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This volume provides a comprehensive guide to three major theaters of combat: the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The war at sea was a critical contest, as sea-lanes provided the logistical arteries for British and subsequent Allied armies fighting on the three continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe. Land forces ultimately won World War II, but the battles at sea fundamentally altered the balance of military power on the ground.

World War II is one of the historical events that has left its tragic mark on the memory of the peoples of the world. An objective and fair study of the history of Uzbekistan during the war years is important for historical memory. In his speech at the reception dedicated to the Day of Remembrance and Honor on May 9, 2017, the President of Uzbekistan praised the hard and courageous work of the people of Uzbekistan during the Second World War, noting that: , arms, medicine, clothing, food. … It would not be a mistake to say that the elderly, women and teenagers worked hard day and night in the factories relocated to Uzbekistan - an example of true devotion and heroism

Cover title. ; The campaign in Poland, 1939 : The German strategic plan ; Results ; Lessons from the Polish campaign -- The Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-40 : The Russian strategic plan ; Initial Russian objectives ; Operations ; Lessons from the Soviet-Finnish war -- The campaign in Norway : The German strategic plan ; Results ; Lessons from the Norwegian campaign ; Concurrent operations -- The campaign in the West, 1940 : Allied plans ; The German strategic plan ; Results ; Lessons from the campaign in the West ; The Battle of Britain (8 August -- 31 October, 1940) -- The Balkan campaign 1940-41: The Italo-Greek War (28 October -- 6 April, 1941) : The Italian strategic plan ; Results ; Concurrent operations -- The Balkan campaign 1940-41 (continued): Invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece (6-20 April, 1941) : The German strategic plan ; Allied strategic plan ; Results ; Lessons of the campaign ; Concurrent operations -- The Balkan campaign 1940-41 (continued): The conquest of Crete (20-30 May, 1941): The German strategic plan ; Results ; Lessons of the campaign -- The war in North Africa : Graziani's advance, 13-16 September, 1940 ; First British offensive, December 1940 -- February, 1941 ; Rommel's first offensive, 24 March -- 14 March, 1941 ; Second British offensive (Battle of Salum), 15-17 June, 1941 ; Third British offensive, 18 November -- 17 January, 1942 ; Rommel's second offensive, January -- July, 1942 -- The German invasion of Russia : The German strategic plan ; Results ; Advance of the northern group of armies, June-September, 1941 ; Advance of the central group of armies, June-August, 1941 ; Advance of the southern group of armies, June-September, 1941 ; Reduction of the Kiev Salient, July-September, 1941 ; Resumption of the general advance, September-December, 1941 ; The Russian winter counteroffensive of 1941-2 ; The German offensive of 1942. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This article focuses on Fascist Italy's active air defenses during the Second World War. It analyzes a number of crucial factors: mass production of antiaircraft weapons and fighters; detection of enemy aircraft by deploying radar; coordination between the Air Ministry and the other ministries involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The relationship between the government and industrialists, as well as that between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the story. The article argues that the history of Italian air defenses reflected many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini's strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet. Moreover, industrial self-interest and inter-service rivalry combined to inhibit even more the efforts of the regime to protect its population, maintain adequate armaments output, and compete in technical terms with the Allies.

This thesis explores the impact of the Second World War on literature and culture in Northern Ireland between 1939 and 1970. It argues that the war, as a unique interregnum in the history of Northern Ireland, challenged the entrenched political and social makeup of the province and had a profound effect on its cultural life. Critical approaches to Northern Irish literature and culture have often been circumscribed by topographies of partition and sectarianism, and it is striking how the Second World War seems to have created conditions for reconsidering the province within broader European and global contexts. ; TARA (Trinity?s Access to Research Archive) has a robust takedown policy. Please contact us if you have any concerns: rssadmin@tcd.ie

The article examines the race for the possession of atomic weapons, which unfolded between Nazi Germany and the United States during the Second World War. The chronology of events shows that Nazi Germany was in the lead in the atomic race in 1940 and 1941. After the defeat of the Fascist troops near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler ordered to mobilize all resources for current military needs. At a time when the fighting on the Eastern Front was pulling more and more financial and human resources out of the Reich, the Nazi leadership came to the conclusion that the creation (and even more so the use) of nuclear weapons during the Second World War are no longer possible. If the United States (a huge rich country without military operations on its territory) intensified work on the nuclear project every month, then the Third Reich, on the contrary, conducted it according to the residual principle. The authors conclude that the main force that prevented the Nazis from unleashing atomic death on the world was the Soviet Union, which made a decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism.

This volume offers a first step toward the unification of many disparate threads in Canada's history of the Second World War and new perspectives on Canada's political and operational wars. What emerges is both unsurprising, and surprisingly new. Canada at war was a young nation increasingly, and sometimes cheekily, pursuing its national interests at the level of policy. Although historians have overlooked Canada's assertive role, through its joint defence measures and alliances Canada largely defined itself as a country, and combined close defence relationships with sovereignty. Operationally, in training, and in civil affairs Canada's inexperience resulted in a steep learning curve. Nonetheless, battlefield experience provided important lessons that, in most key areas, were willingly learned.

Giorgos Antoniou, review of A war without end: the 1940s in political discourse, 1950-1967, by Eleni Paschaloudi.Kateřina Králová and Konstantinos Tsivos, review of Children of the Greek Civil War: Refugees and the Politics of Memory, by Loring M. Danforth and Riki van Boeschoten.Christina Alexopoulos, review of Staying temporarily: Greek political refugees in the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1948-1982, by Katerina Tsekou.Eugenia Bournova, review of Famine and death in occupied Greece, 1941-1944, by Violetta Hionidou.Iordanis Psimmenos, review of Construction workers: The people who built Athens, 1950-1967, by Dimitra Lambropoulou.

Men in reserve focuses on working class civilian men who, as a result of working in reserved occupations, were exempt from enlistment in the armed forces. It uses fifty six newly conducted oral history interviews as well as autobiographies, visual sources and existing archived interviews to explore how this group articulated their wartime experiences and how they positioned themselves in relation to the hegemonic discourse of military masculinity. It considers the range of masculine identities circulating amongst civilian male workers during the war and investigates the extent to which reserved workers draw upon these identities when recalling their wartime selves. It argues that the Second World War was capable of challenging civilian masculinities, positioning the civilian man below that of the 'soldier hero' while, simultaneously, reinforcing them by bolstering the capacity to provide and to earn high wages, frequently in risky and dangerous work, all which were key markers of masculinity.

The Second World War stands across the 20th century like a colossus. Its death toll, geographical spread, social dislocation and genocidal slaughter were unprecedented. It was literally a world war, devastating Europe, China and Japan, triggering massive movements of population, and unleashing forces of nationalism in Asia and Africa that presaged the end of European colonialism. The international order was changed irrevocably, most notably in the rise of the two superpowers and the decline of Great Britain. For Australia too, though the loss of life in the conflict was comparatively small, the war had a profound impact. Yet for all this, the Second World War is relegated to a secondary place in the Australian national memory of war vis-à-vis the war of 1914-18. It is a lesser war in every respect. Why this is so, when the war itself was fought on such a monumental scale globally, is addressed in this article. The subordination of the Second World War is ultimately attributable to the fact that the signifier of 'ANZAC' leads in the imagination and national mythic representation not to any battle or experience of 1939-45 but to 25 April 1915. ANZAC is now irrevocably entrenched in the national political culture as a complex secular signifier of identity and belonging to the nation.

While biographical studies of British composers' experiences in the Second World War abound, little attention has been paid to how the demands of 'total' war impacted on music's ideological status. This article sheds new light on how composers and critics negotiated the problematic relationship between art music and politics in this period. John Ireland's Epic March – a BBC commission that caused the composer considerable anxiety – provides a case study. Drawing first on the correspondence charting the lengthy genesis of the work, and then on the work's critical reception, I consider how Ireland and his audiences sought to reconcile the conflicting political and aesthetic demands of this commission. With its conventional musical style, Epic March offers an example of a 'middlebrow' attempt to bridge the gap between art and politics.

Exploring the role of museums, galleries and curators during the upheaval of the Second World War, this book challenges the accepted view of a hiatus in museum services during the conflict and its immediate aftermath. Instead it argues that new thinking in the 1930s was realised in a number of promising initiatives during the war only to fail during the fragmented post-war recovery. Based on new research including interviews with retired museum staff, letters, diaries, museum archives and government records, this study reveals a complex picture of both innovation and inertia. At the outbreak of war precious objects were stored away and staff numbers reduced, but although many museums were closed, others successfully campaigned to remain open. By providing innovative modern exhibitions and education initiatives they became popular and valued venues for the public. After the war, however, museums returned to their more traditional, collections-centred approach and failed to negotiate the public funding needed for reconstruction based on this narrower view of their role. Hence, in the longer term, the destruction and economic and social consequences of the conflict served to delay aspirations for reconstruction until the 1960s. Through this lens, the history of the museum in the mid-twentieth century appears as one shaped by the effects of war but equally determined by the input of curators, audiences and the state. The museum thus emerges not as an isolated institution concerned only with presenting the past but as a product of the changing conflicts and cultures within society.

Propaganda is a familiar facet of American culture. The federal government has a history of involvement in the formulation and release of propagandistic messages through direct control of the public sector, or influence in the private sector, especially during times of conflict. During World War II the federal government used propaganda conveyed through popular cultural media to create an "us versus them" mentality by releasing information and images that both demonized the enemy and explained the righteousness of the American people and their cause. In doing so, federal officials explicitly and effectively mobilized the population to support the American war effort. Wartime propaganda in the form of radio, film, cartoons, and posters were directly influenced and at times controlled by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration and federal agencies, like the Office of War Information, created by the exigencies of the conflict. Throughout the war years (and even before the United States entered the conflict), there was a release of information that was targeted specifically at the American civilian population in order to garner support for American interests in both the European and Pacific theaters. The distribution of information relating to the war from the federal government to American civilians was carefully formulated to create an American identity based on a set of commonly held values that could be defended.

The study deals with financing state expenditures and war economy of the Third Reich during the SecondWorldWar. Based on macroeconomic analysis of economic development in relation to the concept of total war, the changes in the German economy allowing Nazis' war efforts to continue are analyzed. The effect of replacing private interests with government goals manifested in volume and structure of household consumption and firms' investments, distorted industrial production and labour market, etc. The study points out changes in the development of financial (and partially nonfinancial) coverage of abnormally growing budgetary expenditures of central government after 1939. Special attention is paid to the analysis of financing war expenditures in Germany, including revenue from occupied territories and the role of the financial system. Especially, for more intensive debt financing was underway since the non-debt ways were not sufficient enough from 1943. An important finding, inter alia, is that growing government debt was for the most part covered from domestic sources, such as retracting savings from the financial system and excessive money creation. Within domestic economy the German government preferred "hidden" sources of funding over public issues of state bonds. On average, about a half of government outlays during the war were covered by non-debt resources – taxes, customs, or payments of occupational costs.