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The effect of a selective incentive system on the likelihood of collective action is tested using an experiment with an Apex Game, a power-imbalanced game in which the weak players choose between competing against each other to form an alliance with the strong player or cooperating with each other in a unanimous alliance of weak players (excluding the strong player). A theoretical introduction analyzes the nature and importance of selective incentives for collective action and demonstrates the relevance of Apex Game experiments for studies of collective action. Results confirm the predictions: Formation of the coalition of weak players rises from 20% in the control condition to 62% when a negative selective incentive system is added.

Apex games place weak players in the formal equivalent of a multiperson prisoner's dilemma in which each weak player must choose between competing against the other weak players for the opportunity to coalesce with the strong player or cooperating with the other weak players to produce a jointly preferable outcome. Punishments, not rewards, are predicted to be effective for enforcing cooperation by the weak players. Fifty-four groups of four subjects each played the weak role in a five-person apex game with a confederate playing the apex (strong) role in a 3×3 design with factors of low, medium, and high levels of rewards and punishments available as incentives. As predicted, punishments but not rewards had a significant impact on increasing cooperation. Despite this effect, many groups experienced harmful effects of punishment availability that increased the risk of retaliatory spirals. It is concluded that a second-order dilemma may be seen in prisoner's dilemmas, since punishments are both necessary for enforcing cooperation and detrimental to that cooperation.

In standard models of decision making, participation in violent political action is understood as the product of instrumentally rational reasoning. According to this line of thinking, instrumentally rational individuals will participate in violent political action only if there are selective incentives that are limited to participants. We argue in favor of an alternate model of political violence where participants are motivated by moral commitments to collective sacred values. Correlative and experimental empirical evidence in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict strongly supports this alternate view.

In standard models of decision making, participation in violent political action is understood as the product of instrumentally rational reasoning. According to this line of thinking, instrumentally rational individuals will participate in violent political action only if there are selective incentives that are limited to participants. We argue in favor of an alternate model of political violence where participants are motivated by moral commitments to collective sacred values. Correlative and experimental empirical evidence in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict strongly supports this alternate view.

AbstractI integrate the notion of intrinsic motivation, applied to economics most notably byFrey (1997), into the logic of individual contributions toward collective goods as analyzed sinceOlson ([1965] 1971). This illuminates the many and various ways through which the intrinsic motivation to contribute toward such goods can be crowded out by the application of selective incentives. I suggest that the crowding‐out effect increases the cost to society of organizing the provision of collective goods and argue in favor of designing selective incentives that mitigate this effect.

"This book examines the development of business interest representation in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The central argument is that abusive regulatory regimes discourage the formation of business associations. At the same time, poor regulatory enforcement tends to encourage associational membership growth. Academic research often treats special interest groups as vehicles of protectionism and non-productive collusion. This book challenges this perspective with evidence of market-friendly activities of industry associations as well as their benign influence on patterns of public governance. Careful analysis of cross-national quantitative data that spans more than 25 countries, as well as the qualitative examination of the development of business associations in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Croatia, shows that postcommunist business associations function as substitutes for state and private mechanisms of economic governance. They challenge corrupt bureaucracy and contribute to the establishment of effective and predictable regulatory regimes. These arguments and empirical findings put the long-standing issues of economic regulations, public goods, and collective action in a new theoretical perspective"--

Abstract After a period of relative overperformance due to the focus on output indicators in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) burden-sharing debate, we ask whether the shift back to input indicators prior to the Ukraine War meant that the smaller NATO allies have returned to their fringe position as NATO underperformers. According to the deterrence model, smaller allies are induced to free ride to a higher degree than mid-sized allies. Utilizing insights from public choice theory, our analysis demonstrates, first, that there is no support to the claim that the size of NATO member state GDP determines the percentage of GDP spent on defence. Second, selective incentives tend to reduce the incentive for small allies to free ride. The relationship between GDP and the percentage of GDP spent on defence capabilities is therefore conditional upon the net gain of the individual member state. Defence capabilities that are characterized as a public good when we control for exposed borders indicate a higher percentage of GDP spent on defence. Our conclusions show that even though small allies continue to free ride, they do so less than expected due to the existence of selective incentives in the period from 2009-2019.