Napor na uključenju načela održivosti u osnove prostornog planiranja u današnjem postsocijalističkom svijetu traži nove odnose između ustaljenih i suvremenih sudionika. Pojedini interesenti uključeni u razvoj, upravljanje i politiku djeluju na ishod regionalnih i urbanih sustava u Hrvatskoj ponekad bez obraćanja pozornosti na održivost. Njihovo djelovanje pokazuje nedostatak svijesti i negativan odnos prema održivosti u planerskoj praksi gdje je glavni cilj unaprijediti kakvoću života sadašnjih i budućih naraštaja. Bez dobrih ideja o nosivim kapacitetima i održivosti, neki od ovih sudionika zanemaruju planerska znanja i ekspertizu (CAVRIĆ, NEDOVIĆ – BUDIĆ, 2007.). Vještinama i znanjima planeri ih savjetuju, međutim, glavna pokretačka sila još je uvijek politički utjecaj. Takvi predlagači uspijevaju zaštititi svoje osobne probitke glede prostora i zemljišta nauštrb javnosti i običnih građana, podržavajući sustav izrade "preslikanih" planerskih izvješća, pogodujući tek daljem urbanom širenju i nenadziranoj izgradnji. Na žalost, poradi dužega vremenskog društvenog ignoriranja i jake sveze lobija investitora, arhitekata i građevinara, različite međunarodne planerske ideje s "održivošću na umu" još ne utječu na hrvatsku teoriju i praksu planiranja. Neke su od njih jednostavno neprihvaćane, netočno tumačene ili odbacivane zahvaljujući krutoj zakonskoj regulativi, nepostojanju formalnog školovanja planera i povlaštenom položaju tek jednog tipa ovlaštenih planera tj. arhitekata . Osjetljivost za alternativna razvojna rješenja, sudjelovanje javnosti, novine u ponašanju, organizaciji i tehnologijama, raznovrsnost pomagala za provedbu u planerskoj "kutiji s alatima", kao i različite vrste planerskih poslova u usmjeravanju održivih promjena, tek treba prepoznati u zemlji koja je u procesu pristupanja EU. Unatoč tomu, ovaj rad teži sumirati održivost i njezine sastavnice kao nove postavke, u kojima je glavna misao vodilja novoga globalnog pristupa planiranju, objavljena od Centra za ljudska naselja Ujedinjenih Naroda (UNCHS) kako slijedi: "Novo planiranje je manje kodirano i tehničko, više inovativno i poduzetničko. Ono je više sudioničko i usmjerenije projektima nego cjelovitim prostornim sustavima. Plansku ekspertizu sve češće ne zahtijeva samo država već i dioničarski i javni dijelovi građanskog društva. Prijeporno nije planiranje samo po sebi, nego njegov cilj: da li ga voditi uglavnom učinkovitošću, jačajući postojeću razdiobu bogatstva i moći, ili bi trebalo odigrati distribucijsku ulogu da može pomoći pri stvaranju minimalnih standarda urbanog življenja" (Hague, 2001.). ; Effort to incorporate sustainability aspects into the spatial planning agenda requires new relationships between conventional and new players in today's post-socialist world. Some stakeholders engaged in development, management and governance are sometimes tailoring the destiny of regional and urban systems in Croatia without sustainability concerns. Their activities show the lack of awareness and negative attitude towards sustainable planning practices where the major goal is to improve the quality of life of current and future generations. Without sound ideas about carrying capacities and sustainability, some of these actors have ignored the planning knowledge and expertise (CAVRIĆ, NEDOVIĆ – BUDIĆ, 2007). Planners advise upon them with their professional skill and knowledge but the driving force is still political power. These proponents have managed to safeguard their own spatial and land interests on the expense of the public and ordinary citizens, by maintaining the system of "copy-paste" planning blue prints, suitable for supporting emerging urban sprawl and uncontrolled construction activities. Unfortunately, due to the long-term social ignorance and strong alliance of developer's lobbies, architects and constructors, various international planning ideas with "sustainability in mind" have not affected Croatian planning theory and practice, yet. Some of them are petrified, misinterpreted or simply abolished owing to obstinate legislation, the non-existence of formal planning education, and the privileged position of only one brand of chartered planners (e.g. architects) . Alternative development solutions, such as public participation, behavioral, organizational and technological advances, diversity of implementing instruments in the planner's "toolkit", and the planner's numerous tasks in guiding sustainable change, are still to be recognized in this EU accession country. Notwithstanding, this paper aims to summaries sustainability and its derivates as the new paradigms, in which the guiding leitmotif of the new global agenda for planning is spelled out by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (2001b) as follows: "The new planning is less coded and technical, more innovative and entrepreneurial. It is more participatory and concerned with projects rather than whole spatial systems. Planning expertise is increasingly sought not only by the state, but also by the corporate sector and civil society. What is controversial is not planning per se, but its goal: whether it should be directed chiefly at efficiency, reinforcing the current distribution of wealth and power, or whether it should play a distributive role to help create minimum standards of urban liveability" (Hague, 2001).
Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.
Opći cilj istraživanja prikazanog u ovom radu jest teorijsko i empirijsko razmatranje različitih modela urbanog upravljanja na primjeru urbano-okolišnog sektora Grada Zagreba, pri čemu se posebna pažnja daje mogućnostima i preprekama za integrirano urbano upravljanje, s fokusom na koordinaciju i participaciju. Tema je razrađivana kroz različite teorijske pristupe s namjerom holističkog obuhvata područja istraživanja. Tipologija urbanog upravljanja koju su razvili DiGaetano i Strom (2003) koristi se za analizu i interpretaciju tipova upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru Grada Zagreba. Vezano specifično uz integrirano upravljanje, istraživanjem je obuhvaćena horizontalna integracija, kao dimenzija integriranog upravljanja, odnosno njezina dva aspekta: a) segment integriranog urbanog upravljanja koji pretpostavlja intenzivniju i kvalitetniju suradnju i koordinaciju formalnih aktera unutar gradske uprave; te, b) participacija neformalnih aktera u procesu donošenja odluka i kreiranja javnih politika. Aspekt koordinacije formalnih aktera interpretiran je u ovom radu temeljem teorije koordinacije javnih politika, pri čemu se preuzimaju sukcesivne razine ostvarivanja koherentnosti u oblikovanju javnih politika koje je razvio Peters (2004). U dijagnostičke svrhe utvrđivanja suradnje različitih gradskih tijela u urbano-okolišnom sektoru u ostvarivanju zajedničkih ciljeva korišten je i Metcalfeov (1994) pristup analizi izmjere kapaciteta koordinacije javnih politika. Što se tiče participacije neformalnih aktera, u interpretaciji se koristi tipologija razine participacije koju je izradila Arnstein (1969) kao i klasifikacija jednosmjernih i dvosmjernih participativnih metoda od Anokye (2013). U kontekstu ovog istraživanja razmatra se i redistribucija moći između formalnih i neformalnih aktera izražena kao odnos snaga u kojem su u poziciji moći formalni akteri, a neformalni akteri svojim djelovanjem dovode u pitanje granice i raspodjelu moći (Arnstein, 1969). Istraživanje je dizajnirano kao studija slučaja urbanog upravljanja u Gradu Zagrebu korištenjem metode polu-strukturiranog intervjua i fokusne grupe uz pregled relevantnog normativnog i strateškog okvira. Istraživanjem je utvrđen hibridni tip upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru, specifičnije, korporativno-klijentelistički tip urbanog upravljanja. Uočene specifičnosti u modelu upravljanja odnose se na nepovjerenje neformalnih aktera u tijela lokalne samouprave što je dodatno naglašeno uvjerenjem kako lokalna samouprava počiva na principima klijentelizma i pomanjkanja odgovornosti te sektorskom i piramidalnom sustavu upravljanja s koncentracijom moći u samome vrhu gradske vlasti. Navedeno je u suprotnosti sa integriranim modelom upravljanja koje pretpostavlja ostvarenje moći kroz pozitivan kontekst "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), odnosno, ostvarenje moći kroz suradnju i konsenzus, partnerstvo i procese kolektivnog djelovanja. Koordinacija odabranih gradskih ureda unutar urbano-okolišnog sektora svrstana je, sukladno Petersu (2004) na najnižu razinu negativne koordinacije, te sukladno Metcalfeu (1994), na četvrtu razinu koja isto spada u negativnu koordinaciju s obzirom na manjkavosti koje se očituju u: preklapanjima u obavljanju poslova, pri čemu se ističe nedostatak adekvatne koordinacije aktivnosti i projekata (izostanak strukturirane koordinacije) odnosno komunikacije (različite informacije, različite vizije, različite i nepovezane aktivnosti, nedostatak adekvatne baze podataka koju bi mogli koristiti svi uredi i sektori), kako unutar ureda i sektora (naglasak na nepostojanje adekvatne horizontalne koordinacije), tako i među sektorima (nepostojanje adekvatne međusektorske koordinacije), ali i spram civilnog sektora (u vezi programa i aktivnosti od zajedničkog interesa). Naposljetku, razina participacije u urbano-okolišnom sektoru prema Arnsteininoj gradaciji participacije spada u kategoriju tokenizma. Općenito, građane se ne potiče na preuzimanje aktivne uloge prilikom donošenja relevantnih odluka u domeni djelokruga lokalne samouprave kao ni na ostvarivanje partnerstva sa formalnim akterima. Sukladno klasifikaciji metoda participacije prema Anokye (2013), utvrđeno je prisustvo dominacije jednosmjernih uz ponešto dvosmjernih metoda participacije u kategoriji tokenizma. Navedeno upućuje na instrumentalni pristup (Hordijk, 2015) u participaciji neformalnih aktera koji, iako su uključeni u procese odlučivanja, nisu ravnopravni političkim akterima. Na tragu Arnsteininog (1969) poimanja moći, rezultati istraživanja s jedne strane ilustriraju moć kao asimetričnu (centraliziranu) odnosno hijerarhijsku (podređenost većine i zapovijedanje manjine) strukturu koju karakterizira koncentracija moći u samome vrhu upravljačke strukture (Ured Gradonačelnika), a što kod nekih formalnih kao i kod neformalnih aktera stvara osjećaj bespomoćnosti. S druge strane, nalazi ilustriraju moć kao procesnu, što je vidljivo kroz primjere suradnje među akterima koji ukazuju kako neformalni akteri višom razinom participacije u nekim slučajevima dovode uvriježene hijerarhije u pitanje. Međutim, pritom je isključivo riječ o partnerstvu, ali ne i o delegiranju moći ili pak građanskom nadzoru koje Arnstein svrstava u najviše razine građanske moći. ; The general purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to theoretically and empirically consider different models of urban governance based on the example of the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Particular attention is given to the opportunities and barriers to integrated urban governance with a focus on participation. The research engages with different theoretical approaches with the intention to have a holistic approach to the subject of research. The typology of urban governance developed by DiGaetano and Strom (2003) is utilized for the analysis and interpretation of types of governance present in the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Specifically with regard to integrated governance, the research encompasses horizontal integration – as a dimension of integrated governance – and particularly its two aspects: a) the dimension of integrated urban governance which implies more intensive and enhanced cooperation and coordination between formal actors within the city administration; and b) informal actors' participation in the decision making process and the process of creating public policies. The coordination of formal actors' is interpreted through public policies coordination theory by way of adopting successive levels of coherence implementation when shaping public policies as developed by Peters (2004). Metcalfe's (1994) approach to the analysis of public policies capacity coordination is also utilized as a diagnostic tool with the aim of determining the level of cooperation among the different city offices within the environment sector. With regard to capturing the participation of informal actors, the study utilizes Arnstein's (1969) typology of the level of participation, as well as the one-way and two-way classification of participation methods developed by Anokye (2013). In the context of this study, the redistribution of power between formal and informal actors is conveyed as a struggle between formal actors being in the position of power, and informal actors who through their activities question the boundaries and distribution of power. The research was designed as a case study of urban governance in the City of Zagreb. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted, and relevant legal and strategic documents were analyzed. The research has identified a hybrid governance model, more precisely, a corporate-clientelist model of urban governance. The governance model's specificities are reflected in the informal actors' distrust of local level administration, further emphasized through the conviction that the local administration relies on a clientelist agenda, lack of responsibility, and sectorial and pyramidical system of governance whereby the power resides in the highest echelons of city government. The highlighted findings are contrary to the model of integrated governance that presupposes empowerment through a positive context of "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), through cooperation and consensus, partnership and collective actions. The coordination of examined city offices within the sector of environment is categorized, according to Peters (2004), as the lowest level of negative coordination, and, according to Metcalfe (1994), on the fourth level, which also represents negative coordination, given the noted shortcomings: overlaps in activities conducted and specifically lack of adequate levels of coordinating activities and projects (lack of structured coordination), lack of communication (different information, different visions, different and disconnected activities, lack of an adequate database to be used by all offices and sectors), both within offices and sectors (lack of adequate horizontal coordination) as well as between sectors (lack of adequate inter-sectorial coordination), but in relation to the civil sector (with regard to programs and activities of common interest). Finally, the level of participation in the environment sector, in accordance with Arnstein's participation gradation, falls into the category of tokenism. Overall, citizens are not encouraged to assume active roles in the local administration's decision-making process or realize partnerships with formal actors. Based on Anokye's (2013) classification of participation methods, the study identifies the dominance of one-way participation methods and a handful of two-way participation methods in the tokenism category. This points to an instrumental approach (Hordijk, 2015) to the participation of informal actors', who, although involved in the decision-making process, are not equal to political actors. Drawing on Arnstein's (1969) understanding of power, the study illustrates, on one hand, power as asymmetrical (centralized) and hierarchical (subordination of majority, command of minority), characterized by the concentration of power at the top of the local government structure (Mayor's office), which, in turn, creates a feeling of helplessness both among certain formal as well as informal actors. On the other hand, the study results illustrate that power can also be understood as a process which is exemplified with instances of cooperation between actors showing that informal actors when achieving a higher level of participation bring established hierarchies into question. However, this is strictly reserved for partnership, and not for the delegated power or citizen control which are ranked by Arnstein as the highest levels of citizens' power.
Opći cilj istraživanja prikazanog u ovom radu jest teorijsko i empirijsko razmatranje različitih modela urbanog upravljanja na primjeru urbano-okolišnog sektora Grada Zagreba, pri čemu se posebna pažnja daje mogućnostima i preprekama za integrirano urbano upravljanje, s fokusom na koordinaciju i participaciju. Tema je razrađivana kroz različite teorijske pristupe s namjerom holističkog obuhvata područja istraživanja. Tipologija urbanog upravljanja koju su razvili DiGaetano i Strom (2003) koristi se za analizu i interpretaciju tipova upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru Grada Zagreba. Vezano specifično uz integrirano upravljanje, istraživanjem je obuhvaćena horizontalna integracija, kao dimenzija integriranog upravljanja, odnosno njezina dva aspekta: a) segment integriranog urbanog upravljanja koji pretpostavlja intenzivniju i kvalitetniju suradnju i koordinaciju formalnih aktera unutar gradske uprave; te, b) participacija neformalnih aktera u procesu donošenja odluka i kreiranja javnih politika. Aspekt koordinacije formalnih aktera interpretiran je u ovom radu temeljem teorije koordinacije javnih politika, pri čemu se preuzimaju sukcesivne razine ostvarivanja koherentnosti u oblikovanju javnih politika koje je razvio Peters (2004). U dijagnostičke svrhe utvrđivanja suradnje različitih gradskih tijela u urbano-okolišnom sektoru u ostvarivanju zajedničkih ciljeva korišten je i Metcalfeov (1994) pristup analizi izmjere kapaciteta koordinacije javnih politika. Što se tiče participacije neformalnih aktera, u interpretaciji se koristi tipologija razine participacije koju je izradila Arnstein (1969) kao i klasifikacija jednosmjernih i dvosmjernih participativnih metoda od Anokye (2013). U kontekstu ovog istraživanja razmatra se i redistribucija moći između formalnih i neformalnih aktera izražena kao odnos snaga u kojem su u poziciji moći formalni akteri, a neformalni akteri svojim djelovanjem dovode u pitanje granice i raspodjelu moći (Arnstein, 1969). Istraživanje je dizajnirano kao studija slučaja urbanog upravljanja u Gradu Zagrebu korištenjem metode polu-strukturiranog intervjua i fokusne grupe uz pregled relevantnog normativnog i strateškog okvira. Istraživanjem je utvrđen hibridni tip upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru, specifičnije, korporativno-klijentelistički tip urbanog upravljanja. Uočene specifičnosti u modelu upravljanja odnose se na nepovjerenje neformalnih aktera u tijela lokalne samouprave što je dodatno naglašeno uvjerenjem kako lokalna samouprava počiva na principima klijentelizma i pomanjkanja odgovornosti te sektorskom i piramidalnom sustavu upravljanja s koncentracijom moći u samome vrhu gradske vlasti. Navedeno je u suprotnosti sa integriranim modelom upravljanja koje pretpostavlja ostvarenje moći kroz pozitivan kontekst "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), odnosno, ostvarenje moći kroz suradnju i konsenzus, partnerstvo i procese kolektivnog djelovanja. Koordinacija odabranih gradskih ureda unutar urbano-okolišnog sektora svrstana je, sukladno Petersu (2004) na najnižu razinu negativne koordinacije, te sukladno Metcalfeu (1994), na četvrtu razinu koja isto spada u negativnu koordinaciju s obzirom na manjkavosti koje se očituju u: preklapanjima u obavljanju poslova, pri čemu se ističe nedostatak adekvatne koordinacije aktivnosti i projekata (izostanak strukturirane koordinacije) odnosno komunikacije (različite informacije, različite vizije, različite i nepovezane aktivnosti, nedostatak adekvatne baze podataka koju bi mogli koristiti svi uredi i sektori), kako unutar ureda i sektora (naglasak na nepostojanje adekvatne horizontalne koordinacije), tako i među sektorima (nepostojanje adekvatne međusektorske koordinacije), ali i spram civilnog sektora (u vezi programa i aktivnosti od zajedničkog interesa). Naposljetku, razina participacije u urbano-okolišnom sektoru prema Arnsteininoj gradaciji participacije spada u kategoriju tokenizma. Općenito, građane se ne potiče na preuzimanje aktivne uloge prilikom donošenja relevantnih odluka u domeni djelokruga lokalne samouprave kao ni na ostvarivanje partnerstva sa formalnim akterima. Sukladno klasifikaciji metoda participacije prema Anokye (2013), utvrđeno je prisustvo dominacije jednosmjernih uz ponešto dvosmjernih metoda participacije u kategoriji tokenizma. Navedeno upućuje na instrumentalni pristup (Hordijk, 2015) u participaciji neformalnih aktera koji, iako su uključeni u procese odlučivanja, nisu ravnopravni političkim akterima. Na tragu Arnsteininog (1969) poimanja moći, rezultati istraživanja s jedne strane ilustriraju moć kao asimetričnu (centraliziranu) odnosno hijerarhijsku (podređenost većine i zapovijedanje manjine) strukturu koju karakterizira koncentracija moći u samome vrhu upravljačke strukture (Ured Gradonačelnika), a što kod nekih formalnih kao i kod neformalnih aktera stvara osjećaj bespomoćnosti. S druge strane, nalazi ilustriraju moć kao procesnu, što je vidljivo kroz primjere suradnje među akterima koji ukazuju kako neformalni akteri višom razinom participacije u nekim slučajevima dovode uvriježene hijerarhije u pitanje. Međutim, pritom je isključivo riječ o partnerstvu, ali ne i o delegiranju moći ili pak građanskom nadzoru koje Arnstein svrstava u najviše razine građanske moći. ; The general purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to theoretically and empirically consider different models of urban governance based on the example of the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Particular attention is given to the opportunities and barriers to integrated urban governance with a focus on participation. The research engages with different theoretical approaches with the intention to have a holistic approach to the subject of research. The typology of urban governance developed by DiGaetano and Strom (2003) is utilized for the analysis and interpretation of types of governance present in the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Specifically with regard to integrated governance, the research encompasses horizontal integration – as a dimension of integrated governance – and particularly its two aspects: a) the dimension of integrated urban governance which implies more intensive and enhanced cooperation and coordination between formal actors within the city administration; and b) informal actors' participation in the decision making process and the process of creating public policies. The coordination of formal actors' is interpreted through public policies coordination theory by way of adopting successive levels of coherence implementation when shaping public policies as developed by Peters (2004). Metcalfe's (1994) approach to the analysis of public policies capacity coordination is also utilized as a diagnostic tool with the aim of determining the level of cooperation among the different city offices within the environment sector. With regard to capturing the participation of informal actors, the study utilizes Arnstein's (1969) typology of the level of participation, as well as the one-way and two-way classification of participation methods developed by Anokye (2013). In the context of this study, the redistribution of power between formal and informal actors is conveyed as a struggle between formal actors being in the position of power, and informal actors who through their activities question the boundaries and distribution of power. The research was designed as a case study of urban governance in the City of Zagreb. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted, and relevant legal and strategic documents were analyzed. The research has identified a hybrid governance model, more precisely, a corporate-clientelist model of urban governance. The governance model's specificities are reflected in the informal actors' distrust of local level administration, further emphasized through the conviction that the local administration relies on a clientelist agenda, lack of responsibility, and sectorial and pyramidical system of governance whereby the power resides in the highest echelons of city government. The highlighted findings are contrary to the model of integrated governance that presupposes empowerment through a positive context of "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), through cooperation and consensus, partnership and collective actions. The coordination of examined city offices within the sector of environment is categorized, according to Peters (2004), as the lowest level of negative coordination, and, according to Metcalfe (1994), on the fourth level, which also represents negative coordination, given the noted shortcomings: overlaps in activities conducted and specifically lack of adequate levels of coordinating activities and projects (lack of structured coordination), lack of communication (different information, different visions, different and disconnected activities, lack of an adequate database to be used by all offices and sectors), both within offices and sectors (lack of adequate horizontal coordination) as well as between sectors (lack of adequate inter-sectorial coordination), but in relation to the civil sector (with regard to programs and activities of common interest). Finally, the level of participation in the environment sector, in accordance with Arnstein's participation gradation, falls into the category of tokenism. Overall, citizens are not encouraged to assume active roles in the local administration's decision-making process or realize partnerships with formal actors. Based on Anokye's (2013) classification of participation methods, the study identifies the dominance of one-way participation methods and a handful of two-way participation methods in the tokenism category. This points to an instrumental approach (Hordijk, 2015) to the participation of informal actors', who, although involved in the decision-making process, are not equal to political actors. Drawing on Arnstein's (1969) understanding of power, the study illustrates, on one hand, power as asymmetrical (centralized) and hierarchical (subordination of majority, command of minority), characterized by the concentration of power at the top of the local government structure (Mayor's office), which, in turn, creates a feeling of helplessness both among certain formal as well as informal actors. On the other hand, the study results illustrate that power can also be understood as a process which is exemplified with instances of cooperation between actors showing that informal actors when achieving a higher level of participation bring established hierarchies into question. However, this is strictly reserved for partnership, and not for the delegated power or citizen control which are ranked by Arnstein as the highest levels of citizens' power.
RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAPriprema se novi Zakon o šumama, prema kojemu, nadamo se, neće biti opetovanog smanjivanja postotka naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma. U vrijeme kada nam priroda daje kataklizmičke odgovore za našu nebrigu o njoj, a najveći svjetski zagađivači ne pristaju na njenu zaštitu, šumarskoj struci se već po običaju "sječe grana" na kojoj, ne samo šumari, nego svi sjedimo. Sve više čuju se i glasovi koji sugeriraju izdvajanje priobalnog područja iz dosadašnjeg načina upravljanja, no bez jasne kompenzacijske financijske podloge. Ne opamećuje nas niti rekordan broj požara i potreba saniranja šteta upravo na tome području.S motrišta Hrvatskoga šumarskog društva koje objedinjuje hrvatsku šumarsku znanost, obrazovanje i praksu, ponajprije sa žaljenjem zaključujemo da resorni ministar do danas nije našao vremena za razgovor s njegovim predstavnicima. Bilo to nekome drago ili ne, moramo reći da je to, uz ostalo, i pokazatelj kakav status ima šumarstvo unutar resornog ministarstva. Željno smo očekivali pozitivne promjene nakon gotovo petogodišnjeg zastranjivanja u vođenju šumarske struke i zanemarivanja pojedinih načela potrajnog gospodarenja šumskim resursima, o čemu smo argumentirano pisali. Svakako, Vlada RH između ostalog, mora odlučiti očekuje li i dalje od šumarstva klasičnu "dobit" za državni proračun, ili gospodarenje šumama po načelu potrajnog gospodarenja, gdje se dobit ne mjeri novčanicama, nego optimalnim pomlađivanjem, maksimalnim prirastom, poželjnom bioraznolikošću, prirodnošću i stabilnošću, što naposljetku osigurava očuvanje, a istovremeno i sve benefite šumskog ekosustava. Nismo primijetili ni promjene glede netržišnog gospodarenja, dapače neki i dalje zahtijevaju osiguranje dobave drvnim sortimentima zajamčenim ugovorima, a ne tržišnim nadmetanjem.Da li se nešto radi na proklamiranom restrukturiranju i decentralizaciji Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o., nije nam poznato. Svakako, vidimo da nema vidljivog utjecaja na tu temu nikakav poziv na raspravu, kao primjerice tekst bivšeg ministra Tarnaja, objavljen u Šumarskome listu 3-4/2017. Svakako promjene i građenje novog ustroja, trebalo bi krenuti od poprilično zanemarenih revira i revirnika, neposrednih i najodgovornijih čimbenika gospodarenja šumama, a ne od vrha, koji neprestano buja. Sve to zahtijeva širu stručnu i društvenu raspravu na državnoj razini, ponajprije neovisnih znalaca/stručnjaka, a ne predstavnika raznih interesnih skupina i nedovoljno educiranih političara. Te rasprave nema, bez obzira na činjenicu da se radi o gotovo polovici kopnene površine Hrvatske i šumi koja je prema Ustavu resurs od posebnog interesa za Republiku Hrvatsku. Problemi svakodnevno niču od stručnih – saniranja šteta od ledoloma u Gorskome kotaru, sušenja jasena, šteta od hrastove stjenice, potkornjaka, pošumljavanja opožarenih površina, privatnih šuma, šteta uzrokovanih klimatskim promjenama, do zapošljavanja mladih, kadroviranja pa i političkog nepotizma. Sve probleme u stanju smo uspješno riješiti, jer imamo stručnog i infrastrukturnog potencijala kao malo koja struka, ali uz eliminiranje kadrova koji su struku doveli u današnju situaciju, a koji su se očito unaprijed ugovorima dobro zaštitili. No, nažalost šumarstvo je struka gdje se pogreške u gospodarenju vide tek nakon više godina, kada je "kasno plakati", pa se mnogima čini da je trenutno sa šumarstvom sve u redu. Uredništvo ; EDITORIALPreparations are under way to formulate the new Forest Law, which will, hopefully, eliminate the continual decrease in the fee for non-market forest functions. At the time at which Nature responds with cataclysmic consequences to our indifference towards it and major global polluters refuse to protect it, the branch on which not only foresters but all of us are sitting is again being cut off. There are increased requests to exclude the coastal region from the current management policy, but at the same time no clear compensational financial bases are provided. Not even the record number of fires and the need to recover the damage in these very areas have brought us to our senses.From the aspect of the Croatian Forestry Association, which unifies the Croatian forestry science, education and practice, we can only ascertain with regret that the relevant minister has not yet found time to discuss these hot issues with its representatives. Whether we like it nor not, it should be said that this is, among other things, one more indicator of the status of forestry within the relevant ministry. We had eagerly awaited positive changes after an almost five-year period of a misguided attitude to the forestry profession and the negligence towards the principles of sustainable management of forest resources, which we have already discussed in our Journal. Definitely, the Croatian government should decide, among other things, whether it expects classical "profit" for the state budget from forestry or whether it supports forest management according to the principles of sustainable management. In the latter, profit is not measured by banknotes but by optimal regeneration, maximal increment, desirable biodiversity, naturalness and stability, all of which ensures the preservation of the forest ecosystem and of its multiple benefits. We have not seen any changes in the attitude towards non-market economy, either; on the contrary, some continue to demand the acquisition of wood assortments through guaranteed contracts rather than through market competition.We do not know if anything is being done regarding the proclaimed restructuring and decentralisation of the company Croatian Forests Ltd. What we do see is that no invitation to a debate on the subject has had any effect, such as the text of the former minister Tarnaj, published in Forestry Journal 1-4/2017. In order to develop a new system it is necessary to start from the relatively neglected forest districts and district rangers, the most direct and responsible factors in forest management, rather than at the top management, which is constantly expanding in numbers. This requires a broader professional and social debate at the state level with the participation of independent experts/professionals and not representatives of different interest groups and insufficiently educated politicians. However, such a debate is missing, even though this issue concerns almost half of the land area of Croatia and the forest which the Constitution describes as a resource of particular interest for the Republic of Croatia. There are problems on a daily basis, including the recovery of the damage from ice break in Gorski Kotar, ash dieback, damage from the oak lace bug, bark beetles, reforestation of burnt areas, private forests, damage caused by climate change, employment of the young, personnel policy and political nepotism. We are capable of solving all these problems successfully because we have professional and infrastructural potential that very few professions can boast, but we should primarily eliminate the cadres who have reduced the profession to a current unenviable situation and who have protected themselves with contracts well in advance. Unfortunately, forestry is a profession in which mistakes in the management come to light only after several years, when it is too late to "cry over spilt milk". This is the reason that many erroneously believe that forestry is currently in a good shape. Editorial Board
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.
