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This essay applies Amartya Sen's Capability Approach to the way democracy is practiced in the Philippines by Filipinos. The author has reached the conclusion that negative freedom does not secure for people their well-being. Thus, even after the removal of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines still remains poor. In this essay, the author argues that Filipinos should empower themselves morally in terms of their positive freedoms or capability, and the Church can be at the frontlines of this initiative, in order to achieve national development.

Resumen: The capabilities approaches (CA) have been originated in the work of the economist Amartya Sen on inequality. Sen, born in India in 1933, is currently Emeritus Professor of Harvard University. He is still active in teaching and researching. He was always concerned with the problem of social justice, poverty and equality. This has led him to hold a broad notion and an ethical view of economics. Driven by these concerns, Sen tackled the topics of inequality and quality of life, and during the 80s he formulated the capability approach. Sen's capability approach is a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being, development of countries, present socio-economic situation and social arrangements in order to implement right policies. For Sen, human agency is a crucial element of human well-being in a broad sense that goes beyond utility and that is related to the quality of life. Human agency entails freedom: Freedoms are capabilities of performing some actions, called by him "functionings". These capabilities and functionings compose a good life. Capabilities, for Sen, are a better way of assessing well-being than utility or income (for a good survey, see e.g., Sen 1993 and Ingrid Robeyns 2005). Nobody would deny that this is good news. A concern among scholars, however, has arisen about the operationality of Sen's CA. Traits as the incommensurability of capabilities and their ambiguous definition (see Sen 1999: 76- 7) are sufficient reasons for this concern. As Robert Sugden affirms, "it is natural to ask how far Sen's framework is operational" (1993: 1953). Some arguments for this lack of operationality might be summarized in terms of the inexact or "vague" character of practical reason, the capacity that lies behind the whole CA (on the central role of practical reason within the CA see Nussbaum 1987: 47 and 1995a). For Sen, indeed, the capabilities's ambiguity, both in their definition and in their election, is a positive feature because it reflects and respects the freedom and the differences of the persons (1993: 33-34): for him, asserting ambiguity and fuzziness is not a weakness but a strength.

Over the last 30 years the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya Sen has developed an original normative approach to the evaluation of individual and social well-being. The foundational concern of this 'capability approach' is the real freedom of individuals to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value. This freedom is analysed in terms of an individual's 'capability' to achieve combinations of such intrinsically valuable 'beings and doings' ('functionings') as being sufficiently nourished and freely expressing one's political views. In this account, 'development' is conceived as the expansion of individuals' capability, and thus as a concept tha

WOS: 000452652500013 ; The capability approach initially developed by Amartya Sen is a new evaluative framework frequently used by scholars and policy makers who aim to deal with issues related to development, welfare, poverty, social choice theory, inequality and justice. Drawing upon a sociological account of various diversities related to individuals' characteristics and their social/institutional surroundings, the approach criticizes some mainstream political theories of social justice such as the utilitarian, libertarian and Rawlsian models of social justice. Therefore, it is usually addressed as a "sociological turn" within the relevant literature. This work argues that this is not a fully-deserved characteristic since the approach employs a sociologically-informed perspective of various diversities primarily to criticize rival theories of justice, but not to configure the analytical texture of its own authentic proposal that advocates "individuals' ability to achieve what they have reason to value" as the focal point of assessment of social justice.

The hierarchical nature of the firm affects stakeholders' well-being. This is our main motivation in analysing the firm through the perspective of Sen's capability approach—a social justice theory for the evaluation of any institution, organization or policy aimed at providing well-beings. In order to work out the inherent relation between the capability approach and the economic analysis of the law, we show the strict link between capabilities and entitlements, which we call capabilities-as-entitlements, and investigate if and how corporate governance, i.e., the configuration of entitlements in a firm, enhances or diminishes capabilities of stakeholders. We underline the role that the public use of reason and a sufficientarian criterion play in mitigating conflicts among stakeholders, permitting the reach of a balance amongst all of them and the identification of the capabilities that allow stakeholders to exercise democratic citizenship in corporation. We build several indexes that are able to measure and compare capabilities developed within and between corporate governance regimes.

Background Sen's capability approach is underspecified; one decision left to those operationalising the approach is how to identify sets of relevant and important capabilities. Sen has suggested that lists be developed for specific policy or research objectives through a process of public reasoning and discussion. Robeyns offers further guidance in support of Sen's position, suggesting that lists should be explicit, discussed and defended; methods be openly scrutinised; lists be considered both in terms of what is ideal and what is practical ('generality'); and that lists be exhaustive. Here, the principles suggested by Robeyns are operationalised to facilitate external scrutiny of a list of capabilities identified for use in the evaluation of supportive end of life care. Methods This work started with an existing list of seven capabilities (the ICECAP-SCM), identified as being necessary for a person to experience a good death. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with 20 experts in economics, psychology, ethics and palliative care, to facilitate external scrutiny of the developed list. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed using constant comparison. Results The seven capabilities were found to encompass concepts identified as important by expert stakeholders (to be exhaustive) and the measure was considered feasible for use with patients receiving care at the end of life. Conclusion The rigorous development of lists of capabilities using both initial participatory approaches with affected population groups, and subsequent assessment by experts, strengthens their democratic basis and may encourage their use in policy contexts.

Fundamental questions in value sensitive design include whether and how high-tech products/artefacts could embody values and ethical ideals, and how plural and incommensurable values of ethical and social importance could be chosen rationally and objectively at a collective level. By using a humanitarian cargo drone study as a starting point, this paper tackles the challenges that VSD's lack of commitment to a specific ethical theory generates in practical applications. Besides, it highlights how mainstream ethical approaches usually related to VSD are incapable of solving main ethical dilemmas raised by technological design for well-being in democratic settings. Accordingly, it is argued that VSD's ethical-democratic import would substantially be enhanced by the espousal of a procedural ethics stance and the deliberative approach to value and welfare entailed by Amartya Sen's capability approach. Differently from rival ethical–political theories, its normative and meta-ethical foundations better handle human diversity, value-goal pluralism, conflicting vested interests as well as the epistemic-moral disagreements typical of contemporary complex democracies. Particularly, Sen's capability approach procedural-deliberative tenets result in an "objective-impartial" choice procedure selecting a "hierarchy" of plural incommensurable values and rational goals thus, suitable to validate an applied science such as welfare-oriented technological design in concrete social environments. Conclusions suggest that refining VSD with a capability-based procedural approach to ethics fosters the concern for democracy and social justice while preserving vital scientific-technical standards. Major advantages are at an applied level to delivering ethically and socially justified, but yet highly functional technologies and high-tech products/artefacts.

As regards freedom, Amartya Sen's thesis is simple. Free­- dom is both the primary end and the principal means of develop­ ment. Insofar as many have been critical o f approaches to devel­- opment that emphasize growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), rising personal incomes, industrialization, technological advance, or social modernization, we should be glad that such a distinguished economist is apparently tooting our own horn. Yet there are some issues in Sen's basic assumptions about the nature o f people and his lack o f a feasible prescription for reaching his stated goals that make Development as Freedom in need o f some modifications and nuances. The center of Sen's vision is what he calls a 'capability approach', where the basic concern of human development is 'our capability to lead the kind of lives we have reason to value,' rather than the usual concentration on rising GDP, technical progress, or industrializa­- tion. His approach 'inescapably focuses on the agency and judg­- ment of individuals' including their capability, responsibility, and opportunity. Raising human capability is good because it improves the choices, wellbeing, and freedom of people. Further, human ca­- pability plays a significant role in influencing social change and in influencing economic production. In this context, the author pro­ poses a creative interpretation and criticism of Sen's approach to freedom.

The "capability approach" of development economist Amartya Sen, who received the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998, poses a major challenge to the dominant paradigm of neo-classical economics. According to Sen, human well-being does not depend on the consumption of commodities but on the freedoms human beings have reason to choose and value. The capability approach has frequently been criticised for a lack of attention to the ways in which unjust social, political and economic structures restrict human capabilities. The contributors to this volume take up this criticism in a number of ways, both theoretical and practical. The theoretical discussion engages with the thought of Sen himself and with the hermeneutical tradition represented by Paul Ricoeur. The practical discussion consists of five case studies examining the effectiveness of the capability approach in dealing with cases of structural injustice. These cover: racism in South Africa; access to labour markets in Europe; participation in higher education in the UK; poverty and welfare reforms in the US; and biotechnology patents. How effectively, ask all the contributors, can Sen's capability approach be deployed in the transformation of unjust structures?