Suchergebnisse

Theimpact of nuclear weapons on the present and future trends in international relations continues to attract wide scholarship. While the literature on the subject has been growing apace, nuclear technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and the dangers posed to the survival of mankind are becoming much more acute than hitherto. In broad terms, the fears expressed about these weapons tend to centre around the implications of three major issues: the emergence of greater first-strike inclinations in the two super-power nuclear forces; the possibility of a perceived strategic imbalance favouring either the United States or the Soviet Union; and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Standpunkt der afrikanischen Staaten gegenüber dem Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Atomwaffen. Detailbetrachtung der potentiellen Atommächte im arabischen Afrika, Schwarzafrika und Südafrika; Diskussion der möglichen regionalen und internationalen Auswirkungen. Verantwortlichkeit der beiden Supermächte nicht nur dem eigenen Waffenarsenal, sondern auch den effektiven und potentiellen Atommächten der übrigen Welt gegenüber

Überblick (ohne Angabe von Quellen) über die Ausrüstung des pakistanischen Heeres, der Kriegsmarine und der Luftwaffe sowie über Umfang und technologisches Niveau der Rüstungsindustrie

A study of A. Sen's "Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal" theorem ("The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Politics & Economics, 1970, 78, Jan-Feb, 152-157). The implications of applications of this theorem are discussed in terms of three points: (1) it is possible for this theorem, like all others, to take on a variety of applications; three suggested areas include (A) game theory, (B) public goods & collective action, & (C) voting with abstention; (2) the implications discovered when applying Sen's theorem in a variety of contexts provide valuable information regarding other theoretical problems in those contexts; & (3) these & other theoretical problems, which may be interpreted as liberal paradoxes, can be unified within a single theoretical framework. In "Social Preference" and Game Theory: A Comment on "The Dilemma of a Paretian Liberal," Nicholas Miller (U of Maryland, Baltimore) maintains that Sen's theorem is based on a framework of abstract social choice theory concerned with "social preference relationships." Aldrich's connection of the theoretical frameworks of social preference & game theory is challenged. While it is conceded that Aldrich's work presents a variety of interesting arguments, there is a need for further work on the connection between social choice theory & game theory before Aldrich's work can be meaningfully evaluated. In Liberal Games: Further Comments on Social Choice and Game Theory, John Aldrich agrees that the relationship between game theory & social choice is an ambiguous one, but notes that this was only one of his suggested applications of Sen's theorem. Two differences partially explain this imprecision: (a) In social choice theory, all possible outcomes must be related or compared to each other. Game theory attempts to isolate only one outcome, or at most, a small subset of potential outcomes, that are expected to result from the game. (b) The connection between social choice & game theories implies the substitution of of behavioral assumptions drawn from game theory for some condition of "social rationality." A condition of social rationality has clear normative interpretations & furthermore, may not be identical to conditions of game theory behavior. It is suggested that further work in this area will resolve some of the ambiguities that still remain & will uncover many far-reaching implications. 9 Tables, 4 Figures, Appendix. M. Cain.

Im Hinblick auf die indischen Sicherheitsinteressen ist es nach Auffassung des Autors für die Bewertung der unterstellten Fähigkeit Pakistans, Atomwaffen zu besitzen und herzustellen, unerheblich, ob das nukleare Potential derzeit nur zu friedlichen Zwecken genutzt werden soll