Managing Suppliers
In: Springer Texts in Business and Economics; Supply Chain Transformation, S. 89-128
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In: Springer Texts in Business and Economics; Supply Chain Transformation, S. 89-128
SSRN
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 492-513
ISSN: 1756-2171
This article investigates downstream firms' ability to collude in a repeated game of competition between supply chains. We show that downstream firms with buyer power can collude more easily in the output market if they also collude on their input supply contracts. More specifically, an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above‐cost wholesale prices and negative fixed fees (that is, slotting fees) facilitates collusion on downstream prices. Banning information exchange about wholesale prices decreases the scope for collusion. Moreover, high downstream prices are more difficult to sustain if upstream rather than downstream firms make contract offers.
In: The defence business in the United Kingdom
In: Defence Finance Report, No. 3
World Affairs Online
In: IWH discussion papers 2017, no. 8
We examine how financial constraints in portfolios of suppliers affect cash holdings at the level of the customer. Utilizing a data set of private and public French companies and their suppliers, we show that customers rely on their financially unconstrained suppliers to provide them with backup liquidity, and that they stockpile approximately 10% less cash than customers with constrained suppliers. This effect persisted during the global financial crisis, highlighting that suppliers may be viable insurers of liquidity even when financing from banks and other external channels is unavailable. We further show that customers with unconstrained suppliers also simultaneously receive more trade credit; that the reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with stronger ties to their unconstrained suppliers; and that customers reduce their cash holdings following a significant relaxation in their suppliers' financial constraints through an IPO. Taken together, the results provide important nuance regarding the implications of supplier portfolios and financial constraints on firm liquidity management.
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 40, Heft 2, S. 283-295
ISSN: 1756-2171
This article examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer does not have this ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right of first refusal on the lowest price from the other suppliers. When the buyer has this ability, their joint surplus can be maximized by a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price based on that cost.
In: The nonproliferation review: program for nonproliferation studies, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 2-10
ISSN: 1073-6700
World Affairs Online
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ISSN: 0004-2528
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ISSN: 2192-9114
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In: The nonproliferation review: program for nonproliferation studies, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 2-10
ISSN: 1746-1766
In: Arms control today, Band 46, Heft 10, S. 6
ISSN: 0196-125X