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This work analyzes the Agenda 2030 in its main potentiality to lead public policies and private actions towards a more sustainable path. At the same time it acknowledges its dependency on measurements and finance mechanisms for the Sustainable Development Goals implementation. The main argument is that public expectations face difficulties to be translated in public actions, due to, among other factors, the lack of measurement and finance mechanisms. With this purpose it starts describing what is the Agenda 2030, and how this United Nations lead international declaration is structured to be monitored and implemented by States and others multi stakeholders. Secondly it analyses the importance of the measurements to address critical social environmental challenges and to allow comparison between the achievements of each member state. Third it remarks the role-played by international financial institutions, by international investment and by the private sector in general. Forth, the article highlights the drawbacks the methodology of goals can represent when used to overcome collective challenges marked by moral issues and diffuse impacts, being highly dependent on measurements and finance tools. The methodology chosen was the descriptive and normative, the techniques used were documentary, legislative and bibliographic research.

Habermas discusses the chances for the establishment of world citizenship in contemporary society, marked by multiculturalism and the process of globalization. Habermas identifies the historical configuration of the post-national constellation, and from there themed the transition from international law to the law of citizens of the world, which aligns the concept of citizenship to the idea of ​​human rights. Habermas analyzes the Kantian idea of ​​a cosmopolitan state in which citizens are legal subjects of their respective States and members of a cosmopolitan entity. Kant elaborates on the concept of world republic, which Habermas disagrees with, but offers the example of the European Union for a discussion on the realization of a just and peaceful international order. Based on the Kantian orientation of constituting an order of world citizenship, Habermas discusses the conformation and viability of this idea in contemporary times. For Habermas, it is possible to spell out the idea of ​​cosmopolitan citizenship. From the European Union, cooperation between States and citizens shows that a cosmopolitan community is needed to complement an international community of States.

Self-determination is a crucial concept in establishing the legitimacy of political communities in the international system, and thereby in constructing social identities and political loyalties. At the most general level, self-determination refers to an idea of a right to freedom. In international politics, it also refers to a norm on ways of bounding political communities. At the same time, what self-determination precisely means is contested and contingent. I argue that self-determination evolves today amidst a tension between the challenges of diversity and liberal peace dictates. While diversity has to do with varieties of cultural expression, socioeconomic organization and political status, liberal peace dictates concern global governance practices that tend to impose previous liberal models of democracy, development and human rights. The essay first presents the evolution of the meaning of self-determination in international politics. Then it addresses critical approaches upon contemporary liberal peace. The remaining sections analyze how contemporary self-determination movements present claims highly suggestive to rethink forms of political community, of state-community relation, and of participation in global governance structures.

The present study analyses the taylorian concept of irreducibly social goods. Besides that, aims to evaluate the possibity of existence of intrinsically social goods, or if all the goods, ultimately, shoud be understood only as goods originally formulated as individual goods. If there are intrinsically social goods, what consequence does this point of view have for the treatment of collective rights? The treatment of these questions is carried out by Taylor's article Irreducibly Social Goods, where the Canadian philosopher states that there are convergent goods and irreducibly social goods. Convergent goods would be those that can be broken down into individual goods, that is, those that only individual can access; on the other hand irreducibly social goods are those shared by a human group or having a common meaning given by a background, this goods have not be broken down into individual goods. Finally, the study aims to present the consequences of this discussion in relation to the concept of collective rights.

Self-determination is a crucial concept in establishing the legitimacy of political communities in the international system, and thereby in constructing social identities and political loyalties. At the most general level, self-determination refers to an idea of a right to freedom. In international politics, it also refers to a norm on ways of bounding political communities. At the same time, what selfdetermination precisely means is contested and contingent. I argue that self-determination evolves today amidst a tension between the challenges of diversity and liberal peace dictates. While diversity has to do with varieties of cultural expression, socioeconomic organization and political status, liberal peace dictates concern global governance practices that tend to impose previous liberal models of democracy, development and human rights. The essay first presents the evolution of the meaning of self-determination in international politics. Then it addresses critical approaches upon contemporary liberal peace. The remaining sections analyze how contemporary self-determination movements present claims highly suggestive to rethink forms of political community, of state-community relation, and of participation in global governance structures.

"In this work, one of Latin America's most renowned legal philosophers conducts a comprehensive survey of the ancient Greek understanding of the law, drawing on texts by poets (Hesiod), philosophers (Anaximander), playwrights (Aeschylus and Sophocles), and historians (Herodotus and Thucydides). The book ends with a finely detailed analysis of the relationship between language and reality in Aristotle, and the emergence of the notion of the system and its subsequent introduction into Roman law. The author's in-depth study of all these aspects makes this volume an essential reference for philosophers, jurists, and historians"--

Since it is imposed to thinking, deconstruction can be seen as a law, the Law itself. Deconstruction of law is to put it in the context of writing, to notice its submission to the différance, to the play in the language. The law of deconstruction acts in the deconstruction of law, revealing paradoxes and fragilities of juridical order, as well as concepts of natural law and human rights. Finally, deconstruction of law brings with it justice as undecidability, such as the obligation to make fair decisions, even when it is not possible to state the presence of justice. Law, writing and deconstruction converge then to justice, understood as the hospitality.

The paper aims to clarify the sense of contemporary fascism, particularly from the example of the Brazilian Bonsolarism, defining it as an anti-systemic, anti-institucional, anti-juridical and infralegal perspective with a personalist, devoted, voluntarist, spontaneous and militant character which starts from inside judiciary and in terms of subversion of the relation among law, politics and moral, and that, by means of politicization and partisanship of law, branches to the political system, serving as instrument to the fratricide political war among parties, from there linking to civil society in the form of constitution of a digital-social mass-militia of acclamation oriented to an anti-systemic posture. In this dynamic, the fascism has two constitutive and streamlining cores: on one side, it subverts the correlation of human rights and law, delegitimizing and truly destroying the ontogenetic primacy, the separation, the differentiation, the self-referentiality and the overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of them regarding law; on other, it leads to the deconstruction from inside to judiciary and political system of the highly institutionalist, legalist, technical, formal and depersonalized perspective which is proper to them, eliminating the centrality of the judiciary and, them, delegitimizing its regulator role regarding to political system and to the social dialectics, normalizing the totalizing regression caused by political-moral colonization of the democratic law. By reconstructing the pluralist and universalist democracy's meta-normative and generative basis as a public system of law, that is, the co-originality of universality of human rights, pluralism and law, the condition of ontogenetic primacy, independence, self-subsistence and overposition of law in relation to politics and moral, as the subsidiarity of these regarding to law, we will point to the renewal of this systemic, systematic, procedural, mediated, instancial, progressive and publicized perspective of the public system of law, in the interrelation, separation and overposition of judiciary and political system, demarcated by a strong ideal of methodological-procedural-axiological institutionality, legality, technicality, formality and depersonalization, which eradicates the politicization and partisanship of law and, by devolving the complete integrality to law-judiciary, confines the democracy's political system and civil society to their true limits which are its structural basis: the human rights, the legal process and the public system of law, with the necessity of full translation of politics and moral to law, delimitating the pluralist and universalist democracy as a public system of law oriented to the production of universality in/as/by legality.

Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the "self" is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett's narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs.