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Search for Geopolitical Strategy for Georgia means finding a special road to a civilized future that will be in line with the country's historical and cultural specificity and uniqueness. After the unfavorable conditions, there was created a short but very profitable term implementing its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Everything depended on the ability of the Georgian politicians, how much they would you be able to determine, understand and mobilize the situation. In this case Georgian diplomacy was appropriate. The government which was in a very difficult position soon clarified the situation and was able to use this chance as much as possible. Accordingly, the country received an impressive geopolitical dividend. Georgian diplomacy achieved great success in the geopolitical context. The factor of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, played a major role, he created a desirable background for Western politics in Georgia with his authority in world politics and great political activity. ; Search for Geopolitical Strategy for Georgia means finding a special road to a civilized future that will be in line with the country's historical and cultural specificity and uniqueness. After the unfavorable conditions, there was created a short but very profitable term implementing its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Everything depended on the ability of the Georgian politicians, how much they would you be able to determine, understand and mobilize the situation. In this case Georgian diplomacy was appropriate. The government which was in a very difficult position soon clarified the situation and was able to use this chance as much as possible. Accordingly, the country received an impressive geopolitical dividend. Georgian diplomacy achieved great success in the geopolitical context. The factor of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, played a major role, he created a desirable background for Western politics in Georgia with his authority in world politics and great political activity.

The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU. ; У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після «революції троянд». Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС. ; В статье анализируется внешняя политика Грузии по интеграции в ЕС с 2003 года. Показано, что политика интеграции Грузии в ЕС была активизирована после «Революции роз». Новый президент Грузии М. Саакашвили пользовался солидной поддержкой Запада, но российско-грузинская война в 2008 году, неудачные реформы, высокий уровень безработицы сделали его непопулярным среди грузин, и в октябре 2012 года люди проголосовали против правящей партии. Поражение на парламентских выборах в 2012 г. стала огромным ударом для Саакашвили и его сторонников. Они начали дискредитировать политику нового коалиционного правительства (особенно внешнюю), утверждая, что целью внешней политики Грузии больше не является европейская и евроатлантическая интеграция, и что представители нового правительства являются агентами Кремля. Анализ внешней политики Грузии в контексте интеграции в ЕС показывает, что приоритеты внешней политики Грузии не изменились. Целью внешней политики Грузии и в дальнейшем остается дальнейшая интеграция в ЕС.

The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU. ; У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після «революції троянд». Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС. ; В статье анализируется внешняя политика Грузии по интеграции в ЕС с 2003 года. Показано, что политика интеграции Грузии в ЕС была активизирована после «Революции роз». Новый президент Грузии М. Саакашвили пользовался солидной поддержкой Запада, но российско-грузинская война в 2008 году, неудачные реформы, высокий уровень безработицы сделали его непопулярным среди грузин, и в октябре 2012 года люди проголосовали против правящей партии. Поражение на парламентских выборах в 2012 г. стала огромным ударом для Саакашвили и его сторонников. Они начали дискредитировать политику нового коалиционного правительства (особенно внешнюю), утверждая, что целью внешней политики Грузии больше не является европейская и евроатлантическая интеграция, и что представители нового правительства являются агентами Кремля. Анализ внешней политики Грузии в контексте интеграции в ЕС показывает, что приоритеты внешней политики Грузии не изменились. Целью внешней политики Грузии и в дальнейшем остается дальнейшая интеграция в ЕС.

In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".

In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".

In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".

In November 2003 the ex-soviet state of Georgia experienced a change of incumbents, which was famously dubbed "Rose revolution". This event propelled to power a group of pro-western politicians, led by a young, charismatic leader Mikhail Saakashvili. So-called Rose revolution marked a begining of new chapter in Georgia-Russia relations. As soon as he became president, Saakashvili declared that his main aim was to seek Georgia's eventual accesion to European Union and NATO. This announcement was met in Moscow with clear irritation. In 2006 Georgia became the target of comprehensive Russian economic sanctions. These sanctions inflicted considerable damage on Georgian economy. Moreover, in the summer of 2008 a brief military conflict erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow. The conflict ended badly for Georgians. Soon, the diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia were severed. It looked like Tbilisi-Moscow relations had reached a definitive dead end with neither of the two neighboring countries seeking to normalize the evidently strained relationship. However, in 2012 and 2013 Georgian elections Saakashvili's party was soundly defeated by an upstart political movement "Georgian Dream", led by billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, Bidzina Ivanishvili. One of the key reasons of Ivanishvili's electoral success was poor economic situation in Georgia largely due to Russian sanctions. During his campaign, he constantly spoke about the need to improve relations with Kremlin. This slogan was met rather positively among Georgian population. This thesis attempts to solve an interesting paradox. While economic sanctions theories claim that external economic pressure frequently encourages sanctioned populations to rally around the flag, it was the opposite scenario in Georgia. Incumbents led by Mikhail Saakashvili essentialy lost voters' trust and were driven from office through electoral means. The goal of this thesis is to investigate, why Saakashvili-led political powers lost the support of the Georgian people, although theoretically that same population should have been determined to support its regime during the latter's efforts to defy economic pressure. In order to achieve the aforementioned goal, three tasks are set in this thesis. First, to analize thoroughly the influence of Moscow's economic pressure on the Georgian economy as a whole. Second, to study the results of the Georgian public opinion polls, conducted in the space of 2006 – 2013. Third, to determine which other factors besides Russian sanctions may have had impact on the change of governing powers in Georgia. Previous research on economic sanctions has identified one important aspect about their presumable success. It concerns the role of target regime type. There appears to be a clear difference between the political impact of sanctions on democratic regimes and the political impact of sanctions on autocracies. Many scholars argue that democratic incumbents may be considerably more vulnerable to external economic pressure than authoritarian incumbents. This assumption occupies a significant place in this thesis. The main conclusions of this thesis suggest that Russian sanctions dealt a particularly strong blow to Georgia's agricultural sector, which at the time still occupied a large share of country's economy. Sanctions imposed by Moscow effectively increased levels of unemployment and poverty among Georgian society. This was due to the fact that the aforementioned agricultural sector in 2006 was essentially the main provider of jobs to Georgian citizens. With the lucrative Russian market suddenly closed to Georgian production, the future prospects for many of these citizens did not look bright. This inevitably fueled popular dissatisfaction among Georgian people. It eventually broke out during the 2012-13 elections, when incumbents associated closely with Saakashvili lost in a landslide to a newly formed coalition "Georgian Dream".

This article opens up the role of Georgian politicians in the international mediaspace. All the mentioned political figures have absolutely different image and behavior strategy - if Stalin had formed the structure of Soviet press himself mostly, former president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili is an example of media actors in the modern mediaspace. But each of them is a real media person. ; Данная статья раскрывает роль грузинских политиков в международном медиапространстве. У всех политических фигур, указанных в данной статье, был свой образ и стратегия поведения: если Сталин в основном сам сформировал структуру советской прессы, то бывший президент Грузии Михаил Саакашвили - яркий пример актора в современном медиапространстве. Но каждый из них при этом является человеком медийным.

"Georgia: Warlords, Generals, and Politicians" published on by Oxford University Press.

The socio-political processes developed in Georgia in the 90s of the twentieth century led to the political transformation of the country. The political changes that began during this period led to the ideological and value transformation of elite structures, including procedural changes in the mechanisms of elite circulation. All this was reflected in the country's domestic and foreign policy.In Georgian reality, the main part of the society is focused on a specific political figure, however, the elite groups united around this leader differ from each other in their values and ideological orientation. At the same time, all post-Soviet political leaders followed different paths of accumulating social and political capital, which became an important component of developing their individual political charisma.The article discusses the features of 4 political leaders of post-Soviet Georgia (Z. Gamsakhurdia, E. Shevardnadze, M. Saakashvili, B. Ivanishvili) and the political processes related to them. ; The socio-political processes developed in Georgia in the 90s of the twentieth century led to the political transformation of the country. The political changes that began during this period led to the ideological and value transformation of elite structures, including procedural changes in the mechanisms of elite circulation. All this was reflected in the country's domestic and foreign policy.In Georgian reality, the main part of the society is focused on a specific political figure, however, the elite groups united around this leader differ from each other in their values and ideological orientation. At the same time, all post-Soviet political leaders followed different paths of accumulating social and political capital, which became an important component of developing their individual political charisma.The article discusses the features of 4 political leaders of post-Soviet Georgia (Z. Gamsakhurdia, E. Shevardnadze, M. Saakashvili, B. Ivanishvili) and the political processes related to them.

Georgia's strategic location in the Caucasus means that it has always been in the spotlight of world powers, especially Russia. An opportunity for Georgia is to build and deepen democratic processes, social, economic and political reforms and to establish cooperation with international structures. Georgia declared independence on 9th April 1991 and on 26th May 1991 general presidential elections were held under the banner "Georgia for Georgians". Despite the announcements made by successive presidents, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze, the attempts to carry out political and economic reforms failed. In 2003, an opportunity for democratic change turned up. It was the Rose Revolution and its leader, Micheil Saakashvili. After his first successes, however, it turned out that he also did not stray from authoritarianism, the strengthening of the president's position, and even from the use of force (2007). The next stages and the possibility of democratic changes were to be parliamentary elections in 2012 and 2016 and presidential elections in 2013.