Suchergebnisse

This article presents the result of the study about direct local government election process in several districts in Indonesia. Local government elections, known as Pilkada, have conducted since mid-2005, there are hundreds of regions (provinces, districts and municipalities) have conducted Pilkada, and hundreds move will do the same in the years ahead. This study finds that there are lots of problems still occur during direct local government election process. There main problems are institutional problems, preparation phase problems and implementation phase problems. Institutional problems which are still arise during the direct local election such as lack of independency and profesionalism of local government election are insufficient time for local electoral body to prepare the election process; lack of clarity about recruitment mechanism of PPK, PPS and KKPS; and lack of socialization program. Finally, problems occurs during implementation phase of pilkada are the weaknesses of data updating, problem in candidates recruitment, infringements during the campaign, lack of managementof logistics and budget accountability. This study recommends that government should reformulate the rule of direct local government election.

The involvement of women in politics in Indonesia, especially in the contestation of the Local Election (pilkada) has become an interesting conversation lately. On June 27, 2018, the democratic party elections for regional heads simultaneously in Lampung Province were quite satisfactory for women's leadership, which certainly gave a little hope in the midst of the lack of representation of women in Lampung's political arena. This field research that explains the political dynamics of women in the regional election contestation in Lampung from the perspective of obstacles and women's political strategies in the elections in Lampung. Based on the results of the study it can be concluded that the political dynamics of women in the Lampung elections are very closely related to the influence of figures, political communication and the mass base they have. Women who enter politics can defeat various stereotypes about women even though there are societies that give choices in the elections because of monetary rewards. Women's political strategy in the elections is to show the community that women are not inferior to men and convince the public with various programs that will be fought for when they get a position.

The dispute of local election result is related to difference of the way or amount of result in counting vote between local election commission as the institution of administrator's election and participants of the local election. If only there is participants of local election who are unsatisfied with the result, they can submit the lawsuit to Constitution Court as regulation article 24C UUD 1945. The reason of dispute local election result in Serang City is due to broken seal of vote voice box, and a lot of cheating done by the couples of candidates but the difference in vote between winners and losers is more than 2%. This research is using case study and descriptive-analysis method. The result is Constitution Court wouldn't judge the case, if the lawsuit doesn't comply to formal requisites: first, difference of voting count is not more than 2% of legal vote; second, the lawsuit submitted is not Constitution Court's authority; third, overdue factor related time of submit lawsuit, as the regulation, should be submitted on 3 (three) days after announcement.Keywords: Local Election Disputes, Constitution Supreme Court

The dispute of local election result is related to difference of the way or amount of result in counting vote between local election commission as the institution of administrator's election and participants of the local election. If only there is participants of local election who are unsatisfied with the result, they can submit the lawsuit to Constitution Court as regulation article 24C UUD 1945. The reason of dispute local election result in Serang City is due to broken seal of vote voice box, and a lot of cheating done by the couples of candidates but the difference in vote between winners and losers is more than 2%. This research is using case study and descriptive-analysis method. The result is Constitution Court wouldn't judge the case, if the lawsuit doesn't comply to formal requisites: first, difference of voting count is not more than 2% of legal vote; second, the lawsuit submitted is not Constitution Court's authority; third, overdue factor related time of submit lawsuit, as the regulation, should be submitted on 3 (three) days after announcement.Keywords: Local Election Disputes, Constitution Supreme Court

According to scholarly wisdom, party competition at the subnational level plays a negligible role in national elections. We provide theory and evidence that qualifies this view. Subnational elections determine entrance into subnational parliaments, which provides essential organizational resources: members and money. Since in most cases the same political actors compete at all levels of government, they can make use of these resources to improve their status in national party competition. We test our argument exploiting two institutional features of the German multi-level electoral con- text: the discontinuities generated by the 5% electoral threshold in German state elections, and the occurrence of German state elections at different times in the federal election cycle. We find that parties that marginally cross the threshold for state parliamentary representation gain more members, and eventually perform better in national elections, but only if the party has sufficient time to organize between the state and the federal election. Consistent with our organizational explanation, bottom-up effects are more pronounced where state parliamentary parties receive more financial resources. Alternative mechanisms are tested, and receive no empirical support.

According to scholarly wisdom, party competition at the subnational level plays a negligible role in national elections. We provide theory and evidence that qualifies this view. Subnational elections determine entrance into subnational parliaments, which provides essential organizational resources: members and money. Since in most cases the same political actors compete at all levels of government, they can make use of these resources to improve their statusin national party competition. We test our argument exploiting two institutional features of the German multi-level electoral context: the discontinuities generated by the 5% electoral threshold in German state elections, and the occurance of German state elections at different times in the federal election cycle. We find that parties that marginally cross the threshold for state parliamentary representation gain more members, and eventually perform better in national elections, but only if the party has sufficient time to organize between the state and the federal election. Consistent with our organizational explanation, bottom-up effects are more pronounced where state parliamentary parties receive more financial resources. Alternative mechanisms are tested, and receive no empirical support.

Over the last several decades, elections and parties have become common features of most authoritarian regimes. While recent research on hybrid regimes has often focused on how dictators use these nominally democratic institutions to maintain their non-democratic rule, there is reason to suspect that electoral authoritarianism may pose particular threats to a regime's stability. Theories of collective behaviour suggest that electoral authoritarian regimes might face higher levels of anti-regime mobilization since parties and elections can help regime opponents overcome collective action problems and coordinate their efforts to challenge incumbents. An analysis of 136 authoritarian regimes over the last several decades indicates that regimes that hold nominally competitive elections are characterized by higher levels of political unrest than those with no elections. Furthermore, election years serve as a focal point for mobilizing anti-regime activity. These findings imply that authoritarian rulers face a trade-off when instituting a system of regular elections; while legislatures, parties and elections provide numerous benefits to incumbents, they also increase the frequency of anti-regime protests and other disruptive, mass political action.

This article analyzes how the selection process for the executive affects the risk of rebellion and insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa between 1971 and 1995. Four executive recruitment processes are distinguished that are characteristic for the African context: (1) a process without elections; (2) single-candidate elections; (3) single-party, multiple-candidate elections; and (4) multiparty executive elections. The results suggest that single-candidate elections and multiparty elections substantially reduce the risk of insurgencies compared with systems without any kind of executive elections. They further show that during times of political instability, the risk of large-scale violent dissent increases substantially. The article supports findings of the civil war literature that higher levels of income are associated with a lower risk of intrastate violence, while oil-exporting countries are at a higher risk of rebellion. In short, this article further strengthens the need to use more specific measures of elements of political regimes that also take into account regional particularities, in order to paint a more informative picture of how political structures influence the risk of internal violence.

Political parties maintain local organisations and recruit members mainly to fight elections. For most of the post-war period, however, the dominant view among analysts has been that constituency campaigning in British general elections has little or no effect on election outcomes. This view has been challenged over the last ten years or so. Evidence derived from post-election surveys of constituency election agents following the 1992, 1997 and 2001 general elections is used here to show that the intensity of constituency campaigning significantly affects turnout levels and, for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, levels of party support. There is also some evidence that Conservative campaigning affected constituency variations in the party's performance in 2001. The conclusions reached on the basis of aggregate-level analysis are supported by analysis of individual-level data derived from British Election Study surveys. The effects of campaigning are not large, but they are clear and significant – and sufficient to affect the numbers of seats won by the major parties. In the light of this, parties have good reasons to maintain healthy local organisations.

This article analyzes how the selection process for the executive affects the risk of rebellion and insurgencies in sub-Saharan Africa between 1971 and 1995. Four executive recruitment processes are distinguished, which are characteristic for the African context: (1) a process without elections, (2) single candidate elections, (3) single party, multiple candidate elections, and (4) multiparty executive elections. The results suggest that single candidate elections and multiparty elections substantially reduce the risk of insurgencies compared to systems without any kind of executive elections. They further show that during times of political instability the risk of large-scale violent dissent increases substantially. The article supports findings of the civil war literature that higher levels of income are associated with a lower risk of intrastate violence, while oil-exporting countries are at a higher risk of rebellion. In short, this article further strengthens the need to use more specific measures of elements of political regimes, which also take into account regional particularities, in order to paint a more informative picture of how political structures influence the risk of internal violence.

View that the abolition of the electoral college in 1994 and the introduction of a new system of direct presidential elections was necessary to the stability of democracy.

Introducción / Julio Juárez Gámiz y Carlos Hernández Alcántara -- Autonomía. Autonomía, procedimientos y competencia en la elección más grande y explicada de la historia / Lorenzo Córdova Vianello ; Dinero y elecciones en el proceso electoral 2018 / Ciro Murayama Rendón ; Teorías de la conspiración y desinformación: apuntes para entender la narrativa del fraude electoral / Julio Juárez Gámiz ; Aspectos críticos para repensar el modelo de comunicación político electoral / Marco Arellano Toledo -- Pluralismo. Coaliciones electorales y representación política pluripartidista en las elecciones presidenciales, México 2018 / Carlos Hernández Alcántara ; Candidaturas independientes: consolidando la cuarta expansión de la participación ciudadana / Patricio Ballados Villagómez ; Debates presidenciales, periodismo y democracia: lecciones para mejorar la conversación electoral / Iván Islas ; Paridad de género en las elecciones de 2018: resistencias, insuficiencias y deficiencias / Karolina M. Gilas -- Certeza. Un análisis crítico de la impartición de justicia electoral en el marco del proceso electoral 2018: la relación criterial entre el TEPJF y el INE / Emilio Buendía Díaz ; El uso de Twitter por parte de los candidatos a la presidencia de México centrado en aspectos de su vida familiar / Manuela Olivos Ángeles ; Whistleblowers y Méxicoleaks: nuevas fuentes de información política o actores de un nuevo modelo de comunicación política? / Isabel Uriostegui Carlos.

Die Kommunalwahlen in Nigeria auf Nichtparteienbasis im März 1996 sollten den ersten Schritt für das Demokratisierungsprogramm des derzeitigen Präsidenten Abacha darstellen. Sie wurden von der Regierung streng kontrolliert und in ihrem Sinne beeinflußt, der Wahltag selbst verlief chaotisch. Insgesamt hatten sie vor allem eine außenpolitische und propagandistische Funktion. (DÜI-Wgm)