Suchergebnisse

Fiji's financial reforms were disrupted by the coup of 2000. Since then, Fiji has initiated more targeted reforms. This report, for which work commenced in January 2016, documents the country's financial management systems covering budgeting, funds flow, accounting and reporting, and auditing systems. It provides insights into Fiji's internal control systems, staffing resource capacity, and information technology structure. The intent is to give project teams and consultants a better understanding of the country's financial management systems in order to improve project preparation. Find out how high-quality financial management assessments support projects by identifying key risks and enabling the implementation of appropriate actions and reforms to mitigate those risks.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made a record by becoming the first democratically-elected premier who has presented the fifth consecutive budget in a single tenure in the 70-year history of Pakistan. Although Pakistan People's Party government also completed its five-year term, they had two prime ministers in that tenure. There were a lot of expectations from amongst the people as well as pressure within the party in the run-up to the election that the federal budget 2017-18 would be an election-friendly budget. After all this were to be the first independent budget presented by the PML-N government. The initial four budgets were prepared under the International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. Therefore, in those four budgets, the conditions imposed by the IMF framework took priority in the budget-making process.

In March 2016, elite groups of Natuna and the neighbouring oil-and-gas district Anambas aspired to separate from Kepri to create their own province. Their aim was to secure more fiscal transfers from Jakarta. Among these people was Natuna's former district-head Daeng Rusnadi, who was once imprisoned for corruption concerning oil-and-gas revenues. The plan was supported by Natuna's current district-head Hamid Rizal, whose deputy is Rusnadi's wife. In January 2017, the discourse was adopted by local parliamentarians, who subsequently tried to exploit Jakarta's security interest to push for a "special defence province". Unsurprisingly, Kepri's governor Nurdin Basirun did not support the separation as Kepri would then lose its only oil-and-gas districts. Eventually this spark of separation was doused by the recent gerbangdutas' pledge of funds and the moratorium on the creation of new provinces. On the surface, Jakarta's development funds for Natuna seem to be what the region needs. However, further dependency on the central government's resources may not be helpful in boosting the local economy in the long run. By focusing on the dependence of regions to central government transfers, this article aims to highlight the causes of Natuna's lack of income despite its natural wealth.

In this paper, we focus specifically on areas where digital financial services have significant potential to accelerate financial inclusion through their impact on existing business models. We also provide recommendations for governments and regulatory authorities on how to encourage the development of digital financial services to increase inclusion. In particular, we examine financial inclusion at the base of the pyramid,9 for women, and for MSMEs in four Southeast Asian markets: Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Southeast Asia was chosen as a geographic focus because the region represents a microcosm of the emerging markets universe, with countries at various stages of development. The four markets chosen for this study represent the diverse market structures and development stages we see across Southeast Asia. At one end, Indonesia is a major global economy, where financial inclusion efforts have largely been driven by state-owned banks and the digital economy has started to emerge. At the other end, Cambodia's economy is one-fortieth the size of Indonesia's, and financial inclusion has largely been served by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). This allows us to draw out common themes that may resonate in other emerging markets, as well as important market-specific nuances that may only apply to a narrower group.

China's rising economic and political clout has created both opportunities and challenges for Southeast Asian countries. China's economic cooperation with Southeast Asian countries is multidimensional and multi-layered involving business collaboration, trade and investment, and financial assistance (grants and concessional loans), which are "fused indistinguishably".2 Although the Chinese have claimed that their financial assistance has no strings attached, there is a close link between economic ties and political influence. Some regional analysts argue that "China's rise exerts a profound and complex impact on the political, security and economic contexts of Southeast Asia".3 A Cambodia expert, Sophal Ear, puts it this way, "Taking the geopolitical interests of China in Southeast Asia into account, Chinese investment does not come free; political and economic strings tie those who benefit to the influence of China."

Last week, on October 4th, the budget of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) for 2017 was changed.1 It should be noted that earlier on June 30th, state budget revenues increased by 511 million manat, and expenditures by 1 billion 41 million manat, as amended by the law "On the State Budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan for 2017".2 Changes in the budget of the Oil Fund did not cause wide public debate. We suppose that the changes in the document reflect important symptoms for the analysis and forecasting of the government's current fiscal policy.

This report provides an assessment of the evidence for sugar taxes as a fiscal instrument to improve health. Forty-seven peer-reviewed studies and working papers published in the last five years were reviewed, summarised and assessed for key methodological issues. Experience with sugar taxes is complicated by inconsistencies in their design and context. Most sugar taxes apply to sugar-sweetened beverages, but some also include pure fruit juices or other foods with high sugar content. Some are valoric taxes while others are volumetric. Some taxes were implemented alongside other measures to improve diets or increase awareness of the danger of excess sugar consumption. Sugar taxes are also implemented in some jurisdictions as a means to raise additional tax revenue, with no particular expectation that any reduction in intake will translate into health benefits but sometimes with revenues being earmarked for health programmes.

The lotus Letter is a monthly newsletter from the Lotus Circle. The Lotus Circle is a vibrant community of committed individuals and organizations working together to empower women and girls across Asia by supporting The Asia Foundation's Women's Empowerment Program.

The lotus Letter is a monthly newsletter from the Lotus Circle. The Lotus Circle is a vibrant community of committed individuals and organizations working together to empower women and girls across Asia by supporting The Asia Foundation's Women's Empowerment Program.

According to the Ministry of Finance of Azerbaijan Republic, the external public debt of the country constituted $ 7,651 billion US (12,402 billion manat) in October 2016. The ministry has reported that the debt to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio stands at 20.1 percent. The external public debt consists of direct obligations of the state as well as contingent liabilities emanating from sovereign guarantees. Meanwhile, the ministry has underlined that the external public debt is predominantly attracted from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Japanese International Cooperation Agency and other financial institutions to finance projects in the economy as well as the issuance of bonds in the international capital markets. The CESD calculations show that the foreign debt of Azerbaijan is higher than the figure has reported by the Ministry of Finance of Azerbaijan. Based on the anonymous survey among CESD's contacts in the government show that Azerbaijani real foreign debt is double digit billions dollar. That also means that the foreign debt's share in the GDP in reality is higher than the official figure.

It is argued that the conventional analysis of the 2001 Argentina crisis in terms of populist budgetary policies and institutional rigidities of labor market is not satisfactory. The 2001 collapse takes place within a long history, but it results from a quite specific factor: the structural unbalance within the accumulation regime implied by the convertibility and the complete opening to world trade and financial globalization. The shakiness of major institutional compromises and the lack of policy tools to respond to the vagaries of the world economy explain the 1998 turning point from growth to depression. The fast economic recovery observed since 2002, associated to the default of public debt and the pesification, does not mean that Argentina has definitely overcome the structural obstacles that have been hindering its growth since 1976. The likelihood and resilience of alternative development modes is finally discussed. It is difficult to overcome the logic of a primary product exporter country. Of course, its potential is larger in the 2000s, but this economic regime is not totally transformed by the expected medium term rise of commodities prices at the world level. ; On s'attache à montrer en premier lieu que l'interprétation de la crise argentine par le laxisme de la politique budgétaire et les rigidités institutionnelles du marché du travail n'est pas satisfaisante. La crise qui éclate en 2001 s'inscrit dans l'histoire longue argentine et manifeste l'incohérence du régime d'accumulation impliqué par le régime de convertibilité et l'ouverture commerciale et financière quasi-complète. Absence de compromis institutionnalisés stables et perte de la capacité à répondre aux aléas de l'économie mondiale expliquent la gravité de la dépression qui s'ouvre dès 1998. La vigoureuse reprise économique qui intervient après le défaut de la dette publique et la pesification ne signifie pas que l'économie argentine ait surmonté les obstacles structurels qui hypothèquent sa croissance depuis 1976. L'article s'achève par la discussion de la vraisemblance de divers modes de développement. Il apparaêt difficile d'échapper à la logique d'un régime primaire exportateur dont les perspectives sont certes renouvelées mais pas complètement transformées par la possibilité d'un renchérissement durable des produits agricoles à l'échelle mondiale.

It is argued that the conventional analysis of the 2001 Argentina crisis in terms of populist budgetary policies and institutional rigidities of labor market is not satisfactory. The 2001 collapse takes place within a long history, but it results from a quite specific factor: the structural unbalance within the accumulation regime implied by the convertibility and the complete opening to world trade and financial globalization. The shakiness of major institutional compromises and the lack of policy tools to respond to the vagaries of the world economy explain the 1998 turning point from growth to depression. The fast economic recovery observed since 2002, associated to the default of public debt and the pesification, does not mean that Argentina has definitely overcome the structural obstacles that have been hindering its growth since 1976. The likelihood and resilience of alternative development modes is finally discussed. It is difficult to overcome the logic of a primary product exporter country. Of course, its potential is larger in the 2000s, but this economic regime is not totally transformed by the expected medium term rise of commodities prices at the world level. ; On s'attache à montrer en premier lieu que l'interprétation de la crise argentine par le laxisme de la politique budgétaire et les rigidités institutionnelles du marché du travail n'est pas satisfaisante. La crise qui éclate en 2001 s'inscrit dans l'histoire longue argentine et manifeste l'incohérence du régime d'accumulation impliqué par le régime de convertibilité et l'ouverture commerciale et financière quasi-complète. Absence de compromis institutionnalisés stables et perte de la capacité à répondre aux aléas de l'économie mondiale expliquent la gravité de la dépression qui s'ouvre dès 1998. La vigoureuse reprise économique qui intervient après le défaut de la dette publique et la pesification ne signifie pas que l'économie argentine ait surmonté les obstacles structurels qui hypothèquent sa croissance depuis 1976. L'article s'achève par ...

It is argued that the conventional analysis of the 2001 Argentina crisis in terms of populist budgetary policies and institutional rigidities of labor market is not satisfactory. The 2001 collapse takes place within a long history, but it results from a quite specific factor: the structural unbalance within the accumulation regime implied by the convertibility and the complete opening to world trade and financial globalization. The shakiness of major institutional compromises and the lack of policy tools to respond to the vagaries of the world economy explain the 1998 turning point from growth to depression. The fast economic recovery observed since 2002, associated to the default of public debt and the pesification, does not mean that Argentina has definitely overcome the structural obstacles that have been hindering its growth since 1976. The likelihood and resilience of alternative development modes is finally discussed. It is difficult to overcome the logic of a primary product exporter country. Of course, its potential is larger in the 2000s, but this economic regime is not totally transformed by the expected medium term rise of commodities prices at the world level. ; On s'attache à montrer en premier lieu que l'interprétation de la crise argentine par le laxisme de la politique budgétaire et les rigidités institutionnelles du marché du travail n'est pas satisfaisante. La crise qui éclate en 2001 s'inscrit dans l'histoire longue argentine et manifeste l'incohérence du régime d'accumulation impliqué par le régime de convertibilité et l'ouverture commerciale et financière quasi-complète. Absence de compromis institutionnalisés stables et perte de la capacité à répondre aux aléas de l'économie mondiale expliquent la gravité de la dépression qui s'ouvre dès 1998. La vigoureuse reprise économique qui intervient après le défaut de la dette publique et la pesification ne signifie pas que l'économie argentine ait surmonté les obstacles structurels qui hypothèquent sa croissance depuis 1976. L'article s'achève par la discussion de la vraisemblance de divers modes de développement. Il apparaêt difficile d'échapper à la logique d'un régime primaire exportateur dont les perspectives sont certes renouvelées mais pas complètement transformées par la possibilité d'un renchérissement durable des produits agricoles à l'échelle mondiale.

It is argued that the conventional analysis of the 2001 Argentina crisis in terms of populist budgetary policies and institutional rigidities of labor market is not satisfactory. The 2001 collapse takes place within a long history, but it results from a quite specific factor: the structural unbalance within the accumulation regime implied by the convertibility and the complete opening to world trade and financial globalization. The shakiness of major institutional compromises and the lack of policy tools to respond to the vagaries of the world economy explain the 1998 turning point from growth to depression. The fast economic recovery observed since 2002, associated to the default of public debt and the pesification, does not mean that Argentina has definitely overcome the structural obstacles that have been hindering its growth since 1976. The likelihood and resilience of alternative development modes is finally discussed. It is difficult to overcome the logic of a primary product exporter country. Of course, its potential is larger in the 2000s, but this economic regime is not totally transformed by the expected medium term rise of commodities prices at the world level. ; On s'attache à montrer en premier lieu que l'interprétation de la crise argentine par le laxisme de la politique budgétaire et les rigidités institutionnelles du marché du travail n'est pas satisfaisante. La crise qui éclate en 2001 s'inscrit dans l'histoire longue argentine et manifeste l'incohérence du régime d'accumulation impliqué par le régime de convertibilité et l'ouverture commerciale et financière quasi-complète. Absence de compromis institutionnalisés stables et perte de la capacité à répondre aux aléas de l'économie mondiale expliquent la gravité de la dépression qui s'ouvre dès 1998. La vigoureuse reprise économique qui intervient après le défaut de la dette publique et la pesification ne signifie pas que l'économie argentine ait surmonté les obstacles structurels qui hypothèquent sa croissance depuis 1976. L'article s'achève par la discussion de la vraisemblance de divers modes de développement. Il apparaêt difficile d'échapper à la logique d'un régime primaire exportateur dont les perspectives sont certes renouvelées mais pas complètement transformées par la possibilité d'un renchérissement durable des produits agricoles à l'échelle mondiale.