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One of the most important diplomatic debates of the 1990s evolved around the eastern enlargement of the NATO. In the early years of the foreign policy of the Middle-Eastern countries by now free from soviet influence one major issue was to adapt themselves to the post-cold war world order. All of the countries involved – the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the first round – soon realized that their only option was to get integrated into the western organizations, to NATO in particular. The leading politicians of this organization had their doubts about these countries' capability to adapt to the already developed system of the organization. This is mainly illustrated by the fact that until the middle of the decade there was a lack of real commitment to the enlargement of the alliance. The PfP document of January 1994 may be regarded as a breakthrough. The diplomacy of Moscow became more and more dismissive as to the idea of the eastern enlargement of the NATO. Within a few months an attitude that regarded Russia joining the NATO as a possible perspective gave way to the total rejection of the enlargement. This study aims at exploring the determining points of this debate mainly in the light of the most important documents. ; One of the most important diplomatic debates of the 1990s evolved around the eastern enlargement of the NATO. In the early years of the foreign policy of the Middle-Eastern countries by now free from soviet influence one major issue was to adapt themselves to the post-cold war world order. All of the countries involved – the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the first round – soon realized that their only option was to get integrated into the western organizations, to NATO in particular. The leading politicians of this organization had their doubts about these countries' capability to adapt to the already developed system of the organization. This is mainly illustrated by the fact that until the middle of the decade there was a lack of real commitment to the enlargement of the alliance. The PfP document of January 1994 may be regarded as a breakthrough. The diplomacy of Moscow became more and more dismissive as to the idea of the eastern enlargement of the NATO. Within a few months an attitude that regarded Russia joining the NATO as a possible perspective gave way to the total rejection of the enlargement. This study aims at exploring the determining points of this debate mainly in the light of the most important documents.

In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia. ; In recent decades, the United States has increasingly used the means of economic warfare in its geopolitical struggles. Among these instruments – in addition to the financial markets – it most often launches geoeconomic attacks in the oil market against its geopolitical adversaries. The United States can cause significant economic damage both for oil exporter (eg. Iran, Venezuela) and oil importer (eg. Cuba, North Korea) countries by restricting their access to oil markets.This paper analyzes the economic warfare in the oil market between the United States and Iran, Russia, and North Korea. Through these examples this paper demonstrates how the United States organizes and executes geoeconomic attacks in the oil market and how it handles country-specific problems. The United States has the means to organize broad international coalition alongside the oil market sanctions – even in the lack of UN Security Council resolutions.United Nations has decided on a number of economic sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear program. These sanctions reduced the supply in the world oil market and resulted in about 10-20% price increase, while Iran – despite of the sanctions – found the way to sell significant amount of oil, mainly to China and India.Russia is a member of the UN Security Council, so no UN sanctions can be imposed on it, nevertheless the United States and its allies launched a geoeconomics assault against Russia after the annexation of the Crimea. Russia was prepared for these economic sanctions and could effectively reduce the negative effects on its oil export, which could even increase after the western sanctions. North Korea is under UN sanctions since 2006 because of its nuclear program. The sanctions refer to oil and oil products as well, but has no significant effect on world oil market and oil price, because North Korea is a relatively small country with low oil consumption.North Korea is suffering a huge economic burden due to severe restrictions and its only way to circumvent the embargo – according to American accusations – is to smuggle some oil from China and Russia.

Energy is one of the key tools of Russian geopolitical advocacy that Russia can still use efficiently through the energy supply systems built up after WWII and that is still unavoidable. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the advocacy role of the Russian state has decreased however it has never completely lost its influence on the energy sector and thereby on the countries depending on it. We can speak about the active use of energy relations as a tool of political advocacy again since 2006, nonetheless we cannot observe a complete lack of use of these tools between 1990 and 2006 either. The former Soviet republics and the former satellite countries were the targets of these actions, which illustrates the long-term effects of energy dependency systems developed between 1945 and 1990. The 2006 Russian-Ukrainian conflict was the first, when Russia did not only threaten with but actually reduced the amount of natural gas transported. During the 2006 and the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian conflicts, it became clear that Russia actually uses limitation of supply and price policy pressure and not only as a means of threat in order to enforce its political interests, even accepting its negative consequences.

Since its origins, in the context of the Cold War's beginning, NATO has been a robust defensive alliance, acting in accordance with UN Charter, as a collective defence structure based on solidarity and mutual trust. Nowadays it has 28 member states and one can say that it fulfilled its main role: to protect the West against communist/Soviet threats using the deterrence and containmemt tools. Neither USSR nor its main instrument, the Warsaw Pact dare to attack the Euro-Altantic area. Our main assumption is that because the specific national interests of each member state, because of the domestic-constitutional issues and bureaucratic obstacles, the Alliance cannot yet forge a common strategic culture for all its members and also lacks a common lens for detecting real risks and therats, be they nation states or non-states actors. Nowadays, Russia and Islamic State are the main adversaries for the Western states, thus NATO should be more effective in dealing with them. And there is a need for reform and transformation. Divergences between adepts of territorial defence and those of pro-active "out of area" missions go in addition to divergences concerning the neeed for increased defence budgets for all members and especially concering the attitude towards Russia. Moscow used economic and energy tools trying to divise some allies like Hungary, Greece and Bulgaria and it partially succeeded. Using some theories of alliances and of democratic peace, resorting to recent facts and figures related to NATO's activities and plans, will help the reader understand the problem of increasing the power vs. increasing the security dilemma and the prospect of future conflicts.

Ukraine's division today is mostly a consequence of its peripheral status: throughout the course of history the Ukrainians should (have) achieve(d) independence and the establishment of a sovereign state in the political vacuum that developed due to the rivalry of the neighboring great powers. In the East-European region Ukraine did have a state several times for a short period and in a much debated way, but it only gained complete sovereignity in 1991, while Russia had considered Ukraine, which "voluntarily joined" the empire in 1654, part of the Russian state. What has also contributed to Ukraine's division and the belated establishment of a state was that it did not have a unified national identity: in East- and Central Ukraine, which were continuously under Russian rule from the middle of the 17th century, a strong national movement could never develop. Then, following the partition of Poland, when West-Ukraine – with the exception of Galicia – became part of Russia, most of the Ukrainian territories belonged to – but did not comprise – one state. In Galicia, which was the western border of the eastern Slavic territories and was under the considerably liberal rule of Austria, and was called "the Ukrainian Piedmont", a stronger national self-consciousness developed after 1772. That is why it was there that the idea of a unified Ukrainian state was conceived first, the realization of which, however, took more than a hundred years, because of the division and weak national consciousness of the Ukrainians.

Due to the tremendous ideological stakes of the issue both before and after 1989, the impact of the October Revolution on the Romanian socialist movement was either exaggerated or minimized. If communist literature naturally emphasized the influence of the events in Russia among Romanian socialists, the anticommunist narrative limited its hold to some few radical leaders and to their immediate followers. This article goes beyond these biased perspectives by restoring the topic in its historical environment. Eventually, it tends to corroborate the communist "side of the truth": the changes undergone by the Romanian "proletarian milieu" back in the early 1920s, i.e. the radicalization of the socialist discourse, the mobility of the socialist leadership or the reorganization of the Socialist Party, confirm the significant weight of the October Revolution in the economy of Romanian socialism.