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Public sector auditing provides unbiased, objective assessments of public sector programs, policies, operations, and results to detect whether public resources are managed responsibly and effectively to achieve intended results and to instill confidence among citizens and stakeholders. Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) perform a vital role in the functioning of governments as they inform legislatures and other stakeholders through their independent audit reports. They help promote good governance, accountability, and transparency. The work of SAIs in reducing waste and abuse of public resources has the indirect effect of making more money available for programs that fight poverty, which lie at the core of the World Bank's work to end extreme poverty.

Welchen konkreten Beitrag leisten Oberste Rechnungskontrollbehörden (ORKBn) zu guter Regierungsführung und zur Erreichung der Entwicklungsziele eines Landes? Wie kann Capacity Development ORKBn dabei unterstützen? Diesen Fragen ist die internationale Diskussion bisher nicht systematisch nachgegangen.Der Sammelband greift die vielfältigen Erfahrungen auf, die Deutschland und andere Geber als langjährige Partner von ORKBn gemacht haben. Die Beiträge aus der internationalen Gemeinschaft der ORKB (INTOSAI) zeigen die neuesten Entwicklungen und Fragestellungen zur Förderung von Guter Regierungsführung aus Sicht der ORKB auf. Neben den Blickwinkeln von Entwicklungspartnern und ORKBn ergänzen Beiträge aus der Wissenschaft den Sammelband zu einer umfassenden Darstellung von zentralen Aspekten staatlicher Rechenschaftssysteme. Der Sammelband systematisiert die internationale Diskussion, schließt eine Lücke zwischen Theorie und Praxis und ermuntert zu breiterer Kooperation und Forschung.Mit Beiträgen von:Josef Moser, Generalsekretär der Internationalen Organisation der Obersten Rechnungskontrollbehörden (INTOSAI), Barbara Dutzler (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH), Carlos Santiso (Interamerikanische Entwicklungsbank), Katharina Noussi (GIZ), Luis Fernando Velásquez Leal (Consultant), Clay Wescott (Weltbank), Michael Castro, Carolina Cornejo und Andrew Lyubarski (International Budget Partnership (IBP)), Juan Manual Portal Martinéz (Oberste Rechnungskontrollbehörde Mexiko), Alar Karis (Oberste Rechnungskontrollbehörde Estland), Imrich Gál und Annamaria Vizikova (Oberste Rechnungskontrollbehörde Slowakische Republik), INTOSAI Donor Sekretariat, INTOSAI Development Initiative (IDI) sowie Carlos Mauricio Cabral Figueiredo (GIZ)

Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) constitute important democratic institutions, providing citizens with an independent analysis on how the Governmental Offices and the central public administration function. This paper reports on findings from a survey, submitted to all performance auditors at the Swedish SAI, on 3 May, 2011. The response rate was 70 per cent (65 out of 93 respondents). The survey covered areas such as SAI performance, organisational culture, organisation design, leadership and audit approach. Although confidence in the three Auditors-General has increased considerably since new appointees have replaced these posts, serious problems are pointed out in other areas. Specifically, three areas stand out: SAI performance, SAI organisation and finally SAI compliance with international standards as well as with the Swedish Constitution. Only 3 out of 62 respondents believe that the number of managers at the Swedish SAI is reasonable and 5 out of 65 respondents believe that the organisation design works well. Only 23.8 per cent of respondents believe that the SAI itself meets the standards that it requires other agencies to meet and 26.7 per cent of respondents believe that the costs for the Swedish SAI are reasonable.

In the past, Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) rarely publicized their work. In the 1990s, a few began to publish booklets and brochures for popular consumption and to establish ties with the media. These days, SAIs are concerned about communication. A communication policy completes their cycle of accountability, justifies their existence, is an essential component of their independence and efficiency and brings about measures which assess the impact of their work.The aim of this article is to analyse the latest communication strategies developed by SAIs in order to publicize the results of their activity and to provide the public with an overall vision of what they do. The study, based on a questionnaire sent out to European Union SAIs, highlights the fact that these bodies undertake wide-ranging communication activities involving a close relationship with the media and the use of Internet websites.Points for practitioners This article explores the most recent developments in European Union SAI communication strategy. Based on survey research, the study concludes that SAIs maintain a close relationship with the media and have been able to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Internet to publish their results and to provide users with an overview of their work. For SAIs, this analysis allows them to be graded in terms of their relationship with the media and how they use Internet websites. Hence it will be possible to establish criteria leading to improvements or maintenance of their relative situation.

PurposeTo examine the enabling legislation of European Union (EU) member country supreme audit institutions (SAIs) for their accountability to parliament and independence from the executive arm of government.Design/methodology/approachThe sample comprises the SAIs of the 25 EU member countries and the European Court of Auditors. Data were collected on 30 accountability and independence issues directly from the enabling legislation of these SAIs.FindingsResults indicate that apart from a number of instances where the enabling legislation is silent, provisions generally provide for adequate independence of the SAIs from the executive arm of government. On the other hand, the provisions for the accountability of the SAIs to parliament are somewhat weaker.Research limitations/implicationsIf actual practice or convention does not reflect the literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation, then SAIs may have more or less independence and/or accountability than suggested by the analysis of the legislation alone.Practical implicationsResults of this study highlight where current provisions could be further strengthened through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation.Originality/valueSuch findings may be useful to policy makers and legislators.

As unique and sui generis organizations Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are one of the most important key actors of modern democratic-political system. They must not be regarded simply as administrative or regularity-oriented extensions of the public management framework. If we don't want "the democratic representativeness" to be reduced to "a dead point of an institutionalism", we have to let "the political" reveal in all its robustness. The sheer "democratic modus vivendi" only goes with this sort of de-constructivist and emancipatory state philosophy. Our claim is that without considering the spirit of "the political", it is almost impossible to appreciate the sheer role and function of the SAIs in the modern democratic state system. An SAI appears just like a "vanishing mediator" in the political system. It institutionally serves for the figuration of the political and then it functionally vanishes away to give birth to the political. So what makes an SAI vital for the democracy is closely associated with the role of "vanishing mediator". If an SAI is enabled to take part in the setup of political system without any barrier and if its legislative reporting function is carried out through a deliberative and open agenda, the critical role of the SAIs in remaking process of the political will eventually emerge.

This research is based on the problem of poor audit practices by the Big Four audit firms and the mid-tier audit firms in UK in 2018/2019 cycle, which is indicated as audit failure. This resulted in sanctions and fines that increased significantly from the previous year. Problems related to audit quality are also experienced by government internal auditors in Indonesia. This is due to several factors such as the quality of government internal auditor resources that are still below the lowest service standards as a public institution, lack of available apparatus and low competency, and limited budget. The purposes of this study are to determine the extent of audit quality produced by government internal auditors at the Principal Inspectorate of Indonesia's Supreme Audit Institution. Based on attribution theory, this study has several objectives, namely to determine the effect of competence, independence, and motivation on audit quality. Therefore, the contribution of this research can be the object of consideration and evaluation for Indonesia's Supreme Audit Institution auditors regarding the audit process and audit results in the public or government sector, an information for Principal Inspectorate of Indonesia's Supreme Audit Institution as an effort to maintain and improve the quality of government internal audits, and an information for the public in overseeing the audit quality of the management and responsibility of state finances.

Examines the quality and effectiveness of institutions, such as the British National Audit Office and the French Court of Accounts (Cour des Comptes), and the extent to which they are influenced by performance criteria; also includes Finland, Sweden, and the European Court of Audit (ECA).

Supreme audit institutions' input into the policy cycle -- Supreme audit institutions' input into policy formulation -- Supreme audit institutions' input into policy implementation -- Supreme audit institutions' input into policy evaluation and oversight