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Amartya Sen has recently suggested that certain issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen in terms of social choice. This article explores certain connections and tensions between Kenneth Arrow's celebrated discussion of social choice and the capability approach while focusing on one central link: pluralism. Given the variety of values people hold, substantive issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen as social choice problems. Seeing them in this way helps to explain some of Sen's suggestions about applying the approach in the light of an analogue of Arrow's theorem. However, it also poses a potential problem because of the focus on preferences in social choice theory, given that the capability approach is motivated in part by problems which `adaptive preferences' raise for `utility'-based views. In this article, it is argued that Sen's writings about public reasoning allow him to address this problem to some degree. The reading underlying this argument clarifies issues about the relationship between the individual and society in his approach. It also illuminates the extent of Sen's debt to John Rawls's writings on `public reason', while clarifying some points on which Sen and Rawls diverge.

Citation totals from the Social Science Citation Index, 1966-1988, are used to determine which of several books & articles have been cited often enough to be called "classic" in terms of their influence among "social choice" scholars. The term "social choice" is used broadly, to include not only works by K. J. Arrow & A. Sen, but also Duncan Black, Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson, William Niskanen, & others from modern "public choice." Specifically researched were books by J. Rawls, R. Farguahrson, P. Fishburn, R. Luce, H. Raiffa, & important articles by Ronald Coase, A. Gibbard, Ann Kruger, Sam Peltzman, Paul Samuelson, Mark Satterthwaite, George Stigler, Charles Tiebout, & Gordon Tullock. Some have received hundreds of cites over their lives, while others have received few. In 1987, these authors' works were collectively cited 1,189 times in 450+ different journals. The citation itself was quite eclectic, including, in addition to large numbers in the economics, political science, politics, & law literature, journals from business, environmental studies, health, international relations, philosophy, planning, psychology, public administration, science, sociology, interdisciplinary social science, & urban studies. 3 Tables, 28 References. AA

Since World War II a large literature has arisen that uses the methodology of economics to examine the behavior of governments and the actors in them. Some scholars refer to their research as public choice, some as social choice, and still others as political economy. This article discusses the distinctions among these three terms. It concludes that all of the research falling under these three headings has much in common, and that people who refer to their work as public choice or political economy are essentially employing identical methodologies. Contributions to public choice, narrowly defined, are more often positive and empirical analyses of government behavior than those in social choice, narrowly defined.

THIS PAPER CONTRASTS THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY AS THE AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES WITH THE DELIBERATIVE CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY AS A PROCESS OF OPEN DISCUSSION LEADING TO AN AGREED JUDGEMENT ON POLICY. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY HAS IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS--THE ARBITRARINESS OF DECISION RULES, VULNERABILITY TO STRATEGIC VOTING--WHICH ARE OFTEN HELD TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. CONTRARY TO COMMON OPINION, THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IS LESS VULNERABLE TO THESE DIFFICULTIES THAN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY. THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSION TENDS TO PRODUCE SETS OF POLICY PREFERENCES THAT ARE SINGLE PEAKED; AND WITHIN A DELIBERATE SETTING IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO VARY THE DECISION RULE ACCORDING TO THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE TO BE DECIDED.