Suchergebnisse

U tekstu se, temeljem fotografija od kojih se neke objavljuju prvi put, rekonstruira izvorni izgled secesijske zgrade Hrvatskog doma u Splitu kao zrelog arhitektonskog djela Kamila Tončića. Donosi se i kronološki pregled uloge Hrvatskog doma u društvenoj povijesti grada Splita koji pridonosi spomeničkoj vrijednosti zgrade. ; The idea of building a "Croatian House", in which the Split culture, art and sporting associations connected to National Party would be located Narodna čitaonica (People's Reading Room), Slavjanski napredak (Slav Progress), Narodna glazba (National Music), the Volunteer Fire-Fighters, Muzikalno društvo "Zvonimir" (the Zvonimir Musical Association) and Hrvatski sokol (the Croatian Hawk – sporting association) came upon the scene in 1896. At the turn of the century artists who elevated the cultural and artistic life of Split and took it out of the provincial context, placing it shoulder to shoulder with European contemporaries, came together in the National party circles. The design of the building made in the spirit of Art Nouveau architecture by Kamilo Tončić in 1906 was bold and avant-garde for a centre in which up to then Historicist or revival architecture had prevailed; in consequence it aroused diverse public reactions. But the Croatian House was nevertheless built according to the Tončić design, and opened in 1908. It had an important role in the musical life of Split as a gathering place for musicians, as a stage and concert venue, all the way up to World War I. The most important event in the first year of the existence of the Croatian House was the organisation of the First Dalmatian Art Exhibition at which the foundation of the Medulić Croatian Art Association was mooted, and the idea for founding the Gallery of Fine Art was also put forward. In the changed political circumstances after World War I, the House lost its pre-war role as an essential factor in the creation of the musical and artistic life of the city. When the Sokol association of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was formed in 1929, all activities in the Sokol House unfolded under the aegis of Sokol (Hawk), for it was a state organisation; the art and cultural events did not rise above the average amateur level. The most important event in the working of the amateur sections of Sokol was the foundation of the puppet theatre in 1933, on the foundations of which the Marionette Theatre still in operation today was built in 1945. After WWII, the onetime Croatian and later Sokol House was renamed Youth House, while along with the Split City Puppet Theatre, various sporting organisations were assigned the premises of the House. The house was remodelled and extended in 1930 and 1939, and thoroughly remodelled in 1942, when all the decorations on the facade and in the interior of the grand hall were destroyed in order to bring out the monumental aspects of the house in the spirit of fascist architecture. The concept of the building is a simple T-shaped ground floor. In the northern part of the site there is a narrow four-storey building with an attic along the long side placed parallel to the street in which the premises of the societies were located, while at the end of the plot, perpendicularly to it, is a two-storey building with a grand hall on the upstairs. With logical grouping of features and a functional arrangement, the spatial constraints of the plot were made use of to the best extent and complemented with an extensive programme that was supposed to meet the needs of the associations so that all of them should have their own individual quarters while making use in common of the grand hall meant for municipal events, joint events and Sokol members' athletic exercises. Although the principal facade is symmetrical with the main entrance in the middle, the courtyard part of the house with the hall is not built on its vertical axis, but shifted to the west. At the joint of the street and courtyard part of the house there are the grand stairs. The non-formalist asymmetrical disposition of volumes between the courtyard wing of the Croatian House and the neighbouring house left room for a large exercise space outdoors. Only a photograph of the drawing of the main facade remains of the design of the Croatian House. By rectification of the historical photographs, the drawing of the built facade was reconstructed, and a comparison of the project and the original appearance of the original facade shows that the design really was built, in basic idea and composition, and that alterations were made only to some of the decorative features. The lobby of the auxiliary eastern entrance and the threeflight stone staircase are kept in original form. The rectification of the previously unknown photographs of the interior of the hall has allowed the reconstruction of the original volume, position and repertoire of decoration. The space of the hall that we know of today in denuded form consists of two parts: the grand hall with the stage and the backstage areas. Abstract, linear and almost flat details, floral motifs, female heads with flowers and leaves in their hair and masks – common in the Art Nouveau idiom – were applied in the iconographic programme. In the choice of construction material and the manner of construction Tončić opted for the classic solid masonry construction of roughly worked stone blocks in lime mortar, smoothly rendered. The between-floor constructions were of wood, as was that of the gable roof. The flights of stairs with stone steps were leaned on iron I-section girders clad in rendered moulding. The pilasters alongside the central entrance, the pillars on the facade with an emphasised cornice and the attic are made of concrete, but they are only decorative and not structural elements of the building. The building of the Croatian House was adapted to the possibilities (i.e. the constraints) of the site and the function, that is, the needs of its users, in the allocation of the fundamental volumes and in the organisation of space. The interior decoration was also adjusted to the contents (the modestly decorated staircase area as against the luxuriant decoration of the grand hall), and a clearly, symmetrically and gracefully designed facade enhanced with Art Nouveau decorations and the characteristic Tončić details reveal its almost classical composition. The representative Art Nouveau building of the Croatian House, designed in the spirit of the Wagner school and its earlier works, is the original work of a mature architect in whom along with an echo of the classicist tradition the architecture of the modern age can also be sensed. But it is not just its Art Nouveau idiom that imparts a particular heritage value to the Croatian House, but also the events and personalities linked with it, whose importance in the history of the city of Split and Croatian art surmounts that of the building itself.

Na sjevernim gradskim bedemima Salone započet je novi projekt obnove jedinstvenog spomenika fortifikacijske arhitekture. Izvorno podignut za vrijeme cara Marka Aurelija 170. g., tijekom posljednjih stoljeća antike, stalno se popravlja i dograđuje novim zidnim pojačanjima, mnogobrojnim istaknutim kulama i trokutastim bastionima. Ponovno otkriven perimetralni plašt, na pojedinim mjestima sačuvan u punoj veličini sto jasno pokazuje znatnu moć antičkog graditeljstva, pridonijeti ce osvjetljivanju urbanističkog razvoja glavnoga grada rimske provincije Dalmacije. ; The ruins of Salona, capital of the Roman Province of Dalmatia, have long drawn the attention of many scientists, whose first efforts were concerned with establishing the original size and appearance of the city. D. Farlati, C. Lanza and V. Andrić drew ground plans of the remains which were visible at the time. However, F. Carrara started the first systematic topographic research in 1846, and his ground plan is still used today as a basis for insights into the history of ancient Salona. The city's irregular shape was enclosed by walls with a total length of 4,077 metres, fortified with towers of which 88 have been rediscovered. During his research, F. Carrara discovered several city gates which had been previously unknown (Porta Andetria, Porta Caesarea, Porta Suburbia, Porta Capraria and the Western Gate). He made more detailed excavations in the north-eastern part of the city, where the remains of walls and towers, up to 33 feet high, were best preserved. He noticed various fortification elements - several layers of walls and towers, some with adjoining triangular bastions. He considered the first phase of the fortification to have been completed as early as the 2nd century BC, and several inscriptions showed that parts of the walls were built during the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Carrara observed that the walls had been considerably reinforced by the addition of towers during Diocletian's time. He believed that the triangular bastions were the final element of Salona's fortification. The inscription (CJL JII 1984) suggests that these were probably added when all the towers were renovated, during the rule of Theodosius II. E. Dyggve also researched the walls of Salona and came to more or less the same conclusions. Dyggve was most interested in the urban development of Salona; he established the location of the oldest, central part of the city and described the eastward and westward spread of urban development. Some authors, including W. Gerber and H. Kahler, have investigated the oldest city gate, the Porta Caesarea, and made suggestions for its reconstruction. H. Kahler also examined the visible parts of the walls which had been excavated at that time near the Porta Caesarea and in the north-east part of city, and tried to establish a relative chronology. D. Rendić Miočević paid particular attention to the oldest part of Salona and discovered a square corner tower at the junction of the northern and eastern walls. The Split Conservation Department of the Ministry of Culture commenced protective conservation work on the northern ramparts in 1997. After a considerable time a neglected stretch of wall, reinforced by numerous towers, was exposed to view north of Porta Andetria up to the corner where it turns towards Porta Caesarea. Don F. Bulić had constructed a walkway on the inside of the walls from this point, connecting the north-east and north-west corners of the city. The walls were at that time mostly half-concealed with earth, but some segments, preserved up to their original height, were left visible. Two significant segments of the excavated ruins of the northern walls are particularly impressive: one is the complex at Bilankuša with towers nos. 78-81 which have already been investigated; the other is part of the outer shell and its associated towers, nos. 53-60, which remain at almost their original height. Preventative conservation work has been done on the weakened and uncovered walls, after completion of survey, of photogrammetric, architectural and geophysical records and research. Many fragments of inscriptions and architectural decorations were discovered during this work, mainly material from tombstones which had been re-incorporated into later structures. They came probably from the ancient necropolis which stretched along the ancient street from Porta Caesarea to the north-east, an area which was later incorporated in the secondary ring of walls (the Urbs orientalis). Further inscriptions discovered on the walls between towers 74 and 75 showed that Emperor Marcus Aurelius (CIL III 8570, 6374) was responsible for their construction. About ten late-antique amphorae, mostly spatheia dating from the 5th to the 7th centuries, were discovered in the in-fill immediately behind this original segment of the wall, which has been accurately dated from the inscriptions. The fact that they were found in the in-fill between two walls indicates that major repair work had been undertaken on the fortifications. Similar secondary use of amphorae in the Salona fortification system had been found earlier near tower no. 60. These were of types Dressel 32 and 34, dated between the 4th and the 5th centuries, but remained in use until much later. The complex defence system of the ancient Salona consisted of a series of elements which today provide better insight into the inception and development of the city. It has not been established precisely when the walls of Salona were first built, nor when the Italics and the Romans settled permanently and created their own town on the territory of the indigenous Dalmatic settlement and the of Issaian emporium. Research to date clearly indicates that old lines of communication were respected and that the town followed the contours of the terrain at its inception, as is clear from the irregular shape of the perimeter walls which were built in accordance with contemporary building practise, and the skill of military architects. A new city gate, Porta Caesarea, flanked by octagonal towers, was made in the existing walls at the beginning of the Empire. An aqueduct constructed above the city gate and associated cisterns provided exceptional fire protection of the most vulnerable segment of the fortifications. The threat of barbarian attack led to the construction of a new ring of walls during Marcus Aurelius' reign by the locally stationed military units coh I Del and coh II Del, and by vexilationes leg II Piae et III Concordiae who were urgently summoned from the Province of Pannonia. Inscriptions on the wall show clearly that some sections were built under supervision of the military commanders of these units and that there was simultaneous work on several sections (CIL III 1979, 1980, 8570, 6374). Relatively few towers were built when the walls were first constructed. More were created when new dangers became apparent, especially on the northern ramparts which were naturally most exposed to the enemy. The date of their construction is an open question: it is likely that most were built before the beginning of the 5th century, because there is evidence that they were renovated around that time (CIL III 1984). Further research is needed to establish whether the triangular bastions were added during the renovation, or whether they were built during military operations associated with the Gothic-Byzantine wars. Walls were occasionally strengthened where the defences were weak or for better communication between the protruding towers. The laws of the period (Cod. Theod, XI, 17, 4; XV, l, 49) assigned continuing responsibility for renovation and upkeep of the walls to the community as a whole. During the rule of Theodosius II at the beginning of the 5th century, for example, all the towers, and perhaps all the walls which had been destroyed, were renovated. Constantianos executed emergency repairs to the weakened wails during the Gothic-Byzantine wars, and an outer trench was constructed (Procop. , Bell. Goth. V, 7, 9; 7, 26-31; 16). During the last centuries of the ancient world, the complex defence system around the capital of the Province consisted of walls, doubly reinforced in several places by additional walls, towers and bastions, and by embankments and trenches to form a unique example of fortification architecture. Some segments of the walls of Salona are preserved at their original height of almost ten metres, which show the power and might of ancient architecture, as in other sparsely preserved perimeters of ancient cities such as the walls of Theodosius in Constantinople and of Aurelian in Rome.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.