Suchergebnisse

A review of books by John Bonner, Politics, Economics and Welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986); Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland [Eds], Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge U Press, 1986); & Michale Laver, Social Choice and Public Policy (Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986 [see listings in IRPS No. 43]). Bonner's work introduces the main elements of social choice theory to undergraduates, & presents the concepts of social welfare, utility, rationality, interpersonal comparisons, &, especially, the issue of deriving aggregate or collective welfare functions. Laver's work is also directed toward undergraduates, but its somewhat novel approach should give it a wider audience. The problem of collective action is at the core of the text. A framework for a general comparative discussion of policy outcomes in different systems is developed. The Elster & Hylland work is a collection of essays addressing substantive issues in social choice theory. F. Rasmussen

Many philosophers have regarded social choice theory as a technical discipline of limited relevance to substantive questions in moral & political philosophy. It is argued here, however, that it is concerned with questions of central philosophical importance, since it examines the consistency of various beliefs we may have about the desirable characteristics of philosophical theories about the good for society. Kenneth Arrow (Social Choice and Individual Values [see SA 13:5/64B6797]) showed that some apparently innocuous beliefs are inconsistent, & much of the subsequent literature has been concerned with finding ways out of the inconsistency. One fruitful way of doing so is to relax the requirement that theories be applicable to all conceivable combinations of individual preferences. Another is to accept the moral relevance of many aspects of society other than the welfare of individuals. Some of the literature has focused on rights, & has illuminated our understanding of the risk that the rights of different individuals may conflict. Social choice theory has been increasingly integrated into game theory. Recent developments in the field are noted, & suggestions offered regarding which topics will prove to be of philosophical significance in the future. Modified AA

Pluralist political theory identifies certain patterns of political preferences as promoting the "stability" of democratic political systems and others as threatening to such stability. Social choice theory likewise identifies certain patterns of political preferences as leading to "stability" in social choice under majority rule and related collective decision rules, and other patterns as leading to "unstable" social choice. But the preference patterns identified by pluralist theory as promoting stability are essentially those identified by social choice theory as entailing instability. Thus the notions of stability and the implicit normative criteria associated with the two theories are very close to being logically incompatible. This incompatibility suggests that the social choice ideal of collective rationality may not be one that we should endorse. Indeed, the generic instability of the pluralist political process and its consequent collective irrationality may contribute to the stability of pluralist political systems.

Constitutional scholars do not typically employ spatial reasoning in their work. And yet, constitutional jurisprudence and much work in judicial politics implicitly rest on assumptions best cast in spatial terms. These include assuming that positions in constitutional disputes, and the views of Supreme Court justices, generally lie along a common liberal-to-conservative ideological dimension. Although the single dimension assumption is often appropriate, it suffers inherent limitations. First, Supreme Court decision-making rules, both within and across cases, expose problems of dimensionality. Second, important substantive doctrines likewise reveal dimensionality. Third, and finally, throughout the Supreme Court's history, positions deemed liberal (or conservative) in one period have emerged as conservative (or liberal) in a later period, suggesting that dimensionality is a persistent feature in our jurisprudential history. Social choice proves uniquely suited to explaining these important aspects of constitutional law. After briefly introducing the discipline of constitutional law and its relationship to social choice, this article offers three illustrations of how social choice analysis deepens our understanding of important substantive areas. The analysis exposes dimensionality within Supreme Court decision-making rules, within separation-of-powers doctrine, and over historical shifts in the liberal and conservative valence of once-prominent jurisprudential positions. Failing to appreciate dimensionality, which lies at the core of social choice theory, when studying the Supreme Court and constitutional law risks a truly one-dimensional understanding of a richer and multidimensional institution and body of doctrine. Adapted from the source document.

The means used in an election system to evaluate alternative systems, that is, conditions on social choice functions, are examined. "A condition on a social choice function is an if-then statement which specifies that if a certain designated relationship exists then some particular alternative or alternatives are not in the social choice set." The conditions in the social choice literature are compiled & the relationships among these conditions are presented. Nearly all conditions are classified into three groups, & these are then subdivided. Among the types of conditions discussed are those referred to as ethical, aggregation, & rationality conditions, all of which are dealt with separately. Further research in the area is encouraged. 9 Figures. G. Simpson.

Optimal economic growth deals with the problem of how societies make tradeoffs between current & future consumption, or equivalently, how societies make decisions about investment rates. Social choice theorists have thrown doubt on the concept of societal utility function. Optimal growth is suggested to be a problem in social choice theory. Assuming that citizens have preferences over the various growth plans, under what conditions will a majority rule equilibrium exist? It is shown that such an equilibrium can exist for a Ramsey-type problem (Ramsey, F., "A Mathematical Theory of Saving," Economic Journal, 1928, 38, 543-559). 1 Figure. Modified HA.

Amartya Sen has recently suggested that certain issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen in terms of social choice. This article explores certain connections and tensions between Kenneth Arrow's celebrated discussion of social choice and the capability approach while focusing on one central link: pluralism. Given the variety of values people hold, substantive issues which arise in the application of the capability approach can be seen as social choice problems. Seeing them in this way helps to explain some of Sen's suggestions about applying the approach in the light of an analogue of Arrow's theorem. However, it also poses a potential problem because of the focus on preferences in social choice theory, given that the capability approach is motivated in part by problems which `adaptive preferences' raise for `utility'-based views. In this article, it is argued that Sen's writings about public reasoning allow him to address this problem to some degree. The reading underlying this argument clarifies issues about the relationship between the individual and society in his approach. It also illuminates the extent of Sen's debt to John Rawls's writings on `public reason', while clarifying some points on which Sen and Rawls diverge.