Suchergebnisse

Сегодняшние средства массовой информации, с одной стороны, предоставляют индивиду огромный выбор в информационном пространстве, с другой - этот выбор ограничивают. СМИ сегодня являются основным инструментом формирования общественного мнения и пропаганды. Говоря о пропаганде на территории постсоветского пространства, нельзя обойти стороной Грузию, где в силу экономических проблем население имеет постоянный доступ только к одному источнику информации - национальному телевидению, контролируемому местными властями. Кроме того, политические лидеры страны различными способами ограничивают доступ к альтернативным источникам информации. Каналы национального телевидения используются исключительно как инструмент пропаганды. Тем временем, анализируя грузинские и российские СМИ, мы наблюдаем два диаметрально противоположных образа грузинского народа. В силу этого я обратилась к данной теме, пытаясь найти ответ на вопрос, насколько изменился грузинский народ под влиянием политических процессов, происходящих в Грузии, и информационного пространства. В этой работе я постаралась отразить основные вехи, с чего все начиналось и к чему мы все пришли. ; Contemporary mass-media on the one hand provides a huge choice in the media space, but on the other hand this choice is limited. Nowadays mass-media is one of the fundamental instruments of the public opinion and propaganda management. Speaking about propaganda on the territory of the former Soviet Union Republics one cant skip Georgia, where due to economic problems; citizens can only have one source of information the national television, which is being controlled by the local administration. Moreover, political leaders of the country try to limit access to any alternative sources of information. Channels of national television are being used only as an instrument of propaganda. Meanwhile, while analyzing Georgian and Russian mass-media we can see two absolutely different images of Georgian people. I have appealed to this topic hopefully to find out, how much has the Georgian people changed under the influence of political process which takes place in Georgia? In this article I tried to display all the basics of what was the beginning and where we are now.

The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU. ; У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після «революції троянд». Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС. ; В статье анализируется внешняя политика Грузии по интеграции в ЕС с 2003 года. Показано, что политика интеграции Грузии в ЕС была активизирована после «Революции роз». Новый президент Грузии М. Саакашвили пользовался солидной поддержкой Запада, но российско-грузинская война в 2008 году, неудачные реформы, высокий уровень безработицы сделали его непопулярным среди грузин, и в октябре 2012 года люди проголосовали против правящей партии. Поражение на парламентских выборах в 2012 г. стала огромным ударом для Саакашвили и его сторонников. Они начали дискредитировать политику нового коалиционного правительства (особенно внешнюю), утверждая, что целью внешней политики Грузии больше не является европейская и евроатлантическая интеграция, и что представители нового правительства являются агентами Кремля. Анализ внешней политики Грузии в контексте интеграции в ЕС показывает, что приоритеты внешней политики Грузии не изменились. Целью внешней политики Грузии и в дальнейшем остается дальнейшая интеграция в ЕС.

The article analysis foreign policy of Georgia towards EU integration since 2003. Georgia's EU integration policy was activated after the "Rose Revolution". New President of Georgia M. Saakashvili enjoyed strong support of the West, but Russia-Georgia war in 2008, unsuccessful reforms, high level of unemployment made his policy unpopular within Georgians and in October 2012, people voted against the ruling party. Defeat in parliamentary elections was a negative turning point for Saakashvili and his supporters. They started discreditation of the new coalition government policy (especially foreign policy) claiming that aim of Georgia's foreign policy is not European and Euro-Atlantic integration anymore, that representatives of the new government are agents of the Kremlin. An analysis of Georgia's foreign policy in the context of EU integration shows that the priorities of Georgia's foreign policy are unchanged. The goal of Georgia's foreign policy is membership of the EU. ; У статті аналізується зовнішня політика Грузії щодо інтеграції в ЄС з 2003 року. Політика інтеграції Грузії в ЄС була активізована після «революції троянд». Новий президент Грузії М. Саакашвілі користувався сильною підтримкою Заходу, але російсько-грузинська війна в 2008 році, невдалі реформи, високий рівень безробіття зробили його непопулярним серед грузин, а в жовтні 2012 року люди проголосували проти правлячої партії. Поразка на парламентських виборах в 2012 р стала величезним ударом для Саакашвілі та його прихильників. Вони почали дискредитувати політику нового коаліційного уряду (особливо зовнішньої політики), стверджуючи, що метою зовнішньої політики Грузії більше не є європейська і євроатлантична інтеграція, й що представники нового уряду є агентами Кремля. Аналіз зовнішньої політики Грузії в контексті інтеграції в ЄС показує, що пріоритети зовнішньої політики Грузії не змінилися. Метою зовнішньої політики Грузії й надалі залишається подальша інтеграція в ЄС. ; В статье анализируется внешняя политика Грузии по интеграции в ЕС с 2003 года. Показано, что политика интеграции Грузии в ЕС была активизирована после «Революции роз». Новый президент Грузии М. Саакашвили пользовался солидной поддержкой Запада, но российско-грузинская война в 2008 году, неудачные реформы, высокий уровень безработицы сделали его непопулярным среди грузин, и в октябре 2012 года люди проголосовали против правящей партии. Поражение на парламентских выборах в 2012 г. стала огромным ударом для Саакашвили и его сторонников. Они начали дискредитировать политику нового коалиционного правительства (особенно внешнюю), утверждая, что целью внешней политики Грузии больше не является европейская и евроатлантическая интеграция, и что представители нового правительства являются агентами Кремля. Анализ внешней политики Грузии в контексте интеграции в ЕС показывает, что приоритеты внешней политики Грузии не изменились. Целью внешней политики Грузии и в дальнейшем остается дальнейшая интеграция в ЕС.

Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.

Abstract
This article explores the interplay of Georgian national identity and foreign policy in the rhetoric of Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia in 2004–13, and offers a theoretical framework that captures the complex nature of these interactions. Drawing on the scholarly tradition of critical geopolitics, the article examines perceptions and images of the role of Georgia and its position vis-à-vis the external world in the annual addresses delivered to the Parliament of Georgia. More specifically, the article explores four constitutive areas for Georgia's geopolitical identity – the world, Europe, the United States and Russia – as well as the meanings attached to these spaces. By uncovering how these external spaces have been framed and communicated by President Saakashvili, the article adds to our understanding of the reasoning and ideational determinants of the foreign policy orientation of modern-day Georgia, as well as of the major tenets of its geopolitical identity.

In this exclusive interview with Isabelle Lasserre, the President of Georgia frankly admits he is worried about the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin. Mikheil Saakashvili expects Russia to once again take an aggressive stance against its neighbors in the Caucasus. And its conspicuous support for the secessionist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia does not augur well either. Nor does his announced plan to carry out major Russian military maneuvers at the same time as legislative elections in Georgia, slated for October. Putin could well take advantage of these concurrent events to stir up trouble and then use this as a pretext for a military intervention. According to President Saakashvili, Russia wants to recover Georgia at all costs. If the elections go smoothly, they will mark a point of no return on the road towards democracy and Georgia's integration in Europe. But the Russian administration is very aware of this fact and will do all it can to throw a monkey wrench in the works! Adapted from the source document.

He has supposedly been discredited by Georgia's military defeat against Russia in the summer of 2008, weakened by the loss of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, shaken by the opposition's fierce criticism, ready to resign -- Russian president Dmitri Medvedev even called him a "political corpse." and yet, Mikheil Saakashvili is still alive and kicking, and has no intention of backing down. In this exclusive interview, the Georgian president insists with his usual fighting spirit that his country will eventually recover the territories lost in last summer's war. He denounces the maneuvering of an opposition he describes as an ill-assorted group of people nostalgic for the former regime, and proudly asserts that under his rule his small country has in just a few years evolved into a modern society with a promising economy in which the international business community would do well to invest. What is clear is that Mikheil Saakashvili has lost none of his energy and determination. Adapted from the source document.

After the parliamentary elections in Georgia in October 1, 2012, when the oppositional coalition named "Georgian Dream" ledby Bidzina Ivanishvili, current prime minister of Georgia came to power with the significant majority, the whole world started to talkabout the "Litmus Test" that Georgia passed with success in building its democracy. It was the first time in the history of independentGeorgia when acting government was replaced with the opposition without revolutions and war. President Mikheil Saakashvili andhis United National Movement party became an opposition and commenced to act in "cohabitation" with the acting government.Prime Minister Ivanishvili and his political team express their willingness to maintain the Euro-Atlantic course but at the sametime underline the importance of regulating tensed relations and reestablish diplomatic ties with Russia. President Saakashvili andhis followers blame existing government of being Russian-oriented and express their fairs that Ivanishvili's government is leadingthe country back to the "dark and cold 1990s" and back to the Russian rule.1) Is Georgia really maintaining its western oriented course?2) Will Georgia-US relations remain as ideal as they were during Saakashvili's presidency?

The Rose Revolution in November 2003 created a setting characterized by major new challenges as well as major new opportunities for Georgia. After presenting the forces that gave rise to the Rose Revolution (emerging civil society, vibrant free press, weak state authority, and national memory and unity), several issues that will shape the future of Georgia are examined. The first of these is economic growth, which provides some reason for optimism, though the picture remains tenuous. The second is the struggle over Georgia's territory, in particular the challenges facing the state when it comes to breakaway territories. Frustration on this front remains to the present time. The third is the development of a strong state, something that provides particular challenges in light of the failing state inherited by the Saakashvili government, but something that showed some promising signs in the wake of the Rose Revolution. After a promising start, the Saakashvili government has recently drifted in the direction of over-centralization of power in the president's office, and this is cause for concern as the government continues to struggle to find its way.

Georgia initialed in November 2013, the summit of the eastern partnership in Vilnius an Association Agreement with the EU. It underlined that the South Caucasus republic remains strongly oriented to the west after Saakashvili. At the same time, the Alliance seeks Georgian Dream, since 2012 in power, a restructuring of relations with Russia. This could have an impact on the EU. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract: The process of democratisation in Georgia has its obstacles, mostly connected with cultural and socio-economic aspects. Political challenges are interlinked with societal attitudes and vice versa. The historical role of the Orthodox Church in preserving Georgian national identity throughout the centuries is over-compensated for, with frequent clerical involvements in public life. Non-democratic governments have made no effort to finalise the process of transition and for two decades the state has remained in the grey zone between consolidation and autocracy. 2012 was marked as a year for the new hopes of Georgian democracy, a new government was elected via free and fair elections, but democracy needs conditions to endure and this paper examines those conditions. ; Proces demokratyzacji w Gruzji ma swoje trudności, głównie związane z aspektem kulturowym i społeczno-ekonomicznym. Wyzwania polityczne są powiązane z postawą społeczną i odwrotnie. Historyczna rola kościoła prawosławnego w zachowaniu gruzińskiej tożsamości narodowej przez wieki jest nadmiernie kompensowana z częstymi pisarskimi uwikłaniami w życiu publicznym. Niedemokratyczne rządy dokonały wszelkich starań, aby sfinalizować proces transformacji i przez dwie dekady stan pozostawał w szarej strefie między konsolidacją i autokracją. Rok 2012 został oznaczony rokiem dla nowych nadziei demokracji Gruzji. Nowy rząd został wybrany przez wolnych i uczciwych wyborców, ale demokracja wymaga warunków aby przetrwać i ten artykuł je bada.

The process of democratisation in Georgia has its obstacles, mostly connected with cultural and socio-economic aspects. Political challenges are interlinked with societal attitudes and vice versa. The historical role of the Orthodox Church in preserving Georgian national identity throughout the centuries is over-compensated for, with frequent clerical involvements in public life. Non-democratic governments have made no effort to finalise the process of transition and for two decades the state has remained in the grey zone between consolidation and autocracy. 2012 was marked as a year for the new hopes of Georgian democracy, a new government was elected via free and fair elections, but democracy needs conditions to endure and this paper examines those conditions. ; Proces demokratyzacji w Gruzji ma swoje trudności, głównie związane z aspektem kulturowym i społeczno-ekonomicznym. Wyzwania polityczne są powiązane z postawą społeczną i odwrotnie. Historyczna rola kościoła prawosławnego w zachowaniu gruzińskiej tożsamości narodowej przez wieki jest nadmiernie kompensowana z częstymi pisarskimi uwikłaniami w życiu publicznym. Niedemokratyczne rządy dokonały wszelkich starań, aby sfinalizować proces transformacji i przez dwie dekady stan pozostawał w szarej strefie między konsolidacją i autokracją. Rok 2012 został oznaczony rokiem dla nowych nadziei demokracji Gruzji. Nowy rząd został wybrany przez wolnych i uczciwych wyborców, ale demokracja wymaga warunków aby przetrwać i ten artykuł je bada.

The August war had a paradoxical effect on the Caucasus. It turned the region into the main arena of the biggest international crisis in recent history. Russian-American relations had not reached such a critical point since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some observers harked back to the Caribbean crisis of 1962. The test launching of Russia's Topol-M ballistic missile in response to the appearance of American war ships in the Black Sea; the turning point in the seemingly irreversible process of NATO's enlargement that became evident after Georgia and Ukraine were refused Membership Action Plans in December 2008; and the new tone of the latest American administration in its dealings with Moscow all indicate that global security issues were placed on the map in August and that we should appreciate the fact that this local and short-lived armed conflict helped to resolve (although not entirely) such acute and far-reaching contradictions. For the Caucasus, however, the situation looks different. Of course, the external changes, primarily the appearance of two new independent states, reflect the scope of the crisis. But the old contradictions have not been resolved, while several new ones have appeared. Soon after the Russian presidential decree on recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states was signed and publicized, Russian diplomats began talking about the successful settlement of two ethnopolitical conflicts. There are technical grounds for such an opinion. But only technical. Suffice it to say that nothing has been done to accommodate the Georgian refugees who left their homes in South Ossetia or the Ossetian refugees who cannot return to the republic because their homes have been destroyed and are still in ruins. Abkhazia and South Ossetia (particularly the latter) risk repeating the fate of Northern Cyprus, which was recognized by Turkey but has been unable to rectify its economic underdevelopment or emerge from foreign political isolation. There can be no doubt that such a fate is preferable to the ethnic cleansing that would threaten the Abkhazians and Ossetians if they found themselves back under Tbilisi's jurisdiction. But can such a fate be considered enviable? In August 2008, Georgia underwent a defeat comparable to the collapse of statehood it experienced in the first half of the 1990s. Loss of a large portion of its territory, the blatant incompetence of its political and military leadership, and its disillusions about receiving any kind of significant assistance from the U.S. all gave rise to the national-state project that was being carried out in the country before. "The Georgian Way," which many in the region considered exemplary, turned into a complete fiasco. Whereby in Georgia itself the disaster was merely expressed in an emotional reaction and did not lead to reassessment of the previous strategy. The Georgian political elite is largely sticking to its former rhetoric and declaring its previous goals.