The specific use of the "energy weapon" in the hybrid war is being analyzed. The author highlights the historical retrospective use of the "energy weapon" in general and against Ukraine in particular. Now the energy component of hybrid war is the second in importance and power after the information component. The main political task of the gas conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which was inspired by the Kremlin, was to demonstrate the inability of Ukraine as a transit partner and to damage the reputation of our country as a reliable transit, geoeconomic and geopolitical partner of the European Union. During the gas conflict Russia tried to position itself as an influential geopolitical player to preserve Ukraine in its sphere of political influence. By blackmail and promises to keep "special conditions" in the price formation Kremlin sought to protect its geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Upon solving the gas conflict, Moscow has tried to block the implementation of the provisions of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States on modernization. The "gas weapon" was used for the first time during the winter of 2005–2006. The first gas war demonstrated the vulnerability of Ukraine and European consumers, and demonstrated how effective and promising may be the further use of energy weapons.Gas weapons are used on several different fronts. First, Russia claims Ukraine is not trustworthy as a transit country for gas as it will act firstly to protect its own interests. In other words, Gazprom offers Europe a choice – or they, European consumers and voters, suffer or Ukraine does. Second, Russian specialists are ready at the first opportunity to accuse Ukraine of unsanctioned gas use, thereby justifying a reduction in supply to Europe. Third, Gazprom intends to prevent establishing reserve gas supplies in Ukraine. Fourth, Russia views Ukrainian gas debts as a source of financial income particularly necessary today.The purpose of the use of gas weapons is the implementation of a direct impact on the economy of the state, in this case – causing economic losses of Ukraine, with long lasting effects.
The specific use of the "energy weapon" in the hybrid war is being analyzed. The author highlights the historical retrospective use of the "energy weapon" in general and against Ukraine in particular. Now the energy component of hybrid war is the second in importance and power after the information component. The main political task of the gas conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which was inspired by the Kremlin, was to demonstrate the inability of Ukraine as a transit partner and to damage the reputation of our country as a reliable transit, geoeconomic and geopolitical partner of the European Union. During the gas conflict Russia tried to position itself as an influential geopolitical player to preserve Ukraine in its sphere of political influence. By blackmail and promises to keep "special conditions" in the price formation Kremlin sought to protect its geopolitical interests in Ukraine. Upon solving the gas conflict, Moscow has tried to block the implementation of the provisions of the Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States on modernization. The "gas weapon" was used for the first time during the winter of 2005–2006. The first gas war demonstrated the vulnerability of Ukraine and European consumers, and demonstrated how effective and promising may be the further use of energy weapons.Gas weapons are used on several different fronts. First, Russia claims Ukraine is not trustworthy as a transit country for gas as it will act firstly to protect its own interests. In other words, Gazprom offers Europe a choice – or they, European consumers and voters, suffer or Ukraine does. Second, Russian specialists are ready at the first opportunity to accuse Ukraine of unsanctioned gas use, thereby justifying a reduction in supply to Europe. Third, Gazprom intends to prevent establishing reserve gas supplies in Ukraine. Fourth, Russia views Ukrainian gas debts as a source of financial income particularly necessary today.The purpose of the use of gas weapons is the implementation of a direct impact on the economy of the state, in this case – causing economic losses of Ukraine, with long lasting effects.
The essay submitted is not purely scientific. The author is not a specialist in Polish-Russian relations, but is convinced that the analysis of relations with the eastern neighbor should not be left only to specialists. As a cultural anthropologist who has been dealing with the issues of collective memory for years, I am convinced that too little attention is paid by specialists to the mutual fascination of Russian and Polish cultures. Moreover, at present, the strongly Russophobic moods, in a significant part tof Polish society, influence the formation of too one-sided memory. Hence the political accents in the following text, which also does not avoid subjective accents. Needless to say, a possible polemic with the theses expressed by the author would be the best fulfillment of my expectations. ; The essay submitted is not purely scientific. The author is not a specialist in Polish-Russian relations, but is convinced that the analysis of relations with the eastern neighbor should not be left only to specialists. As a cultural anthropologist who has been dealing with the issues of collective memory for years, I am convinced that too little attention is paid by specialists to the mutual fascination of Russian and Polish cultures. Moreover, at present, the strongly Russophobic moods, in a significant part tof Polish society, influence the formation of too one-sided memory. Hence the political accents in the following text, which also does not avoid subjective accents. Needless to say, a possible polemic with the theses expressed by the author would be the best fulfillment of my expectations.
The article deals with the concepts formulated by Wincenty Witos (1874–45) regarding Russia, its policy towards the Polish nation from the partitions times and throughout the period of Soviet Russia and the USSR, as well as the political thought regarding the security of state borders against its eastern neighbour. According to Witos, the biggest obstacles in Polish-Soviet relations were of political nature, such as the state system, but were also influenced by all problems, prejudices, and issues that arose in over a century of Russian rule in Poland after the partitions. In his opinion, these difficulties should be overcome in the name of the most vital interest: the good of the state and the maintenance of peaceful relations with its neighbours. ; Przedmiotem rozważań w artykule były formułowane przez Wincentego Witosa (1874–1945) koncepcje odnoszące się do Rosji, jej polityki wobec narodu od czasów zaborów, okresu Rosji Radzieckiej i ZSRR oraz myśl polityczna dotycząca bezpieczeństwa granic państwowych ze wschodnim sąsiadem. Do największych przeszkód w relacjach polsko-radzieckich Witos zaliczał te polityczne, takie jak ustrój państwa, ale także wszelkie problemy, bariery i niechęć, które zrodziły się w czasie ponad stuletniego panowania Rosjan na ziemiach polskich pod zaborami. Utrudnienia te w przekonaniu Witosa należało pokonywać w imię najważniejszego interesu, jakim było dobro państwa i utrzymanie pokojowych relacji z sąsiadami. ; The article deals with the concepts formulated by Wincenty Witos (1874–45) regarding Russia, its policy towards the Polish nation from the partitions times and throughout the period of Soviet Russia and the USSR, as well as the political thought regarding the security of state borders against its eastern neighbour. According to Witos, the biggest obstacles in Polish-Soviet relations were of political nature, such as the state system, but were also influenced by all problems, prejudices, and issues that arose in over a century of Russian rule in Poland after the partitions. In his opinion, these difficulties should be overcome in the name of the most vital interest: the good of the state and the maintenance of peaceful relations with its neighbours.
Przedmiotem rozważań w artykule były formułowane przez Wincentego Witosa (1874–1945) koncepcje odnoszące się do Rosji, jej polityki wobec narodu od czasów zaborów, okresu Rosji Radzieckiej i ZSRR oraz myśl polityczna dotycząca bezpieczeństwa granic państwowych ze wschodnim sąsiadem. Do największych przeszkód w relacjach polsko-radzieckich Witos zaliczał te polityczne, takie jak ustrój państwa, ale także wszelkie problemy, bariery i niechęć, które zrodziły się w czasie ponad stuletniego panowania Rosjan na ziemiach polskich pod zaborami. Utrudnienia te w przekonaniu Witosa należało pokonywać w imię najważniejszego interesu, jakim było dobro państwa i utrzymanie pokojowych relacji z sąsiadami. ; The article deals with the concepts formulated by Wincenty Witos (1874–45) regarding Russia, its policy towards the Polish nation from the partitions times and throughout the period of Soviet Russia and the USSR, as well as the political thought regarding the security of state borders against its eastern neighbour. According to Witos, the biggest obstacles in Polish-Soviet relations were of political nature, such as the state system, but were also influenced by all problems, prejudices, and issues that arose in over a century of Russian rule in Poland after the partitions. In his opinion, these difficulties should be overcome in the name of the most vital interest: the good of the state and the maintenance of peaceful relations with its neighbours. ; The article deals with the concepts formulated by Wincenty Witos (1874–45) regarding Russia, its policy towards the Polish nation from the partitions times and throughout the period of Soviet Russia and the USSR, as well as the political thought regarding the security of state borders against its eastern neighbour. According to Witos, the biggest obstacles in Polish-Soviet relations were of political nature, such as the state system, but were also influenced by all problems, prejudices, and issues that arose in over a century of Russian rule in Poland after the partitions. In his opinion, these difficulties should be overcome in the name of the most vital interest: the good of the state and the maintenance of peaceful relations with its neighbours.
Celem artykułu jest próba ujęcia podstawowych problemów w przyjęciu transatlantyckiej strategii wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej w kontekście wojny na Ukrainie. Wyzwaniem dla Stanów Zjednoczonych, Unii Europejskiej oraz jej państw członkowskich jest próba powrotu do polityki neoimperialnej przez Moskwę za prezydentury Władimira Putina. Z uwagi na szereg uwarunkowań dotyczących między innymi odmiennych wizji stosunków międzynarodowych i stosowania siły, Amerykanom i Europejczykom jest trudno przyjąć wspólne stanowisko wobec Rosji. Jest to jednak konieczne nie tylko dla przeciwdziałania agresji Rosji na Ukrainie, ale również dla odrodzenia i rozwoju wspólnoty atlantyckiej. ; The aim of the article is an attempt to identify the basic problems in adopting the transatlantic strategy towards the Russian Federation in the context of the war in Ukraine. The challenge for the United States, the European Union and its member states is an attempt by Moscow to return to neo-imperial during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Due to a number of determinants concerning, among other things, different visions of international relations and the use of force, it is difficult for Americans and Europeans to adopt a common position on Russia. However, this is necessary not only for counteracting Russian aggression in Ukraine, but also for the revival and development of the Atlantic community.
Celem artykułu jest próba ujęcia podstawowych problemów w przyjęciu transatlantyckiej strategii wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej w kontekście wojny na Ukrainie. Wyzwaniem dla Stanów Zjednoczonych, Unii Europejskiej oraz jej państw członkowskich jest próba powrotu do polityki neoimperialnej przez Moskwę za prezydentury Władimira Putina. Z uwagi na szereg uwarunkowań dotyczących między innymi odmiennych wizji stosunków międzynarodowych i stosowania siły, Amerykanom i Europejczykom jest trudno przyjąć wspólne stanowisko wobec Rosji. Jest to jednak konieczne nie tylko dla przeciwdziałania agresji Rosji na Ukrainie, ale również dla odrodzenia i rozwoju wspólnoty atlantyckiej. ; The aim of the article is an attempt to identify the basic problems in adopting the transatlantic strategy towards the Russian Federation in the context of the war in Ukraine. The challenge for the United States, the European Union and its member states is an attempt by Moscow to return to neo-imperial during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Due to a number of determinants concerning, among other things, different visions of international relations and the use of force, it is difficult for Americans and Europeans to adopt a common position on Russia. However, this is necessary not only for counteracting Russian aggression in Ukraine, but also for the revival and development of the Atlantic community.
Autor przyjął założenia badawcze oparte na teorii realizmu politycznego. To pozwoliło mu przeanalizować kryzys ukraiński jako rywalizację mocarstw o Ukrainę. W rywalizacji tej z jednej strony uczestniczy Zachód, tj. USA i Unia Europejska, a z drugiej strony Rosja. Artykuł przedstawia motywy obu stron, uwzględniając w stanowisku Zachodu motywy zaangażowania Polski. Niejako dla zobiektywizowania analizy ukazuje stanowisko strony trzeciej, tj. mocarstw azjatyckich Indii i Chin oraz niezależnych ekspertów z krajów zachodnich. Następnie wskazuje na konsekwencje kryzysu ukraińskiego dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w Europie. W ostatniej części podejmuje próbę ukazania szans znalezienia porozumienia Zachodu z Rosją w celu rozwiązania kryzysu ukraińskiego. Stwierdza, że jest to potrzebne i możliwe, jednak pod warunkiem rezygnacji przez zaangażowane strony z "absolutnej satysfakcji" i zdecydowania się na kompromisowe rozwiązanie. ; The author has adopted the assumptions based on the theory of political realism. This allowed him to analyse the Ukraine crisis as powers rivalry on Ukraine. In this competition, on the one hand, attending West, the United States and the European Union and Russia, on the other hand. The paper presents reasons of both sides, taking into account within the position of the West the motives of Poland's involvement. To make the analysis objective it shows the position of a third party, i.e. Asian powers India and China, and independent experts from Western countries. Then the paper points the Ukraine crisis consequences for international security in Europe. In the last part attempts to show the chances of reaching an agreement between the West and Russia to solve the Ukraine crisis. It states that it is necessary and possible, but subject to the abandonment by the parties involved "absolute satisfaction" and decide on a compromise solution.
Badając, jak wzajemne postrzeganie Europy Środkowej i Rosji zmieniało się na tle złożonych relacji między Wschodem a Zachodem, artykuł czerpie z elementów teorii komunikacji i studiów międzykulturowych (C. Gullién, H. Dyserinck, D. H. Pageaux, D. Ďurišin, etc.) znanych jako imagologia. Jako obszar geograficzny kulturowych przecięć, gdzie weszły ze sobą w kontakt niesłowiański Zachód i słowiański Wschód, Europa Środkowa zawsze wyróżniała sięzmienną pozycją przejściowych centrów i peryferii ze specyficzną mieszanką grup etnicznych, kultur, religii i ideologii. Fakt, że leży ona pomiędzy dwoma tak potężnymi narodami, jak Niemcy i Rosja, wywarł fundamentalny wpływ nie tylko na polityczną, ale i estetyczną komunikację pomiędzy narodami słowiańskimi i Zachodem, który często ujmowany był za pomocą mitów, tzn. fikcjonalnych i subiektywnych obrazów służących do interpretowania rzeczywistości. Wzajemne schodzenie się i rozchodzenie Rosji i Zachodu wynikało z różnic religijnych i "rozdarcia" narodów słowiańskich (przede wszystkim Słowian zachodnich), którzy oprócz trzymania się zachodniej religii i reguł politycznych, pielęgnowali niechęć w stosunku do plemiennej wspólnoty z Rosją. Najsilniejsze więzy z Rosją demonstrowały więc małe narody słowiańskie, żyjące w imperium habsburskim, podczas gdy rosyjskie interesy w Europie skierowane były raczej na Niemcy, Francję lub Anglię, a obszar środkowoeuropejski uznano za strefęprzejściową, traktowaną przez carską Rosję lub Związek Radziecki jako siłę polityczną do prowadzenia własnej polityki względem Zachodu. W przeciwieństwie do tego stanowiska, narody środkowoeuropejskie, nie wyłączając z nich Czechów, nawiązywały relacje z Rosją jako inspirującym liderem i symbolem słowiańskiej niezależności, szczególnie w czasach kłopotów, zagrożenia narodowego i politycznej niestabilności. Ich oczekiwania opierały się na powszechnym przekonaniu, że "nieeuropejska" Rosja i jej inność zdemokratyzuje się poprzez podążanie drogąlokalnej tradycji i popieranie czeskich interesów w geopolitycznej konfrontacji z niesłowiańskim Zachodem. Jak się wydaje, relacja pomiędzy Europą Środkową i Rosją pozostanie centrum permanentnej refleksji metakrytycznej nawet na początku XXI wieku i pozostaje mieć nadzieję, że będzie to model harmonijnej współegzystencji, wzajemnego zrozumienia i szacunku. ; While examining mutual perception of Central Europe and Russia as it has changed against the background of the complex East-West relation, the paper employs the motives of the theory of communication and intercultural studies (C. Guillén, H. Dyserinck, D. H. Pageaux, D. Ďurišin, etc.) known as imagology. As a cultural crossroads and geographicalarea where the non-Slavonic West and the Slavonic East come into contact, Central Europe has always featured a changeable position of transitional centres and peripheries with the specific mingling of ethnics, cultures, religions and ideologies. The fact that it is situated between two powerful nations, such as Germany and Russia, has fundamentally influenced not only political but also aesthetical communication between the Slavonic peoples and the West, which has often been maintained through myths, i.e. fictional and subjective images to interpret the reality. The mutual converging or diverging of Russia and the West has resulted from the religious oscillation and "splitting" of Slavonic peoples (namely the West Slavs) who, despite adhering to Western religion and policies, have fostered awareness of tribal affinity with Russia. The strongest ties with Russia were thus maintained by small Slavonic nations living in the Hapsburg Empire, whereas the Russian interest in Europe was rather aimed at Germany, France or England, andCentral European area was deemed to be a zone of transition employed by Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union as political powers to pursue their goals in the West. In contrast to it, Central European nations, the Czechs not excluding, forged ties with Russia as the inspiring leader and symbol of Slavonic independence, the more so in times of troubles, national danger and political instability. Their expectations were based on the common belief that "non-European" Russia and its otherness would become democratised through following the local tradition and supporting Czech interests in the geopolitical confrontation with the non-Slavonic West. As it seems, the relation between Central Europe and Russia will remain the focus of permanent metacritical discourse even in the early 21st century and one can only cherish hope that it will be a model of harmonious coexistence, mutual understanding and respect.
The purpose of the article is to compare the positions of the presidents of Poland and Russia adopted in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland from 1997 and the Constitution of Russia from 1993. To enable comparative studies, the president's institution was divided into basic elements. It was assumed that the most important elements of the president's political position are: the system of government and separation of powers; way of electing a president; functions and competences; scope and type of responsibility. The publication structure was also divided in this way. The presented research results show that the most important and differentiating elements are the system of government as well as the functions and competences of the president. These factors decide about a strong, strengthened – in comparison with others – presidency in Russia. Some constitutional solutions, such as choice or responsibility, can be considered similar. ; Celem artykułu jest porównanie pozycji prezydentów Polski i Rosji przyjętych w Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 roku i Konstytucji Rosji z 1993 roku. Aby umożliwić komparatystykę, podzielono instytucję prezydenta na podstawowe elementy. Przyjęto założenie, że najważniejszymi elementami pozycji ustrojowej prezydenta jest: system rządów i podział władzy, sposób wyboru prezydenta, funkcje i kompetencje, zakres i rodzaj ponoszonej odpowiedzialności. Tak też podzielona została struktura publikacji. Przedstawione wyniki badań pokazują, że najistotniejszymi, różnicującymi elementami jest system rządów oraz funkcje i kompetencje prezydenta. Te właśnie czynniki decydują o silnej, wzmocnionej – w porównaniu z innymi – prezydenturze w Rosji. Część konstytucyjnych rozwiązań, na przykład sposób wyboru czy odpowiedzialność, można uznać za podobne. ; Целью статьи является сравнение позиций президентов Польши и России, принятых в Конституции Республики Польша от 1997 года и Конституции России от 1993 года. Для проведения сравнительных исследований институция президента была поделена основные элементы. Предполагалось, что наиболее важными элементами политической позиции президента являются: система правления и разделение властей; способ избрания президента; функции и компетенции; объем и вид ответственности. Структура публикации также была разделена таким образом. Представленные результаты исследования показывают, что наиболее важными и дифференцирующими элементами являются государственная система, а также функции и полномочия президента. Эти факторы определяют сильное – по сравнению с другими – президентство России. Некоторые конституционные решения, такие как выбор или ответственность, могут считаться схожими.
The political and economic reforms in Russia since the beginning of the 1990s have made it possible to build a new economic system. Over more than 25 years, this system has evolved under the influence of, among others, economic and financial crises, which resulted in changes in the role of the state, ownership structure and the specificity of the corporate sector. The main goal of the paper is to identify the key elements and features of the economic system in Russia in the specified stages of its evolution and to indicate the perspectives of changes. To achieve this goal, an in-depth analysis was made of the literature and statistical data. The author puts forward the thesis that there are still some premises of the evolution of the economic system in Russia which resulted from the need for structural changes and the exhaustion of the current model of economic growth. However, in the immediate future, the economic system in Russia will not evolve significantly because of the economic stability and the lack of political will to make significant reforms.
The political and economic reforms in Russia since the beginning of the 1990s have made it possible to build a new economic system. Over more than 25 years, this system has evolved under the influence of, among others, economic and financial crises, which resulted in changes in the role of the state, ownership structure and the specificity of the corporate sector. The main goal of the paper is to identify the key elements and features of the economic system in Russia in the specified stages of its evolution and to indicate the perspectives of changes. To achieve this goal, an in-depth analysis was made of the literature and statistical data. The author puts forward the thesis that there are still some premises of the evolution of the economic system in Russia which resulted from the need for structural changes and the exhaustion of the current model of economic growth. However, in the immediate future, the economic system in Russia will not evolve significantly because of the economic stability and the lack of political will to make significant reforms.
The subject of the article are the opinions of the USSR and Russia experts published in the magazine "The Ark" in the years 1991–1995 and concerning the future of Russian Federation. The authors of those publications attempted to answer the question which direction will the internal development of Russia take, when it comes to its politics, economy and social relations. Also they discussed about the tactics that the Russian state will choose for its relations with neighbors, and particularly Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States. Most of the publicists expressed an opinion that Russia will not develop in the direction of liberal democracy and will become a formally democratic, but actually authoritarian rule state instead, with a strong position of the officials-business class. As far foreign policy is concerned there will be attempts at rebuilding the position of a superpower that was forfeited as the results of loss in the Cold War conflict with the United States and Western Europe. ; Tematem artykułu są opinie znawców ZSRR i Rosji zamieszczane na łamach czasopisma "Arka" w latach 1991–1995, dotyczące przyszłości Federacji Rosyjskiej. Autorzy publikacji próbowali odpowiedzieć na pytanie, w jakim kierunku będzie zmierzał rozwój wewnętrzny Rosji zarówno w dziedzinie polityki, gospodarki, jak i stosunków społecznych. Zastanawiano się także nad taktyką, jaką podejmie państwo rosyjskie w stosunkach z sąsiadami, szczególnie z Ukrainą, Białorusią i państwami nadbałtyckimi. Większość publicystów wyrażało opinię, że Rosja nie będzie się rozwijać w kierunku zachodniego modelu demokracji liberalnej, lecz stanie się państwem formalnie demokratycznym, ale faktycznie rządzonym w sposób autorytarny z silną pozycją warstwy urzędniczo-biznesowej. W wymiarze polityki zagranicznej będą natomiast podejmowane próby odbudowy pozycji mocarstwowej utraconej w wyniku porażki w konflikcie zimnowojennym ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi i z Europą Zachodnią.
Analyses show that the mutual relations between the EU and Russia are marked by profound pragmatism on the one hand (in Russia) and a certain complex of a powerful neighbor and the fear of political turmoil on the other (in the EU). Russia tries to take advantage of these fears in order to maximize her profits and skillfully oscillates between the policy of the USA and that of EU which both count on the benefits to be obtained from the opening of the Russian market. However, the recently popular Russian alliance with China does not pose an actual alternative for the commercial exchange with Europe. This is due to the abundance of Chinese natural resources and expanding Chinese economy that is looking for sales markets rather than offering its purchasing market. In the long run the Russian alliance with the EU will have to be based on new principles that will restrict financial support by the United Europe that will be required to finance its new members.
artykuł w: Wschód Europy : studia humanistyczno-społeczne Vol. 6, Nr 1 (2020), s. 91-111 ; streszcz. ang., pol., ros. ; artykuł w: Wschód Europy : studia humanistyczno-społeczne Vol. 6, Nr 1 (2020), s. 91-111 ; streszcz. ang., pol., ros.
