Suchergebnisse

A YEAR HAS PASSED SINCE THE FOUR FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS WITH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAME PARTIES TO THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START I) BY SIGNING THE LISBON PROTOCOL. HOWEVER, THE START ACCORD HAS STILL NOT ENTERED INTO FORCE, AND ITS FUTURE LOOKS MORE UNCERTAIN NOW THAN IT DID ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO. IN UKRAINE, THE MOSCOW POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN AND THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT HAS RAISED FEARS ABOUT A RESURGENCE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM, WHICH HAS REDUCED THE NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINIAN RATIFICATION OF START I AND ACCESSION TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. THE POLITICAL FRICTION BETWEEN YELTSIN AND PARLIAMENT HAS ALSO HURT PROSPECTS FOR THE EARLY RUSSIAN RATIFICATION OF START II.

UKRAINE'S TOP LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE DIVIDED OVER THE ISSUE OF WHETHER UKRAINE SHOULD RETAIN PART OF THE FORMER SOVIET NUCLEAR ARSENAL. THE UNCERTAINTY OVER UKRAINE'S RETENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS COMPLICATING RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE.

BELARUS MOVED THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START I) ONE STEP CLOSER TO IMPLEMENTATION ON FEBRUARY 4, 1993, WHEN ITS PARLIAMENT RATIFIED THE ACCORD. THE PARLIAMENT ALSO VOTED TO ACCEDE TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AS A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE. THUS, UKRAINE REMAINS THE ONLY PARTY TO START I THAT HAS NOT YET APPROVED THE TREATY. KIEV HAS STATED THAT IT WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL SEVERAL DEMANDS, INCLUDING SECURITY ASSURANCES FROM RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES, ARE MET.