Purpose This paper aims to understand the emotional patterns of senior citizens when they digitally transact online and how the personality trait of neuroticism can be a vital part of being susceptible to fraud. The authors identify with the cognitive aspect of fear as a vista of neuroscience and behavioural finance in digital banking in today's banking 5.0 where consumer centricity stands as one of the pillars of the Digital Payment Index of RBI.
Design/methodology/approach This study is empirical and investigative in nature. Primary data has been collected through online questionnaires (via Google Forms) and the interview method to understand the phenomenology of fear and incidents related to becoming victims of fraud and its propensity.
Findings The results exhibit that fear and emotional patterns do affect vulnerability and have a long-lasting psychological impact and susceptivity towards digital frauds.
Practical implications Fear as an emotion is used to understand the emotional expressive patterns of senior citizens as consumers of digital banking. The OCEAN model is one of the widely used personality models at the global level. This research study helps in highlighting the nuances linked to the behavioural and cognitive part of fear in digital crime.
Originality/value This research will be beneficial to reduce the susceptibility towards fraud from a behavioural perspective in the usage of digital banking and evaluate solutions for senior citizens to mitigate and cope up with the pressures and perils associated with digital frauds.
This paper looks at the role and design of regulatory reform institutions in developing countries. These institutions are classified into four broad types: 1) regulatory reform units, commonly known in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries as oversight bodies for regulatory reform; 2) high-level committees for regulatory reform, established in some countries to leverage support and take decisions at a high political level; 3) advisory and/or advocacy bodies in charge of proposing improvements to the regulatory system by strengthening coordination and consultation mechanisms and by promoting the regulatory reform agenda; and 4) Ad hoc institutions for regulatory reform, established to launch regulatory reform efforts and to work on a single defined task or activity. This paper is divided into the following sections: section one briefly reviews the theoretical debate and literature about the role of institutions in facilitating higher economic growth, focusing in particular on regulatory institutions and their relevance in developing countries; section two discusses the main features of regulatory reform institutions at the center of government, namely regulatory oversight bodies, high level committees, advocacy and/ or advisory bodies and ad-hoc institutions for regulatory reform; and section three identifies the features of these institutions that are considered to be best practice. Section three also identifies and discusses lessons learned and the implications for establishing and operating such institutions in developing country contexts.
Good Regulatory Practices (GRP) are a systematic application of tools, institutions, and procedures that governments can mobilize to ensure that regulatory outcomes are effective, transparent, inclusive, and sustained. Other terms used for GRP include 'regulatory governance' and 'better regulation.' Among the most common GRP tools used by governments are: public consultation, ex ante regulatory impact analysis (RIA), ex post review of existing regulations, administrative simplification, access to laws and regulations, forward regulatory planning, and regulatory oversight functions. This report focuses on GRP because by improving the regulatory environment, they can boost conditions for sustainable growth and investment. This is evidenced, among others, in the World Bank Group's Global Investment Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, which surveyed 750 investors in developing and transition economies. The report found that next to 'political stability and security', the 'legal and regulatory environment' was the most important consideration of senior executives when making investment decisions (WBG, 2018). Similarly, evidence shows a positive relationship between the improvement of the regulatory environment and aggregate investment (and economic growth), suggesting that countries stand to gain from a broad push for streamlining regulations and procedures affecting business (Eifert, 2009). The report reflects on Malaysia's formal experience with GRP because, although launched only relatively recently, results have been remarkable. Malaysia has demonstrated that more business-friendly regulations and a more favorable regulatory environment can contribute to economic growth and investment. Moreover, Malaysia's regulatory reform success has been reflected in many international indicators, such as the Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Doing Business, (all produced by the WBG) and those from the World Economic Forum that measure the burden of government regulations and transparency of the policymaking process. International indicators measuring GRP performance show that Malaysia is converging with high-income OECD countries.
There are price-fixing cartels and market-sharing cartels, and both adversely affect trade figures. A measurement matrix is used as a methodological framework through which content analysis is conducted to assess whether senior executives were involved in, and/or aware of, the cartel conduct occurring in their organisation. Sixty-nine court outcomes from eleven jurisdictions were analysed. It was found that senior management were involved in 80% of matters analysed; the CEO of a company was actively engaged in 7% of matters; and that the termination of a cartel member's employment occurred in only 3% of outcomes. The findings suggest that there is still a substantial task ahead for competition regulators to educate and raise the awareness of business people to ensure the provisions of relevant legislation are clearly understood.
Fatwa is a form of an answer/explanation of Muslim scholars and scientists to new and confusing issues. Fatwa can be an individual conclusion of an Islamic lawyer or express a general opinion of scholars of fakikhs and shariat or a special organ. In modern Islamic countries, Fatwa institutions play a quite important role in solving problems ranging from common daily issues to inner and outer political scale. Sunni scholars with fundamental views call to avoid everything new, others support necessity for deep research of Islamic norms to work out Fatwa for new issues. The governments of many countries use Fatwa institutions to provide inner stability, to explain unclearness in the society. In this regard, it is important to study the role of Fatwa institutions in Islamic countries, classification of Islamic decrees depending on juridical power and their preparation mechanism.
Worldwide, there is considerable interest in postal and delivery economics. Governments, particularly in the European Union, are examining closely the roles of the two systems and how best to regulate them. This volume brings together 20 essays originally presented at the 12th Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics held in Cork, Ireland in June 2004. Contributors include researchers, practitioners, and senior managers from throughout the world.
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Regulatory reform and competition policy are two important and inter-related areas of regulatory policy and public administration. Both can play a key role in improving the quality of regulation, and creating healthy and competitive markets and an attractive investment climate. This in turn leads to greater economic growth, employment and incomes. Part one of this paper discusses definitions and key issues associated with regulation, regulatory quality, and competition policy. This discussion focuses on competition policy as it relates to restrictions on competition and also pro-competitive regulation, which involves protecting consumers through economic regulation. Part two of this paper considers institutions and processes for implementing regulatory quality and competition policy agendas, including regulatory agencies, regulatory reform bodies, competition authorities and broader regulation-making processes. Part three notes the importance of assessing competition policy issues on a case-by-case basis and identifies the main objectives and features of competition policy. This includes a discussion about when competition policy issues are likely to play an important role in regulatory assessment and reform. Part four considers mechanisms for coordinating- where appropriate-competition policy and regulatory quality assessments, including undertaking competition assessments and providing advice to decision makers.
This paper discusses the banking regulatory and supervisory practices in People's Republic of China (PRC) with reference to the international standard for banking supervision, namely, the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs). While the PRC has incorporated many sound practices advocated by the BCPs, there are quite a few areas where significant differences can be observed with respect to qualification review of senior management, broader regulation at the product level, prescriptive rules, and guidance for risk management. Broadly speaking, the PRC adopts a rules-based approach to regulation; in many cases, regulations are prescriptive or even intrusive. In building a robust supervisory system, the PRC finds specific guidance more helpful than sole reliance on principles-based approaches. The paper argues that general principles and a principle-based approach to regulation do not seem to work well for emerging markets. Indeed, the current financial crisis has revealed some shortcomings in the existing international standards on banking supervision. Perhaps this standard can be improved by greater specificity and by incorporating more aspects of the experiences in emerging markets.
Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report analyses the institutional set-up and use of regulatory policy instruments in Uganda. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia), and represents an attempt to apply assessment tools and the framework developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its work on regulatory capacity and performance to developing countries.
In The Postal Service: Competition or Monopoly (IEA, 1970), I argued that the Post Office's monopoly of the letter should be removed. Thirty years later, an Act has been passed setting up a regulatory body with powers to do just that. PostComm will need to ensure the continuation of the universal postal service. To avoid market distortions, the Post Office will need to keep separate accounts for its services and to eliminate its historical internal cross‐subsidies. All operators, including the Post Office, with licences to provide postal services may be required to take account of the needs of the disabled, and other disadvantaged groups. The counters network may be subsidised by the DTI. It now remains to be seen whether PostComm has the will and the muscle to open up the postal market to effective competition.
