Suchergebnisse

This study examines Russia's policies towards and within the Councilof the Baltic Sea States in the aftermath of the Ukrainian and other internationalcrises. More specifically, this paper analyses Russia's interest in andexpectations from the CBSS, as well as Moscow's institutional behaviour in theCouncil. The CBSS is viewed by Russia as both a centrepiece and cornerstoneof the regional governance system. Moscow also sees the CBSS as an importanttool for overcoming the politico-diplomatic isolation where Russia founditself with the start of the Ukrainian crisis. With the help of the CBSS, it retainsits ability to influence socioeconomic, political, environmental, and humanitariandevelopments in the Baltic Sea region. Russia supported the Council'sthree long-term priority areas: a regional identity, a sustainable and prosperousregion, and a safe and secure region. Russia favoured further the Council'sinstitutionalization and strengthening of its role in the regional governancesystem. Despite the fact that Russia's relations with other CBSS member-statesremain tense and that Moscow does not always manage to use the Councilto promote its interests in the region, the CBSS is still seen by Russia as animportant platform for regional cooperation.

The aim of this short paper is to show that the relations between Ukraine and Russia are extremely complex as they are built on a shared history, religion, language, and culture and they should not, therefore, be gauged by Western standards. Evaluating the current situation from a broader perspective, the fact that Ukraine plays a significant role in Russia's foreign policy needs to be emphasized. Ukraine is considered the key post-Soviet state, a significant "near abroad" country, whose position, potential, and geopolitical location are vital for the balance of power in both Eastern Europe and Europe in general. The research project aims at a synthetic examination of the current Russia-Ukraine war from the point of view of Ukraine striving for full independence, memory, and identity. Will the war of the brotherly nations wreck Russia's long-term policy towards Ukraine? Will the conflict ruin Russia's plans of post-Soviet space reintegration, whose pivot is set on Ukraine? Will the war stimulate Ukraine to deal with the issue of its identity, post-Soviet legacy, and collective memory?

As Arctic navigation increases and states work, both at the international and the domestic level, at ensuring legal readiness, this article takes a closer look at regulation of Arctic Shipping in Canada and Russia. The analysis first focuses on the current domestic regimes that have developed over the past decades. It highlights that dissimilar political, economic and environmental contexts have shaped not only different shipping patterns off the Canadian and Russian coasts, but also dissimilar coastal state approaches that do not seem to converge noticeably under the influence of the Polar Code. The analysis then turns to challenges that lay ahead as existing regimes could be called into question due to receding ice cover and may need to adapt to evolving shipping patterns and technological innovations.

The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and/or cooperation? Here we start from the theoretical premise that states are not pre-constituted political entities, but are constantly in the making. How Russia views its own role and how it views other actors in the Arctic changes over time, calling for differing approaches. That holds true for Norway as well. To clarify the premises for interaction between Russia and Norway in the Arctic, we scrutinize changes in official discourse on Self and Other in the Arctic on both sides in the period 2012 to 2016, to establish what kind of policy mode—"realist," "institutionalist," or "diplomatic management"—has underlain the two countries' official discourse in that period. Has Norway continued to pursue "balancing" policies undertaken in the realist mode with those in the diplomatic management mode? Which modes have characterized Russia's approach toward Norway? Finding that realist-mode policies increasingly dominate on both sides, in the conclusion we discuss how the changing mode of the one state affects that of the other, and why a New Cold War is now spreading to the Arctic.

The article explores Turkey's ambitions to assume a proactive role as a mediator in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Positioned as a middle power striving to enhance its global standing, Turkey has dedicated itself to striking a delicate balance between Russia and Ukraine in its foreign policy. This is exemplified by Ankara's engagement in an ambiguous cooperative rivalry with Russia while strengthening its partnership with Ukraine, including military cooperation in the Black Sea Region. Given these circumstances, Turkey sees itself as naturally inclined to act as a facilitator in brokering a ceasefire and bringing about peace between the two conflicting parties. Some successes have already been achieved, with the grain initiative being a primary example thereof.

The article deals with the problem of Russia's aspirations to revise the geopolitical system created in Soviet times using Crimea as an example. It shows the activities of both local political circles and the central authorities of the Russian SFSR, and later the Russian Federation, aimed at revising the existing borders and integrating the Crimean peninsula into Russia. The article covers the years from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the 1997 agreement between Russia and Ukraine.

Both Russian authorities and Russian society have a sense of harm associated with the position of Russia in the world. They do not agree with the dominant role of the West. To a large extent it is associated with a sense of Russian pride. The consequence of this situation is the growing confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West. Currently, the theatre of confrontation is i.a. the conflict in the east of Ukraine and the war in Syria. The intensification of military tension is also observed, the confirmation of which is the violation of the airspace of NATO members. The author of this article undertook research effort associated with the determination of the fields of confrontation between Russia and the West.

In Russia, there exist legal norms providing for the protection of indigenous small-numbered peoples' rights. Yet, indigenous small-numbered peoples face multiple challenges when it comes to the implementation of their rights. After a brief presentation of the Russian legislation on the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples, peculiarities of the Russian legal system and impediments to the legal provisions regulating the status of indigenous small-numbered peoples, this article addresses several issues related to the implementation of indigenous small-numbered peoples' rights in Russia today. One of the core issues is the attribution of individual members of indigenous communities to indigenous small-numbered peoples. Such an attribution is still challenging despite the newly adopted amendments to the 30 April 1999 Federal Law N 82-FL: 'On Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation'. Another issue is application of the notion 'foreign agent' to individuals and non-commercial organizations. Still another issue is the State's pressure on independent indigenous organizations. The final challenge is the possible impact of amendments to the Constitution approved by popular vote in July 2020 on the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples.

The specific use of the "energy weapon" in the hybrid war is being analyzed. The author highlights the historical retrospective use of the "energy weapon" in general and against Ukraine in particular. Now the energy component of hybrid war is the second in importance and power after the information component. The main political task of the gas conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which was inspired by the Kremlin, was to demonstrate the inability of Ukraine as a transit partner and to damage the reputation of our country as a reliable transit, geoeconomic and geopolitical partner of the European Union. During the gas conflict Russia tried to position itself as an influential geopolitical player to preserve Ukraine in its sphere of political influence. By blackmail and promises to keep "special conditions" in the price formation Kremlin sought to protect its geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Upon solving the gas conflict, Moscow has tried to block the implementation of the provisions of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States on modernization. The "gas weapon" was used for the first time during the winter of 2005–2006. The first gas war demonstrated the vulnerability of Ukraine and European consumers, and demonstrated how effective and promising may be the further use of energy weapons.Gas weapons are used on several different fronts. First, Russia claims Ukraine is not trustworthy as a transit country for gas as it will act firstly to protect its own interests. In other words, Gazprom offers Europe a choice – or they, European consumers and voters, suffer or Ukraine does. Second, Russian specialists are ready at the first opportunity to accuse Ukraine of unsanctioned gas use, thereby justifying a reduction in supply to Europe. Third, Gazprom intends to prevent establishing reserve gas supplies in Ukraine. Fourth, Russia views Ukrainian gas debts as a source of financial income particularly necessary today.The purpose of the use of gas weapons is the implementation of a direct impact on the economy of the state, in this case – causing economic losses of Ukraine, with long lasting effects.

The specific use of the "energy weapon" in the hybrid war is being analyzed. The author highlights the historical retrospective use of the "energy weapon" in general and against Ukraine in particular. Now the energy component of hybrid war is the second in importance and power after the information component. The main political task of the gas conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which was inspired by the Kremlin, was to demonstrate the inability of Ukraine as a transit partner and to damage the reputation of our country as a reliable transit, geoeconomic and geopolitical partner of the European Union. During the gas conflict Russia tried to position itself as an influential geopolitical player to preserve Ukraine in its sphere of political influence. By blackmail and promises to keep "special conditions" in the price formation Kremlin sought to protect its geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Upon solving the gas conflict, Moscow has tried to block the implementation of the provisions of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States on modernization. The "gas weapon" was used for the first time during the winter of 2005–2006. The first gas war demonstrated the vulnerability of Ukraine and European consumers, and demonstrated how effective and promising may be the further use of energy weapons.Gas weapons are used on several different fronts. First, Russia claims Ukraine is not trustworthy as a transit country for gas as it will act firstly to protect its own interests. In other words, Gazprom offers Europe a choice – or they, European consumers and voters, suffer or Ukraine does. Second, Russian specialists are ready at the first opportunity to accuse Ukraine of unsanctioned gas use, thereby justifying a reduction in supply to Europe. Third, Gazprom intends to prevent establishing reserve gas supplies in Ukraine. Fourth, Russia views Ukrainian gas debts as a source of financial income particularly necessary today.The purpose of the use of gas weapons is the implementation of a direct impact on the economy of the state, in this case – causing economic losses of Ukraine, with long lasting effects.