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Book (print)
Smugglers and smuggling (2014)
in: Shire library 713
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Repository: EconStor (German National Library of Economics, ZBW)
Despite its importance in global illegal migration, there is little, and mostly theoretical research on human smuggling. We suggest an analytical framework to understand the micro structure of the human smuggling market. Migrants interact with smuggling and financing intermediaries; these may or may not be integrated with each other, and with the migrants' employers. Policies of receiving countries (border controls, employer sanctions, deportation policies, sales of visa) affect the interactions in the smuggling market, and, hence, migration flows. We review the theoretical work, point to the scarce empirical evidence, and identify challenges for future theoretical, empirical work and policy advice.
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in: Routledge Handbook on Transnational Criminal Law (2015), eds N Boister and R Currie, 2015
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SSRN
Compares two cases of smuggling -- migration from Ecuador to the US via paid smugglers & the trafficking of girls/women from Burma (Myanmar) to be slaves at brothels in Thailand -- to challenge explanations of human trafficking as a recent illicit activity in transnational crime made possible by globalization, or as exploitation of innocent migrants by organized crime. Instead, it is argued that increased human smuggling is largely the result of historical actions by politicians/state actors in both the sending & receiving nations, & the varied smuggling operations are deeply integrated into regional social structures. Analysis of the two cases shows that, in spite of many contrasts, they both require considerable tacit & active complicity by individuals in the sending & receiving nations. Transnational organized crime was not shown to play an important role in either case; the smugglers were integrated into the social fabric; & their operations were aided by a network of recruiters, middlemen, government/law officials, & financiers. The need to explore the broader historical-sociological dimensions of human smuggling is discussed. 46 References. J. Lindroth
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Compares two cases of smuggling -- migration from Ecuador to the US via paid smugglers & the trafficking of girls/women from Burma (Myanmar) to be slaves at brothels in Thailand -- to challenge explanations of human trafficking as a recent illicit activity in transnational crime made possible by globalization, or as exploitation of innocent migrants by organized crime. Instead, it is argued that increased human smuggling is largely the result of historical actions by politicians/state actors in both the sending & receiving nations, & the varied smuggling operations are deeply integrated into regional social structures. Analysis of the two cases shows that, in spite of many contrasts, they both require considerable tacit & active complicity by individuals in the sending & receiving nations. Transnational organized crime was not shown to play an important role in either case; the smugglers were integrated into the social fabric; & their operations were aided by a network of recruiters, middlemen, government/law officials, & financiers. The need to explore the broader historical-sociological dimensions of human smuggling is discussed. 46 References. J. Lindroth
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in: New politics: a journal of socialist thought, Volume 11, Issue 4, p. 74-79
ISSN: 0028-6494
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in: Mother Jones: a magazine for the rest of US, Volume 29, Issue 2, p. 52-57
ISSN: 0362-8841
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in: The bulletin of the atomic scientists: a magazine of science and public affairs, Volume 53, Issue 3, p. 52-56
ISSN: 0096-3402, 0096-5243, 0742-3829
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World Affairs Online
in: Europäische Sicherheit: Politik, Streitkräfte, Wirtschaft, Technik, Volume 46, Issue 7, p. 41-42
ISSN: 0940-4171
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in: Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Volume 53, Issue 3, p. 52-56
ISSN: 1938-3282
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in: Neil Boister and Robert J. Currie (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law (pp. 247-263) Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2015
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SSRN
Repository: CiteSeerX
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermediaries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude contracts to pay back the debt. These debt/labor contracts are more easily enforceable in the illegal than in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector becomes more costly, for instance, because of stricter deportation policies, fewer immigrants default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus increase rather than decrease the ex ante flow of illegal migrants. We also show that stricter deportation policies worsen the skill composition of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may also result in an increase of debt-financed migration.
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