diaspora's action between hostland and homeland; 2) to analyze Israeli Russian Jews community's identification with Russian culture and evaluate the disintegration into Israeli society process; 3) to evaluate Israel, Russia and community's interests in respect of each other; 4) to identify the role of Russian Jews in political, economical and cultural area. The analysis enables to come to these conclusions: 1) Israeli Russian Jews act like the bridge between Israel and Russia. Dual cultural identification and non-integration process capacitates hostland to obtain homeland features (and vice versa) and creates proper conditions for Russian Jews to act like the mediator. 2) Russian Jews community was one of the main factors for changing Russia's perception of Israel – new perception determines new political courses and opens new possibilities; 3) Israeli Russian Jews is one of the main initiator of Israel-Russia economical cooperation; 4) Russian Jews community is the main actor in cultural each other (Israel-Russia) knowledge. Nevertheless, dual identification on certain conditions operates like community's motivation reducing factor. On the one hand, dual identification capacitates community to act like influential political and economic group in Israel, retain dual citizenship, property and operation freedom in Russia. On the other hand, dual identification is the barrier for active lobby. Dual identification prevents community from political agenda in regard to Israel-Russia relations formation. Thus even disposing of powerful political influence means Israeli Russian Jews don't manage to use it. Eventually, by playing "dual identity" card Russian Jews community may become the mean of influence in the relationship of two states. Dual identity suppresses political consciousness and diasporic community can't be active player in regard to partly hostland/partly homeland - Russia. Because of this passivity Russian Jews community-reversed diaspora becomes potential object of manipulation. The analysis of literature enables to come to the conclusion that Israel government doesn't use the community as the mean of influence. It can be explained by the fact that Israel government, despite dual Russian Jews community's identity, doesn't consider Russian Jews as diaspora, conversely it is considered integral part of Israel society. Whereas Russia is trying to ensure for itself possible means of manipulation through financial support for Russian Jews parties and provided permission to use Russia's mass media for Russian Jews community's purposes. It means that in prospect Russian Jews may become significant Russia's mean of influence to Israel.

Since the demise of FSU, about one million Russian speakers from all republics of the FSU have moved to Israel. Today Russian Jews amount to 20 % of Israeli society. This aliyah doesn't integrate into Israeli society and forms Russian speakers' subculture (externalized through particular cultural identity, Russian language community formation and no integration process) in Israel. This segregation determines complex Russian Jews relationship with Israel and Russia: in Israel this community functions like separate ethnic group and creates diasporic ties with Russia. As a result of the demise of the FSU Russia-Israel relations take a new form. Russia renounced it's entirely proarabic politics and started developing friendly ties with Israel. The aim of the work is to determine the role of Israeli Russian Jews community in Israel-Russia relations, keeping in mind that Israeli Russian speakers in Israel society act like the separate ethnic group with strong diasporic ties with Russia. The hypothesis of the work – Israeli Russian Jews community is one of the factors, affecting Israel-Russia relations transformation in positive way. In order to verify the hypothesis there are formed four goals: 1) to define the term "diaspora"and theoretical model of diaspora's action between hostland and homeland; 2) to analyze Israeli Russian Jews community's identification with Russian culture and evaluate the disintegration into Israeli society process; 3) to evaluate Israel, Russia and community's interests in respect of each other; 4) to identify the role of Russian Jews in political, economical and cultural area. The analysis enables to come to these conclusions: 1) Israeli Russian Jews act like the bridge between Israel and Russia. Dual cultural identification and non-integration process capacitates hostland to obtain homeland features (and vice versa) and creates proper conditions for Russian Jews to act like the mediator. 2) Russian Jews community was one of the main factors for changing Russia's perception of Israel – new perception determines new political courses and opens new possibilities; 3) Israeli Russian Jews is one of the main initiator of Israel-Russia economical cooperation; 4) Russian Jews community is the main actor in cultural each other (Israel-Russia) knowledge. Nevertheless, dual identification on certain conditions operates like community's motivation reducing factor. On the one hand, dual identification capacitates community to act like influential political and economic group in Israel, retain dual citizenship, property and operation freedom in Russia. On the other hand, dual identification is the barrier for active lobby. Dual identification prevents community from political agenda in regard to Israel-Russia relations formation. Thus even disposing of powerful political influence means Israeli Russian Jews don't manage to use it. Eventually, by playing "dual identity" card Russian Jews community may become the mean of influence in the relationship of two states. Dual identity suppresses political consciousness and diasporic community can't be active player in regard to partly hostland/partly homeland - Russia. Because of this passivity Russian Jews community-reversed diaspora becomes potential object of manipulation. The analysis of literature enables to come to the conclusion that Israel government doesn't use the community as the mean of influence. It can be explained by the fact that Israel government, despite dual Russian Jews community's identity, doesn't consider Russian Jews as diaspora, conversely it is considered integral part of Israel society. Whereas Russia is trying to ensure for itself possible means of manipulation through financial support for Russian Jews parties and provided permission to use Russia's mass media for Russian Jews community's purposes. It means that in prospect Russian Jews may become significant Russia's mean of influence to Israel.

In this study, titled "Intersection of US-Russia interests in Central Asia region", the author analyses the strategies of the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards Central Asia region and the main strategic interests in the security policy and economical level. The study pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the democratization aspect, especially in the U.S. foreign policy course, and its impact on the relations between U.S., Russia and the states of the Central Asia. The study is based on the academic concept of "imperialism", which becomes an orient in the analysis of intersection of US Russia interests in Central Asia region and opportunities for cooperation. The study has been divided into four chapters. In the first chapter author introduces a theoretical foundation of "imperialism". The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of US strategic interests in Central Asia and the role and meaning of democratization process. The geopolitical spread of Russia's influence is analyzed in the third chapter of the study, where the author underscores the importance of rally points in the relations between Russia and Central Asia states. The fourth chapter analyzes the prospects of future cooperation and competition between US and Russia. The study concludes, that US strategy towards Central Asia is discontinuous, and because of underestimation of specific situation in this region and lack of rally points (short common historical experience, differences in culture and value systems etc.), US fails to establish in this region. In addition, attempting to pass a "democratization message" to the authoritarian regimes and misjudging their reaction, US harms its other strategic interests. However, US cannot abandon "democratization" message because of it gives an ideological ground for its foreign policy course and legitimizes its actions worldwide. Therefore the study confirms the first hypothesis, that excessively underscoring the democratization aspect and forgetting the specifics of Central Asia region, US reduces the effectiveness of these relations as well as its abilities to reach other strategic goals. Russia, otherwise, does not underline "democratization" issue and avoids the rise of such tension in its relations with Central Asia states. Russia makes use of the bridging cultural connections, common historical experience, and, mostly important, common infrastructure that facilitates economical cooperation. Therefore, study concludes, that Russia manages to make use of Central Asia states' apathy towards US offered democratization model, and increases its opportunities to strengthen the instruments of economical pressure in the region. Central Asia can be seen as a testing area for the competition of US and Russia imperial ambitions. In consideration of US attempts to implement its domination policy goals and Russia's desire to see multipolar international relations system instead of unipolar, cooperation perspectives remain highly questionable.

In this study, titled "Intersection of US-Russia interests in Central Asia region", the author analyses the strategies of the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards Central Asia region and the main strategic interests in the security policy and economical level. The study pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the democratization aspect, especially in the U.S. foreign policy course, and its impact on the relations between U.S., Russia and the states of the Central Asia. The study is based on the academic concept of "imperialism", which becomes an orient in the analysis of intersection of US Russia interests in Central Asia region and opportunities for cooperation. The study has been divided into four chapters. In the first chapter author introduces a theoretical foundation of "imperialism". The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of US strategic interests in Central Asia and the role and meaning of democratization process. The geopolitical spread of Russia's influence is analyzed in the third chapter of the study, where the author underscores the importance of rally points in the relations between Russia and Central Asia states. The fourth chapter analyzes the prospects of future cooperation and competition between US and Russia. The study concludes, that US strategy towards Central Asia is discontinuous, and because of underestimation of specific situation in this region and lack of rally points (short common historical experience, differences in culture and value systems etc.), US fails to establish in this region. In addition, attempting to pass a "democratization message" to the authoritarian regimes and misjudging their reaction, US harms its other strategic interests. However, US cannot abandon "democratization" message because of it gives an ideological ground for its foreign policy course and legitimizes its actions worldwide. Therefore the study confirms the first hypothesis, that excessively underscoring the democratization aspect and forgetting the specifics of Central Asia region, US reduces the effectiveness of these relations as well as its abilities to reach other strategic goals. Russia, otherwise, does not underline "democratization" issue and avoids the rise of such tension in its relations with Central Asia states. Russia makes use of the bridging cultural connections, common historical experience, and, mostly important, common infrastructure that facilitates economical cooperation. Therefore, study concludes, that Russia manages to make use of Central Asia states' apathy towards US offered democratization model, and increases its opportunities to strengthen the instruments of economical pressure in the region. Central Asia can be seen as a testing area for the competition of US and Russia imperial ambitions. In consideration of US attempts to implement its domination policy goals and Russia's desire to see multipolar international relations system instead of unipolar, cooperation perspectives remain highly questionable.

First time name of certification were mentioned 1990s concerning a problems with bad forest practices, hard improvement of governmental regulations especial in tropics. Later this concern were growing to 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference. And so, need of strict forest system in 1993 established Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Main activities started later 1996 in Canada with small group of people which started developing countries regional standards (Claros, 2009). Now FSC program is one of the biggest forest certification and accreditation providing company providing wood and their products and certification service. This program supports LEED Lumber, IKEA, biggest companies buying wood in the world, non governamental organisations World wild Fund (WWF), Green peace (www.fsc.org). The curiosity of how FSC forest certification impact forest management in Lithuania and Russia and lack of FSC standard studies with national law encouraged to create such study. We want to analyze FSC certification annual public reports raised CAR's (Corrective action request) from Forest Management Units (FMU) - enterprises, leaseholders in Lithuania and Russia. The first aim was to find, what main CAR's in Lithuania, Russia and distribute CAR's to environmental, economical, social type aspects. In later stages analyze Lithuanian and Russian FSC standards Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian national. In the last step to compare FSC standards with state law for each country. Analysis of Lithuanian and Russian FSC CAR indicators from Forest Management Units (FMU) showed, that biggest amount of violations from violation distribution in countries is environmental. Violation distribution by FSC principles in the countries proved that both countries had main ecological violations 6, 8 principle. Lithuanian Smart Wood and SGS Qualifor not differ much. Lithuanian with Russian standards was most similar by social context indicators. Study showed most important violated indicators in Lithuania from economical type are 8.3.3 problems with FSC logo use and certificate number on invoices; social: 8.5.1 summary of FMU (Forest management unit) management for public not sufficient; ecological: 6.3.8 problem leaving enough dead wood or trees for natural biodiversity. Analysis of most important indicators in Russia from economical part: 7.1.1 long term forest management goal creation; social: 4.2.11 FMU safety and protection problems; ecological: 6.1.1 environment impact assessment of FMU management activities. Comparison of Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian standards by both countries violated indicators showed that Lithuanian standards ware most similar, most detailed was Russian national. Lower requirements were mostly found in SGS Qualifor and Russian national. Most strict was Smart Wood and Russian national Analyzing standards and state law in both countries by each country standard violations was found that FSC standards were higher than state requirements.

First time name of certification were mentioned 1990s concerning a problems with bad forest practices, hard improvement of governmental regulations especial in tropics. Later this concern were growing to 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference. And so, need of strict forest system in 1993 established Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Main activities started later 1996 in Canada with small group of people which started developing countries regional standards (Claros, 2009). Now FSC program is one of the biggest forest certification and accreditation providing company providing wood and their products and certification service. This program supports LEED Lumber, IKEA, biggest companies buying wood in the world, non governamental organisations World wild Fund (WWF), Green peace (www.fsc.org). The curiosity of how FSC forest certification impact forest management in Lithuania and Russia and lack of FSC standard studies with national law encouraged to create such study. We want to analyze FSC certification annual public reports raised CAR's (Corrective action request) from Forest Management Units (FMU) - enterprises, leaseholders in Lithuania and Russia. The first aim was to find, what main CAR's in Lithuania, Russia and distribute CAR's to environmental, economical, social type aspects. In later stages analyze Lithuanian and Russian FSC standards Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian national. In the last step to compare FSC standards with state law for each country. Analysis of Lithuanian and Russian FSC CAR indicators from Forest Management Units (FMU) showed, that biggest amount of violations from violation distribution in countries is environmental. Violation distribution by FSC principles in the countries proved that both countries had main ecological violations 6, 8 principle. Lithuanian Smart Wood and SGS Qualifor not differ much. Lithuanian with Russian standards was most similar by social context indicators. Study showed most important violated indicators in Lithuania from economical type are 8.3.3 problems with FSC logo use and certificate number on invoices; social: 8.5.1 summary of FMU (Forest management unit) management for public not sufficient; ecological: 6.3.8 problem leaving enough dead wood or trees for natural biodiversity. Analysis of most important indicators in Russia from economical part: 7.1.1 long term forest management goal creation; social: 4.2.11 FMU safety and protection problems; ecological: 6.1.1 environment impact assessment of FMU management activities. Comparison of Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian standards by both countries violated indicators showed that Lithuanian standards ware most similar, most detailed was Russian national. Lower requirements were mostly found in SGS Qualifor and Russian national. Most strict was Smart Wood and Russian national Analyzing standards and state law in both countries by each country standard violations was found that FSC standards were higher than state requirements.

This paper analyses the theoretical approaches of the concept of "identity", which refers to the "historisation" of public life. It is argued that throughout the history people can recognize and interpret social life and people's behaviour is affected by the projections, expectations and memories arising from a broad and defined social, cultural, and historical field in which they are available. While studying the identity of Russian society, the Soviet period is analyzed, in which a national identification was characterized by vertical interaction (human – Soviet government) by levelling down horizontal identity types like ethnic, religious, regional. It is believed that the transformation of Russian to Soviet identity in the nineteenth century overcame the crisis of imperial Russian identity, but almost completely destroyed week ethnic identity layer. The main representatives of the Eurasian concept that had a huge influence in forming the theoretical background to Russian identity were Nicholas Danilevsky (1822-1885), Nicholas Trubeckoi (1890-1938), and Lev Gumiliov (1912-1992). This article emphasizes the ideas of Trubeckoi and his opinion that Western civilization is the greatest enemy of all mankind and the greatest obstacle for the formation of other civilizations and cultures identity. Finally the real, contemporary Russian political steps are analysed which reflected the answers of the Russian identity issue. Vladimir Putin re-established the czarist and Soviet eras' symbols in this way searching for "useful history" that would unite the nation by appealing to the nostalgia. A key trend that is followed is Russia's desire to emphasize that it manages its own affairs and that the West has no right to dictate the direction of democracy or Russia identity development.

This paper analyses the theoretical approaches of the concept of "identity", which refers to the "historisation" of public life. It is argued that throughout the history people can recognize and interpret social life and people's behaviour is affected by the projections, expectations and memories arising from a broad and defined social, cultural, and historical field in which they are available. While studying the identity of Russian society, the Soviet period is analyzed, in which a national identification was characterized by vertical interaction (human – Soviet government) by levelling down horizontal identity types like ethnic, religious, regional. It is believed that the transformation of Russian to Soviet identity in the nineteenth century overcame the crisis of imperial Russian identity, but almost completely destroyed week ethnic identity layer. The main representatives of the Eurasian concept that had a huge influence in forming the theoretical background to Russian identity were Nicholas Danilevsky (1822-1885), Nicholas Trubeckoi (1890-1938), and Lev Gumiliov (1912-1992). This article emphasizes the ideas of Trubeckoi and his opinion that Western civilization is the greatest enemy of all mankind and the greatest obstacle for the formation of other civilizations and cultures identity. Finally the real, contemporary Russian political steps are analysed which reflected the answers of the Russian identity issue. Vladimir Putin re-established the czarist and Soviet eras' symbols in this way searching for "useful history" that would unite the nation by appealing to the nostalgia. A key trend that is followed is Russia's desire to emphasize that it manages its own affairs and that the West has no right to dictate the direction of democracy or Russia identity development.

The master thesis "Reform of the Civil Procedure law in Russia 1990 – 2010" is aimed at analysing the assumptions for the civil procedure law reform, identifying the steps according to which the reform has been carried out, their trends and essential features. Even before the entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation, major changes and additions were made in the Code of Civil Procedure that was in force in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. After entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation became effective in 2003, the law reform of the civil procedure is continued in accordance with the concept mixed (liberal civil procedure law and schools of the social civil law). Despite the fact that the Russians are a form of civil procedure extended through several stages, the differentiation of the forms of procedure was established, disposition and adversarial principles were developed, there was an active court and the activation of the parties – these are the main trends according to which the reform was carried out. The paper attempts to assess the legislator's position, based on the analysis only got at, as well as to highlight the assumed problems.

The master thesis "Reform of the Civil Procedure law in Russia 1990 – 2010" is aimed at analysing the assumptions for the civil procedure law reform, identifying the steps according to which the reform has been carried out, their trends and essential features. Even before the entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation, major changes and additions were made in the Code of Civil Procedure that was in force in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. After entry into force of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russian Federation became effective in 2003, the law reform of the civil procedure is continued in accordance with the concept mixed (liberal civil procedure law and schools of the social civil law). Despite the fact that the Russians are a form of civil procedure extended through several stages, the differentiation of the forms of procedure was established, disposition and adversarial principles were developed, there was an active court and the activation of the parties – these are the main trends according to which the reform was carried out. The paper attempts to assess the legislator's position, based on the analysis only got at, as well as to highlight the assumed problems.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 – 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia's foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what – convergence or alienation – did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries. These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia's relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian–Western relations – the Ukrainian "orange revolution" – is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called "value gap" has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years.