La partecipazione italiana all'intervento in Afghanistan va giudicata nel quadro degli obiettivi che il paese ha nel suo posizionamento internazionale e, più specificamente, nel contesto euro-atlantico. Prendere parte ad una missione così impegnativa non ha risposto né a interessi strategici immediati né a problemi di sicurezza nazionale. Le ragioni dell'impegno italiano vanno invece cercate nel combinato di considerazioni di prestigio internazionale e politica delle alleanze
Il Trattato di Lisbona (2009) ha assegnato all'Unione obiettivi chiari e ambiziosi in campo sociale: la promozione dell'occupazione e di alti livelli di protezione, inclusione e non discriminazione, giustizia sociale, uguaglianza tra donne e uomini, solidarietà tra generazioni e diritti dei bambini (Art. 3 TUE). Coesione economica, sociale e territoriale e solidarietà tra gli Stati membri sono stati ugualmente indicati in modo esplicito. Molti osservatori hanno salutato il Trattato di Lisbona come il punto più alto del lungo processo di avvicinamento e apertura reciproca tra Stati membri, nonché la conferma del loro impegno normativo a creare una "unione sempre più stretta" e al suo interno solidale. L'avvento della crisi finanziaria e la conseguente grande recessione hanno bruscamente interrotto questa traiettoria. Le dinamiche di convergenza e gli obiettivi di condivisione hanno lasciato il posto a nuove divergenze e antagonismi, aprendo così una linea di frattura tra i paesi creditori del Nord e i paesi debitori del Sud. Sulla scia degli allargamenti a est, sono poi emerse crescenti tensioni attorno alla questione della libera circolazione: in particolare, l'accesso ai mercati del lavoro nazionali e alle prestazioni sociali da parte di altri cittadini dell'Ue (per non parlare dei cittadini di paesi terzi). È stato soprattutto su questo secondo fronte che il processo di integrazione ha registrato la sua prima drammatica inversione, cioè la Brexit. Come contrastare queste tendenze disgregative? Occorre a nostro avviso una strategia ambiziosa e di alta visibilità politica e sociale. In questo capitolo illustreremo la nostra proposta: quella di istituire una "Unione Sociale Europea". Nella prima sezione forniamo alcuni dati sulla attuale situazione in termini di spesa sociale, mettiamo in evidenza il "deficit sociale" che caratterizza oggi la UE e le ragioni che invitano il suo superamento. Nella seconda sezione illustriamo la proposta dell'Unione Sociale Europea, poggiando su alcune idee emerse nell'ultimo quinquennio. Nelle sezioni successive entriamo nel merito con alcuni approfondimenti specifici che riguardano il Pilastro Europeo del Diritti Sociali, la cittadinanza UE, il rilancio degli investimenti sociali e la possibile istituzione di uno schema.
The emergence of the Safavid Empire in the early sixteenth century marked a significant change in the geopolitics of the Middle East. This momentous change coincided with the widening of Ottoman expansion eastward and the exploration by European powers, especially by Venice, of the possibilities of forming alliances against the Ottomans with the involvement of the Safavids. Thus, Ottoman threat and commercial interests contributed to the emergence and development of diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations between the Republic of Venice and the Safavid Empire, which lasted until the end of the seventeenth century. Drawing on the documents from the Venetian State Archives and other contemporary sources, this book focuses mainly on some aspects of Safavid diplomacy, including the language of the Safavid polity, the role of European subjects as interpreters for the shahs, material and visual characteristics of Safavid diplomatic letters to Venice, the attitude of the Safavids towards resident diplomacy, the reception of the European envoys in the Safavid court and Europeans' perception of Safavid diplomatic practices, as well as the characteristics of the Safavid embassies to Venice. We have tried to explain the role of Turkish as a language of diplomacy and communication in Safavid-Venetian encounters. We have also attempted to explore briefly how the Venetians distinguished Safavid subjects according to their ethno-linguistic affiliations. Finally, we examine the Ottoman factor in Safavid-Venetian relations in order to establish to what extent, if any, the Ottomans had an impact on the overall character of Safavid-Venetian relations.
In the early 1990s, the deep political and socio-economic transformations showed that the Albanian pension and healthcare models inherited from Communism were inefficient, close to the point of fiscal breakdown, as well as inequitable. In order to address these challenges, the Albanian government promoted a shift towards a social insurance model – which was said to represent the "good way", i.e. a viable solution to build a stable and especially an effective social protection system. In both policy sectors the government's ultimate goal was to link benefits to contribution records. Consequently, the Albanian pension and healthcare systems started to converge towards a Bismarckian social insurance model. However, reform implementation was constrained and, after three decades of reforms, the full shift to an insurance-based model has failed in both pensions and healthcare. The 2014 reform transformed the pension system into a mixed-occupational model – according to Ferrera's terminology (Ferrera 1993) – made up of a social assistance scheme – a means-tested, poverty-relief social pension – and a social insurance, contributory scheme aimed at income maintenance. In the healthcare sector, the last wave of reform, started in 2014, aimed at transforming the system from a social insurance model to a universalistic social security one. These reforms thus led to a partial policy reversal, with the healthcare changing into a mixed-universalistic model, implying a combination of social security and social insurance – respectively financed by the state budget and social contributions. The pension and healthcare systems currently differ in terms of institutional architectures, financing methods, coverage and benefits. This policy change and divergence that exist between these two policy fields is puzzling, given their similar starting position in the early 1990s. The situation becomes even more ambiguous when we take into account the strong influence international actors, supporting neoliberal recipes, had on both systems since the very beginning. In fact, existing research on the Albanian welfare state development focuses on the role of international pressures to explain social policy change, according to which it is the external actors, not domestic ones, that have driven reforms. This strand in the literature, which stresses the role of international organisations in favouring policy diffusion, implicitly assumes that national political factors have limited or no effect on the relationship between (international) economic circumstances and social policy and that governments respond similarly to external constraints (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). However, considering the important role played by the World Bank during the decision-making process, we should have seen convergence towards a single social model, i.e., neoliberal direction. Yet, empirically we observe a divergence over-time and between different social policy domains in Albania. This suggests that in order to understand policy change and variation we should look at other factors, such as internal political dynamics which is significantly missing from the existing literature. In addition, radical policy change and processes of convergence or divergence across policy sectors over-time have clear implications vis à vis historical institutionalism, according to which we should have seen path dependency. In fact, focusing only on institutions can hardly account for what is driving policy change in the first place (Jessoula, 2009), therefore, other factors have to be introduced, such as the role of actors' interests and ideas. This thesis aims at filling this literature gap by contributing to the understanding of welfare state reforms in Albania in terms of policy, politics and theoretical analysis. More specifically, it aims at answering the following research questions: Why pension and healthcare policies converged into a Bismarckian social insurance model in the early 1990s? Why did implementation of the Bismarckian insurance model fail in both sectors? What explains subsequent developments towards a mixed-occupational model in pension and mixed-universalism in healthcare? To achieve these aims, this study provides a detailed empirical investigation in order to reconstruct the policy-making processes in both fields. Building on this analysis, this study argues that social policy reform can be understood as a process formulated through ideas (actors' cognitive and normative frameworks) and shaped by conflicts and compromises between the relevant interests (political exchange dynamics) and their interplay with the institutions inherited from the past (policy legacies).
Turkic peoples have considered the number nine as bearing a special mystic significance. In accordance with the ancient Turkic customary practice, the gifts were presented in nines. One of the leading tribes of the Turks was known as the 'Tokuz Oguz', the 'Nine Oghuz'. The mysticism of the number 'nine' is used in The Book of Dedem Korkut. The eleventh-century Turkish poet from Central Asia, Yusuf Balasagunlu, a writer of the epic Kutadgu bilig (The Knowledge of How to Become Happy) compared the sunrise to the appearance of the ruler before whom nine gold-colored banners were carried1. Abu'l Ghazi, an author of Shajarah-iturk divided his work into nine chapters because 'wise men have said: "nothing must exceed the number nine". Ottoman, Mughal and Safavid chroniclers often mention of "nine skies", "nine vaults of heaven". The number 'nine' also played an important role in gift exchanges: it was customary to give presents in groups of nine. Gift-giving and tribute payment in denominations of nine were also recorded by both local and European authors of the late medieval and early modern periods.
To date, no systematic attempt has been made to describe the main features of the Italian policy advisory system. In particular, we know very little about the role of political scientists within it. This study addresses precisely this gap in the literature. First, by presenting original data derived from an online survey to which 177 Italian political scientists responded, we reconstruct frequency, type, recipient(s), and areas of their (potential) policy advice. Second, by focusing on two very relevant policy processes—the approval of the so-called Italicum (electoral law) and of the so-called Jobs Act (labour market reform)—we add insightful qualitative details to our quantitative analysis. Empirical results show that Italian political scientists are seldom engaged in policy advisory activities: many of them have never been. Moreover, there are no particular differences—from the point of view of personal characteristics (gender and level of academic career)—between policy advisors and the so-called pure academics. Finally, as the two case studies show, informal advice has the greatest impact on policymaking. This latter aspect reminds us of how much the Italian policy advisory system (PAS) is still poorly institutionalised and largely based on personal relationships as well as on political proximity.
There is a growing disconnect between Europeanization and democratization in the immediate neighborhood of the European Union. Often overlooked by euro-centric academic research, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are a litmus test for the challenges facing democratic consolidation in a geopolitically contested region. The study dissects the relationship between Europeanization and Democratization processes in the three countries; scrutinizes the internal and external challenges to democratic consolidation and critically assesses the effectiveness of EU's normative power projection in the region. In the process, the author challenges Huntington's concept of 'snowballing', disconfirming his one directional democratic cascade theory in the specific condition of the countries comprising the case study. The unique condition of these countries is epitomized by the European Union's facilitation of democracy, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Russia's facilitation of the status quo, while also encouraging undemocratic practices. This challenges the neofunctionalist democratic spillover expectation and accredits a path-dependent neo-institutionalist account of democratization in the region. Moreover, the author finds robust evidence in support of the modernization theory of democracy, while also confirming the negative effects of active geopolitical competition on the battleground countries. The study questions the efficacy of EU's democracy promotion efforts and argues in favor of anchoring the three countries on the European integration track as an imperative mechanism for boosting the chances of democratic consolidation.
Several studies have reported a relationship between governments' behaviour in the EU Council and public opinion. However, doubts remain about which mechanisms drive this relationship. We argue that governments align their behaviour with public opinion to forestall future electoral sanctions (rational anticipation). To test this, we deduce hitherto untested observable implications of rational anticipation which suggest that governments' responsiveness to public opinion depends on national-level electoral competitiveness. Using DEU modules I-III and an original empirical measure of electoral competitiveness, we ascertain whether governments adjust their responsiveness as: (1) the expected time period to upcoming elections decreases, and (2) the probability of losing their position in the party system in the next election changes. Our results provide evidence that government parties rationally anticipate risks related to their position in the party system but not to early elections. These findings have implications for our understanding of representation in the Council.
A partire dagli anni '70, processi di globalizzazione, di ristrutturazione economica e deindustrializzazione hanno messo in discussione il modello di sviluppo Fordista-Keynesiano che aveva fino ad allora sostenuto la crescita nell'Occidente. Le città a tradizione manifatturiera, la cui crescita si era basata proprio sul processo produttivo Fordista, furono pesantemente colpite da queste trasformazioni: alti tassi di disoccupazione, un settore terziario poco sviluppato, declino demografico and ridotti livelli di benessere segnarono profondamente i centri industriali europei e nord americani. Alcune di queste città, tuttavia, sono riuscite a far partire un processo di ricostruzione su nuove premesse; questo sforzo si è sovente fondato sulla cooperazione tra attori politici e privati o, in altri termini, su una forma di governance urbana incentrata sulla cooperazione informale e su un ampio coinvolgimento di attori entro il processo politico. Torino è una di queste città. Storicamente uno dei cuori industriali d'Italia che, dopo più di un decennio di declino, perseguì un programma politico-economico orientato alla crescita, articolato su strategie come la ristrutturazione urbana, l'attrazione d'investimenti, la promozione di eventi culturali, l'investimento infrastrutturale e il marketing urbano. Svariati autori hanno sottolineato come tutto ciò fu reso possibile grazie al formarsi di una coalizione di governance urbana che, ridefinendo le regole del gioco politico, ha permesso di riunire risorse disperse, rafforzando la "capacità di governo" locale. Non si registra, però, alcun tentativo di ricostruzione sistematica del processo causale che ha portato alla formazione del sistema di governance torinese. Entro il contesto della letteratura sulla governance, allo stesso modo, sono pochissimi i lavori che si sono occupati del processo di formazione della governance: alcune ipotesi generali sottolineano il ruolo, alternativamente, delle riforme istituzionali e della frammentazione organizzativa, che spingono entità organizzative a definire nuovi percorsi di coordinamento; il ruolo delle pressioni isomorfiche che portano gli attori a riprodurre altre strutture organizzative di successo; infine, il ruolo della agency e l'influenza di idee e discorso. L'obiettivo di questa ricerca è di far luce sul processo di formazione della governance: l'idea fondamentale è che la governance urbana, in quanto fenomeno complesso, non può che essere studiato tramite un approccio di ricerca eclettico. Analizzando il caso di Torino, è mio obiettivo dimostrare che tutte le ipotesi sopra-menzionate – riforma istituzionale e frammentazione, isomorfismo, agency e idee – abbiano un ruolo centrale nel processo di formazione della governance. ; Starting from the 1970s, processes of globalisation, economic restructuring and deindustrialisation fatally undermined the Fordist-Keynesian development model that had hitherto sustained growth in the West. Traditional manufacturing cities, which had expanded greatly precisely by implementing the Fordist production process, were then then heavily hit by these transformations: high unemployment rates, underdeveloped tertiary sectors, population decline, and reduced wealth levels would affect many European and North American industrial centres. Some of these cities have, nonetheless, managed to embark on a reconstruction process focused on redefining the premises for local development; they would often be guided in this effort by the cooperation of political and private actors, that is, by a form of urban governance that emphasised informal cooperation and a wider involvement of actors in the political process. One of such cities is Turin, the former industrial powerhouse of Italy, which, after more than a decade of decline, would pursue a political economic programme focused on growth, involving strategies such as city refurbishment, investment attraction, promotion of cultural events, infrastructural investment, and urban marketing. Several authors have highlighted how this was possible, indeed, because of the emergence of a local governance network that, by redefining the rules of the political game, has succeeded in pooling dispersed resources, thus enhancing the city's overall 'governing capacity'. No systematic attempt, however, has been made at tracing the causal process that has led to the formation of Turin's local governance network. Even when turning to the governance literature, very few works are found to have dealt with the theme of governance formation: general hypotheses point, alternatively, to the consequences of institutional reform and organisational fragmentation in driving institutional entities to devise novel coordination patterns; to the role of isomorphic pressures that push groups to reproduce other, successful organisational structures; or, finally, to that of agency and the influence of ideas and discourse. The aim of this work is to provide some insights as to the process of urban governance formation: the underlying idea is that urban governance is no simple phenomenon and only through an eclectic research design can one grasp the reality and complexity of its formation. The argument, then, is that all the above-mentioned hypotheses – institutional reform and fragmentation, isomorphism, and agency and ideas – play a key role and contribute to governance emergence.
Il presente capitolo del Rapporto si concentra su due avvenimenti importanti, seppur non strettamente connessi, che hanno segnato la politics dell'immigrazione nel corso del 2020: l'emanazione del c.d. decreto "Rilancio" e lo svolgimento in ben otto regioni delle consultazioni per l'elezione diretta del Presidente e del Consiglio regionale.
The present chapter of the Report focuses on two important – albeit not strictly connected – events that have marked the politics of immigration over 2020: the issuing of the so-called "Recovery Decree" and the election by direct vote of the Regional Councils and Presidents in eight Italian Regions.
Gift-giving was an important feature of early modern diplomacy and as a tangible expression of goodwill and generosity, it helped build ties and maintain relationships. The gift was not only a sign of goodwill. As means of symbolic communication, diplomatic gifts conveyed political messages. Apart from facilitating diplomatic encounters, diplomatic gifts revealed the relative status of states as well as their political, economic, and cultural intentions. Furthermore, the rulers used such gifts to display their power and wealth. The emergence of the Safavid Empire in the early sixteenth century coincided with the sustained eastward expansion of the Ottoman Empire, and the European powers, especially Venice, explored the possibilities of forming an alliance against the Ottomans with the involvement of the Safavids. The Ottoman threat and mutual commercial interests contributed to the emergence and development of diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations between the Republic of Venice and the Safavid Empire. The Safavid-Venetian diplomatic relationship was generally characterized by its infrequent nature and only the reign of Shah Abbas I (r. 1587–1629) witnessed a relative increase in diplomatic contacts between these states.
This analysis of issue emphasis on Twitter by the seven main German parties during the 2017 federal election campaign underlines the importance of taking a time-sensitive approach when investigating issue competition. We show that the attention parties give to issues they are associated with fluctuates frequently on social media and alternates with other thematic priorities that may not be 'owned'. In the digital age, therefore, established theories of issue ownership come under pressure. Our findings reveal that short-term issue emphasis is driven by exogenous shocks and spatial considerations. The exact mechanism behind parties' decisions to emphasise a specific issue in the short run depends on the type of issue in focus. Communication on economic left-right and socio-cultural issues is shaped by different strategies. Our study reveals that when studying issue competition online different policy dimensions need to be distinguished just as the temporal dynamics need to be understood. This needs to be done instead of aggregating data to give a holistic account.
Hybridity has become a central characteristic of accountability in public governance. Contemporary service delivery is increasingly defined by the mixing and layering of public, market and social accountability regimes operating as overlapping 'hybrid' accountability arrangements. Although hybrid accountability is not a new phenomenon, recent trends have accelerated the process of hybridization, particularly in welfare state governance. In this symposium, we seek to advance our understanding of the under‐theorized concept of hybrid accountability and empirically examine what is actually going on. In this introductory article, we put forward a definition of what hybridity means in public welfare governance and explore its origins and dynamics. We then present the articles of this symposium, showing how they go beyond fixed and static typologies to grasp the dynamics of interactions between actors, values and mechanisms under hybrid accountability. We conclude by reflecting on a future research agenda for studying hybrid accountability arrangements.
Italy and Spain have been traditionally characterized by underdeveloped childcare and persistent familism in the provision of care (Ferrera 1996, 2005a). However, in the last two decades, childcare has undergone an expansionary as well as divergent trajectory in Italy and Spain. An high childcare expansion coincided with the increase of public delivery and level of inclusiveness in Spain. By contrast, childcare expansion in Italy was moderate, driven by private sector and less inclusive than in Spain. Therefore, childcare policy change in both countries has varied along three analytical dimensions: the extent of expansion, the way childcare is delivered and the level of inclusiveness. The latter – if combined with the delivery of high quality service - is particularly relevant to achieve effective social investment aims on childcare reforms (Bonoli 2017; West et. al. 2019). In both countries regional governments hold key competences on the three dimensions of change (expansion, delivery and social investment). Due to a decentralized policy setting, Italian and Spanish regions distribute financial resources to the lower level of childcare implementation. Against this backdrop, we develop an empirical analysis of regional childcare trajectory in order to understand the determinants of Italian and Spanish divergence on childcare expansion, delivery and social investment. Trough an in-depth reconstruction of policy-making processes in four regional cases – Andalusia, Rioja, Tuscany and Piedmont - we show that government colours and political competition dynamics still matter for childcare expansion. Also, political competition dynamics – rather than government colour – turn to be relevant to explain the shift from a social assistance to a social investment approach on childcare. Finally, political exchange dynamics between service providers, interested to expand their childcare supply, and governments looking for political support and sharing responsibilities on childcare policy, are crucial to explain changes on childcare delivery.
