In the era of fake news, truth has become a different and more urgent political problem than the traditional issues of the arcana imperii and the lies of the rulers. Starting from this observation, and deepening some considerations contained in the essay by Hannah Arendt Thruth and Politics, the article offers a worried report on the possibility of truth (scientific and factual) not to be reduced to mere opinion among others, and concludes that only a loyal collaboration between epistemic authorities and politics can make the judicial road for the protection of truth less attractive.
The essay discusses three key-concepts in Luigi Ferrajoli's legal philosophy; these concepts are: constitution, legal positivism, and democracy. Ferrajoli articulates these concepts in an interestingly original way and, in his latest book La democrazia attraverso i diritti, also stresses their interconnection. The essay critically assesses Ferrajoli's use of these concepts, and in the process also highlights some problems with Ferrajoli's "formal" definition of fundamental rights.
European politics, media and public opinion in the last decade has given prominence to the burqa as an icon of fundamentalist and almost terrorist Islam. This harsh debate has turned the typical garment of a religious and cultural tradition into a national security threat and a symbol of oppression against women. Thereby the opinion is that women are forced to wear the burqa as a duty sprung from family context or because they are considered "victims of their own culture", considering it a culture that promotes gender inequality and infringes female dignity and rights. The debate led to promulgate various measures to ban the burqa. France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canton Ticino and Bulgaria have issued national laws, whereas other European are debating bills before Parliament. The reasons put forward by proponents of a ban on the burqa focus particularly on national security and the protection of women's rights. The analysis of these reasons allows the examination of their effectiveness relating to free will. In this context, it is important to evaluate whether the ban has enough social usefulness to permit a limitation of personal liberty (as the freedom of expression and the freedom of worship, even through the display of symbols). The examination of the Italian social, political and legal system, which has fueled the debate and the bills on the subject, leads to decrease the problematic nature of the burqa. It must be distinguished between what the symbol means and which kind of threat it really is. Meanwhile the origin of the burqa is deepened through archaeological, historical and literary documents dating back to pre-Islamic era to understand whether the symbol has much religious or cultural significance. The outcome of this analysis shows that often the thoughts of the women who wear the burqa (0.5% of the Muslim population in Europe) are not even considered. For this reason, in the fourth chapter we try to give voice to the persons concerned, such as Muslim women who wear the full veil or those who simply wear the hijab through a qualitative empirical study conducted on a sample of 30 Muslim women, 8 of whose wear the burqa. Respondents perceive the ban as an interference by the State which claims the right to interpret the meaning of the practice of wearing the burqa and to standardize its display, unlike the same States do with customs of other denominations. They also emphasize the risk that banning the burqa could lead to counterproductive consequences compared with its original purpose. In addition, women report feeling free to decide to wear the burqa and are generally available to become identifiable. Therefore the points put forward relating to the needs of protection and emancipation of women and those of public security lose value which are the main arguments that are put forward in support of a general ban on the burqa.
Mediation as a dispute resolution method is being rediscovered today in Western legal systems. Modern jurisdictions now tend to promote mediation according to a 'formal legislative approach', based on recommendations issued by international organizations, in response to the pressure of public opinion that shows discontent with constant crisis in the justice system. The EU Directive of 2008 on civil and commercial mediation has in vague terms imposed the obligation to ensure the quality of mediation services, and by declaring as desirable only a certain level of training for mediators, it has left it up to member states to decide whether to make accreditation compulsory. In such a framework, where there is likely to be a further push towards regulation, we need to discuss what the basic skills of a mediator are. The point is that the mediator's professionalism is not easily pigeonholed in a set of disciplinary skills. The mediation model that the European Union has sought to promote and regulate is highly legal, but good mediation skills are not necessarily the same as the ones required to earn a degree in law and then pass the bar exam. University education must not necessarily train mediators, but rather form professionals who should be aware of the skills needed in mediation, or who know enough about mediation to direct their clients to mediation when the need arises. In order to prepare for anticipated future disputes and discern when to negotiate and when to fight, it becomes important to simulate conflict experientially, and to field-test what works in managing it, and when possible, in solving it. Simulating conflict using audio recordings, videos, and feedback reports allows the teacher to make the learner relive what happened: decisive moments, what could have been said differently or better, what should have not been said, posture, signs of nervousness, proxemics, all that which makes us feel more comfortable or uncomfortable in a situation. Empirical research using a socio-psychological paradigm has shown, for example, that mediators are assessed as effective when they are able to create an atmosphere of trust in mediation meetings, adapting flexibly to the situation, and transmitting energy, optimism and a non-judgmental attitude.
Leon Petrażycki (1867-1931) was active not only as a legal theorist but also as a scholar of Roman law (e.g., Petrażycki 1892, 2002), as a forerunner of economic analysis of law (e.g., Petrażycki 1895, 2002), as a political and theoretical supporter of women's rights (e.g., Petrażycki 1915, 2010d), as a philosopher of science (e.g., Petrażycki 1908), as a philosopher of logic (e.g., Petrażycki 1939), as a psychologist (e.g., Petrażycki 1908), as an economist (e.g., Petrażycki 1911), and as a general sociologist (see Lande 1935, 42-3; 1959b, 1975).
There is empirical evidence that corporations, often in collusion with states, are complicit in, if not instigators of, a variety of human rights violations. Despite this evidence, the international community of states has been unwilling or unable to respond to these violations in any adequate measure. At the same time, the discourse of human rights has become integral to state legitimacy in a post-Cold War society. An analysis of the legal structure of the corporation and its omnipresence in the global political economy raises questions about the overarching framework of an international human rights law that protects corporations in analogous ways to physical persons. The extension of rights to corporations reveals a human rights paradigm that holds private property and capitalist accumulation at the core of its value system. This thesis scrutinises the association between human rights and corporations and raises questions about whether human rights law can be used to challenge corporate power. The thesis is an empirically based inquiry into the perspectives of judges from the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights on the potential for human rights law to respond to corporate harms. The thesis seeks to examine the role that human rights courts play in using existing mechanisms of human rights law in cases involving corporate violations. The data was gathered from a detailed analysis of case law from these regional human rights systems, as well as fifteen interviews with judges from the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights. The analysis reveals that the open-texture of the law and the use of international human rights courts in counter-hegemonic struggles is a strong indication of the possibility for alternative uses of human rights law. These alternative uses of law are illustrative of the potential to challenge the relative impunity afforded to corporations from within the very system that has been developed to protect them.
Il libro tratta della semantica di quegli enunciati normativi individuati dai giuristi e dai giudici quali "clausole generali". A partire dall''analisi della copiosa letteratura di diritto privato si conclude con una definizione esplicativa di "clausola generale" in grado di mettere in luce le peculiarità semantiche, interpretative e applicative delle stesse clausole generali.
L'autore analizza l'impatto delle nuove tecnologie sull'ordinamento italiano. Si sofferma in particolare sulla perenne ricorsa del legislatore a disciplinare i nuovi fenomeni, sulla rapida obsolescenza delle norme, sull'estremo tecnicismo, sulla necessaria internazionalità e l'accesa giurisprudenzialità che caratterizzano l'informatica giuridica
L'autore analizza l'impatto delle nuove tecnologie sull'ordinamento italiano. Si sofferma in particolare sulla perenne ricorsa del legislatore a disciplinare i nuovi fenomeni, sulla rapida obsolescenza delle norme, sull'estremo tecnicismo, sulla necessaria internazionalità e l'accesa giurisprudenzialità che caratterizzano l'informatica giuridica
Il carattere probabilistico delle leggi scientifiche e la più generale incertezza che sempre circonda l'implementazione sociale delle nuove tecnologie è stata all'origine di prospettive di policy diverse nei contesti normativi statunitense ed europeo. In ambito europeo, pur nella coesistenza di molteplici modelli di science policy, le riflessioni sull'incertezza sono state all'origine, anche nel settore della sicurezza alimentare, di nuovi strumenti giuridici che collegano l'allocazione delle conoscenze rilevanti a forme differenziate di responsabilità rispetto alle conoscenze medesime o alle loro conseguenze. In tali nuove forme di responsabilità si mescolano approcci innovativi1 e soluzioni che ripropongono in nuova veste il modello della certezza e dell'oggettività della scienza e dei suoi esperti. "Prendere sul serio" la società della conoscenza e il ruolo dei cittadini europei significa approfondire prospettive di ricerca epistemica, di valorizzazione di tutta la conoscenza rilevante e di riforma democratica 3 per ora più evocate che praticate dalle istituzioni comunitarie. ; In democratic knowledge-based societies the reference to scientific evidence as a source for objectivity and certainty has become a major tool to make law and policy more reliable and legitimate. However, as unforeseen risk in connection with science-based policies (especially in the health and food sector) can hardly be reduced and controlled, new legal concepts to deal with uncertainty in science policy have been shaped in different legal systems. The construction of a safe market both through certification bodies and the right to information for responsible citizens framed by Regulations 765/2008 and 1169/2011 belong to this theoretical framework. After having presented the main characters of the US and EU science policy, the paper argues in favor of a radical approach to uncertainty as a normal condition. This approach encompasses democratizing policy-making processes by assembling all relevant knowledge from citizens, and a two-ways communications between experts and nonexperts. In order to rebuild citizens' trust towards scientific and political institutions, and to establish sound forms of responsibility towards unexpected impacts of innovation, new interactions between science and society should take place
IN the last few decades ethics has become a source of legitimization in implementing science and technology policies in so-called knowledgebased societies and economies.In western countries, ethics has become a political instrument to normalize innovation by supposedly neutralizing social choices on science and technology, and by making them accepted by citizens without any direct citizen involvement in the decision-making process. In this sense, ethics has been framed as a soft legal tool aimed at facilitating the implementation of technoscience.
L'indeterminatezza è una delle caratteristiche salienti del diritto negli stati costituzionali contemporanei. Tale caratteristica mette in crisi le concezioni "oggettualistiche" del diritto che riducono il diritto a un insieme di norme o a un insieme di fatti e corrobora quelle concezioni che considerano il diritto una pratica sociale interpretativa. La costituzionalizzazione degli ordinamenti giuridici accresce la flessibilità del diritto a detrimento della certezza e impone a tutti – legislatori, giudici e individui soggetti al diritto – di assumersi le proprie responsabilità e i rischi che ne conseguono. Il modo in cui il legislatore, a diversi livelli, fronteggia l'attuale pandemia da Covid-19 costituisce un interessante angolo visuale per riflettere sugli effetti – alcuni positivi, altri negativi – prodotti dall'indeterminatezza del diritto contemporaneo. ; Indeterminacy is one of the main characteristics of the law in contemporary constitutional States. It challenges the objectualist conceptions of law reduce reduce law to a system of norms or a set of facts and confirms those conceptions that regard the law as an interpretative social practice. Legal systems' constitutionalization increases legal flexibility at the expense of legal certainty; it imposes to legislators, judges and individuals the responsibility and the associated risks of individuating the law. The ways in which the legislator, at different levels, faces the Covid-19 current pandemic offer an interesting perspective to analyze the positive and negative effects produced by the indeterminacy of contemporary law.
Ogni azione si svolge ed acquista significato in uno sfondo articolato di credenze, valori, desideri (coscienti o presupposti). Al fine di comprendere l'agire del singolo o del gruppo non è quindi sufficiente 'attenersi ai fatti'; ma occorre, per quanto è possibile, scandagliare le dinamiche interiori che hanno impresso una forma alla materia dell'azione. Ad esempio il diritto penale tiene conto dello 'sfondo teorico' dell'imputato, punendo diversamente uno stesso delitto, a seconda se esso è premeditato, semplicemente colposo o preterintenzionale. Se volessimo allora cimentarci nell'ardua impresa di comprendere l'agire, non semplicemente di un singolo individuo, ma di quel coagulo contraddittorio e contrastante di fazioni e partiti che è il Governo di una nazione, molti sarebbero i documenti che saremmo tenuti a consultare per ricavarne un articolato 'sfondo teorico'. Tra questi, però, la normativa scolastica costituisca una testimonianza privilegiata: essa svela, più esplicitamente di altre produzioni legislative, i valori, le credenze e i desideri dell'Istituzione che l'ha promossa e dell'epoca in cui è sorta. Infatti tramite le leggi sulla Scuola, il Governo enuncia che genere di uomo e di cittadino vuole abiti il suo territorio.
Il costituzionalismo dei diritti limita i poteri delle autorità obbligandole al rispetto dei diritti fondamentali, nonché ad agire secondo le procedure ed entro le competenze prescritte assumendo che ciò sia necessario al fine di massimizzare, nel complesso, la protezione dei diritti; in virtù del medesimo fine, obbliga i cittadini ad osservare le direttive delle autorità delegando ad esse la tutela dei loro diritti. Ciò comprime ma non elimina la possibilità di giustificare lo stato di eccezione o il diritto di resistenza: si potrà infatti rivendicare il diritto eccezionale delle autorità a violare i limiti dei propri poteri, ovvero il diritto eccezionale a rovesciare un'autorità legittimamente istituita, per ripristinare una condizione di fatto in cui i diritti siano nel complesso garantiti. ; Rights constitutionalism limits the power of authorities by requiring them to respect the fundamental rights and to operate according to prescribed procedures within the limits of recognized competences. It is assumed to be necessary in order to protect the fundamental rights as much as possible. In order to achieve the same goal, rights constitutionalism requires citizens to observe the prescriptions of authorities and to delegate them the safeguard of their rights. In this way the chances of justifying a state of exception or a right of resistance are reduced but not completely eradicated. In order to restore a condition in which the fundamental rights are overall guaranteed, it may in fact be claimed in favour of the authorities the exceptional right to violate the limits to their own powers, or against a legally established authority the exceptional right to overthrow it.
