A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries. This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contrast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
A country's democracy improves when it receives democracy aid from a larger number of donor countries.This finding appears surprising from a development perspective, as the presence of a large number of donors, and more generally 'fragmented aid', have been shown to impact negatively on the recipient country. But fragmented aid can be beneficial: Diversity on the donor side provides choice to the local actors involved in the process of democratization. It thus creates a 'marketplace of ideas' which increases the viability of the resulting institutions. In contraast, a highly-concentrated donor community can lead to the imposition of an institutional blueprint, designed in advance and not adapted to the needs of the recipient society. An instrumental variable analysis with panel data for 133 countries from 1994 to 2013, explicit tests of the causal mechanism, and anecdotal evidence from Ghana provide strong support for the benefits of diverse democracy aid.
Dieser Artikel untersucht neun Fragilitätsindizes. Die Inhaltsvalidität der Indizes wird durch die Überprüfung von Konzeptualisierung, Messung und Aggregationsmethoden bewertet. Die konvergente/diskriminante Validität wird mittels Hauptkomponentenanalyse und multidimensionaler Skalierung bewertet. Diese Verfahren erlauben die Untersuchung von Dimensionalität und statistischer Ähnlichkeit innerhalb der Gruppe von Indizes. Sowohl die konzeptionelle als auch die statistische Analyse stützen die Hypothese, dass es eine Gruppe "holistischer" Fragilitätsindizes gibt, die für die Erforschung der Ursachen und Folgen von Fragilität von geringem Nutzen sind. Die restlichen Indizes befassen sich mit spezifischen Aspekten von Fragilität und produzieren empirisch unterscheidbare Ergebnisse.
Method factors represent variance common to indicators from the same data source. Detecting method factors can help uncover systematic bias in data sources. This article employs confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to detect method factors in 23 democracy indicators from four popular data sources: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House, Polity IV, and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Using three different multi-dimensional concepts of democracy as starting points, we find strong evidence for method factors in all sources. Method-specific factors are strongest when yearly changes in the scores are assessed. The sources find it easier to agree on long-term average scores. We discuss the implications for applied researchers.
Measuring state fragility across countries may at first sight seem a purely academic exercise. Yet, the measurementof fragility is a prerequisite for adequately dealing with fragile states in the first place. Decision makers and development practitioners have come to acknowledge that effectively reducing poverty is not possible without "fixing" fragile states. Fragile states lack core state functions, most importantly the maintenance of security and basic administration. In such a deficient environment, international donors do not encounter capable governments – the most important partners to implement development-oriented reforms. Certain aid instruments are assumed to be less effective under these circumstances, and some actors argue that standard development approaches do not work well in fragile states. Fragility indices could be of use for development policy as a tool for • determining which countries need a different aid approach; • monitoring larger trends of global political stability; • evaluating the overall impact of development aid; • and for investigating the dynamics of state fragility. All of these applications could make aid to fragile countries more efficient. While most of today's knowledge on state fragility is based on case studies, quantitative approaches could generate more generalizable findings to inform future policies. The applications listed above – especially the latter two, which refer to the causes and consequences of state fragility – presuppose very precise easurements. So what can the currently available indices tell us? All of them try to identify the most fragile countries, and they agree in many cases, including Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries do not come as a surprise, however. Indices would have to incorporate other features – especially a high degree of precision regarding the distinction of the remaining countries – should they aspire to provide an added value compared with ad-hoc classifications based on common sense. Upon closer examination, one also finds differences in how indices classify certain countries. They do not agree on cases such as Cuba and North Korea, both authoritarian but reasonably capable states. The indices' discrepancy brings forward a fundamental question regarding the nature of authoritarian states: Must repressive but stable regimes be considered fragile, just because it is assumed that, in the long run, they will not be able to accommodate social demands as democracies can? We argue that such a classification obscures more than it clarifies and that 'fragile' should refer only to countries with incapable governments that are likely to break down soon. This briefing paper gives a short summary of the messages that current fragility indices convey, portrays their limitations and delineates how development cooperation could better exploit their potential. It shows how current indices can be applied, and how both policy makers and researchers can contribute to improving future indices for ultimately supporting development in fragile states.
Western donors attempting to promote democracy across the globe face a dilemma. Democracy is a highly valued policy goal, but they are fearful that the path to democ¬racy will undermine another highly valued goal – political stability – and potentially cause widespread violence in the recipient countries or beyond. We ask whether these fears have empirical support and how donors can balance the potentially conflicting objectives of democratisation and stability when intervening in governance matters. Recent research at the German Development Institute shows that fears about the destabilising effects of democratisation do indeed have some empirical support (Leininger et al 2012; Ziaja 2013). But these fears deflect attention from the bigger problem of "getting stuck in the middle". Hybrid regimes that exhibit authoritarian traits under a façade of formal democratic institutions constitute, in the long run, a larger security risk than attempts to make these countries more democratic. Hybrid regimes also hamper economic development, thus constituting an additional, indirect, risk of violent conflict. The promotion of democracy is hence a laudable effort, but it may itself carry risks. A recent DIE study of 47 African countries suggests that support for democracy increases popular mobilisation in the short run, leading to increased demonstrations and riots. However, the same study produced no evidence that democracy support is likely to spark civil wars. Increased mobilisation is thus rather a sign of aid effectiveness than a reason to worry. Yet, to be effective in the long run and to help steer popular demands into peaceful channels, democracy support must assist domestic actors in building institutions that fit the needs of their society. In the past, the potentially de¬stabilising consequences of popular participation have seduced would-be engineers of social change into re¬stricting competition in young democracies. This is a bad idea, as our recent research shows: narrow, elite pacts have, on average, led to worse political outcomes than open competition. The best contribution that donors can make from the out¬side is to enable marginalised groups to participate in crea¬ting the institutional setup. This is best achieved when many donors promote democracy simultaneously. Only then can they avoid the "blueprint trap", which snaps shut when donors try to impose – advertently or inadvertently – an institutional setup on the partner country that does not fit its society's needs. Diversity on the donor side increases the chances of finding a context-adequate institutional design. These findings suggest that an overly cautious sequencing approach to democracy promotion – stability first, only then democracy – has little empirical support. Most countries in the world embarked on a (formally) democratic path more than two decades ago. A gradualist approach that builds institutions while at the same time encouraging mobilisation is thus the more viable approach. Recommendations in brief: Promote democracy now Keep democracy aid diverse Encourage endogenous, inclusive polity design Enforce conditionality on conflict resolution mechanisms in institutional design Balance trade-offs of democratic transitions.
We review the aid effectiveness literature to assess whether foreign aid given to areas of limited statehood can be expected to promote economic and social outcomes in the recipient country. We distinguish different types of aid, motives for granting it, recipient country policies and characteristics, and modalities by which aid is delivered, as these factors have been argued to influence the effectiveness of aid. In short, aid is most likely to be successful if given for non-strategic motives, and if given to recipient countries with "good" policies and democratic institutions. Fragmented aid and aid amounts that exceed the absorptive capacity of the recipient reduce the effectiveness of aid. We then compare these properties between recipients most affected by limited statehood and those least affected. This allows us to assess the relative effectiveness of aid in countries with areas of limited statehood. We conclude that on average aid given there is less likely to be effective than elsewhere.
AbstractAid effectiveness is widely understood to suffer when multiple donors operate in the same space, but recent studies indicate benefits of fragmentation. We posit that these mixed findings may reflect differences across aid sectors — and also show how the level of implementation can condition the interpretation of results. Cross-national time-series analysis of 152 countries implies aid fragmentation can promote child survival and improve governance. However, analysis of subnational variation in Sierra Leone and Nigeria suggests the presence of more donors is associated with worse health outcomes, but better governance outcomes. Having more donors in a locality may thus be beneficial when they are working to improve the systems through which policies are implemented, but harmful if they target policy outcomes directly. A survey of Nigerian civil servants suggests potential mechanisms: fragmentation in health aid may lead to internal "brain drain" and pressure to alter projects, whereas diversity in governance aid might promote meritocratic behavior.
