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Respon'sible,liable to be called to account or render satisfaction: answerable: capable of discharging duty: able to pay. The old Chambers's dictionary gives a behavioristic view of responsibility: in terms of action, not thought or belief. "Lust in the heart" is not equated to lustin flagrante. It is this view I shall explore in this essay, rather than the more subjective notion ofmoralresponsibility, as in, "I feel moral responsibility (i.e.,guilt) for not doing anything to save the Tutsis [Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.]." My presumption is that responsibility implies capability: you cannot be held responsible for something over which you have no control (Hutus, ethnic Albanians, etc.). There is obviously uncertainty in some cases—where control is less than total, where the degree of potential control depends on our own efforts, where we cannot know if we have control until we try to exert it, etc. The relation between responsibility and degree of control is a separate topic which I shall not treat here.

The dramatic clarification of segregation and diversity law -- Determining the legitimacy of laws that use racial/ethnic classifications -- Legal rationales relating to school segregation and diversity -- Empirical assessments of legal doctrine responding to school segregation and diversity -- Empirical assessments of the implementation of laws addressing school segregation and diversity -- Lessons from the law and empirical research addressing school segregation and diversity

"Convictions Without Truth sets out to determine whether and to what extent science and law may coexist in an institutional relationship that truthfully generates individualization through application of forensic testimony for charges relating to violations of criminal law. In the first two chapters, readers are exposed to contemporary unscientific forensic practices as juxtaposed to the evidentiary standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, as well as scientific requirements for validity and reliability of expert witness testimony. The remaining chapters provide an explanation for retention of existing, though faulty, forensic practices by way of analysis of path dependency, the fixation of belief, and neuro and cognitive psychology. Through immanent critique and unmasking, the book deconstructs prevailing forensic practices through application of existing published documentation. The final chapter addresses the fixation of belief from the perspective of neuropsychology and cognitive psychology. Readers will gain an understanding of the current concerns relating to application of contemporary forensic practices ; current case law and federal rules guiding the introduction of expert witness testimony; and why it is that despite widely recognized concerns raised from within and outside of the criminal legal system, application of unscientific forensic practices continues., The book also shows how the criminal legal system is experiencing a paradigm shift due to dialectical juxtaposition of existing unscientific forensic practices with contemporary science. Readers are shown that because of its continued reliance upon unscientific forensic practices, the criminal legal system reveals its hegemonic commitment to social control through its willingness to accept "satisfying" as opposed to "truthful" results that generate wrongful convictions. Convictions Without Truth will be of particular interest to students, academics, and practitioners working within the criminal legal field. It will also appeal to those wanting to know more about forensics and criminal law"--

Comments on Patricia Wald's (2003) article on social science's utility to judges. In reviewing Wald's work, surprise is registered at her lack of attention to amicus curiae briefs for synthesizing, digesting, & presenting social science data for judges. It is then argued that Wald's ideas have implications for the choices that political scientists make if her view that judicial decisions would be well served if judges were better able to use social scientific evidence were shared. The relevance of "who judges" in terms of background is discussed, arguing that what judges know derives from their legal & judicial education; specialist training for judges is looked at briefly. It is concluded that political scientists can make themselves more accessible as public intellectuals to judges & employ institutional analysis to help guide the construction of the legal system for the best possible legal decision making. 21 References. J. Zendejas