Suchergebnisse

In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU-Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use -- these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine -- is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical application of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and their correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU-Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values and pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia engagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define their own cultural-political identities. Adapted from the source document.

The article analyses the aesthetic dimension of Chinese propaganda in Russia. The analysis seeks to identify the aesthetic component of Chinese propaganda in Russia as the fundamental, synthesising catalyst of Russian Sinophilia which unites several factors. The aesthetic aspect of Chinese propaganda in Russia is revealed through an analysis of official PRC websites in Russian, which clarifies a close connection between form and content in propaganda. The form quite often acquires a function which not only imparts the content, but also corrects it and uses it to manipulate and dominate. The analysis names as Russia's Achilles' heel its unbridled and unshakeable belief in its unique and inevitable Messianic mission in World History. This is its weak spot exploited by Chinese propaganda. The Russian reaction to Chinese propaganda is analysed, invoking the categories of both Sinophilia and Sinophobia. It is asserted that Chinese propaganda in Russia relies on the principles of involvement and participation, which are based on cultural exoticism and Confucian philosophy. To sum up, Chinese propaganda in Russia is identified as part of a plan/strategy for the establishment and maintenance of a grand, universal, practical, cosmopolitan Chinese philosophy or world order at the level of a global international system and world politics. Adapted from the source document.

This article aims at discussing methods of analysis and understanding of the "imperial discourse" in modern investigations of Russian culture. Having introduced Michel Foucault's and Edward Said's basic concepts that have influenced postcolonial studies and researches of Russian culture, the author proceeds to the works of Ewa Thompson, Alexander Etkind, Susan Layton, Andrei Zorin, Richard Wortman and Harsha Ram. The concept of imperial discourse in their works describes the relationship between the culture and literary text to specific historical context defined as imperial. The relationship between the text and imperial context is ambiguous and is demonstrated on different levels. This relationship is revealed in investigations of the ceremonies of the Russian imperial court, literary representations, functioning of ideological symbols, as well as the genre poetics and the lyrical subject's specifics. General feature of these investigations of Russian culture and literature is that rather than analyzing repressive aspects of imperial discourse (except Ewa Thompson), the authors focus on its constructive aspects that reveal new meanings of text and specify formation of cultural identity of Russian writers. Adapted from the source document.

Straipsnyje keliami du tarpusavyje susije klausimai. Pirma, kokia yra Baltijos valstybiu vieta Rusijos saugumo vaizdiniuose. Antra, kaip Balti-jos valstybes susidoroja su neigiamu Rusijos suvokimu. Siame straipsnyje teigiama, kad Rusijos ir triju Baltijos valstybiu abipusio reprezentavimo ir saveikos problemas geriausiai galima suprasti atskleidziant siu valstybiu erdves suvokima, kuris visu pirma formuoja poziuri i artimiausia aplinka, taigi ir savo kaimynus. Sis suvokimas, kylantis ir is istoriniu reprezentaci-ju, pagrindzia ir pateikia issamu, objektyvizuota saves ir 'kito' suvokima. Taigi siekiama parodyti, kaip itemptus ir nepasitikejimo kupinus Rusijos ir triju Baltijos valstybiu santykius veikia susiduriantys ir konfliktuojantys savo vietos tarptautineje politikoje apibudinimai ir is ju kylantys veiksmai. Si ide-ja straipsnyje atskleidziama, pirma, ispletojant teorines prielaidas, kad yra teritorijos, tapatybes ir sienu rysys, ir is to kylancius kaimynystes analizes principus, antra, parodant, kaip Rusija ir trys Baltijos valstybes savo uzsie-nio politika isreiskia, formuluoja ir dar karta itvirtina savo erdvini tapatybini pasaulevaizdi. Isvadose parodoma, kaip skirtingu ir vienas kita neutralizuoti bandanciu pasaulevaizdziu susidurimas formuoja dvisales The article raises two interconnected questions: first, what is the place of three Baltic States in Russia's security image, and second, how Baltic States cope with their own negative perception of Russia. The proposed idea is that the problems of mutual representation and interaction can be understood analysing the conceptualisations of space, which influences the way in which the closest environment, including the neighbours, is approached. This representation, together with historical narratives, formulates and justifies the comprehensive, consistent, and objectivised self and the other. Thus, the goal is to show how the tense relations between Russia and Baltic States, full of mistrust, can be explained as a clash between two conflicting geo-spatial views. This idea is developed, first, by presenting the theoretical assumptions on the relation among territory, identity, and borders and the principles of the neighbourhood analysis, and second, by demonstrating how the spatial representation by Russia and Baltic States is formulated and supported in their spatial identity and foreign policy practices. In the conclusions, the answer is given as to how this clash between the two different and competing understandings is reflected in the bilateral interactions and how these insights allow contributing to the analysis of the foreign policy of the states. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.

The EU energy policy has always been governed by a sort of go-it-alone principles. There has been a lack of common approach to energy problems and no real determination to create a common energy market. As a result, the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine left certain Central and South European countries without gas and showed how vulnerable the EU is when it does not have real instruments to react unanimously. In that context the effects of Lisbon Treaty in energy security sector are very important to assess by looking what contribution the Treaty makes in that field. Moreover, it could be argued that The Lisbon Treaty established the main priorities of the European energy policy and has envisaged the possibility for the EU to play a more active role in that sector. Adapted from the source document.

Although it is not the primary reason for Russian economic collapse which occurred in August of 1998, the permanent crisis of Russian political system after 1991 had contributed to this breakdown. A major role in all this was played by the process of privatisation by which Russian natural and economic resources remained in the hands of the political/economic elite. The crisis of the political system in Russia has another consequence - bringing into question not only the attained degree of democratic development but also the future of democracy in Russia. (SOI : SOEU: S. 117)

Due to their strategic position, the Baltic peoples throughout their history have always been a kind of a buffer-zone, which has to a large extent affected their development. In the new European environment, the Baltic region is today somewhat marginalized, but because of its proximity to Russia it has an important strategic position. They want to join NATO and the EU because the Baltic states in this see a guarantee of their security and stability. This may alo be an opportunity for solving the very delicate relationship with Russia, still an important actor influencing the Baltic states. (SOI : PM: S. 59)