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This paper aims to further investigate hybrid regimes, which are becoming a more and more analysed topic in political studies. After the pathbreaking article by Thomas Carothers (Carothers, 2002) where he claims that many of the regimes that were considered usually in "transition" were actually proved highly durable and did not move neither toward autocracy nor democracy, other scholars started to be interested in this particular phenomenon as such. In this paper I stem from the definition of Hybrid regimes provided by Leonardo Morlino: "A hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions […] lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regimebut also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian" (Morlino, 2008:7), in order to investigate how incumbents hold and strengthen power in this peculiar political and institutional environment, without forcefully becoming neither fully authoritarian or fully democratic.

This paper aims to further investigate hybrid regimes, which are becoming a more and more analysed topic in political studies. After the pathbreaking article by Thomas Carothers (Carothers, 2002) where he claims that many of the regimes that were considered usually in "transition" were actually proved highly durable and did not move neither toward autocracy nor democracy, other scholars started to be interested in this particular phenomenon as such. In this paper I stem from the definition of Hybrid regimes provided by Leonardo Morlino: "A hybrid regime is always a set of ambiguous institutions […] lacking as it does one or more essential characteristics of that regimebut also failing to acquire other characteristics that would make it fully democratic or authoritarian" (Morlino, 2008:7), in order to investigate how incumbents hold and strengthen power in this peculiar political and institutional environment, without forcefully becoming neither fully authoritarian or fully democratic.

Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian government implemented a number of major institutional reforms which have succeeded in modernising Georgia's state institutions, reducing corruption and 'formalising' the public sector. While the effects of Saakashvili's reforms on state and institution-building, corruption and the rule of law have been examined by a large and growing body of academic literature, there has been little discussion about the impact of institutional changes on the previously widespread culture of informality in Georgia. This article explores the effects of Georgian institution-building from such aspects of informality as the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favours, gift-giving and other types of informal activities. The findings of this study, based on the analysis of recent surveys and in-depth interviews, conclude that the reforms succeeded in undermining the overall importance of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, education system, healthcare, law enforcement, judiciary and some other areas previously dominated by informality. However, the reliance on informality did not disappear, and informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets.

Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian government implemented a number of major institutional reforms which have succeeded in modernising Georgia's state institutions, reducing corruption and 'formalising' the public sector. While the effects of Saakashvili's reforms on state and institution-building, corruption and the rule of law have been examined by a large and growing body of academic literature, there has been little discussion about the impact of institutional changes on the previously widespread culture of informality in Georgia. This article explores the effects of Georgian institution-building from such aspects of informality as the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favours, gift-giving and other types of informal activities. The findings of this study, based on the analysis of recent surveys and in-depth interviews, conclude that the reforms succeeded in undermining the overall importance of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, education system, healthcare, law enforcement, judiciary and some other areas previously dominated by informality. However, the reliance on informality did not disappear, and informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets.

Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the Georgian government implemented a number of major institutional reforms which have succeeded in modernising Georgia's state institutions, reducing corruption and 'formalising' the public sector. While the effects of Saakashvili's reforms on state and institution-building, corruption and the rule of law have been examined by a large and growing body of academic literature, there has been little discussion about the impact of institutional changes on the previously widespread culture of informality in Georgia. This article explores the effects of Georgian institution-building from such aspects of informality as the use of informal networks and connections in exchanges of favours, gift-giving and other types of informal activities. The findings of this study, based on the analysis of recent surveys and in-depth interviews, conclude that the reforms succeeded in undermining the overall importance of informal practices in dealings with state bureaucracy, education system, healthcare, law enforcement, judiciary and some other areas previously dominated by informality. However, the reliance on informality did not disappear, and informal networks are still employed as coping mechanisms and as social safety nets.

In this exclusive interview with Isabelle Lasserre, the President of Georgia frankly admits he is worried about the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin. Mikheil Saakashvili expects Russia to once again take an aggressive stance against its neighbors in the Caucasus. And its conspicuous support for the secessionist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia does not augur well either. Nor does his announced plan to carry out major Russian military maneuvers at the same time as legislative elections in Georgia, slated for October. Putin could well take advantage of these concurrent events to stir up trouble and then use this as a pretext for a military intervention. According to President Saakashvili, Russia wants to recover Georgia at all costs. If the elections go smoothly, they will mark a point of no return on the road towards democracy and Georgia's integration in Europe. But the Russian administration is very aware of this fact and will do all it can to throw a monkey wrench in the works! Adapted from the source document.

After the parliamentary elections in Georgia in October 1, 2012, when the oppositional coalition named "Georgian Dream" ledby Bidzina Ivanishvili, current prime minister of Georgia came to power with the significant majority, the whole world started to talkabout the "Litmus Test" that Georgia passed with success in building its democracy. It was the first time in the history of independentGeorgia when acting government was replaced with the opposition without revolutions and war. President Mikheil Saakashvili andhis United National Movement party became an opposition and commenced to act in "cohabitation" with the acting government.Prime Minister Ivanishvili and his political team express their willingness to maintain the Euro-Atlantic course but at the sametime underline the importance of regulating tensed relations and reestablish diplomatic ties with Russia. President Saakashvili andhis followers blame existing government of being Russian-oriented and express their fairs that Ivanishvili's government is leadingthe country back to the "dark and cold 1990s" and back to the Russian rule.1) Is Georgia really maintaining its western oriented course?2) Will Georgia-US relations remain as ideal as they were during Saakashvili's presidency?

Georgia initialed in November 2013, the summit of the eastern partnership in Vilnius an Association Agreement with the EU. It underlined that the South Caucasus republic remains strongly oriented to the west after Saakashvili. At the same time, the Alliance seeks Georgian Dream, since 2012 in power, a restructuring of relations with Russia. This could have an impact on the EU. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract: The process of democratisation in Georgia has its obstacles, mostly connected with cultural and socio-economic aspects. Political challenges are interlinked with societal attitudes and vice versa. The historical role of the Orthodox Church in preserving Georgian national identity throughout the centuries is over-compensated for, with frequent clerical involvements in public life. Non-democratic governments have made no effort to finalise the process of transition and for two decades the state has remained in the grey zone between consolidation and autocracy. 2012 was marked as a year for the new hopes of Georgian democracy, a new government was elected via free and fair elections, but democracy needs conditions to endure and this paper examines those conditions. ; Proces demokratyzacji w Gruzji ma swoje trudności, głównie związane z aspektem kulturowym i społeczno-ekonomicznym. Wyzwania polityczne są powiązane z postawą społeczną i odwrotnie. Historyczna rola kościoła prawosławnego w zachowaniu gruzińskiej tożsamości narodowej przez wieki jest nadmiernie kompensowana z częstymi pisarskimi uwikłaniami w życiu publicznym. Niedemokratyczne rządy dokonały wszelkich starań, aby sfinalizować proces transformacji i przez dwie dekady stan pozostawał w szarej strefie między konsolidacją i autokracją. Rok 2012 został oznaczony rokiem dla nowych nadziei demokracji Gruzji. Nowy rząd został wybrany przez wolnych i uczciwych wyborców, ale demokracja wymaga warunków aby przetrwać i ten artykuł je bada.

The process of democratisation in Georgia has its obstacles, mostly connected with cultural and socio-economic aspects. Political challenges are interlinked with societal attitudes and vice versa. The historical role of the Orthodox Church in preserving Georgian national identity throughout the centuries is over-compensated for, with frequent clerical involvements in public life. Non-democratic governments have made no effort to finalise the process of transition and for two decades the state has remained in the grey zone between consolidation and autocracy. 2012 was marked as a year for the new hopes of Georgian democracy, a new government was elected via free and fair elections, but democracy needs conditions to endure and this paper examines those conditions. ; Proces demokratyzacji w Gruzji ma swoje trudności, głównie związane z aspektem kulturowym i społeczno-ekonomicznym. Wyzwania polityczne są powiązane z postawą społeczną i odwrotnie. Historyczna rola kościoła prawosławnego w zachowaniu gruzińskiej tożsamości narodowej przez wieki jest nadmiernie kompensowana z częstymi pisarskimi uwikłaniami w życiu publicznym. Niedemokratyczne rządy dokonały wszelkich starań, aby sfinalizować proces transformacji i przez dwie dekady stan pozostawał w szarej strefie między konsolidacją i autokracją. Rok 2012 został oznaczony rokiem dla nowych nadziei demokracji Gruzji. Nowy rząd został wybrany przez wolnych i uczciwych wyborców, ale demokracja wymaga warunków aby przetrwać i ten artykuł je bada.

This article sheds light on the Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia by situating it in a wider frame. It provides an analysis of its Euro-Atlantic orientation by presenting it as a continuation of past efforts to involve European powers in Georgian affairs and highlights changing trends in this aspect of contemporary foreign policy. Far from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the different arguments that have been used to support Georgian "Europeanness" are evaluated to assess its role in the national identity construction process. Focusing primarily on the United National Movement government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, we demonstrate how the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been employed domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy and explore its function in seeking Western patronage, a key foreign policy goal.

Something amazing happened in Georgia's 1 October 2012 parliamentary elections. The government lost and it gave up power, aside from the now-weakened presidency that it will hold for another year. A new coalition known as Georgian Dream ran under the leadership of Georgia's richest man, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and won 85 seats in the unicameral, 150-member Parliament. Georgia's post-Soviet background and circumstances make the 2012 opposition win and subsequent orderly handover of power truly remarkable. Indeed, among the "competitive authoritarian" regimes found in what used to be the USSR, it is nearly unheard of. Georgia is lucky to be getting a fourth chance at democracy, after the opportunities under Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–92), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003), and Saakashvili faded. But this chance remains a fragile one.

This article sheds light on the Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia by situating it in a wider frame. It provides an analysis of its Euro-Atlantic orientation by presenting it as a continuation of past efforts to involve European powers in Georgian affairs and highlights changing trends in this aspect of contemporary foreign policy. Far from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the different arguments that have been used to support Georgian 'Europeanness' are evaluated to assess its role in the national identity construction process. Focusing primarily on the United National Movement government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, we demonstrate how the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been employed domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy and explore its function in seeking Western patronage, a key foreign policy goal. Adapted from the source document.