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"Lessons in innovation from key FinTech trends and successes Creating Strategic Value through Financial Technology explores the growing Financial Technology (FinTech) industry to provide insight on how traditional financial institutions and FinTech companies can boost innovation and enhance valuation in a complex regulatory environment. In plumbing the depth and breadth of several niches within in the FinTech sector, author Jay Wilson uncovers key themes that have contributed to the industry's success; in this book, he maps them together to provide useful guideposts for investors, entrepreneurs, and traditional institutions looking to facilitate growth as technology and financial services collide. With an expert's perspective on FinTech history and outlook, certain trends and examples of value-enhancing strategies stand out. FinTech niches covered include: payments, crowdfunding, alternative/marketplace lending, the blockchain, and technology solutions in the context of banking, insurance, and investment companies. There is no denying the growing importance of technology in the financial services industry, and the FinTech sector offers valuable solutions for a diverse array of financial services providers and their customers. This book guides you through several niches of the FinTech sector, and highlights the most important takeaways from recent endeavors. Navigate the financial technology sector Enhance customer and product offerings Improve efficiency and cost structure Enhance profitability and company valuation from the intersection of technology and finance Innovation and customer preference is a key driver of FinTech's growth. Customers are demanding better value and convenience, and the organizations that provide it are reaping the rewards of growth. As financial regulations grow more and more complex, and customers are presented with more and more options, it is becoming imperative for traditional institutions to modernize processes and carve out a place in the future of financial services. Creating Strategic Value through Financial Technology provides a handbook for navigating that space, with practical guidance on how FinTech companies and traditional financial institutions can enhance profitability and valuation from the trends"--

This book provides a map of the FinTech industry and presents guideposts for navigating the landscape of the sector so that different parties (investors, entrepreneurs, and traditional financial service companies) can enhance customer/product offerings, improve efficiency/cost structure, and ultimately profit as financial services and technology increasingly intersect.

Unilateral carbon policies are inefficient due to the fact that they generally involve emission reductions in countries with high marginal abatement costs and because they are subject to carbon leakage. In this paper, we ask whether the use of carbon tariffs—tariffs on the carbon embodied in imported goods—might lower the cost of achieving a given reduction in world emissions. Specifically, we explore the role tariffs might play as an inducement to unregulated countries adopting emission controls of their own. We use an applied general equilibrium model to generate the payoffs of a policy game. In the game, a coalition of countries regulates its own emissions and chooses whether or not to employ carbon tariffs against unregulated countries. Unregulated countries may respond by adopting emission regulations of their own, retaliating against the carbon tariffs by engaging in a trade war, or by pursuing no policy at all. In the unique Nash equilibrium produced by this game, the use of carbon tariffs by coalition countries is credible. China and Russia respond by adopting binding abatement targets to avoid being subjected to them. Other unregulated countries retaliate. Cooperation by China and Russia lowers the global welfare cost of achieving a 10% reduction in global emissions by half relative to the case where coalition countries undertake all of this abatement on their own.

"Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the information, and individuals may prefer not to learn their cost of provision. If the time horizon is sufficiently short, in equilibrium only one individual may acquire information about his cost. For a long time horizon, acquiring information is strictly dominant. The time limit is an important instrument in influencing the efficiency of the volunteering game." (author's abstract)