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The first article of a roundtable discussion on evaluating the preemptive use of force examines distinctions between preemptive & preventive war. Preemption has traditionally been based on perceptions of immediate threat, making the right to preempt an extension of the right of self-defense. Preventive war is considered illegal because it is based on perceptions of future threats that could be responded to in other ways. Historical examples of the difference between preemption & prevention are described to point out difficulties that arise from the distinction. President George W. Bush's assumption that possession of weapons of mass destruction by potential enemies is justification for a preventive war is discussed, along with the implications of not having an international political framework capable of restraining states; the illusion of absolute security; & the notion of humanitarian intervention. The fact that sanctions against Iraq have unintentionally imposed suffering on innocent citizens that the regime has made no attempt to alleviate is seen as possible justification for a more active policy. J. Lindroth

The concepts of necessity, imminence, and proportionality play a central part in Daniel Bethlehem's sixteen proposed principles regulating a state's use of force against an imminent or actual attack by nonstate actors. While all three are requirements that must be considered in the law of self-defense, their exact content remains somewhat unclear. In this comment, we examine how each one is conceived in Bethlehem's principles and review the questions that remain unanswered.

"This book examines to what extent the right of self-defence, as laid down in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, permits States to launch military operations against other States. In particular, it focuses on the occurrence of an 'armed attack' - the crucial trigger for the activation of this right. In light of the developments since 9/11, the author analyses relevant physical and verbal customary practice, ranging from the 1974 Definition of Aggression to recent incidents such as the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan and the 2006 Israeli intervention in Lebanon. The notion of 'armed attack' is examined from a threefold perspective. What acts can be regarded as an 'armed attack'? When can an 'armed attack' be considered to take place? And from whom must an 'armed attack' emanate? By way of conclusion, the different findings are brought together in a draft 'Definition of Armed Attack'"--

Setting the stage -- Developing the 'value-based model' of self-defence -- The scholarly community's surprising neglect of values as self-defence decision-grounds -- The value-based model's answer to common theoretical ('hard case') questions -- Examining German law's treatment of self-defence from a value-centric perspective -- Examining the US law's treatment of self-defence from a value-centric perspective -- Examining the English law's treatment of self-defence from a value-centric perspective -- Parting observations.

In his address at West Point on June 1, 2002, President George W. Bush appeared to be signaling America's willingness to regard the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by potential enemies as grounds for an anticipatory war. Historically, however, a clear distinction has been drawn between preemptive and preventive, or anticipatory, war, with the latter regarded as illegitimate. The National Security Strategy announced by the president on September 20, 2002, was more conventional in its approach to preemption, but doubts remain as to whether the old distinction can be preserved. And this discussion is taking place in the context of a specific problem, namely the apparent desire of Iraq to obtain WMD and the determination of the United States, and, less clearly expressed, the UN Security Council, to prevent this from happening.