Suchergebnisse

The reign of strongman presidents and the routine use of electoral fraud and manipulation have produced widespread apathy, resignation, and cynicism about the prospects for democracy in the Caucasus. In the fall of 2003, these trends dominated the presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the parliamentary elections in Georgia. But shortly after the elections, a brief and nonviolent series of mass protests in Tbilisi—the so-called Revolution of the Roses—forced Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze and his Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG) to resign, and paved the way for democratic reform under Mikhail Saakashvili of the New National Movement. The inspiring events in Georgia hold a number of lessons for students of democratization and prodemocracy activists alike, and should make us reconsider the methods by which fragile openings to democracy may be sustained and widened.

This paper looks at the securitization process that took place during M. Saakashvili's time as President of Georgia. It argues that, in order to overshadow political misdeeds and non-democratic state-policy as a whole, M. Saakashvili and his political allies used "constructed" Russian threats to discredit and marginalize opponents. Furthermore, M Saakashvili's regime tended to restrict freedom of speech, civil liberties and other democratic rights by referring to non-existent constructed threats from the Moscow. Through security dimension, Russia poses a menace to Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty and Western aspirations. But at the time of M. Saakashvili's presidency it has been turned into a political tool to be used against opponents. This paper off ers a scholarly debate on the issue. Finally, it gives a case-by-case analysis of the most crucial happenings that explain "how" and "why" Russia has been securitized.

The small breakaway republic of South Ossetia is located north of Georgia, along the Russian border. For several years now, it has been the subject of a fierce fight between Tbilisi & Moscow. Over & above the future of this small land, it is in large part the future of the Caucasus that is at stake. If the government of Mikhail Saakashvili wins out in the end, & brings this separatist entity back into the fold, Georgia will emerge strengthened from this struggle, & could continue to develop democratic reforms & links with Euro-Atlantic institutions. However, if the Kremlin wins & makes South Ossetia part of the Russian Federation, then Vladimir Putin will have taken a major step forward in his plans to re-conquer the ex-Soviet empire. For the moment, an authoritarian, pro-Russian government reigns over this dark zone, where international observers are barred from entry. Adapted from the source document.

The article examines the process of formation of the political elite in Georgia during the period of independence, starting from the cardinal de-Sovietization of management personnel in the 90s, and ending with the last significant appointments in the era of B. Ivanishvili. The stages of evolution and transformation of the elite are analyzed in detail – under E. Shevardnadze, M. Saakashvili, and B. Ivanishvili, the peculiarities of the personnel policy of this or that Georgian leader are highlighted. Both the very course of the change and rejuvenation of the elite and the change in its educational background and political guidelines are traced. The article shows that despite all these changes the nature of government in Georgia has not been changed. The political regime in Georgia is still a kind of patronage rule. The author examines its characteristic features, analyzes the reasons for survivability of such a form despite repeated changes and political parties in power.

Since the Rose Revolution (2003), Georgia has encountered an unprecedented scale of institutional reforms concomitant with the rise of American and European involvement in the "democratization" process. Various scholars have suggested that Georgian nationalism developed from an ethno-cultural basis to a more civic/liberal orientation after the Rose Revolution. This paper analyzes Georgian nationalism under President Mikheil Saakashvili to demonstrate the significant divergence between political rhetoric on national identity, the selection of symbols, and state policy toward the Georgian Orthodox Church versus state policy toward ethnic minorities. The aim of this article is to examine the at times conflicting conceptions of national identity as reflected in the public policies of Saakashvili's government since the Rose Revolution. It attempts to problematize the typologies of nationalism when applied to the Georgian context and suggests conceptualizing the state-driven nationalism of the post-Rose Revolution government as "hybrid nationalism" as opposed to civic or ethno-cultural.

In autumn 2012, Georgia underwent a development that is already being described as historical. Following an emotional and at times hostile election contest, the Georgian parliamentary elections on 1 October led to a change of government, which the country is hailing as proof of its democratic maturity. President Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement party, which had been in power for the last nine years and held a two-thirds majority in the last parliament, suffered a clear defeat against a coalition of six opposition parties, none of whom had been represented in the previous parliament. Saakashvili will remain in office until 2013. What course will the new coalition government under Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili now set in domestic and foreign policy? Will the incumbent president, who is endowed with a wide range of powers, and the new government be able to work together in the run-up to the 2013 presidential elections or will they become entrenched in bitter rivalry? (author's abstract)

Salome Zourabichvili's story is extraordinary. This French diplomat of Georgian origin enjoyed a long, brilliant career in the diplomatic corps, culminating in her appointment as French ambassador to Tbilisi in November 2003. A few weeks later came the "rose revolution": the corrupt regime of Eduard Shevardnadze was toppled by a popular movement which brought to power the young -- & very pro-Western -- Mikhail Saakashvili. The new leader quickly made an exceptional decision: he appointed Salome Zourabichvili as his minister of foreign affairs! Alas, the rest of the story is not so rosy. Under fire from local political insiders, the former French ambassador was dismissed eighteen months later. But this reversal of fortunes has in no way altered her desire to work for the good of her country. Salome Zourabichvili has created her own political party & is determined to play a front-line role in Georgia's future, as she explains in this wide-ranging interview with Galia Ackerman. Adapted from the source document.

Over the summer month of August 2008, Georgia launched a large-scale military offensive against South Ossetia in an attempt of reconquering the territory. Four years later, on October 1, 2012, Georgia is holding its first Parliamentary Elections after the conflict that caused so much harm. The Parliamentary Elections constitute the 7th legislative elections held since Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. It is however the first time for Georgia to elect an alternative party from the ruling party solely based on principle of democratic vote.
The article examines the almost ten years of President Saakashvili's Administration. During this decade, Saakashvili's United National Movement government realized many positive works. Works like the successful reform of police forces and the determined force-back of corruption. These liberating works were all eagerly welcomed by Europe and other western nations. However, in the apparent loss of sense of reality towards the end of its reign, Georgia's United National Movement government turned to dictating and ordering as a main style of governing. This in turn pushed citizens away from Saakashvili's politics into voting for the opposition.
Unforeseen by even the most experienced Southern Caucasus and Georgia experts, Georgia's 2012 Parliamentary Elections gave way to the opposition coalition Georgian Dream to sweep to victory, leaving President Saakashvili to ceded defeat.
Despite President Saakashvili's statement that he would go into opposition there has not been a complete paradigm shift in Georgia's domestic politics. With the Georgian Dream's failure to gain a constitutional majority and questions over the ideological compatibility of the coalition – along with the fact that United National Movement still has the greatest representation in Parliament relative to the other parties, Saakashvili and his supporters keep hold to substantial political leverage. Also, Saakashvili will remain President until the October 2013 election. His opponent, Prime Minister Ivanishvili is expected to manifest himself, bringing in a less contentious, more pragmatic approach to relations with the country's giant neighbour to the north.
Overall, it can be said that Georgia's unrivalled ballot-box transfer of power elevated the country to a category fundamentally higher in terms of democratic development than virtually all other post-Soviet states. This has been the more remarkable even since Georgia had been widely cited as an example case of a failed state, with a destroyed infrastructure and economy, dysfunctional state institutions and something approaching anarchy as its governance model.
The impact of the ongoing reform of Georgia's constitution and electoral law has lead to major shifts in Georgia's political landscape. However, opinions vary as to whether the farsighted amendments made to the Georgian constitution on the initiative of the United National Movement are a genuine attempt to improve the country's system of governance or that they rather are an effort by the incumbent president to cling on to power. The adoption of the amendments and the timing of their entry into force strongly suggest that the latter might be the case. Meanwhile, as a result of the changes to the Georgian constitution, a system of dual power has come in place. These and other factors suggest that Georgia's political landscape is set to become more predictable. The article examines the degree to which this can be held true.
In the streets of Tbilisi, hundred days into the reign of the new government, there is an air of optimism amongst the people. This holds especially true when it comes to youth. The hope is that the Georgian Dream becomes a Georgian reality. The disappointment otherwise might be shattering. In spring 2013, the new leadership offers new opportunities for Georgia. It can improve its democratic system and economic growth and establish a dialogue with Russia and the breakaway districts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would alleviate the frozen conflict and tense security dilemma' on the Administrative Boundary Lines. Yet, if the transition of power does not go well, there will be prolonged power struggles that could cripple the policy making and cast Georgia back to pre-Saakashvili times.
The article addresses the overall question whether the smooth transfer of power Georgia achieved after October's election sets a standard for democracy in the region depending on whether the new government can strengthen the independence and accountability of state institutions in what remains a fragile, even potentially explosive political climate. The victory of the Georgian Dream Coalition over the United National Movement has brought pluralism into Georgian policymaking. However this political pluralism also includes that awkward dual powers; Georgia's good cop and bad cop.

The article is dedicated to analyse the politics of so called "historical memory" during the state-building and nation-building process in post-socialist Georgia After the Rose Revolution 2003, the new government that aimed at building the "new Georgia," implementing radical changes in many key spheres, including institutions, readdressing the totalitarian past, faced number of problematic manifestations in political and cultural life in this post-Soviet country. The "politics of memory" became one of the key factors of reconstructing of "new, democratic, western Georgia". This process can be evaluated as leading toward state nationalism. Analyzing the politics of memory, symbolism is the most notable attitude and that is why former President Mikheil Saakashvili used commemorative ceremonies continuously. The authors argue in favour of approach, that the so called "memory politics" is the integral part of one's legitimacy building, but at the same time, it can be used as tool for reconsidering of Polity's future and mobilization of population under the "citizenship" umbrella towards the strong loyalty to the actual and future state-building.

After the Rose Revolution, President Saakashvili tried to move away from the exclusionary nationalism of the past, which had poisoned relations between Georgians and their Armenian and Azerbaijani compatriots. His government instead sought to foster an inclusionary nationalism, wherein belonging was contingent upon speaking the state language and all Georgian speakers, irrespective of origin, were to be equals. This article examines this nation-building project from a top-down and bottom-up lens. I first argue that state officials took rigorous steps to signal that Georgian-speaking minorities were part of the national fabric, but failed to abolish religious and historical barriers to their inclusion. I next utilize a large-scale, matched-guise experiment (n= 792) to explore if adolescent Georgians ostracize Georgian-speaking minorities or embrace them as their peers. I find that the upcoming generation of Georgians harbor attitudes in line with Saakashvili's language-centered nationalism, and that current Georgian nationalism therefore is more inclusionary than previous research, or Georgia's tumultuous past, would lead us to believe.

In recent years Russia has launched a concerted effort to undermine pro-Western regimes in the former Soviet area by using economic sanctions. Most studies of this economic offensive have focused on Russia's obvious use of natural gas as a political weapon. This paper adds to that literature by showing how the Kremlin in fact uses many kinds of sanctions simultaneously. The case of Georgia illustrates this clearly. To undermine President Saakashvili Moscow used not only energy sanctions, but also trade and financial sanctions, as well as restrictions on Georgian migrant workers. As this case shows, democratic regimes may be particularly vulnerable to such economic sanctions, since even a relatively small economic decline can cause an incumbent to lose an election. The Russian effort in Georgia seems to have succeeded, as Saakashvili's party was driven from office in the 2012 and 2013 elections by Georgian Dream, a new coalition founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his fortune in Russia. However, Ivanishvili has now found that he, too, faces Russian economic pressure.

After serving two terms as president of Georgia, the man who spearheaded the 'Rose Revolution' heeded the lessons of his recent losses at the polls and last October relinquished the reins of a country he had utterly transformed. In the space of ten years, Mikheil Saakashvili anchored democracy in Georgia, leading the country out of the Soviet era and towards NATO and the European Union. On the domestic scene, he restored security by cracking down on local mafias and halted corruption through a 'zero tolerance' policy towards organized crime. But he also lost the war against Russia over control of the breakaway region of South Ossetia in 2008. At 45, the former president is too young to retire. He now lives and teaches in the United States and regularly returns to the region to throw his weight behind any pro European movement that stands up against Moscow's domination. He's gone... but he'll be back. Adapted from the source document.