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In this timely book, distinguished scholars from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow take up the challenge passionately articulated in the Foreword by Eduard Shevardnadze. Considering the unprecedented opportunities for unifying a region split into antagonistic blocs for more than forty

Babassika, I.: Migration and minorities. - S. 29-34. Kouneva, M.: Minority governance in Bulgaria. - S. 35-42. Petricusic, A.: Implementation of rights of minorities in Croatia. - S. 43-58. Bieber, F.: Minority-majority relations in Serbia and Montenegro. - S. 59-69. Sobotka, E.: National minorities in the Czech Republic: from exclusion to coexistence. - S. 71-81. Trier, T.: Minorities in post-Shevardnadze Georgia. - S. 83-89. Negrin, K.: Minorities in postsocialist Hungary. - S. 91-110. Andreescu, G.: National minorities in Romania: the contribution of the Advisory Committee. - S. 111-122. Vermeersch, P.: Minorities in democracy: notes from a Belgian perspective. - S. 123-137. Shirlow, P.: 'Who fears to speak': fear, mobility, and ethnosectarianism in the two 'Ardoynes'. - S. 139-166. Roccia, M.: Ethnic minorities in Italy: history and legislative framework. - S. 167-180. Daftary, F.: Lessons learned from Corsican experiences with autonomy. - S. 181-223

"This book presents and interprets the archival records pertaining to the last meetings between Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush between 1985 and 1990, and the transcripts which include direct quotes by top leaders, as far as the interpreters and the notetakers managed to capture them. Important sources are the excerpts from the transcripts of the foreign ministers--Eduard Shevardnadze, Alexander Bessmertnykh, George Shultz, and James Baker--especially when they go face to face with the president or the general secretary. The summit conversations fueled a process of learning on both sides. Geneva 1985 and Reykjavik 1986 reduced Moscow's sense of threat and unleashed Reagan's inner abolitionist. Malta 1989 and Washington 1990 helped dampen any superpower sparks that might have flown in a time of revolutionary change in Europe, set off by Gorbachev and by Eastern Europeans (Solidarity, dissidents, reform communists). The high level and scope of the dialogue between these world leaders was unprecedented and appears to be largely missing in today's world"--Provided by publisher

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword: Biography, Ethics, and Statecraft -- Preface to the Third Edition -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I: War -- 1. "Bodyguard of Lies": Franklin D. Roosevelt and Defensible Deceit in World War II -- 2. Political Leadership and "Dirty Hands": Winston Churchill and the City Bombing of Germany -- 3. No End of a Lesson: Vietnam and the Nature of Moral Choice in Foreign Policy -- 4. Noncombatant Immunity and Civilian Liability in Contemporary Asymmetric Warfare -- Part II: Peacemaking -- 5. Power and Principle: The Statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt -- 6. The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson -- 7. Responsibility to Protect: Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities -- Part III: Transformation -- 8. Realism and Idealism in Historical Perspective: Otto von Bismarck -- 9. Konrad Adenauer, Arms, and the Redemption of Germany -- 10. Eduard Shevardnadze and the End of the Soviet System: Necessity and Choice -- Part IV: Emerging Issues -- 11. "The Lady Doth Protest Too Much": Intervention and the Turn to Ethics in International Law -- 12. Human Security -- 13. Drone Ethics -- 14. Ethics and Targeted Sanctions -- Selected Bibliography -- About the Editor and Contributors -- Index

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1. The Reluctant Intervention -- 2. The Turn toward Diplomacy -- 3. Gorbachev Confronts Afghanistan -- 4. The National Reconciliation Campaign -- 5. Engaging with the Americans -- 6. The Army Withdraws and the Politburo Debates -- 7. Soviet Policy Adrift -- Conclusion -- Abbreviations -- Notes -- A Note on Sources -- Bibliography -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

This book is the culmination of twenty years of research in which the editors gathered thousands of pages documenting the most important conversations of the late Cold War. Every word Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev said to each other in their five superpower summits from 1985 to 1988 is included in this volume. The editors argue in their contextual essays and detailed notes that these summits fueled a learning process on both sides of the Cold War. Their anthology provides insight into the nuanced shifts of monumentally important discussions, showing how Moscow's sense of threat was eased and how a hawkish Reagan softened his tone in negotiations during his second presidential term. Documents from foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and George Shultz offer a particularly intriguing look into the handful of conversations that ended almost half a century of conflict. These verbatim transcripts, until now top secret, are combined with fascinating photos and crucial information from declassified preparatory and after-action documents from both the Americans and Soviets, obtained in the US through the Freedom of Information Act and in Russia from the Gorbachev Foundation, the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, and from the personal files of Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of contributors -- Introduction: Unexpected transformations? -- Notes -- 1. Threat or opportunity? Kissinger, Brzezinski, and the demise of the Soviet Union -- Introduction -- Outsiders -- Oracles -- The pause of 1989 -- "Dangle something in front of Gorbachev" -- Into the post-communist era -- Notes -- 2. The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, George Shultz, and the end of the Cold War -- Introduction -- The Nuclear and Space Arms Talks, 1985–1991 -- (Re)assessment #1: The nuclear balance was not stable in the 1980s -- (Re)assessment #2: The bilateral format of NST benefitted all parties affected -- (Re)assessment #3: SDI (and SALT) contributed to nuclear arms reductions -- Conclusion: Delinkage and arms reductions -- Notes -- 3. Nuclear weapons, "nuclear ideas", and protests: Did they matter? -- Introduction -- "Better active today, than radioactive tomorrow": Opposition to nuclear energy and weapons in the 1970s -- "And […] on some unlucky morning": The rise of the "window of vulnerability" myth -- Epilogue: Protests, nuclear weapons, and nuclear diplomacy -- Notes -- 4. Eduard Shevardnadze, Anatoly Chernyaev, and German reunification: The role of secondary political actors in ending the Cold War -- Introduction -- Until the fall of the Berlin Wall -- Consent with German reunification -- Consent with freedom to choose an alliance -- Conclusions -- Notes -- 5. German foreign policy and the "German Problem" during and after the Cold War: Changes and continuities -- Introduction -- The "German Problem" and the origins of the European post-war division -- The German Problem and the German Question in the Cold War -- The end of the Cold War, the German Problem, and unification

This memoir by the second most powerful Communist Party leader during the early Gorbachev years provides an important alternative view of the USSR's transformation?a view that is gaining ground in Russian politics today. In a substantial new piece for this edition, Mr. Ligachev outlines the political agenda of today's communist coalition?the establishment of a new Soviet Union, with strong economic and political integration of its member-states.Yegor Ligachev, a seasoned Party boss from Siberia, made a solid career for himself in the capital during the Khrushchev era, but, following Khrushchev's ouster, chose to retreat to the provinces. In 1985, his political patrons brought him back to Moscow to help them build a dynamic new leadership team under Mikhail Gorbachev. The two reform-minded communists launched an effort to inject life and energy into the Party, economy, and society through a series of liberalizing measures. But when Ligachev saw the reforms moving into a revolutionary phase that could result in the Party's loss of control over the helm of state, he found himself increasingly siding with the opposition.In this gripping book, Ligachev describes the evolving confrontation between opposing forces at high-level Party meetings and sessions of the Politburo as well as in less formal conversations. Along the way, he gives revealing glimpses not only of Gorbachev but also of Yuri Andropov, Andrei Gromyko, Alexander Yakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze, Boris Yeltsin, and other top leaders. Notorious events such as the 1989 massacre in Tbilisi and the Gdlyan/Ivanov affair?in which, Ligachev argues, he was unjustly implicated?are also highlighted.

";Memoirs are worthless if their authors attempt to present themselves as angels. I resolutely oppose those of my countrymen who shift responsibility for Soviet evils exclusively to the leaders. It is important that each Soviet citizen realize and admit his or her share of the responsibility."; —from On the Battlefields of the Cold War For more than forty years Victor Israelyan served in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rising through the ranks to become one of the Soviet Union's leading diplomats specializing in disarmament negotiations. He was forced to retire in 1987, a casualty of a system that was about to collapse under the weight of its contradictions. On the Battlefields of the Cold War offers unique insight into the volatile inner workings of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where the battle lines of the Cold War were often first drawn. Israelyan has no patience for those of his compatriots who argue that Soviet foreign policy was ultimately just, save for a few ";aberrations"; such as the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan. These acts were intrinsic to the system, and without them the mighty Soviet Union would not have existed as long as it did. The very foundation of Soviet foreign policy, therefore, was untenable, and the entire structure it supported was destined to implode. Israelyan brings to this memoir a wealth of experience, having worked with all the postwar Soviet foreign ministers—from Molotov and Vyshinsky to Gromyko and Shevardnadze—and established diplomatic ties to the West, particularly to the United States. As part of the middle tier of the diplomatic hierarchy, he was privy both to meetings of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry as well as to the many informal, private discussions among rank-and-file diplomats. Israelyan explains how he and his colleagues, as faithful defenders of Soviet ideology, viewed the United States, the Soviet Union's main adversary and partner. He tells of distinct factions within the Soviet foreign policy apparatus—factions that Soviet leaders sought to hide, fearing that any internal divisions might be interpreted by outsiders as discord. This aging Cold Warrior—one who accepts that he belonged to the party that lost the war—relates a deeply human story whose legacy continues today