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This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU : the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does ESDP come from and what are its main objectives ? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management tools, and how do theses tool work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors involved ? Last but not least, how does ESDP interplay between Brussels and the member states ? What does ESDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits up to now? ESDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or the OSCE. ESDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense and security matters in Europe –France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and procedures in the framework of ESDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its crisis management policy as the heart of ESDP is to propose an integrated approach combining military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. ESDP still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of ESDP operations. This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in the light of their national security interest. Yet ESDP combined with the new trends in military socialization since the 80's constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies and military education. Thus ESDP seems ...

International audience ; La tension entre politique de sécurité et réduction des inégalités en Colombie amène à interroger la place du crime organisé dans le rapport énoncé par les autorités entre paix et développement, alors que l'impératif sécuritaire justifie la stratégie gouvernementale de contrôle territorial et replace le processus de paix dans le temps géopolitique plus long d'une entreprise d'ajustement des conditions d'investissement. La mobilisation de la force publique dans le cadre d'une politique sécuritaire visant à garantir un régime capitaliste et libéral montre que le traitement de la menace criminelle est un instrument stratégique de consolidation des rapports de force entre groupes sociaux.

International audience ; La tension entre politique de sécurité et réduction des inégalités en Colombie amène à interroger la place du crime organisé dans le rapport énoncé par les autorités entre paix et développement, alors que l'impératif sécuritaire justifie la stratégie gouvernementale de contrôle territorial et replace le processus de paix dans le temps géopolitique plus long d'une entreprise d'ajustement des conditions d'investissement. La mobilisation de la force publique dans le cadre d'une politique sécuritaire visant à garantir un régime capitaliste et libéral montre que le traitement de la menace criminelle est un instrument stratégique de consolidation des rapports de force entre groupes sociaux.

International audience ; La tension entre politique de sécurité et réduction des inégalités en Colombie amène à interroger la place du crime organisé dans le rapport énoncé par les autorités entre paix et développement, alors que l'impératif sécuritaire justifie la stratégie gouvernementale de contrôle territorial et replace le processus de paix dans le temps géopolitique plus long d'une entreprise d'ajustement des conditions d'investissement. La mobilisation de la force publique dans le cadre d'une politique sécuritaire visant à garantir un régime capitaliste et libéral montre que le traitement de la menace criminelle est un instrument stratégique de consolidation des rapports de force entre groupes sociaux.

Abstract This article reports on the modalities of application of the food security policy at the level of a local authority in Mali through the interventions of the State and NGOs. The objective of the study was to understand and analyze the strategies of the different actors in the process of implementing the food security policy and to assess the results achieved at the level of the municipality of Zan Coulibaly (Dioïla circle, Koulikoro region) in Mali. The research methodology of a rural community. Our results are based on the review of documentary research and socio-anthropological surveys based on interviews and observations carried out iteratively between May 2015 and December 20197 with groups of strategic actors (Sardan, 1995) involved in the implementation of implementation of the food security policy at the municipal level. at the level of Zan Coulibaly commune (Dioïla circle, Koulikoro region) in Mali. The results show that this rural commune is subject to both the predominance of cash crops, cotton, and strong land speculation, reducing agricultural land year after year. The actions of the various food security stakeholders such as cereal banks are diverted into resource capture strategies by certain groups of stakeholders from the local population, thus compromising food security for the vast majority of the population. Keywords: Food security, actors, strategies, Zan Coulibaly commune, Mali ; Résumé Cet article rend compte des modalités d'application de la politique de sécurité alimentaire au niveau d'une collectivité locale au Mali à travers les interventions de l'Etat et des ONG. L'objectif de l'étude était d'analyser les stratégies des différents acteurs dans le processus de mise en œuvre de la politique de sécurité alimentaire et dans l'atteinte des résultats à l'échelle de la commune Zan Coulibaly (cercle de Dioïla, région de Koulikoro) au Mali. La méthodologie de recherche s'appuie sur la revue documentaire et les enquêtes de type socio-anthropologique basées sur des entretiens et ...

This dissertation presents a general method for the specification and quantitative evaluation of information systems security. This method allows to monitor the evolutions of an information system in operation, as well as to compare the impact on security of possible modifications of the functioning. It relies on a formal specification of the system security policy, augmented by a model of the vulnerabilities observed in the real system in operation. Then, a security measure represents the difficulty for an attacker to exploit the vulnerabilities and defeat the objectives defined in the security policy.Information systems security policy specification necessitates the definition of a rigorous and expressive framework. Furthermore, the language should be general enough to be usable in the context of an organization. The method defined and used in this work is based on an extension of deontic logic, enriched with a graphical representation.Vulnerabilities of the information system are described by a model called a privilege graph. These vulnerabilities, probed in the system, may have various origins, such as incorrect operation of the protection mechanisms of a computer system, or delegation of privileges in an organization. The assessment of a weight to these individual vulnerabilities allows the definition of highly relevant and global quantitative measures of security.Two practical examples are presented to illustrate the methodology: the study of a medium-size bank agency; and the observation of the security evolutions of a large computer system in operation. ; Cette thèse présente une méthode générale de spécification et d'évaluation quantitative de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. Cette méthode permet de surveiller les évolutions d'un système d'information pendant sa vie opérationnelle, ainsi que de comparer l'impact sur la sécurité de modifications éventuelles du fonctionnement. Elle s'appuie sur une spécification formelle de la politique de sécurité, complétée par un modèle des vulnérabilités du ...

This dissertation presents a general method for the specification and quantitative evaluation of information systems security. This method allows to monitor the evolutions of an information system in operation, as well as to compare the impact on security of possible modifications of the functioning. It relies on a formal specification of the system security policy, augmented by a model of the vulnerabilities observed in the real system in operation. Then, a security measure represents the difficulty for an attacker to exploit the vulnerabilities and defeat the objectives defined in the security policy.Information systems security policy specification necessitates the definition of a rigorous and expressive framework. Furthermore, the language should be general enough to be usable in the context of an organization. The method defined and used in this work is based on an extension of deontic logic, enriched with a graphical representation.Vulnerabilities of the information system are described by a model called a privilege graph. These vulnerabilities, probed in the system, may have various origins, such as incorrect operation of the protection mechanisms of a computer system, or delegation of privileges in an organization. The assessment of a weight to these individual vulnerabilities allows the definition of highly relevant and global quantitative measures of security.Two practical examples are presented to illustrate the methodology: the study of a medium-size bank agency; and the observation of the security evolutions of a large computer system in operation. ; Cette thèse présente une méthode générale de spécification et d'évaluation quantitative de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. Cette méthode permet de surveiller les évolutions d'un système d'information pendant sa vie opérationnelle, ainsi que de comparer l'impact sur la sécurité de modifications éventuelles du fonctionnement. Elle s'appuie sur une spécification formelle de la politique de sécurité, complétée par un modèle des vulnérabilités du ...

This dissertation presents a general method for the specification and quantitative evaluation of information systems security. This method allows to monitor the evolutions of an information system in operation, as well as to compare the impact on security of possible modifications of the functioning. It relies on a formal specification of the system security policy, augmented by a model of the vulnerabilities observed in the real system in operation. Then, a security measure represents the difficulty for an attacker to exploit the vulnerabilities and defeat the objectives defined in the security policy.Information systems security policy specification necessitates the definition of a rigorous and expressive framework. Furthermore, the language should be general enough to be usable in the context of an organization. The method defined and used in this work is based on an extension of deontic logic, enriched with a graphical representation.Vulnerabilities of the information system are described by a model called a privilege graph. These vulnerabilities, probed in the system, may have various origins, such as incorrect operation of the protection mechanisms of a computer system, or delegation of privileges in an organization. The assessment of a weight to these individual vulnerabilities allows the definition of highly relevant and global quantitative measures of security.Two practical examples are presented to illustrate the methodology: the study of a medium-size bank agency; and the observation of the security evolutions of a large computer system in operation. ; Cette thèse présente une méthode générale de spécification et d'évaluation quantitative de la sécurité des systèmes d'information. Cette méthode permet de surveiller les évolutions d'un système d'information pendant sa vie opérationnelle, ainsi que de comparer l'impact sur la sécurité de modifications éventuelles du fonctionnement. Elle s'appuie sur une spécification formelle de la politique de sécurité, complétée par un modèle des vulnérabilités du ...

While information technology is essential in complex, cooperative and largely distributed applications like telemedicine or social declarations, it becomes more and more necessary to have a high confidence in the processing and the distribution of data and services. This thesis proposes an approach based on a security policy, for healthcare and social information and communication systems (HSICS). These systems cover the whole of the needs generally found in other fields: interworking of systems, complexity of organizations, sensitivity of information, and diversity of security requirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability and auditability). The aim of the approach is to achieve a good trade-off between respect of the least privilege principle and flexibility of the access control. The first step consists in describing the system, identifying sensitive information and characterizing the threats. Then, the security policy specifies security properties that must be satisfied, and the rules expressing how the protection state of the system may evolve. The identified security policy is original in the way that it takes the context into account, and is flexible enough to manage any improvement, change or update in the system. Besides, a new access control model is presented: the Organization-Based Access Control (Or-BAC). In Or-BAC, the specification of the security policy is completely parameterized by the organization so that it is possible to handle simultaneously several security policies associated with different organizations. The model is not restricted to permissions, but it also includes the possibility to define prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. In this respect, Or-BAC is able to specify policies developed for HSICS, as it can be applied to a large range of complex and distributed applications. Or-BAC is represented by UML diagrams, and by a new logical language based on deontic logic. It is also integrated in a system security UML model. A prototype has been developed to illustrate ...

While information technology is essential in complex, cooperative and largely distributed applications like telemedicine or social declarations, it becomes more and more necessary to have a high confidence in the processing and the distribution of data and services. This thesis proposes an approach based on a security policy, for healthcare and social information and communication systems (HSICS). These systems cover the whole of the needs generally found in other fields: interworking of systems, complexity of organizations, sensitivity of information, and diversity of security requirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability and auditability). The aim of the approach is to achieve a good trade-off between respect of the least privilege principle and flexibility of the access control. The first step consists in describing the system, identifying sensitive information and characterizing the threats. Then, the security policy specifies security properties that must be satisfied, and the rules expressing how the protection state of the system may evolve. The identified security policy is original in the way that it takes the context into account, and is flexible enough to manage any improvement, change or update in the system. Besides, a new access control model is presented: the Organization-Based Access Control (Or-BAC). In Or-BAC, the specification of the security policy is completely parameterized by the organization so that it is possible to handle simultaneously several security policies associated with different organizations. The model is not restricted to permissions, but it also includes the possibility to define prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. In this respect, Or-BAC is able to specify policies developed for HSICS, as it can be applied to a large range of complex and distributed applications. Or-BAC is represented by UML diagrams, and by a new logical language based on deontic logic. It is also integrated in a system security UML model. A prototype has been developed to illustrate ...

While information technology is essential in complex, cooperative and largely distributed applications like telemedicine or social declarations, it becomes more and more necessary to have a high confidence in the processing and the distribution of data and services. This thesis proposes an approach based on a security policy, for healthcare and social information and communication systems (HSICS). These systems cover the whole of the needs generally found in other fields: interworking of systems, complexity of organizations, sensitivity of information, and diversity of security requirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability and auditability). The aim of the approach is to achieve a good trade-off between respect of the least privilege principle and flexibility of the access control. The first step consists in describing the system, identifying sensitive information and characterizing the threats. Then, the security policy specifies security properties that must be satisfied, and the rules expressing how the protection state of the system may evolve. The identified security policy is original in the way that it takes the context into account, and is flexible enough to manage any improvement, change or update in the system. Besides, a new access control model is presented: the Organization-Based Access Control (Or-BAC). In Or-BAC, the specification of the security policy is completely parameterized by the organization so that it is possible to handle simultaneously several security policies associated with different organizations. The model is not restricted to permissions, but it also includes the possibility to define prohibitions, obligations and recommendations. In this respect, Or-BAC is able to specify policies developed for HSICS, as it can be applied to a large range of complex and distributed applications. Or-BAC is represented by UML diagrams, and by a new logical language based on deontic logic. It is also integrated in a system security UML model. A prototype has been developed to illustrate ...

National audience ; In this thesis, we specifically focus on the Android environment. Indeed, we noticed a lack in the capabilities of the Android permission model against a number of emerging threats. To address these threats, we propose a security policy that complements the current Android permission system. This policy aims at restricting dynamically, i.e. based on the current smartphone execution context, the execution rights and the ability to access smartphone resources for each installed application. Besides the security benefits, the use of such a policy allows a user to have a tighter control over the access ofapplications to privacy-related data. This security policy is the first contribution of this thesis. Furthermore, we designed a security architecture that implements the access control mechanisms required to carry out such a policy. This second contribution is based on a so-called "multi-level" architecture, i.e. made up of several components of different privilege levels. Specifically, these have been implemented both in the Android framework, in the Linux kernel, and in a hypervisor. The last contribution of this thesis involves the realization of a prototype of this architecture on a development board, associated with the presentation of tests that showcase the effectiveness and relevance of the approach. ; Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons spécifiquement à l'environnement Android. Nous avons en effet relevé un manque dans les capacités d'expression du modèle de permission d'Android vis-à-vis d'un certain nombre de menaces émergentes. Pour répondre à ces dernières, nous proposons une politique de sécurité venant compléter le système de permissions actuel d'Android. Celle-ci a pour but de restreindre dynamiquement, i.e. en fonction du contexte courant d'exécution du smartphone, les droits d'exécution et la capacité d'accès aux ressources du smartphone, pour chaque application installée. Outre les bénéfices en termes de sécurité, l'utilisation d'une telle politique permet à un utilisateur ...

National audience ; In this thesis, we specifically focus on the Android environment. Indeed, we noticed a lack in the capabilities of the Android permission model against a number of emerging threats. To address these threats, we propose a security policy that complements the current Android permission system. This policy aims at restricting dynamically, i.e. based on the current smartphone execution context, the execution rights and the ability to access smartphone resources for each installed application. Besides the security benefits, the use of such a policy allows a user to have a tighter control over the access ofapplications to privacy-related data. This security policy is the first contribution of this thesis. Furthermore, we designed a security architecture that implements the access control mechanisms required to carry out such a policy. This second contribution is based on a so-called "multi-level" architecture, i.e. made up of several components of different privilege levels. Specifically, these have been implemented both in the Android framework, in the Linux kernel, and in a hypervisor. The last contribution of this thesis involves the realization of a prototype of this architecture on a development board, associated with the presentation of tests that showcase the effectiveness and relevance of the approach. ; Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons spécifiquement à l'environnement Android. Nous avons en effet relevé un manque dans les capacités d'expression du modèle de permission d'Android vis-à-vis d'un certain nombre de menaces émergentes. Pour répondre à ces dernières, nous proposons une politique de sécurité venant compléter le système de permissions actuel d'Android. Celle-ci a pour but de restreindre dynamiquement, i.e. en fonction du contexte courant d'exécution du smartphone, les droits d'exécution et la capacité d'accès aux ressources du smartphone, pour chaque application installée. Outre les bénéfices en termes de sécurité, l'utilisation d'une telle politique permet à un utilisateur ...