Suchergebnisse

We test two interesting results that can be obtained from a simplified version of the theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between politicians and managers of state-owned firms. The model suggests that firms with more state ownership tend to pay less in bribes but not have a different experience of costly obstacles imposed on them by politicians. In our full sample, the results suggest that a one percent increase in state ownership is associated with a $125 reduction in the total annual informal payment of the firm and with a 0.5% decrease in the probability that a firm will consider corruption to be an obstacle to their current operations. We refine these average relationships by splitting the sample by global region. Only in our Europe and Central Asia sample do we find strong evidence in support of the first result and again we find a significant effect of state ownership on obstacles.

This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the "real sector" affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the "real sector" affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

The author describes the att's to state ownership expressed in selected conservative publications & concludes that: (1) opposition to nationalization of the Bank of England was weak; (2) encouragement to expansion of air transport by private enterprise was encouraged; (3) decentralization of the control of coal was advocated; (4) over transport & steel, active denationalization steps were taken. He concludes that the modern British Conservative approach to state ownership is strictly empirical & undoctrinaire. IPSA.

The paper examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The authors have tried to discriminate the influence of direct and indirect state ownership. Using econometric analysis we conclude that the size of the block of shares owned by the state has negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on average perform worse than private companies. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of indirect productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs the similar correlation between return on equity and efficiency characteristics was not revealed. The study shows that the increase of the size of direct government ownership leads to lower productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect state ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

The conventional wisdom is that state ownership may hinder patenting through reduced incentives and pronounced agency problems associated with state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Empirical evidence from a variety of contexts, including the U.S., Europe, and China, is consistent with this view, including evidence that shows that reductions in state ownership are associated with an increase in patent counts. In this paper, we investigate the innovative efficiency of Chinese SOEs. Innovative efficiency refers to patents/R&D expenditure, and not patent counts. The data indicate that SOEs, and especially central government SOEs, are substantially more innovatively efficient than non-SOEs. The relative innovative efficiency of SOEs is more pronounced amongst firms with high financial constraints, those removed from financial centers, and those in high-technology industries. The data are consistent with the view that in the Chinese context, there are favorable benefits to state ownership through access to talent, connections, and technological resources that enables a sustained commitment to R&D to enable efficient patent outcomes relative to R&D expenditure.