Suchergebnisse

Przedmiotem artykułu są regulacje unijne dotyczące dozwolonej pomocy udzielanej mediom publicznym przez państwa członkowskie Unii Europejskiej oraz praktyka ich stosowania. Celem badań jest weryfikacja następującej tezy: prawo Unii Europejskiej w sposób ogólny reguluje kwestie dozwolonej pomocy państwa dla mediów publicznych, natomiast szczegółowe wytyczne formułowane są ad causum, w wyniku kontroli Komisji Europejskiej i pod wpływem orzecznictwa Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej. W pierwszej części autorka przedstawi regulacje unijne obowiązujące w przedmiotowej dziedzinie. Istotne znaczenie dla sektorowych zasad udzielania i kontroli pomocy państwa w obszarze radiofonii i telewizji ma komunikat Komisji z 2009 roku w sprawie stosowania zasad pomocy państwa wobec radiofonii i telewizji publicznej (Dz. Urz. UE C 257 z dnia 27 października 2009 roku). Następnie omówione zostaną wybrane orzeczenia Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej, istotne z punktu widzenia zasad udzielania przez państwo pomocy dla mediów publicznych. ; The article discusses the European Union regulations on permitted aid provided to the public media by member states of the European Union (EU) and the practice of their application. The aim of the research is to verify the following thesis: European Union law regulates the permitted state aid to public media only generally, but detailed guidelines are formulated ad casum, as a result of the control of the European Commission and according to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The first part will discuss the EU regulations in this area. The important document for sectoral policies and the provision of State aid control in the area of radio and television is the Commission Communication of 2009 on the application of State aid rules to public service broadcasting (OJ. EU C 257 of 27 October 2009). Then it will be discussed selected judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, important for the relevant rules of granting state aid to public media.

The author argues that the clerical mobility – related to the career paths of civil servants– is closely connected not only to politics understood as the struggle for power (leadingpolitical science point of view) but also to public policy. Against this background, heanalyzes the occupational mobility of public officials, taking into account the processes ofpublic administration politicization and professionalization. I search for the interrelationsbetween this phenomena, civil service systems (career and position based) and governancemodels (Weberian bureaucracy, new public management, governance / good governance).He defines the type of the influence of mobility on the civil servants' professionalism andstate agility. For this purpose, the author also examines the typical advantages and disadvantages of clerical mobility as well as the influence the politicians exert on it. ; Autor argumentuje na rzecz tezy, że mobilność urzędnicza – odnosząca się do ścieżekkarier urzędników państwowych – jest ściśle związana z polityką utożsamianą nie tylkoz walką o władzę (dominujące ujęcie politologiczne), ale również z polityką publiczną.Na tym tle analizuje mobilność zawodową urzędników, uwzględniając procesy polityzacji i profesjonalizacji administracji. Bada związek tego zjawiska z systemami służbycywilnej (zamknięty i otwarty) oraz modelami rządzenia (Weberowska biurokracja,nowe zarządzanie publiczne, współzarządzanie/współrządzenie, w tym dobre rządzenie).Określa rodzaj wpływu mobilności na profesjonalizm urzędników i sprawność państwa.W tym celu rozpatruje także typowe wady i zalety mobilności urzędniczej oraz wpływ,jaki na nią samą wywierają politycy.

The subject under discussion is the problem of publications on the relationship between the e-government implementation process and the ability to compete. Today, it is estimated that the key objective of the informatisation of public administration at both central and local levels, is the preparation and implementation of electronic public services for citizens and businesses productively and efficiently. The e-government vision presented by the European Commission, and gradually implemented through EU Member States shows, that the process of developing e-government should serve as a tool to support the processes of governance. Projects related to the informatisation may influence the improvement of the education system and health services, create jobs, change how resources are managed, reduce transaction costs and the overall transformation of institutional nature. The currently used measuring tools of benefits from the implementation of public e-services and general development of e-government do not always show directly whether they are generated. The purpose of the publication is to identify and evaluate currently used indicators of electronic administration development in the context of measuring the benefits of this process, which are significant for improving the country's competitiveness in the international arena. ; Przedmiotem rozważań zawartych w publikacji jest problematyka zależności między procesem wdrażania administracji elektronicznej a zdolnością konkurencyjną kraju. Współcześnie ocenia się, że kluczowym celem informatyzacji administracji publicznej, zarówno na szczeblu centralnym, jak i lokalnym, jest produktywne i efektywne przygotowanie oraz wdrożenie elektronicznych usług publicznych dla obywateli i przedsiębiorstw. Wizja e-administracji przedstawiona przez Komisję Europejską oraz stopniowo realizowana przez państwa członkowskie UE ukazuje, że proces rozwoju e-administracji powinien służyć jako narzędzie wspomagające procesy rządzenia. Projekty związane z informatyzacją mogą wpływać m.in. na poprawę systemu edukacji i służby zdrowia, tworzenie nowych miejsc pracy, zmianę sposobów zarządzania zasobami, zmniejszenie kosztów transakcyjnych i ogólne przemiany instytucjonalne. Stosowane obecnie narzędzia pomiaru korzyści wynikających z wdrażania e-usług publicznych i ogólnie rozwoju e-administracji nie zawsze ukazują je wprost. Celem publikacji jest zidentyfikowanie i ocenienie stosowanych obecnie mierników stopnia rozwoju administracji elektronicznej w kontekście pomiaru korzyści wynikających z tego procesu, mających znaczenie dla poprawy konkurencyjności państwa na arenie międzynarodowej.

This paper concerns the institutional and organizational structure of the Euroregion. It is multi-level and affects the functioning of the Euroregions, including, but not limited to, organized approach to the use of structural aid under the regional policy of the European Union (EU). The highest level of the organization is the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), which lobbies for Euro-regions within the EU and provides professional services for broadly understood regional action. In turn, the Euroregion itself is also organized by having institutions. This allows for an orderly performing of tasks at the local level while showing a "different" approach to management, which can take many forms.

Public perception of healthcare personnel in Poland and some other European countries in view of selected studiesThe paper presents current trends in the perception of healthcare in Poland and other European countries. The authors present the results of numerous surveys conducted both in Poland and abroad, which demonstrate significant changes in the way healthcare is perceived by the public in individual countries. As the diagnosis of how the medical profession is perceived in Poland gives no grounds for optimism, factors affecting its perception must be identified. This shows healthcare evaluation to be contextually-based, depending on the performance of both individual healthcare establishments and of the whole healthcare system in Poland. Demography has a heavy impact on the evaluation, as the medical services are being rated by the ageing society.

Red. nauk. Wydziału Organizacji i Zarządzania: Lewandowski, Jerzy. ; This study has been devoted to the agency system of the European Union and its place and role in the decisional and management process of this integration grouping. The content of this monograph has been divided into six chapters – five of them describe the EU agencies; chapter I has an introductive character and presents the description of the EU institutional system. In the following chapters (i.e. II, III, IV, V and VI) one can find a detailed description of a genesis, organizational structure, goals and functions of the Community agencies, foreign policy and security agencies, agencies for domestic affairs and judicature and executive agencies. To illustrate goals and functions, the decisional and management activities of the EU agencies have been presented as a decentralized structures supporting EU institutional system, member states and their citizens. The deepening of the integration process has caused, that the agencies have become an indispensible element of the whole institutional system. The agencies have been entrusted with numerous and various tasks depending on the agency`s type. In this way they secure a sophisticated knowledge, beginning from the quality of our professional life and environment, through basic rights, services for the society and the industry, finishing on security, justice and application of the structural aid. All these issues are present in this monograph.

Artykuł recenzowany / peer-reviewed article ; The article presents the circumstances of setting up the Assay Offi ce in the Free City of Kraków and also its activity in 1843–53. Th e source base consisted of regulations of the Governing Senate on the organisation and competence of the Assay Offi ce, and documentation related to its activity, being a part of the complex of the Archive of the Free City of Kraków. Th e fundamental task of the Assay Offi ce was to supervise Kraków jewellers and goldsmiths. The supervision especially focused on gold and silver objects brought for stamping. The offi ce charged fees defi ned by the government for its services. The article also mentions prosecution of crimes against the assay stamp, which was a prerogative of the administrative authorities: the Senate, and later the Administrative Council and the City Council. ; W artykule przedstawiono okoliczności powstania Urzędu Probierczego w Wolnym Mieście Krakowie, a także przebieg jego działalności w latach 1843–1853. Podstawę źródłową stanowiły rozporządzenia Senatu Rządzącego dotyczące organizacji i kompetencji Urzędu Probierczego, a także związana z jego działalnością dokumentacja, stanowiąca część zespołu Archiwum Wolnego Miasta Krakowa. Podstawowym zadaniem Urzędu Probierczego było nadzorowanie krakowskich jubilerów i złotników, przy czym kontrola obejmowała zwłaszcza przynoszone przez nich do ostemplowania wyroby ze złota i srebra. Za swoje czynności urząd pobierał opłaty według taksy rządowej. W artykule wspomniano też o ściganiu przestępstw probierczych, co należało do władz administracyjnych: Senatu, a następnie Rady Administracyjnej i Rady Miejskiej.

The aim of the study is to underline the importance of regulation – in the context of compliance – as a strategic tool and an element of the new strategic thinking. The concept of compliance is treated as an essential element of the proper functioning of the company. Compliance has to ensure the company's structure, which will also ensure that its operations will not infringe the law. The compliance function allows not only to optimize risk management, but also enables increasing the organizational culture of the company and is a factor that strengthens the competitiveness of the company. Compliance issues are subjected to scientific analysis and consultancy sector offers services with its implementation, as well as certification of the CMS. These phenomena are examined on the example of the market for new technologies and intellectual property rights on the Internet in reference to the achievements of economic analysis of law and the regulatory impact assessment. ; Celem opracowania jest zbadanie znaczenia regulacji – w kontekście compliance – jako narzędzia strategicznego oraz elementu nowego myślenia strategicznego. Koncepcja compliance jest traktowana jako niezbędny element prawidłowego funkcjonowania przedsiębiorstwa. Compliance to zapewnienie takiej struktury przedsiębiorstwa, która sprawi, iż w jego funkcjonowaniu nie będzie dochodziło do nieprawidłowości. Funkcja compliance pozwala nie tylko zoptymalizować zarządzanie ryzykiem, ale również podnosi kulturę organizacyjną przedsiębiorstwa i jest czynnikiem zwiększającym konkurencyjność przedsiębiorstwa. Zagadnienia compliance są poddawane analizie naukowej, a sektor doradztwa oferuje usługi doradcze przy implementacji i certyfikacji CMS. Zjawiska te są poddane badaniu na przykładzie rynku nowych technologii oraz praw własności intelektualnej w internecie, w nawiązaniu do dorobku ekonomicznej analizy prawa i oceny skutków regulacji.

Podważenie pozycji ustrojowej Trybunału Konstytucyjnego przez większość rządzącą po 25 października 2015 r. wpisuje się w ciąg zdarzeń głównie o charakterze ustawodawczym, które w istocie przekreślają status Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej jako państwo prawa. Rządzący, na czele z prezydentem, podejmują liczne działania i zaniechania stawiające ich ponad Konstytucją. Tryb i tempo uchwalania przez Sejm regulacji dotyczących ważnych dziedzin życia państwowego, takich jak ustawy: o policji, o mediach elektronicznych, o służbie cywilnej czy o prokuraturze, bez społecznych konsultacji i w atmosferze lekceważenia praw opozycji, niweczy demokrację proceduralną i rodzi najwyższy niepokój o cele, które rządzący stawiają przed sobą. Towarzyszące temu ruchy personalne na wysokich stanowiskach w administracji państwowej, w policji czy w agencjach rządowych, spółkach Skarbu Państwa i mediach publicznych, sprawiają wrażenie niekontrolowanych w pełni – ich gwałtowne nasilenie może wywołać chaos w życiu publicznym i pokusę wprowadzenia rządów autorytarnych. ; The undermining of the political position of the Constitutional Tribunal by the ruling majority seen since 25 October 2015 is one of a sequence of events, of largely legislative character, which in fact put an end to the status of the Republic of Poland as a state governed by the rule of law. The government, as well as president, is, by taking numerous measures or omitting to take others, putting itself above the Constitution. The manner as well as the speed at which the Seym passes resolutions concerning major spheres of public life such as legislative acts with respect to the police, electronic media, the civil service, or the prosecutor's office, which are being adopted without public consultation and in an atmosphere in which the rights of the opposition are ignored, is a blight on procedural democracy, stirring deep concerns about the goals that the current government is setting itself. The accompanying movement of personnel in high official positions in the state administration, the police, government agencies, companies with State Treasury participation and public media would seem to escape full control and the intensity with which it is forcedthrough may lead to chaos in public life and result in a temptation to impose authoritarian rule.

Discussed amendment of Civil Procedure Code has entered into force on 3 May 2012 and it is still very speculative. Polish Civil Procedure Code is an act of 17 November 1965 which regulates actions in civil cases. It has been changed many times up till now. The amendment from 3 May 2012 implements big change in enforcement proceedings. It is obvious that enforcement proceedings may be undertaken only by the legally entitled bodies. This kind of proceedings are essential for creditors. Execution must be short and effective to provide creditors protect them rights. In order to improve the service of civil courts many responsibilities are now imposed on court referendary. In addition, to improve the quality of the enforcement proceedings it was necessary to implement rise of fines. The Polish legislator implemented new institution astreinte which may force debtors to obey the executive law. The amendment introduces also new definition of executory entitlement, shorter terms for some of actions and many other changes in Polish civil procedure. Now, there is huge possibility that debtors would obey the law more successfully. Even if the amendment dated 16 September 2011 seems positive there are opinions that there were too many changes in Polish Civil Procedure Code yet. The doctrine postulate implementing new civil procedure code in order to guarantee legal certainty and stability. ; Na przestrzeni lat polski Kodeks postępowania cywilnego był poddawany licznym zmianom, którym zawdzięcza swój obecny kształt. Jedną z ważniejszych nowelizacji była ta, która weszła w życie z dniem 3 maja 2012 r. Jej źródłem była ustawa z dnia 16 września 2011 r. o zmianie ustawy – Kodeks postępowania cywilnego oraz niektórych innych ustaw. Wśród głównych założeń nowelizacji wymieniono: likwidację odrębnego postępowania gospodarczego, rozszerzenie dyskrecjonalnej władzy sędziego, udzielenie dodatkowych kompetencji referendarzom sądowym oraz wprowadzenie zmian w zakresie postępowania zabezpieczającego i egzekucyjnego. Niniejsze opracowanie koncentruje się głównie na zmianach dotyczących postępowania egzekucyjnego, które miały doprowadzić do usprawnienia i przyspieszenia postępowania egzekucyjnego. Szeroko omówiono również zwiększenie zakresu kompetencji referendarzy sądowych oraz zmiany w zakresie środków przymusu, z naciskiem na wprowadzenie nieznanego do tej pory środka w postaci tzw. astreinte oraz innych. W konkluzji autorka starała się dokonać oceny zmian wprowadzonych nowelizacją.

This article presents The National Firefighting and Rescue System (NFRS), which implements in Poland, tasks in rescue service, organization and management. Based on the twenty years of experience, the belief has been established that in order to ensure the safety and protection of the population in the case of natural disasters or technical failures, the integrated solutions are the only effective form of risk prevention. To demonstrate the functionality of NFRS as part of the security system of the state in the area of rescue and civil protection, in the article has been made a general analysis of the system in 20 years, and presented the thesis that the continuous development of civilization and the consequent new and changing threats, causing a continuing need of improving rescue systems in Poland. The approach to the tasks of civil protection must evaluate, which has a beneficial effect on the rescue system, and the solutions adopted for rescue are effective and widely acceptable by Polish society. It is also essential considering how to present reality to link actions NFRS the designed system in Poland to protect the population. It should be noted that for several years the development of the NFRS is aimed at protecting the population, not only in the areas of rescue, so there is no logical justification for creating and maintaining an armchair formation of Civil Defense, since NFRS can fulfill the tasks assigned to these formations ; Artykuł przedstawia Krajowy System Ratowniczo-Gaśniczy (KSRG), który realizuje w Polsce zadania z zakresu ratownictwa oraz organizacji i zarządzania nim. Na podstawie dwudziestoletnich doświadczeń utrwaliło się przekonanie, że w celu zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa i ochrony ludności w przypadku wystąpienia klęsk żywiołowych, katastrof naturalnych i awarii technicznych, tylko zintegrowane rozwiązania są skuteczną formą przeciwdziałania zagrożeniom. Aby zaprezentować funkcjonalność KSRG jako elementu systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa w obszarze ratownictwa i zarządzania ochroną ludności, dokonano ogólnej analizy działania systemu w minionych 20 latach oraz przedstawiono tezę, że ciągły rozwój cywilizacji i wiążące się z tym nowe, zmieniające się zagrożenia, powodują ciągłą potrzebę doskonalenia systemu ratowniczego w Polsce. Podejście do zadań z zakresu zarządzania ochroną ludności musi ewaluować, co ma korzystny wpływ na system ratowniczy, a przyjęte rozwiązania dla ratownictwa są skuteczne oraz powszechnie akceptowane przez polskie społeczeństwo. Zasadnicze stają się również rozważania, jak w obecnej rzeczywistości powiązać działania KSRG z projektowanym w Polsce systemem ochrony ludności. Należy zauważyć, że od kilku lat rozwój KSRG nakierowany jest na ochronę ludności nie tylko w obszarach ratowniczych, więc nie ma logicznego uzasadnienia dla tworzenia i utrzymywania nieaktywnych formacji Obrony Cywilnej, skoro KSRG może wypełniać zadania wyznaczone dla tych formacji

Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs. Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland's foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland's main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland's security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland's policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland's foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance's enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland's strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia's actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building an order in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland's NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS. A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland's disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia's. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia. Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia's interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one's own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland's anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise. One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland's policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbated divisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia. A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between 2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merely anti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP's security policy, Russia was formally pointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna). The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland's policy towards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland's security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strenghtening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region's security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very sceptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the "revolutionary" speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one's own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including the loss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian- Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict for the modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed, like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area. The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation that the main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed at occidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should suport not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland's security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the "scarcest commodities" in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups in Poland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.