Suchergebnisse

This book investigates the selective nature of UN sanctions regimes with a specific focus on the post-Cold War era. Legally binding on all members, UN sanctions are the most effective and legitimate non-violent multilateral tools to respond to international security threats. They are also symbolically more powerful than unilateral or multilateral sanctions because they enjoy global support. However, while dozens of threats to international peace were met with UN sanctions since 1990, many others were not. How can we explain this incoherent approach? With a focus on the selectiveness, rather than effectiveness of UN sanctions the author reflects on the shifting geopolitical tensions between Security Council members and uses a variety of widely used academic datasets to provide a unique overview of what determines sanctions and sanctionable events.

This book investigates the selective nature of UN sanctions regimes with a specific focus on the post-Cold War era. Legally binding on all members UN sanctions are the most effective and legitimate non-violent multilateral tools to respond to international security threats.

Abstract
This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition setups, we (1) dissect welfare losses for sanctions senders and target; (2) compare prospective coalition partners; (3) investigate 'optimal' coalitions that maximize payoff from sanctions; (4) provide bounds for sanctions potential, that is, the maximum welfare change attainable when sanctions are scaled vertically up to an embargo, and horizontally up to a global regime. Relative to unilateral action, we find that coalitions magnify welfare losses imposed while their impact on domestic welfare loss incurred depends on the design and sectoral dimension of sanctions. Hypothetical cooperation of large developing economies such as China additionally raises the deterrent force of coalitions. Additionally, we quantify transfers that equalize welfare losses across coalition members to further demonstrate asymmetries in the relative economic burden of sanctions. In all scenarios, we implement a novel Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands for simulation outcomes.