International audience ; Direct democracy is often proposed as a possible solution to the 21st-century problems of democracy. However, this suggestion clashes with the size and complexity of 21st-century societies, entailing an excessive cognitive burden on voters, who would have to submit informed opinions on an excessive number of issues. In this paper I argue for the development of "voting avatars", autonomous agents debating and voting on behalf of each citizen. Theoretical research from artificial intelligence, and in particular multiagent systems and computational social choice, proposes 21st-century techniques for this purpose, from the compact representation of a voter's preferences and values, to the development of voting procedures for autonomous agents use only.
International audience ; Direct democracy is often proposed as a possible solution to the 21st-century problems of democracy. However, this suggestion clashes with the size and complexity of 21st-century societies, entailing an excessive cognitive burden on voters, who would have to submit informed opinions on an excessive number of issues. In this paper I argue for the development of "voting avatars", autonomous agents debating and voting on behalf of each citizen. Theoretical research from artificial intelligence, and in particular multiagent systems and computational social choice, proposes 21st-century techniques for this purpose, from the compact representation of a voter's preferences and values, to the development of voting procedures for autonomous agents use only.
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable preferences. This raises a challenge for welfare economics, which takes as a key postulate that individual preferences should be respected. We agree with Bernheim (2009) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009) that behavioral economics is compatible with consistency of partial preferences and that subjective welfare measures do not offer an attractive way out of the impasse. However, their analysis which rests on traditional concepts like Pareto optimality and compensation tests, is not adequate to introduce distributional considerations. We explore how partial preferences can be introduced in the recent theory of welfare that has developed from the theory of fair allocation. We revisit the key results of that theory in a framework with partial preferences and show how one can derive partial orderings of individual and social situations.
U ovome radu bavimo se pitanjem kako preferencije skupine individualaca spojiti u jednu preferenciju koja bi najbolje opisivala preferenciju društva. Na početku, u prvom poglavlju upoznajemo se s nekim od najpoznatijih načina glasovanja i problemima koji se javljaju prilikom primjene istih. U drugom poglavlju razmatramo funkciju društvenog blagostanja koja profile preferencije svih individualaca u društvu preslikava u jednu relaciju preferencije. Pokazujemo da kada postoje tri ili više alternative, ne postoji funkcija društvenog blagostanja koja zadovoljava određene uvjete. Zatim u trećem poglavlju se bavimo funkcijom društvenog izbora koja sve profile preferencije skupine individualaca preslikava u jednu alternativu, i to onu koja bi društvu bila najpoželjnija. Tu također pokazujemo da takva funkcija ne postoji u slučaju kada imamo tri ili više alternativa i određene uvjete koje bismo htjeli da funkcija zadovoljava. U četvrtom poglavlju, u obzir uzimamo i mogućnost manipulativnosti, odnosno gledamo što se događa ako individualci iskažu preferencije koje se razlikuju od njihovih stvarnih preferencija. Na kraju, u petom poglavlju razmatramo slučaj ponderiranog glasovanja, gdje svaki individualac na raspolaganju ima određen broj glasova koji mu je dodijeljen prema nekim pravilima te proučavamo dva načina na koja možemo odrediti koliku moć ima odredeni individualac u takvim sustavima glasovanja. ; In this thesis we deal with the question of how to aggregate preferences of a group of individuals into a single preference that would best describe preference of the society. At the beginning, in the first chapter we meet some of the most famous voting systems and problems encountered when applying them. In the second chapter, we consider the social welfare function which maps profile preferences of all individuals into one preference relation. We show that when there are three or more alternatives, there is no social welfare function that meets certain conditions. Then, in the third chapter, we're dealing with a social ...
International audience ; Social choice theory is the field of scientific inquiry that studies the aggregation of individual preferences toward a collective choice. For example, social choice theorists— who hail from a range of different disciplines, including mathematics, economics, and political science—are interested in the design and theoretical evaluation of voting rules. Questions of social choice have stimulated intellectual thought for centuries. Over time, the topic has fascinated many a great mind, from the Marquis de Condorcet and Pierre-Simon de Laplace, through Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland), to Nobel laureates such as Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Lloyd Shapley.
International audience ; Social choice theory is the field of scientific inquiry that studies the aggregation of individual preferences toward a collective choice. For example, social choice theorists— who hail from a range of different disciplines, including mathematics, economics, and political science—are interested in the design and theoretical evaluation of voting rules. Questions of social choice have stimulated intellectual thought for centuries. Over time, the topic has fascinated many a great mind, from the Marquis de Condorcet and Pierre-Simon de Laplace, through Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland), to Nobel laureates such as Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen, and Lloyd Shapley.
Das derzeitige Wahlsystem zum Deutschen Bundestag weist einen schwerwiegenden Defekt auf: Mehr Stimmen für eine Partei können dazu führen, dass diese weniger Sitze erhält - das sogenannte negative Stimmgewicht. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat den Bundestag aufgefordert, bis Ende Juni 2011 diesen Fehler durch eine Änderung des Wahlrechts zu beseitigen. Hierzu gibt es eine Vielzahl von Möglichkeiten. Dieser Artikel unternimmt den Versuch, mögliche Änderungen aus Sicht der Social Choice-Theorie zu beurteilen. Hierzu wird ein einfaches System von Bedingungen an Wahlen vorgestellt, anhand dessen die bisherigen Lösungsvorschläge systematisiert werden. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass es kein Wahlsystem geben kann, das gleichzeitig all diesen Bedingungen genügt. Dennoch lassen sich unter den existierenden Änderungsvorschlägen solche identifizieren, die mehr wünschenswerte Bedingungen erfüllen als andere.
International audience ; The article applies Social Choice theory to analyse new and so far undiscovered aspects of the Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and 1993. The article queries whether the amended Maastricht Treaty adopted in 1993 was, in fact, the most preferred alternative for a majority of Danish voters. A reconstruction of voter preferences regarding the political alternatives in the European Union — the Maastricht Treaty, the amended Maastricht Treaty and the Status Quo — reveals that the amended Maastricht Treaty, despite the fact that it was the Condorcet winner and won the 1993 referendum, may not have been preferred by a majority but was probably the most preferred alternative only for a minority of the electorate.
International audience ; This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 19381 "Application-Oriented Computational Social Choice". The seminar was organised around four focus topics: group recommender systems, fair allocation, electoral systems, and interactive democracy. For each topic, an invited survey was given by one of the participants. 26 participants presented their research in a regular talk, and two rump sessions allowed other participants to present their ongoing work and open problems in short talks. A special session was dedicated to software demonstrations, and 3 voting experiments were run during the seminar, also thanks to a mobile experimental laboratory that was brought to Dagstuhl. Finally, three afternoons were dedicated to group works.
International audience ; This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 19381 "Application-Oriented Computational Social Choice". The seminar was organised around four focus topics: group recommender systems, fair allocation, electoral systems, and interactive democracy. For each topic, an invited survey was given by one of the participants. 26 participants presented their research in a regular talk, and two rump sessions allowed other participants to present their ongoing work and open problems in short talks. A special session was dedicated to software demonstrations, and 3 voting experiments were run during the seminar, also thanks to a mobile experimental laboratory that was brought to Dagstuhl. Finally, three afternoons were dedicated to group works.
International audience ; This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 19381 "Application-Oriented Computational Social Choice". The seminar was organised around four focus topics: group recommender systems, fair allocation, electoral systems, and interactive democracy. For each topic, an invited survey was given by one of the participants. 26 participants presented their research in a regular talk, and two rump sessions allowed other participants to present their ongoing work and open problems in short talks. A special session was dedicated to software demonstrations, and 3 voting experiments were run during the seminar, also thanks to a mobile experimental laboratory that was brought to Dagstuhl. Finally, three afternoons were dedicated to group works.
International audience ; We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
International audience ; We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
International audience We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
These are the sheets of a presentation on June 8 2018, at the conference of Dutch and Flemish political science. These sheets give an overview, and see "Voting Theory for Democracy" (VTFD) for precision. Arrow's theorem is that four axioms would be reasonable and morally required each by themselves, but together they result into a contradiction. The deduction stands but the interpretation can be rejected. Arrow confuses voting and deciding. The axiom of "pairwise decision making" can be rejected - and Arrow's label "independence of irrelevant alternatives" is distractive. A method that many would find interesting is Borda Fixed Point. ; This is an update of the sheets of my presentation on March 16 2001 for the Social Choice group in Tilburg, The Politicologenetmaal 2018 has this link: https://politicologenetmaal.eu See Voting Theory for Democracy at https://zenodo.org/record/291985
