Suchergebnisse

The aim of the present paper is to analyze the conception of science of Popper resorting to the metaphor with the game of chess that he uses in his work The logic of scientific research. We consider that by means of this metaphor it is possible to perceive that its conception of science is not reduced to the logical criterion of falsifiability as many of its critics let us envisage, nor even to define methodological rules to guide the practice of science. But the philosopher himself in establishing such analogy makes it clear the existence os rules is what science has in common with the game of chess. In our view, these rules, as well as the scientific criterion, are not sufficient to define the scientific practice, since it involves other elements such as: values, objectives, scientific community and context in which the research is carried out. Popper assumes these elements in his metaphor, but does not make them explicit. It is only in later works such as Conjectures and Refutations and The Open Society and Its Enemies that they are clearly defined. We, therefore, intend to bring to light those elements involved in the game of science in Popper in order to give greater clarity to his conception of what science is.