Suchergebnisse

The relations with Russia rank among the most important and most complex issues in the US and UK foreign policy. The years after the Second World War have been marked by an exhausting arms race between the Western and Eastern bloc that ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the victory of the United States and its Western allies. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relations between the US and the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, during the mandate of President Trump and after Brexit and point to possible directions that these relations may take in the aftermath of Biden's victory in the 2020 US Presidential elections. The author proceeds from a hypothesis that the efforts of President Trump, who, contrary to his predecessors, felt that the relations with Russia should be based on interests rather than ideology, have failed. He has not been successful primarily due to the huge resistance mounted by the state structures, mainstream media and anti-Russian coalition forged by the Republican and Democratic parties. The relations between the UK and Russia remain cold after Brexit as well due to the severe problems between the two countries. The first part will deal with the strained relations between the United States and Russia following the West's victory in the Cold War, the efforts of President Trump to improve these relations and his failure to do so. The second part of the paper will address the relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia, which is in many respects even more complicated than that between Russia and the US. After Brexit, the relations between the two countries continue to be plagued by the activities of the Russian agents in Great Britain, the crisis in Ukraine and different views on the war in Syria. In the third part, the concluding part of the paper, the author tried to answer the question of how the relations between the US and Russia will develop after Joseph Biden won the 2020 US Presidential elections. According to him, the new President will continue to pursue the traditional policy towards Russia agreed upon by both US parties. It can be expected that Biden will, despite the policy of sanctions pursued by his predecessors, Obama and Trump, engage more in supporting the opposition and civilian sector in Russia. Given the cold and strained relations between these two states, it may be assumed that Great Britain will readily follow a new, tougher course of action pursued by President Biden towards Russia and Putin. It is especially important for UK politics that Biden returns to the ideas of liberalism because, as we have seen on previous pages, in London, in addition to the actions of Russian agents on the UK territory, Putin is most resented precisely for his activities to overthrow the ruling liberal order. Despite the good ties between Prime Minister Johnson and the former US President who supported Brexit, Biden's victory will bring relief to the UK because of his commitment, as opposed to Trump, to bring back America to the world political stage, where London is likely to expect to find space for its new global role after leaving the EU. On the other hand, Moscow will probably continue with its past foreign policy strategy in anticipation of the moves to be taken by the new US President without high expectations regarding the future relations between the two countries. Russia has even fewer expectations when it comes to relations with the UK, given the gravity of the problems that burden the relations between the two countries.

After the cold war, when the Eastern block collapsed, considerable changes were made in the world security architecture. Althought it seemed like a beginning of more certain and secure era, cold war ending didn't fulfill expectations neither the main actors in the cold war conflict, nor the expectations of the rest of the world. Besides, collapse of one block, didn't stop growth dynamic of new power centers. Tendencies for power are not new and unfamiliar to human. When bypolar system collapsed, other subjects started fighting for the positions. PRC role with her enormous people potential, growing economy and strengthened military is evident. Soviet Union, accordingly Russian Federation, believed that there was no more need for strenghtening the other block, especially when the opposite doesn't exist. But, former partners included the opposite side, and that made more tensions between Russia and United States. Rest of the world didn't get better chance to create own future. On the contrary, especially for the peripheral and semiperipheral countries, new threats appeared that destabilized individual and collective security. Efforts to make human community rational, were always idealism and those efforts were considered utopian, but under the given circumstances, for the international stability, the most accseptable model is model of global triangle - China, Russia, USA. Reason why this three countries is ther specific potention: USA is powerful technological, military and political center, RF is worlds warehouse' and China is the worlds manufacture. In the globalism domination over nationalism era that model could be the optimal 'braking and balance' system in the international relations- political ideal that all liberal schools wanted to acchievestarting Lock, Montesquieu, Rousseau till today.

In this paper the authors examine the dynamics of security relations of the three key security actors in the Euro-Atlantic area - NATO, Russia, and the European Union. Based on their findings, and using a comparative analysis of the actors' doctrinal and strategic documents, as well as their observations of contemporary challenges, risks and threats, the authors discuss if, and to what extent, their productive security cooperation is possible, or their positions are opposed in such a way that in short and medium terms only disputes or less or more open conflicts are likely to be expected between them. This leads to a conclusion that a majority of recognized security challenges, risks and threats are shared, as well as that these actors see each other not only as competitors but also as partners in the struggle against those challenges, risks and threats, which opens possibilities of security cooperation.

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Alienated fragmented identity in case of the state and nation is analyzed through cultural identity, selfidentification in historical, geopolitical, and political contexts. The main question is how a nation should stay as it was when all around there are huge political, economic, and social changes? What is the influence of internal and extern al structures in shaping the relationship between perceptions of national identity, culture, "foreign"? And what are the manifestations and consequences of real policy (that is based on mythical thinking) on the process of state and nation formation? One of the most interesting and important objects of analysis of alienated identity in the context of states and nations is Russia. This multicultural, multireligious giant constructed by coincidences, wars and aggression and having a unique cultural and historical heritage lacks only one thing – clear autoidentification.

Since the demise of FSU, about one million Russian speakers from all republics of the FSU have moved to Israel. Today Russian Jews amount to 20 % of Israeli society. This aliyah doesn't integrate into Israeli society and forms Russian speakers' subculture (externalized through particular cultural identity, Russian language community formation and no integration process) in Israel. This segregation determines complex Russian Jews relationship with Israel and Russia: in Israel this community functions like separate ethnic group and creates diasporic ties with Russia. As a result of the demise of the FSU Russia-Israel relations take a new form. Russia renounced it's entirely proarabic politics and started developing friendly ties with Israel. The aim of the work is to determine the role of Israeli Russian Jews community in Israel-Russia relations, keeping in mind that Israeli Russian speakers in Israel society act like the separate ethnic group with strong diasporic ties with Russia. The hypothesis of the work – Israeli Russian Jews community is one of the factors, affecting Israel-Russia relations transformation in positive way. In order to verify the hypothesis there are formed four goals: 1) to define the term "diaspora"and theoretical model of diaspora's action between hostland and homeland; 2) to analyze Israeli Russian Jews community's identification with Russian culture and evaluate the disintegration into Israeli society process; 3) to evaluate Israel, Russia and community's interests in respect of each other; 4) to identify the role of Russian Jews in political, economical and cultural area. The analysis enables to come to these conclusions: 1) Israeli Russian Jews act like the bridge between Israel and Russia. Dual cultural identification and non-integration process capacitates hostland to obtain homeland features (and vice versa) and creates proper conditions for Russian Jews to act like the mediator. 2) Russian Jews community was one of the main factors for changing Russia's perception of Israel – new perception determines new political courses and opens new possibilities; 3) Israeli Russian Jews is one of the main initiator of Israel-Russia economical cooperation; 4) Russian Jews community is the main actor in cultural each other (Israel-Russia) knowledge. Nevertheless, dual identification on certain conditions operates like community's motivation reducing factor. On the one hand, dual identification capacitates community to act like influential political and economic group in Israel, retain dual citizenship, property and operation freedom in Russia. On the other hand, dual identification is the barrier for active lobby. Dual identification prevents community from political agenda in regard to Israel-Russia relations formation. Thus even disposing of powerful political influence means Israeli Russian Jews don't manage to use it. Eventually, by playing "dual identity" card Russian Jews community may become the mean of influence in the relationship of two states. Dual identity suppresses political consciousness and diasporic community can't be active player in regard to partly hostland/partly homeland - Russia. Because of this passivity Russian Jews community-reversed diaspora becomes potential object of manipulation. The analysis of literature enables to come to the conclusion that Israel government doesn't use the community as the mean of influence. It can be explained by the fact that Israel government, despite dual Russian Jews community's identity, doesn't consider Russian Jews as diaspora, conversely it is considered integral part of Israel society. Whereas Russia is trying to ensure for itself possible means of manipulation through financial support for Russian Jews parties and provided permission to use Russia's mass media for Russian Jews community's purposes. It means that in prospect Russian Jews may become significant Russia's mean of influence to Israel.

Since the demise of FSU, about one million Russian speakers from all republics of the FSU have moved to Israel. Today Russian Jews amount to 20 % of Israeli society. This aliyah doesn't integrate into Israeli society and forms Russian speakers' subculture (externalized through particular cultural identity, Russian language community formation and no integration process) in Israel. This segregation determines complex Russian Jews relationship with Israel and Russia: in Israel this community functions like separate ethnic group and creates diasporic ties with Russia. As a result of the demise of the FSU Russia-Israel relations take a new form. Russia renounced it's entirely proarabic politics and started developing friendly ties with Israel. The aim of the work is to determine the role of Israeli Russian Jews community in Israel-Russia relations, keeping in mind that Israeli Russian speakers in Israel society act like the separate ethnic group with strong diasporic ties with Russia. The hypothesis of the work – Israeli Russian Jews community is one of the factors, affecting Israel-Russia relations transformation in positive way. In order to verify the hypothesis there are formed four goals: 1) to define the term "diaspora"and theoretical model of diaspora's action between hostland and homeland; 2) to analyze Israeli Russian Jews community's identification with Russian culture and evaluate the disintegration into Israeli society process; 3) to evaluate Israel, Russia and community's interests in respect of each other; 4) to identify the role of Russian Jews in political, economical and cultural area. The analysis enables to come to these conclusions: 1) Israeli Russian Jews act like the bridge between Israel and Russia. Dual cultural identification and non-integration process capacitates hostland to obtain homeland features (and vice versa) and creates proper conditions for Russian Jews to act like the mediator. 2) Russian Jews community was one of the main factors for changing Russia's perception of Israel – new perception determines new political courses and opens new possibilities; 3) Israeli Russian Jews is one of the main initiator of Israel-Russia economical cooperation; 4) Russian Jews community is the main actor in cultural each other (Israel-Russia) knowledge. Nevertheless, dual identification on certain conditions operates like community's motivation reducing factor. On the one hand, dual identification capacitates community to act like influential political and economic group in Israel, retain dual citizenship, property and operation freedom in Russia. On the other hand, dual identification is the barrier for active lobby. Dual identification prevents community from political agenda in regard to Israel-Russia relations formation. Thus even disposing of powerful political influence means Israeli Russian Jews don't manage to use it. Eventually, by playing "dual identity" card Russian Jews community may become the mean of influence in the relationship of two states. Dual identity suppresses political consciousness and diasporic community can't be active player in regard to partly hostland/partly homeland - Russia. Because of this passivity Russian Jews community-reversed diaspora becomes potential object of manipulation. The analysis of literature enables to come to the conclusion that Israel government doesn't use the community as the mean of influence. It can be explained by the fact that Israel government, despite dual Russian Jews community's identity, doesn't consider Russian Jews as diaspora, conversely it is considered integral part of Israel society. Whereas Russia is trying to ensure for itself possible means of manipulation through financial support for Russian Jews parties and provided permission to use Russia's mass media for Russian Jews community's purposes. It means that in prospect Russian Jews may become significant Russia's mean of influence to Israel.

In this study, titled "Intersection of US-Russia interests in Central Asia region", the author analyses the strategies of the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards Central Asia region and the main strategic interests in the security policy and economical level. The study pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the democratization aspect, especially in the U.S. foreign policy course, and its impact on the relations between U.S., Russia and the states of the Central Asia. The study is based on the academic concept of "imperialism", which becomes an orient in the analysis of intersection of US Russia interests in Central Asia region and opportunities for cooperation. The study has been divided into four chapters. In the first chapter author introduces a theoretical foundation of "imperialism". The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of US strategic interests in Central Asia and the role and meaning of democratization process. The geopolitical spread of Russia's influence is analyzed in the third chapter of the study, where the author underscores the importance of rally points in the relations between Russia and Central Asia states. The fourth chapter analyzes the prospects of future cooperation and competition between US and Russia. The study concludes, that US strategy towards Central Asia is discontinuous, and because of underestimation of specific situation in this region and lack of rally points (short common historical experience, differences in culture and value systems etc.), US fails to establish in this region. In addition, attempting to pass a "democratization message" to the authoritarian regimes and misjudging their reaction, US harms its other strategic interests. However, US cannot abandon "democratization" message because of it gives an ideological ground for its foreign policy course and legitimizes its actions worldwide. Therefore the study confirms the first hypothesis, that excessively underscoring the democratization aspect and forgetting the specifics of Central Asia region, US reduces the effectiveness of these relations as well as its abilities to reach other strategic goals. Russia, otherwise, does not underline "democratization" issue and avoids the rise of such tension in its relations with Central Asia states. Russia makes use of the bridging cultural connections, common historical experience, and, mostly important, common infrastructure that facilitates economical cooperation. Therefore, study concludes, that Russia manages to make use of Central Asia states' apathy towards US offered democratization model, and increases its opportunities to strengthen the instruments of economical pressure in the region. Central Asia can be seen as a testing area for the competition of US and Russia imperial ambitions. In consideration of US attempts to implement its domination policy goals and Russia's desire to see multipolar international relations system instead of unipolar, cooperation perspectives remain highly questionable.

In this study, titled "Intersection of US-Russia interests in Central Asia region", the author analyses the strategies of the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards Central Asia region and the main strategic interests in the security policy and economical level. The study pays a lot of attention to the analysis of the democratization aspect, especially in the U.S. foreign policy course, and its impact on the relations between U.S., Russia and the states of the Central Asia. The study is based on the academic concept of "imperialism", which becomes an orient in the analysis of intersection of US Russia interests in Central Asia region and opportunities for cooperation. The study has been divided into four chapters. In the first chapter author introduces a theoretical foundation of "imperialism". The second chapter is dedicated to the analysis of US strategic interests in Central Asia and the role and meaning of democratization process. The geopolitical spread of Russia's influence is analyzed in the third chapter of the study, where the author underscores the importance of rally points in the relations between Russia and Central Asia states. The fourth chapter analyzes the prospects of future cooperation and competition between US and Russia. The study concludes, that US strategy towards Central Asia is discontinuous, and because of underestimation of specific situation in this region and lack of rally points (short common historical experience, differences in culture and value systems etc.), US fails to establish in this region. In addition, attempting to pass a "democratization message" to the authoritarian regimes and misjudging their reaction, US harms its other strategic interests. However, US cannot abandon "democratization" message because of it gives an ideological ground for its foreign policy course and legitimizes its actions worldwide. Therefore the study confirms the first hypothesis, that excessively underscoring the democratization aspect and forgetting the specifics of Central Asia region, US reduces the effectiveness of these relations as well as its abilities to reach other strategic goals. Russia, otherwise, does not underline "democratization" issue and avoids the rise of such tension in its relations with Central Asia states. Russia makes use of the bridging cultural connections, common historical experience, and, mostly important, common infrastructure that facilitates economical cooperation. Therefore, study concludes, that Russia manages to make use of Central Asia states' apathy towards US offered democratization model, and increases its opportunities to strengthen the instruments of economical pressure in the region. Central Asia can be seen as a testing area for the competition of US and Russia imperial ambitions. In consideration of US attempts to implement its domination policy goals and Russia's desire to see multipolar international relations system instead of unipolar, cooperation perspectives remain highly questionable.

First time name of certification were mentioned 1990s concerning a problems with bad forest practices, hard improvement of governmental regulations especial in tropics. Later this concern were growing to 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference. And so, need of strict forest system in 1993 established Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Main activities started later 1996 in Canada with small group of people which started developing countries regional standards (Claros, 2009). Now FSC program is one of the biggest forest certification and accreditation providing company providing wood and their products and certification service. This program supports LEED Lumber, IKEA, biggest companies buying wood in the world, non governamental organisations World wild Fund (WWF), Green peace (www.fsc.org). The curiosity of how FSC forest certification impact forest management in Lithuania and Russia and lack of FSC standard studies with national law encouraged to create such study. We want to analyze FSC certification annual public reports raised CAR's (Corrective action request) from Forest Management Units (FMU) - enterprises, leaseholders in Lithuania and Russia. The first aim was to find, what main CAR's in Lithuania, Russia and distribute CAR's to environmental, economical, social type aspects. In later stages analyze Lithuanian and Russian FSC standards Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian national. In the last step to compare FSC standards with state law for each country. Analysis of Lithuanian and Russian FSC CAR indicators from Forest Management Units (FMU) showed, that biggest amount of violations from violation distribution in countries is environmental. Violation distribution by FSC principles in the countries proved that both countries had main ecological violations 6, 8 principle. Lithuanian Smart Wood and SGS Qualifor not differ much. Lithuanian with Russian standards was most similar by social context indicators. Study showed most important violated indicators in Lithuania from economical type are 8.3.3 problems with FSC logo use and certificate number on invoices; social: 8.5.1 summary of FMU (Forest management unit) management for public not sufficient; ecological: 6.3.8 problem leaving enough dead wood or trees for natural biodiversity. Analysis of most important indicators in Russia from economical part: 7.1.1 long term forest management goal creation; social: 4.2.11 FMU safety and protection problems; ecological: 6.1.1 environment impact assessment of FMU management activities. Comparison of Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian standards by both countries violated indicators showed that Lithuanian standards ware most similar, most detailed was Russian national. Lower requirements were mostly found in SGS Qualifor and Russian national. Most strict was Smart Wood and Russian national Analyzing standards and state law in both countries by each country standard violations was found that FSC standards were higher than state requirements.

First time name of certification were mentioned 1990s concerning a problems with bad forest practices, hard improvement of governmental regulations especial in tropics. Later this concern were growing to 1992 Rio de Janeiro conference. And so, need of strict forest system in 1993 established Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Main activities started later 1996 in Canada with small group of people which started developing countries regional standards (Claros, 2009). Now FSC program is one of the biggest forest certification and accreditation providing company providing wood and their products and certification service. This program supports LEED Lumber, IKEA, biggest companies buying wood in the world, non governamental organisations World wild Fund (WWF), Green peace (www.fsc.org). The curiosity of how FSC forest certification impact forest management in Lithuania and Russia and lack of FSC standard studies with national law encouraged to create such study. We want to analyze FSC certification annual public reports raised CAR's (Corrective action request) from Forest Management Units (FMU) - enterprises, leaseholders in Lithuania and Russia. The first aim was to find, what main CAR's in Lithuania, Russia and distribute CAR's to environmental, economical, social type aspects. In later stages analyze Lithuanian and Russian FSC standards Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian national. In the last step to compare FSC standards with state law for each country. Analysis of Lithuanian and Russian FSC CAR indicators from Forest Management Units (FMU) showed, that biggest amount of violations from violation distribution in countries is environmental. Violation distribution by FSC principles in the countries proved that both countries had main ecological violations 6, 8 principle. Lithuanian Smart Wood and SGS Qualifor not differ much. Lithuanian with Russian standards was most similar by social context indicators. Study showed most important violated indicators in Lithuania from economical type are 8.3.3 problems with FSC logo use and certificate number on invoices; social: 8.5.1 summary of FMU (Forest management unit) management for public not sufficient; ecological: 6.3.8 problem leaving enough dead wood or trees for natural biodiversity. Analysis of most important indicators in Russia from economical part: 7.1.1 long term forest management goal creation; social: 4.2.11 FMU safety and protection problems; ecological: 6.1.1 environment impact assessment of FMU management activities. Comparison of Smart Wood, SGS Qualifor and Russian standards by both countries violated indicators showed that Lithuanian standards ware most similar, most detailed was Russian national. Lower requirements were mostly found in SGS Qualifor and Russian national. Most strict was Smart Wood and Russian national Analyzing standards and state law in both countries by each country standard violations was found that FSC standards were higher than state requirements.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.